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1
 Introduction
Feminism is in trouble. Antagonisms, conflicts, and disputes abound in 
many liberal democratic countries around pop culture, neoliberalism, and 
postfeminism, around sex work and pornography (yes, still), around trans* 
politics, around race and postcolonialism. They seem to concentrate, with an 
ever- escalating force, around religion, in particular Islam. In many corners 
of Europe and North America, it has been not a small irony of history that 
women’s rights have been presented by right- wing movements as a new na-
tional treasure against which to judge immigrants’ claims to be included in 
the political community, and claims by Muslim citizens to equal treatment in 
the face of the perpetuation of racial exclusion and discrimination in Western 
postcolonial societies. Even if voices rising from within feminist movements 
have denounced hegemonic whiteness,1 racism, colonial aphasia,2 and 
Islamophobia when they are associated with feminist claims, they have 
remained, in many contexts, marginal and marginalized. For many, the col-
lusion of feminist ideals with right- wing populism and xenophobic political 
agendas puts in peril the future of feminism as a political utopia. The feminist 
collective project thus seems to be once again fragmented and disintegrated 
and in urgent need of reinventing itself.
The increasingly heated disputes about the place of Islam in liberal 
democracies may not be surprising, considering the broader geopolitical 
landscape that the liberal democracies in Europe and North America have 
inherited since the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11. Nationwide debates questioning 
the compatibility of Islam with European or “Western” culture and its con-
ception of secularism have focused on gender relations,3 and have there-
fore moved to the center of the feminist agenda. Veils, niqabs, forced and 
arranged marriages, polygamy and sharia rules concerning women have 
all been the object of intense public scrutiny and legal regulations in many 
Western countries since the 1990s, and these policy debates have split the 
women’s movements into various positions with regard to the status of gen-
dered symbols and gender relations associated with the practice of Islam.4 
With a particular intensity in Europe, the feminist concern about gender 
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inequalities in “minority cultures” has become closely intertwined with na-
tional anxieties about the boundaries of the political community, its het-
erogeneity, and the necessity to integrate groups perceived as embodying 
different cultural and religious values.5
Few European states have been left untouched by these political dynamics, 
which have led to the imposition of more restrictions on Islamic practices. 
Between 2003 and 2019, bans on forms of Islamic veiling (in public service, 
public schools, or public space) have been adopted in France, Germany, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
and Quebec, as well as in Italian and Spanish municipalities, and have 
been fiercely debated in Norway, Latvia, and Finland.6 Gender equality has 
suddenly gained a new visibility and a new status. In each country where 
these debates have emerged, gender equality has been presented as a na-
tional achievement, a Western cultural specificity, and a new norm, which 
determines who will be able to assimilate and what practices are or are not 
politically desirable. The concept of “femonationalism,” coined by Sara 
Farris, following the term “homonationalism,” forged by Jasbir Puar,7 refers 
to the ways in which political parties and government institutions have used 
women’s rights to bolster nationalist identities and pass repressive policies 
against immigrants and Islam.8 As Farris writes: “The mobilization, or rather 
instrumentalization, of the notion of women’s equality both by nationalist 
and xenophobic parties and by neoliberal governments constitutes one of the 
most important characteristics of the current political conjuncture, particu-
larly in Europe.”9
One should add that xenophobic parties and right- or left- wing 
governments are not the only players in this game. Indeed, women’s rights 
organizations themselves participate in this trend, whether fueling it or 
resisting it. While they do not have the power to shape public policies as 
political parties and governments do, they have appeared as experts and 
legitimating voices, in particular when they have stood side by side with 
power- holders.10 As gender equality has become associated with secu-
larism11 and anti- Islamic, xenophobic, and racist policies, feminism has 
been enrolled in nationalist projects12 and lost its critical edge in public dis-
course. While these debates have incentivized many feminist scholars to 
reflect on the articulation between colonialism, gender, race, and Islam in 
contemporary Europe,13 this perilous context asks for a renewed theoret-
ical feminist imagination that can dissociate feminism from nationalist and 
racist policies.
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Critical feminist work has been engaged in this task, documenting re-
sistance to these discourses by women and feminists of color,14 unveiling 
epistemic violence perpetrated in the name of feminism and ideologies of 
racelessness in Europe,15 and analyzing collusion between feminism and ne-
oliberal logics.16 I argue in this book that we also need to elaborate a feminist 
critique that can revive feminist imagination and that can put feminist ideals 
at work not to support nationalist and racist agendas but to dismantle them. 
To do so demands, I contend, we start from the experience and discourses 
of feminists engaged in these debates and, what is more, engaged in daily 
feminist work and activism. Indeed, despite numerous sophisticated anal-
yses of the ways in which these policy debates have rearticulated feminist 
public claims in the language of nationalism, anti- immigrant sentiment, and 
Islamophobia, we lack an account from the point of view of those who are 
primarily concerned with this political project and its future: activists who 
self- identify as feminists.17 Only if we understand their attachment to na-
tionalist and secular ideals, or on the contrary their ability to remain crit-
ical, can we envision a feminist project that will appeal to feminists’ political 
imagination.
So far, few studies have investigated the actual impact that these policy 
debates about the regulation of Islamic religious practices have had on fem-
inist movements, especially in European contexts. Few have documented 
how, beyond a set of limited public discourses made in the name of feminism 
by prominent public figures, feminist activists themselves have energetically 
participated on both sides— in favor of prohibition and in favor of accommo-
dation.18 Because we lack many narratives from feminist activists involved in 
Islamic veiling debates, we are still at pains to explain why these debates have 
triggered such powerful and opposite emotional reactions from feminists, 
and why these controversies have shattered feminist movements, creating 
new divisions, performing exclusions and nurturing long- lasting rancor, 
while in other contexts, feminist organizations have found ways to maintain 
coalitions. In other words, we are still missing an understanding of the ex-
tent to which these debates have empirically transformed a variety of femi-
nist subjectivities and have altered feminism as a normative political project. 
Why are Islamic veiling debates troubling feminism? What is the exact na-
ture of this trouble? How does this trouble engage us to rethink feminism?
Ultimately, the participation of feminist voices in these public debates that 
have crystalized around religion and race in Europe reflects controversies 
within feminism about what is true emancipation and who can be a feminist 
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subject. France is a case in point. Many French feminist organizations iden-
tifying with secularism have supported policies prohibiting forms of Islamic 
veiling, such as the 2010 ban on full veiling in public spaces, in the name of 
enforcing gender equality and protecting Muslim women from their patri-
archal religion and beliefs. The list of prohibitions begins with the ban on 
veiling in public schools in 2004, leading up to the most recent ban passed 
by municipalities against burkinis— the full- body covering used by devout 
Muslim women to swim on French beaches— in the summer of 2016, which 
was subsequently overturned in court. Still, as municipal decrees against 
burkinis were multiplying on French beaches, an open letter signed by a 
number of French feminists was published to encourage mayors from the 
cities in question to annul these bans.19 The petition pointed to the rampant 
Islamophobia in the French public sphere and society that these decrees re-
vealed and fueled, and to the incompatibility of these measures with a true 
conception of feminism. But its authors dramatically failed to obtain the 
support of the most important national French women’s organizations. The 
episode of the 2016 burkini controversy showed that questions of religious 
differences and postcolonialism remained highly divisive among French 
feminists. It proved that what is a true feminist politics— and a good feminist 
subject— in France is still the object of much controversy and contention.
Debates about Islamic veiling have therefore struck at the heart of the desir-
able definitions of the feminist subject— of the emancipated proper feminist 
subject. As European feminists have fought over if and how Muslim veiled 
women should be considered emancipated and potential feminist subjects, 
or instead as subjects to be educated by or excluded from the feminist pro-
ject, their debates have exposed the limits of the Western, dominant strand 
of feminism as profoundly liberal and, despite protests to the contrary, exclu-
sive of female subjectivities that do not suit the liberal political and moral im-
aginary.20 These debates waged in the name of feminism have also revealed 
the perpetuating equation between liberalism and whiteness that suffuses 
many feminist discourses. As authors of the petition against the 2016 anti- 
burkini French laws have contended, using the language of postcolonialism, 
racism, and feminism to analyze the political issues at stake, the language 
of feminism can become the vehicle for racist policies that delegitimize the 
public presence of nonwhite bodies.21 Hence, debates about Islamic veiling 
have fueled a critical theoretical discussion within feminism on the meaning 
of agency and autonomy, on the relationship between subjectivity and sub-
jection, that has called into question basic premises of (liberal) feminism. In 
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doing so, these debates seem to have imperiled feminism as a modern polit-
ical project of emancipation.22 For this reason, Islamic veiling debates cast a 
much larger shadow on feminism as a political project of emancipation than 
have previous debates over “differences” within feminism.
Feminist Agency in Postsecular Times
What type of challenge do female pious religious identities and subjectivities 
pose for feminism? And why do they do so? As Rosi Braidotti aptly put 
it:  “The postsecular turn challenges European feminism because it makes 
manifest the notion that agency, or political subjectivity, can actually be 
conveyed through and supported by religious piety, and may even involve 
significant amounts of spirituality.”23 Feminist theory has been preoccu-
pied for several decades with the identity/ freedom paradox, as Allison Weir 
recaptures it, that is, the paradox that what makes us subjects, our social 
identities, is also what subjects us. Identities are “both sources and ends of 
freedom, and identities are the shackles that imprison us.”24 However, the 
postsecular context offers a new paradox and challenge, not so much one that 
is preoccupied with how identities might foster or restrain freedom, as one 
that questions the value and meaning of freedom per se, and for feminism in 
particular.
In this context, religious women’s agency has become a focal point of in-
terest for feminist theorists, and a growing literature has explored and com-
plicated feminist understandings of agency and freedom.25 Various strands 
of feminist theory— liberal, multiculturalist, and postcolonial— have strug-
gled with the challenge of reconceptualizing women’s autonomy in a way that 
can account for practices, emotions, and desires that fall outside the scope 
of the Western liberal conception of autonomy. While liberal feminists such 
as Marylin Friedman propose a minimalist conception of autonomy, one in 
which the procedures through which women reach a decision— rather than 
the substantive content of this decision— matter in determining individual 
moral autonomy,26 multiculturalist feminists such as Monique Deveaux and 
Anne Phillips also insist on the deliberative procedures within cultural and 
religious communities that can ensure that women are participants in the 
decisions that concern them.27 Postcolonial feminist Uma Narayan shares 
the concern of multiculturalist feminists to avoid the twin pitfalls of eth-
nocentricity and cultural relativism in judging religious women’s agency, 
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and argues that the only proper way to describe both religious and Western 
women’s relationship to patriarchy is the concept of bargaining with internal 
and external constraints shaped by political, economic, and moral factors.28
These various redefinitions of agency remain, however, within the scope 
of the traditional liberal feminist conception of subjectivity and freedom— 
albeit at its margins. Indeed, while their efforts to pluralize conceptions of 
freedom and autonomy in order to recuperate religious subjects within the 
feminist project are important, they fall short of accounting for desires other 
than the desire for freedom, and therefore of accurately describing the ethical 
dispositions of religious women.
In contrast, studies of female religious agency have tried to disentangle 
the deep relationship between Western feminism and its biased conception 
of agency as subversion, its conception of freedom, and its enduring eth-
nocentrism. Drawing on her fieldwork with pious Muslim women partici-
pating in the mosque movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood takes on this very 
task in order to propose an alternative to the feminist conception of agency 
and freedom. She notes, with others,29 that dominant conceptions of femi-
nist agency always associate it with individual political and moral autonomy, 
with a desire for freedom and the subsequent subversion of norms rather 
than their acceptation. She argues that this dominant conception of agency 
imposes on conservative and religious women who decide to abide by norms 
perceived as oppressive by Western women a gaze that constructs them as 
eternal and absolute victims, victims of false consciousness or complicit with 
their oppression.
To “speak back” to these liberal- secular assumptions,30 Mahmood proposes 
to reformulate the concept of agency via a focus on ethical dispositions. 
Indeed, mobilizing Judith Butler’s definition of agency, which locates agency 
within structures of power rather than in the individual subject, Mahmood 
suggests that agency can be traced not only, as she claims Butler argues, in 
practices of resignification and subversion of gendered norms, but also in the 
way one inhabits and experiences these norms. Here Mahmood departs from 
a strictly political account of agency and power to turn to the process of eth-
ical formation and modes of subjectivation. She departs from the association 
of agency with resistance to domination while she also displaces the location 
of agency from the self to a nexus of social relations that permeate and shape 
the self. Doing so, Mahmood radically decouples agency from its (liberal) 
feminist roots in individual moral and political autonomy and resistance to 
oppression. Following Foucault’s insight that ethics is a positive modality 
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of power, Mahmood interprets the processes of ethical formation to which 
women participating in the mosque movement are subjected— through 
authoritative discursive traditions interpreting religious norms, conduct, 
and imperatives— as processes that create forms of ethical agency, which 
are tightly interwoven with political agency in that ethical agency enables, 
for instance, the political actions of the mosque movement. Expanding the 
realm of ethical agency to moral actions such as submission to God, docility, 
and humility, Mahmood asserts that ethical agency “does not belong to the 
women themselves, but is a product of the historically contingent discursive 
traditions in which they are located.”31 She effectively breaks with the dom-
inant liberal feminist conception of autonomy and emancipation, as agency 
can mean chosen submission to God, inhabiting conservative gender norms 
and engaging, through reading and other religious interpretative practices, 
in a self- fashioning as a devout Muslim.
The literature on religious agency has unveiled implicit liberal beliefs at 
the heart of feminism, but this critique has left us with some degree of polit-
ical powerlessness: Mahmood’s careful theoretical and anthropological ac-
count of the formation of the ethical agency of women participating in the 
mosque movement32 leads her to argue that “the question of how the hierar-
chical system of gender relations that the mosque movement upholds should 
be practically transformed is, on the one hand, impossible to answer and, on 
the other hand, not ours to ask.”33 Her work has struck at the heart of both the 
moral individual subject of feminism and the viability of the collective polit-
ical subject of feminism, but has not provided many indications about which 
routes we might want to explore to reclaim this project.34 If one can agree 
with Mahmood’s warning that the feminist notion of agency should be crit-
ically scrutinized in order to avoid the pitfall of global sisterhood, and agree 
that there is some analytical payoff in her choice to decouple the notion of 
agency from progressive politics, her position raises a thorny issue for femi-
nist politics and theory.35 Her critical reappraisal of agency implies that one 
should shy away from the temptation to elaborate a collective feminist imag-
ination and avoid thinking through modalities of solidarities across different 
contexts and subjectivities (liberal and nonliberal). From this perspective, 
both the transnational feminist imagination some have called for36 and the 
very possibility of feminist coalitions across religious identities in Western 
countries seem impossible to achieve, even undesirable to pursue.
Speaking back to liberal feminist assumptions from the vantage point of 
ethical religious agency, Mahmood therefore leaves us with a major question 
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regarding our feminist beliefs— what do we mean when we as feminists say 
that gender equality is the central principle of our analysis and politics? or 
in other words, can a feminist project exist without liberal and therefore ex-
clusive premises?— and a very modest proposal to address it. While she does 
not abandon a critical stance toward practices we find unjust, she suggests 
that we should be open to the possibility of having our political and analyt-
ical certainties “transformed in the process.”37 I wish to take on this task— 
suggested but not carried out by Mahmood— following some of her insights 
but also displacing the question. Indeed, while Mahmood’s anthropological 
account expands the meaning of agency and reveals both the complexity of 
nonliberal ethical practices of self- fashioning and how they differ from what 
has been considered as feminist agency, feminism, as a normative political 
project, also demands that we engage with the moral and political questions 
raised by these differences. At this critical juncture, we have to thus ask our-
selves: Does Mahmood’s understanding of agency provide us with a new and 
more inclusive agenda for feminism? This was, after all, the question that fem-
inist theorization of agency meant to address in the first place. Framed in the 
terms posed by Mahmood, the breadth of the challenge to liberal feminism 
as a political project is daunting, and an indication that, indeed, questions re-
garding religious difference appear today as different as can be from previous 
questions of differences with which feminist theory and practices have strug-
gled before.38 If autonomy or equality, understood in their liberal sense, are 
performing inacceptable exclusions of nonliberal subjects from the feminist 
project, then what is the future of feminism? For those unhappy with liberal 
feminism— not only because its conception of ethical agency is restrictive 
and inadequate but also because its politics perpetuates exclusions— what is 
the alternative?
Beyond the Religious Agency Debate: Exploring 
Feminists’ Political Subjectivations
I argue that our theoretical energy must not be consumed by attempts to re-
define agency as a way to salvage the feminist project. We do not need to 
engage in debates about what counts as autonomous behavior or free action 
in order to address questions such as Islamic veiling, or more broadly to ad-
dress the question posed by Mahmood about the possibility of feminism 
beyond its roots in liberal visions of emancipation. Indeed, what we need 
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is an understanding of how hierarchies between feminist subjects, through 
discourses about agency and emancipation, are created and sustained, and 
a normative proposal to undo them. Theoretical conceptions of agency and 
freedom are only a part of the story of femonationalism and Islamic veiling 
debates. As I will argue, we need to focus our analytical energy on our moral 
and political attachments to these conceptions, which are rooted in hierar-
chies and power and which should be the focus of our critical inquiry.
While accounts of “solidarity” and gender equality imposed by Western 
feminists and international organizations from the top down have pro-
vided us with cautionary tales, in Europe and other Western countries the 
possibility of elaborating a feminist project that cuts across racial and reli-
gious differences is a matter of political survival for feminism itself, because 
it is about finding and building what we have in common. I argue that in 
order to go beyond the negativity of critique,39 we must redirect our inquiry. 
Rather than focus on those who have been labeled as “improper” feminist 
subjects— illiberal or not- liberal- enough devout women supposedly impos-
sible to theoretically or morally accommodate within the (liberal) feminist 
project— I argue that a productive way to think about feminism is to look 
at how feminists themselves grapple with the recurrent crises and conflicts 
over racial and religious differences, and to explore their moral and political 
agency. If we are looking for an understanding of the current feminist predic-
ament, then shouldn’t we explore how self- defined feminists address these 
issues, the limits they erect, and the alliances they imagine? We must ask 
them and ourselves, to paraphrase Mahmood, “What do they (and we) mean 
when they/ we say gender equality is, or isn’t, the central principle of their 
(our) analysis and politics?” We must take seriously their moral dispositions 
and scrutinize their modes of political subjectivation as liberal, or radical, or 
socialist, or intersectional, or Black, or Afro, or Muslim feminists.
Beyond the theoretical grammar of liberal feminism, many feminist 
practices address the challenge that perceived illiberal religious practices pose 
to feminism, and thereby trace the contours of feminist praxis that might well 
define feminism outside, or at the margins of, the liberal grammar. What is 
more, many feminists are also well aware of how the liberal grammar of fem-
inism reproduces exclusions and hierarchies between feminist subjects. As 
gender equality has become heralded by conservative pundits as a new fun-
damental value, and as Western feminists and their organizations struggle 
to find common denominators and elaborate positions in recurring disputes 
over sharia law, arranged marriages, or veiling practices, we must investigate 
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their (and our own) ethical dispositions, in order to reconceptualize both the 
values at the center of this political project and our and their relationship to 
these values. Hence, I suggest a practical and normative investigation into 
the ethical dispositions of feminism and feminists.
As I will develop, this is not an instance of an ethical turn away from pol-
itics. Like many, I conceive of ethics as intimately articulated with politics, 
in particular when scrutinizing feminist ethics.40 Indeed, what I propose to 
explore is how feminist ethical dispositions sustain— or undermine— the 
political community that is feminism. Mine is not a call to disregard power 
within feminism, but rather to examine how power shapes feminists’ ethical 
dispositions and, thereby, the orientation of the future of the feminist project. 
Power shapes relations, those very relations that sustain the feminist project 
in its various instantiations, and thus also shape the distribution of responsi-
bility among feminists, an important political issue. I contend that exploring 
the various modes of subjectivation that inform feminist commitments, 
conflicts, and desires offers new insights on the ways in which hierarchies of 
power might be rejected, and differences included, within a feminist political 
project.
What can the moral and political subjectivation of feminists tell us about 
the future of their political project? Exploring the moral dispositions formed 
by a diverse array of feminists in different contexts provides an access point 
to understand the conflicts that characterize the political project they claim 
to embody and to make happen. Why do some white and racialized feminists 
react in such potent emotional ways to the issue of Islamic veiling, while 
others do not? What values seem to be at stake for some white feminists that 
make coalitions with Muslim or Afro- feminists impossible to imagine? On 
the contrary, how do some practices of inclusion emerge in other contexts, 
practices that challenge the whiteness of the feminist movement and provide 
a political and moral vocabulary to prevent exclusions along the lines of race 
or religion? How are we to understand the resentment that some racialized 
feminists express and their strategy to resist the hegemony of whiteness 
within feminism?
I argue that only by understanding why feminists do what they do can 
we begin to explore the ways in which practices and norms can be carefully 
reimagined to build bridges, to bring transformative political change, and 
to experience a freedom to transform the world and be transformed in the 
process. To do so, we must examine the moral dispositions that feminists 
from various strands adhere to and develop, and we must explore how they 
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respond to the political and moral challenges they identify. Only then may we 
understand what is at stake— politically and morally— what is being lost, and 
what might be found.
Feminism as a Moral and Political Project
Feminist Trouble offers such an account by focusing on the moral and polit-
ical dimensions of the feminist project, and on its articulation with feminist 
politics. Indeed, feminism presents itself as a political project: a project that 
creates a political community that shares political ideals and goals. However, 
how feminists define the content of those goals— equality, emancipation, 
freedom— varies. For some, veiling practices and religious beliefs impede 
female autonomy, and gender equality requires banning Islamic veiling 
practices, and for others, on the contrary, true feminism implies accommo-
dating these practices and granting agency to pious Muslim women. The 
political community that feminism creates is therefore divided by conflicts 
over what these values mean, and which value must take precedence over the 
others.
Conflicts about good and bad feminist subjects, about the type of political 
community feminism is about, are not new. The history of feminism abounds 
with episodes of feminist troubles. These have included conflicts over the 
importance and political significance of race,41 class, sexuality,42 attitudes 
toward pleasure,43 sex work, and the definition of femininity heralded by 
popular culture.44 While these conflicts are expressed and explained as po-
litical disputes, the claim I make in this book is that they also entail a moral 
appeal. The trouble within and with feminism is not only a political conflict 
about the feminist project and its future— that is, a conflict over the content 
of shared values such as equality, agency, or emancipation— but also a moral 
one, that is, a crisis that calls into question the feminist subject as an ethical, 
moral subject. Indeed, feminism must be understood as not only a polit-
ical project of social transformation, but also a promise that feminists make 
to build the world in a certain way. Feminists are emotionally invested in 
their own promise, and their promise creates moral and political relations 
with others: a promise is always made to someone. As feminists, we make 
promises first and foremost to other feminists, promises to share a vision, 
promises to act together and in a common name, that of feminism. The re-
lations our feminist commitment creates are not only political— sharing a 
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vision for social transformation, sharing a critique of power relations— they 
are also moral: keeping a promise made to each other. Hence, moral relations 
are at the heart of the collective feminist project. They define who is to partic-
ipate and how feminists engage with each other.
Teresa de Lauretis captured this dimension, calling it the ethical drive 
within feminism, a drive toward community and accountability.45 It is no 
surprise, then, why Islamic veiling debates have elicited such affective and 
disturbing responses. They have revolved around figures of desirable or ab-
ject feminist subjects, discussing the moral dispositions that pious Muslim 
women should display if they are to be incorporated in a project of emanci-
pation that pretends to be universal but nonetheless rests upon what Judith 
Butler has termed “excluded domains.”46 By discursively casting out or 
recuperating pious Muslim women in the feminist project, feminists create 
specific moral bonds— or enact abandonment— with them. Hence, the un-
derlying question that haunts Islamic veiling debates is that of the nature of 
the moral bonds feminism can and should create, across racial hierarchies 
and in the context of rising racism and Islamophobia, if it is to live up to its 
own promise of inclusion and community. Because feminism is not only a 
political horizon that feminists wish to see realized, but also implies a moral 
subject we wish to embody ourselves, as feminists, and that we want to see 
others adopt and personify as well, it is a deeply moral project that defines 
moral relations between us, actual or potential feminist subjects.
To understand how the current crisis is reconfiguring the feminist project 
and producing new— and reproducing old— feminist subjects, we therefore 
need to analyze jointly the various dimensions of these feminist disputes— 
political, affective, and moral— and their reciprocal relations. To explore 
feminism as a moral and political project means that we must be attentive to 
the connection between feminist morals and politics. Indeed, understanding 
feminism as a moral project, and thus turning our attention to feminists’ 
ethical responsibilities, is not a turn away from politics and from a critical 
focus on power relations within feminism and among feminist subjects, as 
some would argue.47 Relational conceptions of ethics stress how our be-
coming a subject is enmeshed with our encounter with and dependence on 
the Other,48 and they therefore interrogate our responsibilities toward dis-
tant and concrete others. Understanding feminism as a moral project entails 
asking the question of feminist responsibility:  to whom are feminists ac-
countable? What types of hierarchies distribute responsibilities and power 
among feminists? These are highly political questions. They ask what type of 
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political community feminism is, and they interrogate the social and polit-
ical conditions for the moral responsiveness of feminists. How are vulnera-
bility and privilege distributed among feminists, with what consequences for 
feminism as a moral project?
A first way to capture this connection between ethics and politics is 
to keep in our analysis the political and social context in which moral 
arguments are made.49 Joan Tronto reminds us that we must recognize that 
“all moral arguments are made in a political context, and feminists ignore 
the political setting of their moral arguments at their peril.”50 Indeed, moral 
arguments about “good” and “bad” feminist subjects are deeply embedded 
in specific political contexts, marked in Europe and beyond by rising 
Islamophobia, heightened racism, and xenophobia. What is more, feminist 
moral arguments about who can be part of the feminist project have obvious 
political consequences for the racialized women they discursively include 
as equals or, on the contrary, regulate as improper subjects, as well as polit-
ical consequences for white feminists whose privilege they may contribute to 
securing or to dismantling. Feminist involvements and attachments to op-
posing sides of the current moral debates on the good feminist subject there-
fore produce contrasting political consequences for feminist movements and 
beyond for democratic politics. Feminist Trouble thus explores in depth the 
social and political context in which moral arguments about who can be a 
“good” feminist subject are being made, to identify those relations of power 
that shape asymmetries within feminism.
Another way to analyze the connection between feminist morals and pol-
itics is to acknowledge that feminist politics implies and is based on moral 
relations. To cite again Joan Tronto, “No feminist theory that cannot address 
questions of distance and of otherness will be adequate.”51 That is to say, 
under any type of feminist politics and discourse lies a moral address toward 
distant or concrete others. We must therefore ask how feminists relate mor-
ally to others, especially feminist others. Ethics here is not opposed to politics 
but articulated with it: to think about ethical responsibilities among feminists 
is to think about the boundaries of the political community that feminism 
creates, and about the hierarchies that structure it. There is an underlying 
current of disagreements running through the debates about Islamic veiling 
that has to do with how feminists propose to treat distant or proximate 
others. When reasoning about the reasons to ban or accommodate, for ex-
ample, Islamic headscarves, whose situation and welfare are put at the center 
of our attention and care? While many white feminists voice their concern 
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or care for other women, these are often distant others, abstract figures who 
secure white feminists’ privilege to universalize their experiences as women 
and define who may be considered a “good” or a “bad” feminist subject. If 
caring is to be equated with treating the other well, it must be grounded in 
a concrete relationship. Following Tronto’s proposal of an ethic of care, we 
must be attentive to the ways in which we pretend to care when others are 
distant, and how we actually care when they are close.
To analyze feminism as a political and a moral project, Feminist Trouble 
describes and analyzes the moral dispositions displayed by a variety of 
feminists in order to map how these moral dispositions sustain forms of fem-
inist politics and include or exclude other feminist subjects. Feminist Trouble 
also engages in a normative endeavor, that of defining the contours and 
content of what I call a feminist ethic of responsibility; that is, a set of moral 
dispositions that, I argue, can foster and sustain equal relations within the 
feminist project, and help to dismantle hierarchies of privilege, especially 
those based on race and religion. The normative endeavor proposed in this 
book is not an abstract one: it is grounded in the social and power relations 
that shape feminist communities. This endeavor is not about solving the 
crisis of the feminist subject or about reconciling differences. This would 
be an impossible and undesirable task since, as Teresa de Lauretis argues, 
feminism’s essential difference lies in the paradoxes and contradictions of its 
history and thought.52 There will always be trouble within and with femi-
nism. The normative endeavor that Feminist Trouble proposes is rather about 
rearticulating politics and morals; it is about redeploying feminist imagina-
tion in new directions, and thinking through what is a feminist responsibility 
to others— especially fellow feminists— that recognizes privilege and power, 
with the aim of dismantling hierarchies.
Critical Feminist Theory and Ethics of Care
To achieve its normative ambition, Feminist Trouble situates itself in the tra-
dition of critical theory, following which normative inquiry must emerge 
from a sociologically realist analysis of power.53 However, feminism is not 
only about power; it is also, as this book argues, about care and moral re-
lations. Hence Feminist Trouble also draws on a rich tradition of ethics and 
philosophical inquiries of care, which are also empirically grounded in 
experiences and also explore subjective emotions as important clues about 
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the moral nature of relations and about the forms of responsibility— which 
can be both moral and political— they entail. This book argues that only if 
we can capture the concrete and lived meanings that the troubles I document 
have for feminists can we understand the impact they have had on feminism 
as a political project, and how they may imperil its future or open new venues 
for activism. Feminist Trouble is a normative reflection on existing feminist 
practices, looking for those “possibilities glimmering” in actual experiences, 
as Iris Young suggests, and being attentive to feelings of dissatisfaction that 
orient us toward normative principles.54 Hence, in this book, I  approach 
feminism both as a collective political project— with its historical and soci-
ological thickness— that triggers tremendous emotional responses from its 
participants,55 and as an individual process of political subjectivation, which 
involves emotions and moral dispositions, and which I capture through em-
pirical fieldwork with feminist activists. As Didier Fassin reminds us, “The 
boundaries between the moral or the ethical and the political are empirically 
more confused than what one usually believes.”56 Feminist Trouble proposes 
an empirical and contextual investigation of how feminists’ political 
subjectivations are shaped, and how they might be transformed. Through 
an investigation of how Islamic veiling debates have transformed feminist 
coalitions and feminists’ political subjectivities, Feminist Trouble traces how 
postcolonial racial relations of privilege and disadvantage shape feminist 
discourses, regulating their subjects and the political projects they aspire to 
realize, as well as the moral relations they wish to forge with other feminist 
subjects.
While the focus of Feminist Trouble is on feminist movements and the 
feminist project, the approach it proposes could be extended to other eman-
cipatory identity/ postidentity movements that are also structured by re-
lations of relative privilege and disadvantage. Indeed, the question of how 
to resist the sirens of nationalism in populist times— how to forge a polit-
ical project of emancipation that does not use tropes that can be recuper-
ated for xenophobic agendas— cuts across the field of contemporary social 
justice movements. The development, and critique of, homonationalism is a 
likely candidate for such a task. As feminist and queer movements struggle 
in many contexts to put into practice their ideological commitment to 
intersectionality,57 conceiving these social justice projects as embedded in 
political and moral relations among their members may help decipher and 
counter dynamics of exclusion and inclusion along lines of race, sexuality, 
disability, age, or religion.
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Researching feminism and feminist subjectivities is a tricky methodo-
logical exercise. Indeed, the boundaries of “the” feminist “movement” are 
famously hard to draw. To borrow Jo Reger’s metaphor, feminism is “every-
where and nowhere” at the same time,58 and it is also often difficult to neatly 
separate women’s movements from feminist movements.59 Delimiting who 
belongs and who can legitimately be recognized as such is an exercise in cat-
egorization, and therefore power. Conflicts over who rightly belongs to this 
category and can embody the “good” feminist subject remind us that the 
category is highly politically and morally charged. My focus on feminists’ 
discourses and experiences in the context of feminist conflicts along lines 
of religious, racial, and immigrant identities has determined the methodo-
logical design of the study. Because I wanted to capture feminists’ political 
subjectivations, I  selected interviewees in two national contexts, France 
and Quebec, working in organizations or groups that self- identified as fem-
inist, and interviewed fifty individuals, both feminists who self- identified as 
racialized feminists (twenty), and feminists who did not identify racially and 
were predominantly white (thirty).60 These activists perform their commit-
ment to feminism in their day- to- day activities, and are immersed in fem-
inist organizations, which shape their worldviews, their identities, and the 
politics of everyday life that comes with their “becoming” a feminist.61 As 
I detail in the next chapter, I use the concept of political subjectivation to cap-
ture both the shaping of one’s political identity and its inherent moral dimen-
sion, in particular as it plays out in the concrete confrontation or encounter 
with differences within the movement. It was thus important to interview 
feminists who were active members— volunteers, officers, and employees— 
in more or less organized settings.
Through this fieldwork, my goal was to shed light on, and identify, pro-
cesses of political subjectivation in order to describe and analyze forms of 
attachment to the feminist project, attachments that are emotionally and 
morally invested. These attachments and forms of political subjectivation 
are historical ones, shaped by a specific social context, as well as by my own 
positionality. Feminist epistemologies have taught us to carefully assess our 
own positionality when making knowledge claims and that there is no “out-
side” position to which we can abstract ourselves from the world we ana-
lyze.62 I argue that our positionality also entails a moral dimension: the moral 
position that the theorist or sociologist occupies implies that she engages, in 
different modes, with the moral issues at stake for those she encounters in the 
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field.63 Because the values that underpin the feminist project are inextricably 
political and moral, and the relations we, as feminists, want to create with 
other feminists are at the heart of this project, as a feminist scholar studying 
the moral and political project that is feminism, I cannot not attempt to pro-
pose ways in which, as a feminist, I should be accountable to other feminists. 
I must respond to the claims being made about feminism; to do otherwise 
would be to renounce the idea that I share a common political space and 
a common form of life with the feminists I have engaged with during my 
fieldwork.
The method and approach I propose in this book, as well as my stand-
point as a feminist, are thus shaped by my disciplinary trajectory within 
academia, my feminist encounters in the field as an academic and as an ac-
tivist, and of course my social positioning as a white, privileged academic 
in the global North. This positioning has given me many resources with 
which to carry on my research and thinking. It has also led me to many 
migrations between France, the United States, and Canada/ Quebec that 
have influenced me as much as my point of departure. However, my stand-
point remains always partial and limited, and I am indebted to the many 
feminists I  interviewed for their insights and their agreement to my bor-
rowing from their variegated experiences to gain a deeper knowledge of the 
issues at stake and to decenter my gaze. In return, as Joan Tronto suggests, 
I offer to place their perspectives, interests, and concerns as “a more cen-
tral concern than the starting point from which (I) otherwise might have 
begun.”64 Nevertheless, I have been keenly aware of the risk of not being able 
to convey the complexity of the reasonings, moral issues, and emotional 
charges I have encountered and experienced. The feminist literature on care 
was a helpful guide in taking on the daunting task of describing in adequate 
terms what the reality has felt like.65 Hence, the standpoint from which this 
book has been written is also a moral one, that of my own moral relationship 
to feminism and to other feminists. Both aspects, my positionality and my 
own moral standpoint, limit my possible perception and understanding of 
the subjective positions of others, especially those less privileged.66 But both 
aspects also constitute the inescapable ground upon which I can pretend to 
give meaning to my own experience as a feminist attached to the collective 
feminist project, a feminist that feels uncertain about the viability of this 
project, and who wishes to respond to the moral and political claims laid 
upon her by fellow feminists.
18 Feminist Trouble
Outline of the Book
In the next chapter, I  introduce the theoretical framework I  use to ana-
lyze feminism as a moral and a political project, with a focus on what I call 
feminists’ political subjectivations. To understand current feminist theoret-
ical and political debates about Islamic veiling, it is important to first situate 
them within a broader theoretical history of feminist theory’s engagement 
with the question of “difference.” I argue that theorizing feminism is often 
an effort to theorize differences between feminists. Reflecting on this polit-
ical and moral urge to theorize difference, I argue that feminist debates on 
Islamic veiling, with their ambition to define proper and improper feminist 
subjects, and to rethink and critique core moral and political values of the 
feminist project, bring a renewed attention to its moral dimension. To make 
sense of the deeply moral nature of these feminist debates and the challenge 
they pose to feminist theory, I focus on feminists’ political subjectivations. 
Indeed, I argue that the theoretical focus on pious Muslim women’s agency, as 
the site of tension and challenge to the feminist project, diverts our gaze from 
feminist political subjectivations and how they shape feminists’ responses to 
Islamic veiling debates. If we are to reimagine feminism, I argue, feminists’ 
political subjectivation is a good place from which to start investigating what 
type of moral dispositions sustain feminism as a moral and political project 
of equal relations. To do so I draw on a genealogy of intersectionality theory 
that has been interested in exploring how emotions, affects, and moral 
dispositions shape identities and relations among feminists.
Chapter 3 maps the politics of intersectionality with respect to race and re-
ligion in feminist movements in two contexts, France and Quebec, that pre-
sent striking features and therefore opportunities to investigate the effects of 
Islamic veiling debates on feminist movements and their ability to remain 
critical in the face of rising femonationalism. The chapter retraces the head-
scarf debates and how feminist organizations and public voices engaged in 
them on both sides of the Atlantic. While these histories are specific to each 
context, they certainly echo the political dynamics that played out in other 
liberal democracies, especially in Europe. This chapter draws the contours 
of feminist activism in each country and underlines the variety of positions, 
conflicts, and coalitions that these debates sparked. It also argues that inter-
sectional conflicts over race and over respect to religion, specifically Islam, 
both overlap and differ, and that we must be attentive to these differences if 
we are to understand the complexity of intersectionality in both contexts.67 
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The chapter thus provides the reader with the historical and sociological 
context of feminist activism and its transformation in the wake of a rising 
femonationalism. In particular, I demonstrate why intersectional coalitions 
and discourses in the context of heated debates over secularism and hijab 
and niqab proved possible in Quebec while they failed in France. Hence 
the chapter focuses on a crucial issue for feminist scholars and scholars of 
social movements, exploring how some feminist coalitions managed to re-
main inclusive and critical of femonationalist discourses, while others have 
not resisted this new hegemonic discourse. This chapter thus sets the stage 
for the next two chapters, which further explore how feminists’ political 
subjectivations have been transformed by Islamic veiling debates.
Chapter 4 focuses on feminist whiteness, a concept the chapter introduces 
and defines as the product of a process of political subjectivation as a white 
feminist. The concept captures the various repertoires that white feminists 
elaborate to talk about— or rather actively ignore68— race relations of power 
and their own privileged positions in this racial order. Chapter 4 documents 
how whiteness informs white feminists’ political subjectivation as feminists, 
and how it has changed over time. It traces how white feminists are consti-
tuted as political subjects through their relationship to nonwhite feminists, 
and to those whom they perceive and label as “bad” feminist subjects. 
Tracing the construction of feminist whiteness means documenting how fem-
inism is made white, how it marks nonwhite feminist subjects as others, as 
racialized and improper subjects to be excluded from the feminist collective 
project. This chapter shows that debates on Islamic veiling have effected a 
shift in feminist whiteness, from feminist whiteness as ignorance to feminist 
whiteness as active participation in national identity and femonationalist 
discourses.
While it charts a general evolution in feminist whiteness,  chapter 4 also 
shows that feminist whiteness is multiple and varies across contexts. In 
France and Quebec, white feminists use different repertoires to address race 
and racism. Some work around or evade race, while others recognize its po-
litical salience. These different repertoires therefore point to different ways in 
(and extents to) which feminism is made white and the location of white fem-
inist privilege is made invisible or acknowledged. The chapter introduces a 
distinction between feminist practice as a social project— that of responding 
to the need of vulnerable, “othered” women— and feminism as a political 
collective project of transformation that bonds women together. While in 
the first instance, feminist whiteness translates into specific feminist moral 
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dispositions, such as the suspension of judgment, self- improvement, benev-
olence, and ignorance of white privilege, in the second case, religious and 
racial differences are highly politicized and used to define improper feminist 
subjects. Feminist whiteness then entails moral dispositions such as disap-
proval, indignation, and self- righteousness, and emotions such as melan-
choly, fear, and anger.
Chapter  5 turns to racialized feminists’ activism and their political 
subjectivations. It analyzes how racialized feminists have forged specific 
political vocabularies to name and politicize their relationships with white 
feminists in the context of the headscarf debates. As for white feminists, 
these political vocabularies are articulated with a set of emotions and moral 
dispositions. This chapter thus attempts to capture the formation of (col-
lectively produced) moral, political, and ethical dispositions that are inti-
mately linked to and shaped by the context of postcolonialism and (post)
secularism in France and Quebec. In particular, it asks: How do nonwhite 
feminists address their political and moral relationship to the mainly white 
feminist movement in both contexts? What are the moral dispositions 
and emotions that the encounter, conflict, or alliance with white feminists 
elicits for racialized feminists? How do they resist racism and the exclusions 
from white feminist spaces it performs? This chapter argues that racialized 
feminists occupy a minority position, in the Deleuzian sense— that is, not an 
identity or a sociological “object,” but a position of endogenous conflictuality 
within a hegemonic normative system69— from which they seek to create 
a new language, and from which they articulate specific moral addresses. 
Thus, racialized feminists’ forms of political subjectivation are relationally 
connected to white/ mainstream/ hegemonic forms of feminist discourse. 
This relationship is both political and moral. The chapter explores the po-
litical emotions, such as indignation, frustration, pain, unease, anger, or las-
situde, that sustain racialized feminists’ relationship to white feminists, and 
the forms of moral address they convey to white feminists through both re-
sistance and resentment. This chapter analyzes, in particular, resentment as 
an attempt to fashion new relations.
Chapter 6 brings the insights of the previous chapters to bear on a nor-
mative endeavor that seeks to center the feminist project on a feminist ethic 
of responsibility. Indeed, while feminism is often understood as a political 
project of representing women, or advancing their social situation, I pro-
pose to conceive of feminism as a political project that creates relations be-
tween feminists, comprising both those who claim to be part of this project, 
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and those who are claimed by this project. I argue that such a conception of 
feminism orients our normative endeavor not so much toward theorizing 
inclusive coalitions, reflecting on the conditions under which coalitions 
might be sustained while acknowledging a differential of power, but rather 
toward defining the nature of the moral relationships created between femi-
nist subjects by feminism. Taking seriously the moral dimension of the fem-
inist project and drawing on moral theories of care, Feminist Trouble argues 
that we need a feminist ethics of responsibility at the center of this political 
project. Such an ethics aims at treating the other equally and treating her 
well, at creating a space of possibility for the “others” of feminism within the 
feminist project. Such an ethics is resolutely pragmatist: it considers that the 
concrete consequences of our actions define our moral responsibility, rather 
than the values we wish to uphold, and that an ethical responsibility entails 
responding to others70— which often means finding compromise and trans-
lating demands. Hence feminists need to accept that values we hold dear— 
such as gender equality— must always be put in relation to other values, 
because feminists are attached to a multiplicity of values:  freedom, inclu-
sivity, respect, dignity, and so on. Heralding only one value over all others as 
deserving of our attachment is morally unproductive and politically ill fated. 
It is bound to misrecognize other feminists’ attachment to other values. The 
conception of feminism deployed in  chapter 6 and centered on a feminist 
ethics of responsibility is a salutary plea to turn our attention to relations 
between feminists— rather than to supposed common identity as “women” 
or to not- so- liberal subjectivities supposedly embodied by pious Muslim 
women— and to “the world in between us,” as Hannah Arendt would say,71 
which endows us with a political and moral responsibility toward others. It is 
not, however a plea to return to a nurturing feminist community or sorority. 
Rather, by elaborating a feminist ethic of responsibility, I propose feminists 
work to disestablish hierarchies within feminism, a work transformative for 
feminism but also, evidently, for society at large.
The conclusion of the book assesses what it means for feminism and fem-
inist theory to revisit its “we” along the lines I suggest, that is, to conceive 
feminism as a project focused on the ethical and political relations between 
feminists and between subjects enrolled in the feminist project, rather than 
focused on “we” women or as oriented toward shared values such as equality. 
I argue that such a displacement of our drive to theorize enables us to revisit 
the theoretical debate on the “foundations” of feminism. It also encourages 
us not to get trapped in the agency debate that has concerned much feminist 
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theorizing. Indeed, while these theoretical discussions have proved tremen-
dously important in articulating a critical feminism, they have also fueled a 
legitimate suspicion about the viability of the feminist project. Redirecting 
our theoretical and political energies from scrutinizing the agency of 
subjects perceived as not so liberal and not recoverable for the feminist pro-
ject, to examining our own ethical practices as feminists, may prove to be, 
this book argues, a potent way to move beyond the negativity of critique. As 
Elizabeth Grosz aptly reminds us: “Theory is never about us, about who we 
are. It affirms only what we can become.”72
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 Theorizing Feminism
Politics, Morals, and Emotions
What does it mean to theorize feminism as a political and moral project in 
the context of public debates that, in the name of gender equality, have fueled 
nationalism, anti- immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia? These policy 
debates have led, in many contexts in Europe, to the dismantling of former 
alliances and solidarities among some women’s rights organizations, as well 
as spurred new configurations of antagonistic feminist politics.1 The devel-
opment and consolidation of what Sara Farris has termed femonationalism2 
has restructured the political landscape and imposed new grammars to voice 
women’s rights claims. This is not the only development transforming femi-
nist mobilizations in Europe,3 but it is a worrying one. This context urges us 
to develop a critical discourse on feminism and its claims, a critical discourse 
that must recapture feminism’s promise. To do so, I argue, we must be atten-
tive to the morality, or the ethical drive, that characterizes feminism. Finding 
ways forward to forge critical discourses to dismantle femonationalism 
demands that we consider jointly the political and moral dimensions of the 
feminist project.
In this chapter, I argue that to capture both the political and the moral 
dimensions of feminism we must explore feminists’ political subjectivations. 
Such an approach places at the center of its inquiry the moral dispositions 
that feminists cultivate toward other feminists, taking into account the power 
inequalities— particularly, but not only, along axes of race and religion— 
that shape these relations between feminists. This perspective is indebted 
to specific genealogies of intersectional feminist theory that have insisted 
that social locations and hierarchies of power shape feminist subjectivities 
through emotions, affects, and moral sentiments. I argue that such a perspec-
tive, taking into account both hierarchies of power and the ethical drive that 
characterizes feminism, can provide a new and productive way to rethink the 
“question of differences” that has animated feminist theory. Theorizing fem-
inism in this way also offers important insights on intersectionality theory 
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when it comes to analyzing feminist movements and how they address power 
hierarchies of race and religion.
In a first section, I argue that the recent history of theorizing feminism is 
a history of theorizing differences within feminism and between feminists. 
I elaborate on this insight about the centrality of differences to feminist the-
orizing to approach the nature of feminism as a political project to create a 
political community, that of feminists, sustained by relationships of equality 
between feminists. These relationships of equality also have a moral dimen-
sion, as treating the other equally is also treating her well. I  develop this 
understanding of feminism as a project to create such a political commu-
nity in the second section. To explore the politics of difference within fem-
inism in the “postsecular” context, articulating both the political and the 
moral dimensions of the feminist project, I argue in the following section 
that we can draw on intersectionality theory. I then nuance this account in 
the fourth section, in which I situate my approach in an alternative gene-
alogy of intersectionality, less focused on identity and more attentive to how 
experiences and emotions shape relations between feminists. I  argue that 
such an approach captures both the moral and the political dimensions of 
the feminist project and, crucially, how power hierarchies structure both 
dimensions. In this vein, I propose in a last section the concept of feminist po-
litical subjectivation as a framework to understand how feminist subjectivities 
are produced, in a specific historical and political context, by a set of moral 
discourses about the “good” feminist subject, sustained by specific emotions. 
This concept helps tease out the relationship between ethics, emotions, and 
politics that shapes feminist practices and discourses. I argue that such an ap-
proach can help us understand the dynamics of feminist intersectional pol-
itics in “postsecular” times, in which some feminist subjects are heralded as 
“good” or to be saved, while others are cast out and denigrated.
Theorizing Feminism / Theorizing Differences 
between Women
Exploring the nature of the trouble within feminism is an exercise in the-
orizing feminism. No normative investigation of feminist conflicts can 
evade theorizing feminism. However, this is no small task. Feminism is his-
torically and contextually variegated, as many sociological works on femi-
nist movements have underscored. For scholars of feminist movements, the 
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challenge has long been to delimit the borders of such a protean practice and 
identity: who counts as a feminist?4 Interestingly, for feminists who theorize 
feminism, the question of who may or may not count as a feminist seems 
much less problematic: the desire to be freed from sexism and patriarchy, 
the desire to “end sexism, sexist exploitation and oppression,” to use bell 
hooks’s encompassing definition, will make one a feminist.5 Being a feminist 
is often presented as a set of dispositions that one has adopted and is attached 
to— “We are moved to become feminists,” as Sara Ahmed insists6— without 
having to adhere to or define a specific set of values or to practice certain 
types of action. However, this does not mean that theorizing what feminism 
is is easy. This apparent lack of need for a normative foundation to define who 
can be a feminist is matched by an intense preoccupation with the differences 
among those who claim to be feminists. While the subject of feminism need 
not be predefined or confined to a specific foundation, its conflictual nature, 
its heterogeneity, and the power asymmetries it harbors have been causes for 
feminist theorists’ concerns.
Theorizing feminism has thus been equated to some extent with theorizing 
differences within feminism or, more to the point, theorizing differences— 
marked by power hierarchies— among feminist subjects and among women. 
Much of the most challenging and productive feminist theorizing of the past 
decades shares a common impulse and a common conundrum:  thinking 
through the impossibility of a unified feminist subject while continuing to 
theorize and practice some kind of feminist politics, the very possibility of 
this thing called feminism.7 This tension has unfolded in distinctive ways 
as feminist theorists with diverse locations, immersed in different political 
struggles and deploying singular feminist imaginations, have tried to address 
the “difference” question within feminism. Judith Butler’s immensely influ-
ential Gender Trouble starts with the very question of the (im)possible unity 
of the feminist collective subject8 and proposes to rethink the subject itself as 
a way to escape what Linda Zerilli has presented as an unending dilemma for 
feminist theorists: “We nod to the importance of acknowledging difference 
among women, yet we persistently return to the idea that feminism demands 
a unified subject. Alternatively, we vigorously refuse such a subject, but are at 
a loss about how to say or claim anything beyond the particular case.”9
This long history of feminist theorizing that engages with the “differ-
ence” question suggests that how feminists address issues of power and 
how they construe it is in fact central to defining the nature of feminism. 
The “difference” question has taken hold of feminist theory in different ways 
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since the second wave of the feminist movement, and various genealogies 
of the difference question can be traced and imagined. To name a few, and 
to chart the contours of this foundational dilemma, we can invoke black/ 
Chicana feminist thought from Maria Stewart’s and Sojourner Truth’s ini-
tial formulation up to the development of intersectionality,10 which provided 
both a trenchant analysis of the political question of differences and power 
differentials among women and inside feminist movements, and a profound 
reflection on the relationship between political identity and subjectivity that 
debunked white feminists’ pretension to represent feminism both as a polit-
ical movement and as a form of subjectivity.
The unfolding of the subject question within feminist theory at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, be it through the work of Judith Butler, Teresa de Lauretis, 
or Drucilla Cornell, also provided new articulations of subjectivity, sexual 
difference, and sexuality and attempted, often through theoretical use of 
Freud, of Wittgenstein, and of Jacques Derrida’s différance, to rethink the re-
lationship between sameness and difference in the formation of subjectivity 
in a way that could untie gender identity— and feminist subjectivity— from 
sexual difference, and therefore open up the subject to transformation and 
differences.11 The poststructuralist theoretical turn in feminist theory and 
the debate on the “category of women”12 attempted to use the deconstruction 
of the gender dichotomy as an avenue to also address differences of race and 
sexuality.13 In doing so, it provided much of the fuel for the deconstruction of 
the feminist subject, individual and collective.14
At the same moment, postcolonial feminist theorists provided a powerful 
critique of the feminist Western gaze on Third World women— motivated 
by her difference and by the status ascribed to her of an eternal victim in 
need of saving15— a critique that would be revived and expanded a decade 
later during the multiculturalism versus feminism debate launched by Susan 
Moller Okin.16 Interestingly, differences were no longer located within fem-
inism, among feminists, but within “women,” and attention was focused on 
the “Other” woman, her agency or complicity in her own oppression and how 
she might be recuperated, or not, for the feminist project.17 Finally, the suc-
cess of the concept of intersectionality at the turn of the twenty- first century 
also testifies to the continuing need to think about differences among women. 
Indeed, as Kathy Davis has summarized, “ ‘intersectionality’ addresses the 
most central theoretical and normative concern within feminist scholar-
ship: namely, the acknowledgement of differences among women,” and this is, 
in her opinion, the main reason for its academic success.18 These theoretical 
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debates that question the nature and boundaries of the feminist subject “have 
proved to be among the most bitter and enduring within feminism.”19
In all these instances of debates about differences and feminism, feminism 
as a collective project of emancipation and as a political subjectivity has been 
questioned, deconstructed, and sometimes revived in the name of acknowl-
edging “differences”20 to the point that, despite their richness, these debates 
have also appeared to some as dangerously vexing for feminist theory be-
cause of their tendency to reify feminism(s), including black feminism, as 
identity politics.21
Feminism and the Constitution of Political and 
Moral Relations
Why is theorizing differences so central to theorizing feminism? Why do 
feminist theorists focus their theoretical energies on the question of how 
to adequately acknowledge and act upon differences of power among them 
and among women? What does this centrality of differences tells us about 
the very nature of feminism that feminist theorists have tried to capture? 
The insistence on theorizing differences reveals, I claim, a political and eth-
ical drive to account for differences that is central to the feminist project. It 
informs us about the nature of feminism itself, as a project that requires that 
inequalities among its participants be acknowledged and addressed, both 
as a political endeavor and as a moral responsibility. Feminism therefore 
constitutes relationships between feminists that are based on recognizing 
other participants in this project as equals.
Linda Zerilli’s theorization of feminism as a political project that 
constitutes a political community directs our attention precisely to this di-
mension of feminism, as creating relationships. Indeed, Zerilli theorizes 
feminism following Hannah Arendt’s conception of political action, as a 
practice of freedom that creates a political “we.”22 To sustain this “we,” what 
we have are promises we make to other participants, and the recognition of 
the “world between us,” to use Arendt’s words.23 That is, the recognition that 
we share the world, but also that we are all positioned differently toward it. 
This world is therefore defined by plurality. Zerilli’s conception of feminism 
thus emphasizes the political nature of the feminist project that creates a “we” 
not based on a shared identity but rather, for Zerilli, on the project of creating 
free relationships between its participants. Zerilli focuses her analysis of 
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feminism as a practice of freedom, understood in its Arendtian dimension— 
that is, in relation to world- building activities such as founding, promising, 
judging— as a way to refute any foundationalist account of feminism based 
on identity.24 Her insistence on freedom also shuns the tendency to focus 
on individual subjectivities— considering the self as the locus of politics and 
transformation— that she associates with poststructuralist accounts of femi-
nism, which she argues are misguided in their concern with the self.
While Zerilli’s account of feminism as a project of creating free relations 
between women is inspiring, my argument in this book is slightly different. 
I take from Zerilli the important notion that feminism creates relationships 
that are political (as in world- building), but I  depart from her analysis 
when I  state that the relationships that feminists create by calling them-
selves feminists and appropriating feminism are also— and may be chiefly— 
about treating the other equally, which is also treating the other well. Hence, 
while she focuses on freedom, I argue that equality, in both its political and 
its moral dimensions, is also central to feminism. What is more, as I will 
argue in this book, Zerilli’s claim that feminism creates free relations among 
women is, I contend, too broad. Rather, I argue that feminists’ ethical drive is 
primarily directed toward other feminists, or other subjects enrolled in the 
feminist project.
To consider the ethical drive and the moral dimension of the feminist sub-
ject is not a way to divert attention away from politics and power. Theoretical 
reflections on the formation of an ethical self (and of the self) as relational, 
dependent on the other, which characterize, for example, authors in the per-
spective of the ethics of care but also the work of Judith Butler, are deeply 
political. Indeed, they interrogate in various ways how moral boundaries are 
drawn within political communities and with others. Butler’s reflections on 
ethical violence as it is displayed when some lives are considered not worthy 
of being grieved25 is clearly articulated with a critique of nationalism as a way 
to delimit the political community, and to calls for a global ethics.26 Tenants 
of an ethics of care have also ventured into proposal for a global ethics that 
address asymmetries of power between global South and North, and ecofem-
inist political proposals.27 In a similar vein, I argue here that we must scruti-
nize our feminist ethical drive and its affective grounds if we are to reimagine 
the feminist political community and address issues of difference and power 
that are at the heart of its political project.
But how are we to keep our promise as feminists while recognizing the 
differences that characterize the world and “we” feminists? Because her focus 
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is on freedom, the question of differences for Zerilli is resolved by a norma-
tive proposal about differences that is indebted to Hannah Arendt. Indeed, 
for Zerilli, what matters are not social or identity differences, but rather 
plurality. Plurality, a concept introduced by Arendt, refers to differences in 
perspectives, differences in judgments, in our points of views on the world. 
Plurality is, like uncertainty, inherent to political life and to the world, and 
is what makes freedom so central as a political practice of world- building. 
Because we share the world between us, and because it is a world marked by 
plurality, the way to create a political community is to exercise one’s freedom 
by judging the world, expressing one’s point of view— and putting oneself in 
the place of others.28 This perspective reminds us that differences that cut 
across the political community that feminism seeks to create are not only 
differences linked to identities and power asymmetries, but also differences 
in judgment and values. However, if we consider, as I do, that feminism is also 
and mainly about treating other feminists well and equally, we must engage 
with the question of differences with other theoretical insights, to address the 
question of what it means to treat the other well in a context of power asym-
metries. This question, I think, is to be solved empirically and normatively 
by reflecting on feminists’ practical engagements with differences of power.
Feminist theories offer much thought about these issues. In the next sec-
tion I review two bodies of literature that have addressed differences within 
feminism, and I explain how they can be put to use to analyze current fem-
inist disputes about Islamic veiling debates. The first one refers to the dom-
inant understanding of intersectionality theory, and the second one is an 
alternative genealogy of intersectionality that focuses on the moral and emo-
tional dimensions of feminism.
Theorizing Difference in Feminism: Identity 
and Intersectionality
With its long history of theoretical engagement with the question of 
differences within feminism, the concept of intersectionality has become 
a favored tool to approach conflicts within feminism and to address power 
asymmetries related to race and class in particular. Intersectionality, defined 
as the theoretical approach and political critique that aims at making visible 
the identities and interests of women of color who have been marginalized, 
has been a tremendously important conceptual tool to analyze divides, make 
30 Feminist Trouble
visible power relations, and challenge white hegemony within feminism in 
various Western contexts.29 I explore here what this specific approach can 
bring to a theorization of feminism in the context of Islamic veiling debates 
and femonationalism, and its limits.
A prominent field of studies of intersectionality in feminist movements 
focuses on the relationship between unequal power relations and racial/ 
ethnic identity and divisions in women’s movements. This approach is 
epitomized by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s analysis showing that single- identity 
movements sideline and render invisible the interests and identities of 
women situated at the intersection of other axes of domination than gender 
alone.30 Indeed, Crenshaw proposed two different meanings of the term 
intersectionality.31 First, intersectionality is structural. This term refers to 
the intersection of two axes of domination such as race and gender, which 
constitutes a social category with a specific experience of social life. This first 
understanding stresses the unique experience that characterizes the subjec-
tivity and the social positioning of individuals situated at the intersection of 
multiple axes of power relations. The second meaning is political. It refers, 
for Crenshaw, to the fact that the political interests of intersectional groups, 
such as Black women, will most likely differ from the political interests of 
nonintersectional groups, such as Black men or white women, and that con-
sequently these interests are being misrepresented or ignored by some so-
cial movement organizations: Black women are “sometimes excluded from 
feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are predicated 
upon a discrete set of experiences” that does not accurately describe their 
intersectional experience.32 For Crenshaw, there is an intimate connec-
tion between structural and political intersectionality:  structural relations 
of oppression, domination, and marginalization constitute intersectional, 
multiply- marginalized groups that have a specific social experience, and its 
theoretical and political misrecognition leads to the political marginalization 
of the group.
The underlining logic is, of course, that the specific social experience of 
intersectional groups implies necessarily specific political interests, which 
happen to be denied, underrepresented, or misrepresented by current 
theories and policies. Intersectional theory hence offers a new semantic 
and political platform to represent and promote those interests that have 
been misrecognized and those experiences that have been inadequately 
represented. The political answer to this situation is more identity politics; 
that is, the recognition that Black women have specific interests that they 
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should be able to voice and have recognized by the single- issue movements. 
At the heart of Crenshaw’s theorization of intersectionality is an analysis of 
power and its intimate link with identities and political interests. There is 
also the conviction that identity politics is the right— and most efficient— 
way to promote black women’s interests and that recognition of their specific 
needs is required to tackle their political and social marginalization.33
This approach, rooted in the genealogy of black feminism and the theo-
rization of the “double oppression” or the “triple jeopardy” that women of 
color face in the context of the US second- wave women’s movement,34 has in-
spired several important studies of intersectionality in women’s movements 
that stress how unequal power relations between women based on racial/ 
ethnic identities structure women’s mobilization in various contexts. Studies 
on the US context have shown that women from minoritized ethnic/ racial 
groups have followed “different roads to feminism,” to borrow the illustrative 
wording of Benita Roth, both on account of structural racism and unequal 
power relations with white women,35 and on account of their desire to “or-
ganize one’s own” on the basis of their shared identity and experience.36 The 
tendency for most privileged subgroups in a constituency based on a shared 
identity (such as gender, race, or class) to impose their agendas and define 
their interests as “universal” for their whole group has been documented be-
yond feminism.37 Because the privilege of whiteness includes the ability to 
see oneself as “unmarked” by race,38 and to understand one’s interests as uni-
versal, studies have shown that coalitions or daily work across racial bound-
aries in US women’s organizations have met with resistance and obstacles.39 
While white women may acknowledge the pervasiveness of racism in so-
ciety, they are often unwilling to apply this analysis to their own organiza-
tion and their own behavior. Similar findings have been found for women’s 
movements in locations as diverse as Uruguay,40 Norway, Spain, the United 
Kingdom,41 Belgium,42 and France.43
This important body of work focuses on how social relations of power 
structure inequalities, marginalization, and identities within women’s 
movements. It shows how power asymmetries fuel identity politics within 
feminism, and the need for more identity politics in order to place women 
of color’s interests at the center of analysis and at the center of policymaking 
processes, thereby redressing the epistemic erasure of women of color.44 
Thanks to their emphasis on power and inequalities, these studies contribute 
to explaining the pervasive divides among women’s organizations along racial 
and ethnic identities. They also document how coalitions might emerge and 
32 Feminist Trouble
how “strategic sisterhood” may at times build bridges across these divides.45 
Intersectionality in that sense brings to the fore the conditions under which 
coalitions across racial differences, for example, may be envisioned and sus-
tained; among these conditions, the politics of representation— who can 
speak for whom— is of particular importance.46
Interestingly, while the politics of difference and representation is poten-
tially an issue for any social movement, since, as studies on social movements 
have shown, identity is an important element of movement politics and of 
the ability to coalesce individuals around a cause,47 it has been particularly 
divisive and conflictual in the feminist movement.48 This is due in no small 
part to the forceful focus on the collective dimension of the feminist subject 
and of feminist politics. The insistence on collective rather than individual 
emancipation in recent Western (white majority) feminist movements fuels 
a suspicion about diversity, because differences are intrinsically perceived as 
divisive if they are not overcome by a common political project that, more 
often than not, implies a unitary vision of identity.49
Debates on Islamic forms of veiling show that race, class, coloniality, and 
sexuality— to name a few— continue to delineate tensions, fractures, and 
alliances within feminist movements— in France and Quebec and beyond. 
Logically, intersectionality must be put to use to critically assess the claims 
by liberal, secular, or multicultural feminists regarding the headscarf debates 
to unveil the racialization, erasure, and hypervisibilization of women of 
color that they convey.50 In this perspective, while the public debates, and 
some feminist theorists, frame the issues as pertaining to religion, culture, 
and gender, they are in fact new instances of the “haunting of Europe’s silent 
racializations and ethnicizations,” to borrow Fatima El- Tayeb’s illustrative 
metaphor.51 The concept of intersectionality is therefore crucial to analyze 
current disputes in the sense that it provides an account of the operations of 
power that structure relationships between feminists: it makes manifest the 
continuities between colonial racial politics and current prohibitive polit-
ical and legal regulations of Muslim religious practices, especially in France 
but also in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, where the 
presence of racialized migrant/ Muslim women within the nation is continu-
ously questioned and their identities and interests are excluded from main-
stream/ dominant feminist agendas.52
This book is thus indebted to intersectionality methodologically53 and 
theoretically, and situates itself within this wide field of research and polit-
ical project by making visible in the analysis the experiences and discourses 
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of women of color.54 However, I also argue that the political critique that is 
leveraged by intersectionality must cast a wider net, looking beyond iden-
tity politics. Indeed, there is a risk in this approach of conflating identities 
and interests, or identities and values and judgments. If we draw on Zerilli’s 
account of feminism and her focus on freedom, we are reminded that 
differences may also be differences in judgments, and not only in identities 
and power. What is more, and as critiques of this approach to intersectionality 
have underscored, it provides a trenchant critique of power asymmetries and 
marginalization, but less exploration of relations between feminists based on 
other grounds than identity, such as solidarity, shared ideals, recognition, or 
even love.55
We are reminded by Sara Ahmed of the complexity of how power shapes 
feminist practices and ideals when she writes: “We need to take care not to 
install feminist ideals as ideals that others must embody if they are to pass 
into feminism. Such a reification of political ideals would position some 
feminists as ‘hosts,’ who would decide which others would receive the hos-
pitality of love and recognition, and would hence remain predicated on a 
differentiation between natives and strangers.”56 Hence, while a strand of 
intersectionality research on feminist movements focuses on marginaliza-
tion and invisibility, and associates closely identities and interests, Ahmed’s 
reflection suggests that feminism is also about moral relations of hospitality 
and foreignness, about love, recognition and distance, and indifference, and 
that power expresses itself through the dynamic process of hosting or being 
hosted.57 Feminism is thus also about relationships that engage our moral 
responsibilities to treat the other well, relationships that are therefore also 
grounded in affects.
In this vein, I argue that theorizing feminism, in general and in partic-
ular in the context of the “post- secular condition”58 that characterizes most 
Western liberal democracies, demands that we complexify our under-
standing of the politics of identity, exclusion, and visibility within feminism 
with an account of how emotions and moral dispositions support those dy-
namics of marginalization, and of how they may also support other political 
and moral relations based on equality. As religious difference has emerged 
alongside race and migration as a ground for difference politics and a topic 
for antagonism within feminism, we must reflect on whether the conflicts 
around Islamic veiling are only conflicts about power asymmetries along ra-
cial identities. In the 1980s, migrant women and women of migrant descent 
were seen in countries such as France as a legitimate concern for feminist 
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action and as potential feminist subjects, and dominant strands of French 
feminism defined themselves as antiracist, as they still do today.59 Once 
veiled, however, the same girls and women became an impossible or ambiv-
alent subject for many of the same white French feminists.60 From subjects 
of care, even though distant and marginalized, Muslim women and girls be-
came subjects of conflict and of exclusion as these feminists claimed to save 
pious Muslim women from their religion for their own good. Racial and reli-
gious identities have thus not been perceived in similar ways by many white, 
and some nonwhite, feminists.
Another important nuance to bring to an intersectional analysis based 
on postcolonial and racialized identities is that it tends to underestimate 
the differences within each group and the plurality of positions and identi-
ties that characterize these public discussions.61 An intersectional approach 
reveals how these debates perform processes of racialization, political mar-
ginalization, and the preserving of white privilege. Nevertheless, as I detail 
in the next chapters, in both contexts I study closely, France and Quebec, not 
all women’s organizations representing racialized women agree; far from it. 
Different types of racialized feminists voice their claims in various national 
contexts, and while they might all be critical of the dominantly white women’s 
rights organizations, they do not all advocate the same policies when it comes 
to veiling, although they aim at representing the same constituency. While 
some women who identify as Muslim and feminist have politicized the veil 
as an issue of racial and postcolonial politics, others have criticized the veil as 
potentially oppressive, and others have stated that it should not be the focus 
of their politics.62
Islamic veiling debates bring to the fore feminists’ moral claims to save 
subjects, to establish moral relations between feminist subjects, and to de-
fine “good” and “bad” feminist subjects, drawing moral boundaries between 
those deserving of feminists’ attention and care, and those who must be cast 
away or reformed for the sake of feminism’s endeavor to transform the world. 
Hence, the deep moral overtones of feminist debates about the regulation of 
forms of Islamic veiling remind us of the deeply moral nature of feminism. 
This realization urges us to complexify accounts of intersectionality focused 
on identity politics within feminism to also recapture other dimensions 
of the feminist project and its conflictual nature that revolve around mo-
rality, emotions, and relations. Debates on Islamic forms of veiling thus 
make apparent how the contentious feminist politics of racialization, mar-
ginalization, deprivation, and silencing of the voices of women living at the 
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intersection of several axes of domination, which include religion, race, and 
citizenship status,63 is articulated with moral ambitions to define and pa-
trol the borders of “good” feminist subjects, worthy of feminists’ care and 
attention. Reciprocally, a feminist politics that fights racialization and mar-
ginalization of women of color and pious Muslim women also expands and 
challenges moral ideas about the feminist subject, thriving not only for ep-
istemic justice,64 but, I argue, also for the moral duty to keep a promise: a 
promise to create relationships that are more equal, a promise “to find ways 
to support those who are not supported,” to borrow Sara Ahmed’s formula-
tion.65 To capture these complexities of the moral and emotional stakes of 
the politics of difference within feminism, I suggest we turn to an alterna-
tive genealogy of intersectionality, one that has problematized identities and 
feminism’s emotional dimension.
Theorizing Feminism: Experience and Affective Politics
An alternative genealogy of intersectionality, not always included under 
the label of intersectionality despite its kinship and simultaneity with the 
first,66 looks at differences and power within feminism in conjunction with 
the emotional and psychic dynamics they trigger.67 Rather than theorizing 
identity politics within feminist movements, this body of work is more inter-
ested in theorizing affective politics and the delicate invocation of solidarity 
and crafting of relationship between feminists. This approach considers that 
identities are being constructed in the very process of alliancing, coalescing, 
or separating. They are not a given that would predetermine possibilities of 
coalitions or conflicts between opposite interests. This approach is illustrated 
by Chandra Mohanty’s theorization of the politics of location within femi-
nism and its critical take on identities and identifications.68 For Mohanty, a 
politics of location implies more than a geographical or historical location, 
although it starts from there. It also implies “psychic and imaginative bound-
aries,”69 and it involves a conception of experience as shaped by politics, rather 
than only the reverse. In other words, while of course any project of feminist 
coalition should necessarily recognize differences and inequalities based on 
ethnic, racial, sexuality, or class inequalities, Mohanty underlines that fem-
inist politics also construct gender, sexual, and racial identities:  “It is the 
kind of interpretive frame we use to analyze experiences anchored in gender, 
race, class, and sexual oppression that matters.”70 Political consciousness and 
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praxis shape experiences and identities; thus, in the words of Mohanty, “We 
cannot avoid the challenge of theorizing experience.”71
While it may be tempting to read feminist movements’ intersectional pol-
itics as the pure product of identity politics based on “experiences” produced 
by social structures of power, I suggest with others that we need to approach 
the processes that lead to intersectional conflicts, divisions, and coalitions 
with more caution toward “experience” and “identity.” To borrow Chandra 
Mohanty and Biddy Martin’s words, we must question “the all too common 
conflation of experience, identity and political perspective.”72 Joan Scott has 
similarly emphasized that we must historicize experience and identity and 
beware of the immediacy or “authenticity” of experience, because “it is not 
individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through 
experience.”73 As she insists: “Experience is at once always already an inter-
pretation and is in need of interpretation. What counts as experience is nei-
ther self- evident nor straightforward; it is always contested, always therefore 
political.”74
In the realm of feminist politics, I  join here Sara Ahmed and her 
coauthors’ call “to think of ‘identity’ as an effect of the deployment of fem-
inist strategies, tactics and rhetoric, rather than its origin or cause.”75 In 
this perspective, feminist discourses elaborated and deployed in specific 
contexts produce feminist identities rather than reflect them. These feminist 
discourses provide interpretations of experiences and identities that lead to 
inclusions, exclusions, coalitions, divisions, and solidarities. Identities such 
as Afro- feminist, Muslim- feminist, or white- feminist are not givens but are 
produced and are to be interpreted. Rather than considering the subject of 
feminist politics as a pregiven, we must try to understand, in the words of 
Joan Scott, the “complex and changing discursive processes by which iden-
tities are ascribed, resisted, or embraced.”76 By considering identities as al-
ways in construction and intimately articulated with experiences always in 
need of interpretation, we open the analysis of feminist subjectivities and 
identities to more complexity, and we can make sense of the wide range of 
differences within minority/ racialized and ethnic majority/ white feminist 
groups, and represent the plurality of voices and positions that have been 
expressed during these debates.77 In this perspective, debates on Islamic 
veils should not be understood as only revealing a preexisting social lo-
cation of white privilege on the part of white/ ethnic majority feminists in 
European countries. These debates actually also produce the experience 
and identity of white feminists in both contexts. They shape instances of 
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what I call in  chapter 4 feminist whiteness. They fuel processes that lead to 
new feminist identities.
A second characteristic of this alternative genealogy to intersectionality 
theory is its interest in and account of emotions as an important part of fem-
inist politics and feminist subjectivities. Writings of Black feminists that 
explore the conflicts between feminists of color and white feminists in the 
context of the US second- wave movement display and theorize a wide range 
of affects that appear as symptoms of politicization and as fueling processes 
of feminist subjectivation. Emotions are symptoms of political and moral 
wrongs, or of political and moral care and, at the same time, fuel feminists’ 
perception of themselves as part of the political community that feminism 
creates. The rich emotional vocabulary and poetry used by Cherríe Moraga 
illustrates the importance of emotions as deeply (feminist) political affects. 
Writing about the completion of This Bridge Called My Back, she stresses the 
“pain and shock of difference, the joy of commonness, the exhilaration of 
meeting through incredible odds against it.”78 Talking about racism within 
the movement, she evokes how the “dread and terror in the room lay like a 
thick immovable paste above all our shoulders, white and colored alike” and 
how her feelings were “dark with anger.”79 Moraga also offers a powerful il-
lustration of the politicization of experience and identity when she writes in 
the next paragraph: “My growing consciousness as a woman of color is surely 
seeming to transform my experience. How could it be that the more I feel 
with other women of color, the more I feel myself Chicana, the more sus-
ceptible I am to racist attack!” These analyses prompt us to analyze the role 
that emotions play in sustaining or destroying feminist projects but also in 
shaping feminist subjectivities.
The articulation between emotions and moral disposition is not specific to 
feminist politics. Didier Fassin reminds us in his studies on resentment and 
inequalities that emotions are tightly linked to processes of subjectivation 
and therefore to politics.80 Political theorists, from Adam Smith to Sigmund 
Freud, have recognized the role played by emotions in forging, securing, or 
destabilizing the political community and the social contract. Sympathy, 
envy, anger, resentment, love— to name a few— are emotions that constitute 
the grammar of our relationship to the other members of the political com-
munity we belong to, as well as of our relationship to the values that organize 
the forms of governing this community— equality, freedom, injustice, and 
so on.81 Emotional attachments are necessary to sustain political commu-
nities. Political passions are not only affective, they are also deeply moral. 
38 Feminist Trouble
These feelings produce political subjects and convey a moral dimension to 
their relationship to the political community.82 Public passions therefore 
convey moral values and moral relations. While many political theorists 
have investigated the role played by passions in our attachments to a political 
community and our self- fashioning as good (or bad) liberal or republican 
subjects,83 less attention has been devoted by political theorists to under-
standing the role played by moral emotions in political projects that are not 
attached to the national political community, such as feminism.84 What are 
the moral emotions involved in the becoming feminist? What forms of polit-
ical subjectivation sustain, or erode, this individual and collective project?
Social movement studies have recently given more attention to the role of 
emotions in social movements, stressing in particular the emotional satisfac-
tion that individuals retain from being part of a collective political identity.85 
However, in this literature emotions are often treated as a means toward col-
lective action,86 not as symptoms of moral and political dilemmas or as con-
tributing to processes of identification with collective projects and identities 
that impact moral dispositions and subjectivities. Only a few studies look at 
how emotions sustain political projects and shape political subjectivities in 
social movements or “counterpublics.”87 Some social movement studies do 
look at how emotions denote and produce disidentification among, for ex-
ample, micro- cohorts of feminist activists, explaining variations in forms 
of expressive politics over generations— such as when sociologist Jo Reger 
analyzes “old” feminists’ feelings of being displaced in a slut walk.88 These 
studies are generally focused on differences in collective identities and how 
emotions contribute to shape collective feminist identities.89 They more 
rarely address the issue of how emotions sustain moral values that shape spe-
cific feminist political projects and subjectivities.
An exception is Sarita Srivastava’s work on the display of emotions by 
white feminists and how it can prevent and block antiracist work within 
women’s rights organizations.90 Indeed, Srivastava notes that exchanges 
within feminist organizations over racism are rife with “moral undertones, 
undertones with roots in feminist community, imperial history, and national 
imaginings.” In the context of her fieldwork in Canada, she argues that “in the 
face of antiracist challenges many white feminists may feel that it is their self- 
image— as good, implicitly nonracist people— and particularly their shared 
moral identity as feminists that is under siege. In other words, we can see that 
the typical pattern of emotional responses to antiracist challenges— anger, 
fear, and tears— is in part produced by implied challenges to what counts 
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as a good feminist, a good person, a good woman, and a good national cit-
izen.”91 Srivastava’s analysis leads us to focus on how emotions sustain moral 
dispositions as feminists, our ability to see ourselves as “good feminists,” 
and how these moral dispositions are closely articulated with operations 
of power. What counts as a good woman and a good citizen is intimately 
intertwined with the historical formation of the liberal modern subject as 
bourgeois and white, and therefore respectable, allowing white feminists to 
secure their position as “good” national subjects and “good” feminist subjects 
through self- righteousness.
In this perspective, feminists’ emotions and feminist emotions are un-
derstood as laden with moral values, which shape different feminist polit-
ical projects and feminist political subjectivities. We can explore with such 
an approach how politics, morals, and emotions are articulated in feminists’ 
discourse and practice, and how feminist discourses police the boundaries of 
the good subject of feminism, regulate feminist subjectivities, and also define 
how to treat well other participants in this project. We must therefore investi-
gate the politics of emotion that characterize contemporary feminist politics 
of difference, describing the various attitudes toward different differences, 
the emotions and moral dispositions they carry with them, and how they 
produce different feminist subjects. How are feminists’ moral dispositions to 
treat the other well supported by, conveyed through or diverted by specific 
emotions? What are the types of emotions that have characterized Islamic 
veiling debates? What are the moral and emotional boundaries that are being 
drawn or displaced during these debates?
Feminists’ Political Subjectivations
To explore these questions, I  focus on what I  call feminists’ political 
subjectivations. The concept of political subjectivation that I propose captures 
how feminist subjects are constituted through these intersectional debates 
that give meaning to and politicize some of their experiences as feminists. It 
allows us to observe how feminism is mobilized in different contexts through 
particular emotions and feelings. I argue that feminist discourses elaborated 
and deployed during these contentious debates over Islamic veiling produce 
and politicize feminist identities and feelings, and that they provide inter-
pretations of experiences and identities that lead to inclusions, exclusions, 
coalitions, and divisions.
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The process of feminist political subjectivation is the process by which 
feminist political and moral issues become personal ones, through a set of 
experiences and engagement with a collective subject and a historical and 
fantasized collective identity.92 The concept of subjectivation refers to Michel 
Foucault’s understanding of subjectivation as “the forms and modalities of 
the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes him-
self qua subject.”93 Drawing on Foucault’s conception of subjectivation, 
Judith Butler notes the “indistinguishability” between the moral and polit-
ical dimensions of subjectivation. She observes: “The formation of the sub-
ject is the institution of the very reflexivity that indistinguishably assumes 
the burden of formation. The ‘indistinguishability’ of this line is precisely 
the juncture where social norms intersect with ethical demands, and where 
both are produced in the context of a self- making which is never fully self- 
inaugurated.”94 In other words, self- formation and ethical deliberation are 
always bound up with the political context and norms that shape the subject, 
and moral judgment and social and political critique cannot be dissociated.95
However, here my interest is not in the constitution of the subject qua sub-
ject, but in the production of a political subjectivity, a political and moral 
relationship to oneself, which entails a process of political identification with 
and an attachment to a collective subject.96 I am interested here in describing 
the moral dispositions displayed by a variety of feminists toward feminism, 
that is, toward a political project, and toward other feminists, across rela-
tions of power and privilege, difference and identity. To borrow anthropol-
ogist Didier Fassin’s words, “The sort of subjectivity I try to analyze is not so 
much psychological as political. I am interested in the formation of subjects 
engaged in actions they justify on moral grounds rather than in the depths 
of their unconscious.”97 Hence, my endeavor is not to provide an anthropo-
logical account of the ethical practices shaping a feminist ethical self, or a 
psychoanalytical account of feminist identifications— although these would 
be fascinating to pursue. In the perspective I adopt, self- formation as a fem-
inist is indistinguishable from processes of ethical deliberation that are his-
torical and contextual. Hence analyzing feminist political subjectivations 
will require that I engage with the politics of feminist values as well as with 
ethical questions about how to treat the subject(s) of feminism. Indeed, as 
I give an account of myself as a feminist, I become engaged in ethical re-
lations with others who also claim to participate in this political project.98 
The concept of feminist political subjectivation thus allows us to understand 
feminists’ moral arguments in their political, social, and historical context 
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with its inherent power asymmetries. Indeed, as Joan Tronto insists, we must 
understand moral arguments in their political context,99 and any normative 
inquiry into feminist ethics must place hierarchies of power at the center of 
its attention and theoretical care.
However, this process is not only one of ethical deliberation that deploys 
itself in a specific historical context. It is also a social and psychic process, 
involving emotions, subjectivity, and affects, since, as Teresa de Lauretis 
notes, “The constitution of the social subject depends on the nexus lan-
guage/ subjectivity/ consciousness—  . . . in other words, the personal is po-
litical because the political becomes personal by way of its subjective effects 
through the subject’s experience.”100 The importance of emotions in polit-
ical subjectivation has been underlined by many queer and feminist cultural 
theorists who are part of the “affective turn” and who explore how affects 
are enmeshed with ethics and politics, looking at how affects contribute 
to subjectivation, our sense of belonging, and the formation of historical 
subjectivities.101 In particular, Sara Ahmed and José Muñoz have insisted on 
the role that emotions perform in forging our sense of self and our ability to 
align with and participate in collective feminist/ queer identities.102 Affects 
are sometimes presented as first and foremost located in the body and less 
formed and structured than emotions. I do not share the overemphasis on 
bodily reactions that seems to subtract affects from critique and from the 
individual’s reflexivity. For this reason, I  mostly use the term emotions. 
However, I do share with these approaches the idea that our relationship to 
belonging and norms is sustained by emotions and that we may channel and 
cultivate affective practices that are also ethical practices.103
I thus consider processes of political subjectivation as processes that link 
the moral and the political in individuals’ practices, self- understanding, and 
self- fashioning, processes that do not unfold only through rational beha-
vior but also through emotions, memories, drives, and desires.104 The con-
cept of feminist political subjectivation thus aims to capture how political 
positions voiced in the name of feminist values are also intimately articu-
lated with feminist subjectivities that imply affects, memories, and political 
emotions that often do not lead to political inclusion of a variety of feminist 
subjects, but rather fuel a drive to reenact injury or its denial. It helps us to 
describe how, in specific contexts, power relations along racial and religious 
identities, political structures and organizations within women’s movements, 
individual histories of activism and encounters with feminism, and moral 
dispositions as feminist are connected and produce specific feminist political 
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subjectivations that carry specific ethical or moral dispositions, sustained 
by a set of emotions. By looking at what feminists care for, when and why 
they self- identify as feminists, and how specific emotions secure these moral 
dispositions, we may capture the nature of the promise that feminism holds, 
as well as what stands in the way of this promise.
Focusing on processes of subjectivation allows us to articulate the polit-
ical, moral, and emotional dimensions of contemporary feminist politics 
in a productive and heuristic way. Indeed, by understanding how a variety 
of feminist political subjectivations are formed in the current context of 
femonationalism, we can understand how the moral dimension of fem-
inism is appropriated and acted upon by a variety of feminists, and how 
these appropriations may lead to conflict, separatism, disidentification, or 
coalition, all processes that shape thepresent and the future of the feminist 
project.105 Investigating the various moral and political relationships that 
a variety of feminists entertain and develop with what they identify as the 
feminist project and with other feminists, one can attempt to answer the 
questions put forth by Jonathan Dean and Kristin Aune in their mapping 
of contemporary European feminism: “How are the boundaries of the fem-
inist subject demarcated and maintained? Which forms of feminist identity 
and subjectivity are valued and affirmed, and which are erased or cast to the 
margins?”106
Exploring feminist political subjectivations is not only impor-
tant for social movement scholars trying to make sense of the dy-
namics of divisions or coalitions among feminist organizations, or for 
intersectionality scholars who want to show how intersectional social and 
political processes unfold in the specific context of secularism debates, 
and how they transform feminist movements, leading to the visibility of 
new identities. It is also important, I argue, for feminist theory. As Teresa 
de Lauretis has aptly noted, conflicts over feminism— and I would add, 
over the good feminist subject— are the very flesh and the history of fem-
inist theory. As she writes, “It would be difficult to explain, otherwise, 
why thinkers or writers with political and personal histories, projects, 
needs, and desires as different as those of white women and women of 
color, of lesbians and heterosexuals, of differently abled women, and of 
successive generations of women, would all claim feminism as a major— 
if not the only— ground of difference; why they would address both their 
critiques or accusations and their demands for recognition to other 
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women, feminist in particular; why the emotional and political stakes in 
feminist theorizing should be so high, dialogue so charged and confron-
tation so impassioned.”107
De Lauretis’s point encourages us to understand the complexity of the re-
lationship that feminists entertain with the political project that defines their 
political and moral identity, and to capture simultaneously both the profound 
social and political divisions that cut across this political community, and 
the deep attachments, claims for recognition, and drives toward common-
ality that feminism awakens. Understood in this perspective, feminism is a 
project of creating a political community and relationships among feminists. 
These relationships are both political and moral and are sustained and con-
veyed through affective politics. In each context, these relationships will take 
particular forms. For example, Jennifer Nash interprets second- wave black 
feminism as based on love- politics among women and among black women 
in particular. Contrastingly, in many contexts, the feminist community cre-
ated by white feminists is based on caring for distant others so abstract that 
their concrete needs and interests are misrepresented and the relationship is 
characterized by asymmetry rather than equality.
I propose therefore to explore emotions as crucial features in the processes 
of political subjectivation that characterize contemporary feminist poli-
tics. This approach directs our attention to the moral and affective nature 
of the feminist project, allowing us to explore how feminists make promises 
to each other, create a community, and intend to build relationships based 
on equality. It allows us to consider the range of moral dispositions that 
feminists can hold and deploy: the claim to represent others and to improve 
their condition, the claim to treat others well or to treat them equally, the 
claim to care for distant others or for concrete and proximate others; and 
how these moral dispositions are sustained by emotions such as benevo-
lence, self- righteousness, anger, or resentment.
***
In this chapter, I have argued that Islamic veiling debates not only reveal in a 
singular light the moral nature of feminism, but also enjoin us to take into ac-
count the ethical drive that characterizes feminism in our endeavor to elabo-
rate normative proposals when reflecting on feminism’s continuing relevance 
and ability to transform the world. To do so, I have drawn on a genealogy of 
intersectionality theory that takes into account feminist subjectivities, mem-
ories, and emotions, not only identity politics, and therefore that orients our 
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inquiry toward an exploration of the moral dilemmas, political conflicts, and 
emotional stakes in feminist intersectional politics. In this vein, I propose an 
approach focused on the processes of political subjectivation that are trig-
gered by debates over veiling and about Islam, race, and gender, which aims 
at grasping simultaneously the political, emotional, and moral dimensions of 
feminists’ engagement— through separatism, coalition, or exclusion— with 
their collective political project. I argue that feminist debates and conflicts— 
sustained by specific emotions— are political, but they are also moral: they 
help define what is a “good” feminist subject and what is the right type of 
feminism to adopt. Because feminism is both a political and a moral project, 
our analysis of feminist divisions must explore both dimensions and their 
articulation. The moral dimension of these debates is all the more important 
in that, in fact, it is connected with the political and sociological dimensions 
of these issues. We must thus ask: how does the context of recurring crises 
over veiling and postcolonial issues shape specific forms of feminist political 
subjectivations in Europe? The following chapters explore this question by 
investigating the political subjectivations of white and nonwhite feminists in 
different contexts.
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 Race, Religion, and Gender
Feminist Intersectional Politics in “Postsecular” Times
Feminism is a project concerned with differences:  differences between 
women and differences between feminists. However, what differences will 
be the objects of theorizing and political conflicts or alliances depends on 
the context in which feminist activism and thought are deployed. The sali-
ence of differences, their potential to disrupt hegemonic feminist discourses 
and to shape feminist political subjectivations, therefore varies, and for each 
historical and social context we must analyze which differences are made to 
matter for feminist praxis, while others are ignored or sidelined, and with 
what consequences for the feminist project. The intersection of racialization, 
migration status, religion, and gender in contemporary Europe has created 
a specific political configuration for feminist movements, marked by the 
instrumentalization and co- optation of gender equality in the implementa-
tion of anti- immigrant policies,1 but also marked by a resurgence of older 
political and moral questions about women’s emancipation and the proper 
feminist subject. While race matters deeply in understanding the dynamics 
of feminist praxis and coalitions, it is intimately tied up with postcolonialism, 
immigration, and religion, more precisely Islam. How does this specific 
configuration, which characterizes many European democracies, shape 
the feminist politics of intersectionality in these contexts? And what can 
a careful analysis of this complex dynamics bring to our understanding of 
intersectionality?
This chapter analyzes the intersectional politics of contemporary feminism 
in France and Quebec, two contexts that share similarities— notwithstanding 
differences— and that reveal processes that are also unfolding in other 
European countries. To do so I explore a set of public debates rearticulating 
issues of gender equality and secularism— which, following Joan W. Scott’s 
neologism, I will call “sexularism” debates2— that occurred in both contexts, 
tracing the elaboration of specific articulations between racialization, reli-
gion, migration/ national identity, and gender; and I map how feminists from 
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various strands participated in them. I expose the variety of positions and 
arguments that diverse women’s rights organizations elaborated during these 
debates, insisting on how the voices and interests located at the intersection 
of gender and racial/ postcolonial/ migrant/ religious identities have been 
silenced or misrepresented, while also emphasizing the plurality of voices 
that emerged despite the dichotomous dominant framings of the debates. 
While sexularism debates have produced profound divides within the 
French feminist movement and the sharp decline of one of its main umbrella 
organizations, in Quebec the main women’s rights coalition has moved for-
ward despite important tensions. The fact that in Quebec a feminist coalition 
was sustainable and that dominantly white feminist grassroots organizations 
took positions against femonationalism, while this was not the case in France, 
suggests that we must examine what makes some contexts more conducive to 
inclusive and critical intersectional feminist politics. I highlight in particular 
in this chapter how the strength of racialized women’s self- organizing, the 
history of women’s organizations (especially the history of their relationships 
with other radical social movements), and the history of their institutional 
involvement in addressing racism and racial differences shape the political 
responses that feminist coalitions can elaborate in troubled times.
Finally, I also interrogate the specificity of the current postsecular context 
regarding intersectional politics within feminism. As discourses about Islam 
play an increasingly political role in Europe through political debates on 
women’s rights, we must try to understand the dynamics that they create for 
intersectional groups and for feminist politics. I argue that the renewed focus 
on Islam, rather than race or migration, produces a twofold process, in the 
public sphere in general but in particular for feminist public discourses and 
praxis. First, the religious dimension of these debates (rather than the focus 
on immigration that characterized the 1980s and early 1990s) shapes fem-
inist engagements with intersectionality in specific ways because it revives 
the question of who is a “good” feminist subject and what feminist emanci-
pation and agency should mean. Second, the tight articulation between sec-
ularism and national identity in both contexts, which is the product of more 
than two decades of public debates about religious accommodation and the 
“integration” of Islam in the national body politic,3 means that discourses 
about gender and secularism contribute to defining the boundaries of na-
tional identity. Hence, while there is a process of “racing religion”4 that is 
surely taking place with regards to Islam in the postcolonial West, we must 
remain attentive to the specificity that comes with the religious dimension 
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of Muslims’ identities as they are socially constructed in the West, which 
inflects racialization. The fact that those debates and the intersectional pol-
itics they trigger concern an identity also perceived as religious means that 
nationalism is reasserted not through “culture” but through secularism, 
thereby bolstering a set of moral and political discourses about female eman-
cipation that influence feminists’ discourses.
Racialization, Religion, and National Identity: The New 
Face of Women’s Rights
Questions today addressed under the label of intersectionality are not new to 
feminist theory or feminist praxis.5 While the concept of intersectionality has 
contributed in unique ways to make visible structural relations of power, es-
pecially within feminist movements, its predecessors— terms such as “triple 
oppression” or “double jeopardy,” also coined by feminists of color— similarly 
highlighted differences, inequalities, and oppression within women’s 
movements. These terms challenged white privilege, racism, misrepresen-
tation of racialized women’s identities and interests,6 and false universalism 
within the women’s movements, and they also fostered a sense of identity 
and specific ways to organize and to think feminist praxis among women 
of color, postcolonial / Third World women, and migrant women.7 In that 
perspective, questions now raised thanks to the concept of intersectionality 
are intrinsic and inherent to feminist theory, and certainly not new or mar-
ginal.8 However, each historical, social, and political context raises new in-
tersectional issues and questions— and old issues in new ways— for feminist 
movements. Identifying what is new and what is not, and what are the spe-
cific configurations that intersectional issues and struggles take at a certain 
moment in time in a certain context, helps us understand how dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion evolve within feminist movements, and how feminist 
activists frame and respond to these processes. It also matters for the study of 
social movements, which is only beginning to explore how intersectionality 
shapes social movement dynamics of identity, separatism, and coalition.9
In this vein, I use in this chapter an intersectional approach to analyze 
how structures of power have shaped the dominant framings of policy 
debates on race, migration, and religion as well as the positions taken by 
a diversity of feminist organizations in these public controversies, in two 
contexts, France and Quebec, since the beginning of the 2000s. Muslim 
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and racialized women have occupied center stage in the debates about sec-
ularism and Islam, the accommodation of religious differences linked to 
Islam, and the “integration” of immigrants and their children into national 
hegemonic cultural values. Indeed, in the past two decades a distinctive 
nexus articulating immigration, ethnicity, religion, and class has formed in 
many European countries. The racialization of Muslim religious identities, 
which overlaps with the racialization of migrants and their children,10 has 
occurred in part through a series of public debates on Muslim and immi-
grant women: veiling, arranged and forced marriages, and female genital 
mutilations have been discussed in the European public spheres,11 with 
policy or judicial outcomes detrimental to migrant/ Muslim women’s rights 
and concrete lives.12 In these two contexts, dominant framings of the public 
debates on veiling and religious accommodation have invisibilized and mar-
ginalized racialized women, especially Muslim women, as political and fem-
inist subjects, while hypervisibilizing them as objects of public policies— a 
process typical of the contemporary intersectional politics targeting women 
of color in Europe.13 The ways in which gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and 
nationality intersect varies depending on each national context, but at the 
European level, these debates on Islamic veils have contributed to a shared 
perception by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and polit-
ical actors of the European public sphere that there is an incompatibility 
between gender and diversity, which demands either the abandonment of 
diversity or the end of gender equality claims.14
Islam in Europe today is a cultural product intimately shaped by 
postcolonialism, racism, restrictive migratory policies, the “civic” turn in 
immigrant integration policy,15 right- wing populist nationalism, and what 
Fatima El- Tayeb has named the “European narrative of racelessness.”16 It is 
therefore tightly articulated with processes of racialization and the politics 
of race in Europe. This is evident in the cross- fertilization of policy debates 
on immigrant integration, the regulation of Islam, citizenship and racial dis-
crimination, and the multiple slippages in legal discourses from one domain 
to the next. However, it is also important to underline that religion cannot 
completely be subsumed under race as an analytical category and as a source 
of discrimination and social marginalization.
How are we to make sense of the specific religious dimension of these 
debates in an intersectional framework of analysis? Indeed, the focalization 
on religious beliefs and behaviors, especially those of Muslim women, can 
lend itself to a form of culturalism17 that invisibilizes how race, class and 
Race, Religion, and Gender 49
migration status shape the politics of secularism and religion. Hence it is im-
portant to specify how the politics of religious difference is both different 
from and articulated by the politics of race and migration.
Critical scholarship on secularism has pointed to the association of sec-
ularism with Western modernity and sexual freedom, and its intimate link 
with colonial discourses on Muslim men.18 Hence the configuration of secu-
larism, Islam, and gender politics is a historical formation specific to Western 
and European contexts that provides legitimate tropes in the public space. 
In particular, the discourse of secularism provides specific legal tools to reg-
ulate behavior deemed improper. With these legal tools— banning forms of 
Islamic veiling and religious practices— secularism can destabilize human 
rights discourses and erode antiracist and anti- Islamophobia efforts. In par-
ticular, it can divide traditional antiracist movements by operating a dis-
tinction between racism based on illegitimate racial categorizations, and 
secularism, what sociologist Nacira Guénif- Souilamas has termed a “vir-
tuous racism,”19 which supposedly fosters the integration of religious minor-
ities. The political will to regulate Islam and its perceived “difference” thus 
leads to new discourses about secularism20 that allow a continuing mar-
ginalization of racialized groups from migrant descent despite their formal 
belonging to the nation- state.
The historical connection of secularism with nation- building also allows 
for the expansion of femonationalism by associating gender equality not only 
with the West and modernity, but also with national identity. Indeed, secu-
larism is historically closely linked with the state and organizes the bound-
aries of citizenship and inclusion in the national community. It is therefore 
no surprise that religion, especially the religion of colonial and postcolo-
nial subjects in the case of France, should activate discourses and policies 
that enact the policing of national identity boundaries,21 and that headscarf 
debates perform the exclusion of veiled Muslim women from European na-
tional imaginaries.22 The legislations banning Islamic religious symbols in 
several European countries have operated a resignification of secularism 
that excludes European Muslims from citizenship, at the cost of bending and 
curtailing fundamental rights and the existing legal framework organizing 
the regulation of religious beliefs and practices.23 This is especially true in 
France, admittedly the liberal democracy that has gone the furthest in the 
attempt to restrict the public expression of Islamic faith, equating state neu-
trality with the invisibility of religion (especially Islam), and thus organizing 
its disappearance from public spaces. In that sense, race and Muslimness 
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are categories of difference that are, in contemporary Europe, heavily 
coconstructed, but which do not totally overlap.
What is more, for a majority of white, nonimmigrant feminists, and also 
for some racialized feminists in both France and beyond in Europe and 
in Quebec, religion, contrary to race, raises the issue of faith— that is, a 
form of submission to a religious authority— and therefore also the issue 
of women’s agency and emancipation in potent ways.24 Religion, contrary 
to race, therefore lends itself to moral discourses and boundary work that 
police the frontiers of good and bad feminist subjects, emancipated agents 
and oppressed women. This boundary work does not neatly follow the lines 
of racial categorizations. French Muslim women and girls from migration 
descent who adhere to secularism and modernity discourses may receive 
benefits from their conformity to majority norms.25 More largely, debates 
over Islamic religious symbols raise the question of the relationship be-
tween the state and organized religions, and therefore, in countries such 
as France and in Quebec with a long history of struggle between the state 
and the Catholic Church for social hegemony, the question of who should 
emancipate/ protect individuals from religious influence.26 This history of 
virtuous feminist struggle against the Catholic Church bolsters feminists’ 
moral claims and righteousness in their opposition to Islamic religious 
practice.27
If there is a denial of racism in many corners of white women’s movements 
in many contexts both in the United States and elsewhere, there is also a his-
toric commitment by most white feminist movements to fight against racism, 
and there is historical evidence of coalitions to support immigrant women’s 
rights in the 1980s and 1990s in many countries (more on this below). Hence, 
race does not elicit from white (and racialized) feminists the exact public 
emotions and political responses as religion does. Of course, reactions to re-
ligious Islamic practices are heavily shaped by racism and, in Europe at least, 
by colonial history and discourses. However, I argue that we must also be at-
tentive to these other factors, such as feminists’ understanding of emancipa-
tion and religious agency, which have contributed to frame specific debates 
and political responses within feminist organizations on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In order to grasp how racialized Muslim women’s voices, identities, 
and interests were silenced and misrepresented, or on the contrary reclaimed 
and championed, by a variety of white and nonwhite feminists in these 
debates, I thus argue that we must take seriously the fact that these debates 
are shaped by racism and Islamophobia and by secularism, understood as a 
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set of political and moral discourses defining oppressed and emancipated fe-
male subjects, and tied to exclusionary visions of national identity.
My aim in the next sections is not to expose in detail the various sexularism 
debates that have occurred since the beginning of the twenty- first century in 
France and Quebec. Many scholars have told most of these stories, explored 
the different framings mobilized by various sets of actors, and showed how 
historical racial and postcolonial formations pervaded the debates (despite 
the “neutral” focus on religion) and how the boundaries of secularism and of 
the national community have been contracted through a constant recourse 
to the value of sex equality, now culturally assigned to the liberal (Christian 
and white) West and opposed to barbaric orientalized others.28 For instance, 
scholars have focused on the legal and political meaning of secularism,29 
and of national models of integration30 in the two countries, with different 
interpretations of fundamental rights,31 and different relationships between 
national and supranational courts.32 France and Quebec also differ in the 
local spread of right- wing populism and its electoral effects on other political 
parties, and in the relative powerlessness of antidiscrimination agencies— to 
cite just a few other important elements determining the policy outcomes 
of these debates. Furthermore, these two national contexts display different 
“immigrant integration models”:  that is, distinct politics of race and dif-
ferent regulations to accommodate cultural and religious difference.33 While 
Quebec remains in the ambit of Canadian multiculturalism and therefore 
promotes the visibility of ethnic and immigrant communities through public 
policy tools, France has sustained a color- blind approach to public policies34 
and a “civic” approach to immigrant integration. Nor do France and Quebec 
have similar histories of colonization. Quebec was founded on colonial set-
tlement, which seized indigenous lands and oppressed indigenous peoples 
living where Quebec established its territory.35 At the same time, its fran-
cophone population was also dominated culturally until the 1970s by their 
Anglophone compatriots, intimidating them into “speaking white,” that is, 
English. Hence, the burst of debates on Islamic religious practices and the de-
velopment of Islamophobia in the two contexts do not have similar historical 
roots, even if the French discourse on secularism has found profound echoes 
in the Quebecois public sphere.36
The goal of this chapter is not to survey all the factors that explain how 
these debates have unfolded differently for feminists in the two contexts. 
Rather, it is, more modestly, to chart the terrain of intersectionality politics, 
discursive and political, that women’s rights organizations in France and 
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Quebec have had to navigate, and to the formation of which they have also 
contributed in important ways. These two countries have feminist traditions 
that share important commonalities and ties, but very different histories of 
institutionalization and coalitions among the various strands of the move-
ment. Here I identify actors, arguments, and chronologies that have altered 
the landscape of women’s rights activism since the 2000s, fueling or resisting 
the rise of femonationalism in both countries. As I explore in more depth the 
factors that have led to contrasting strategies and alliances of major feminist 
players in response to these sexularism policy initiatives in both contexts— 
that is, a profound division within French feminist national coalitions, 
and a protracted but still workable coalition in Quebec despite important 
tensions— we gain insights into how feminists have articulated the moral and 
political issues that legislating veiling practices has triggered for them. This is 
the background against which the feminist political subjectivations that I ex-
plore in the next chapters must be contextualized and understood.
Feminist Tensions in Quebec
I start with the less notorious case of Quebec, which has witnessed, since the 
mid- 2000s, a continuous string of public debates about religious accommo-
dation, secularism, and the place of gender equality among the values that 
Quebec should promote as a nation, culminating in 2017 with a law (Bill 
62) on religious neutrality aimed at preventing forms of face and head cov-
ering, mostly for users and agents of public services.37 To get a sense of how 
the political terrain has shifted in the past decades, it is useful to remember 
first that Quebec, while a Canadian province, conceives itself more as a na-
tion. This conception is of course contested, inside and outside Quebec, but 
the Quebecois state has often been ruled by one of Quebec’s most important 
political forces, the Quebecois Party, which openly favors Quebec’s sover-
eignty and independence from Canada. During these periods of nationalist 
rule, Quebec has adopted laws that favor the French language, and has fought 
to gain federal political competences, for example on immigration, that no 
other Canadian province has. What is more, because of its distinctive rela-
tion to the rest of Canada, Quebec also opposed early on the development 
of Canadian multiculturalist policies, proposing its own version of immi-
grant integration and ethnocultural communities policies under the label 
interculturalism.38 Hence Quebecois nationalism, in opposition to Canadian 
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federalism and multiculturalism, is an important component of Quebecois 
political life, and a dynamic that has influenced the way in which secularism 
and Islam have been debated.
Like many liberal states with an immigrant population, Quebec was faced 
early on with political debates and legal discussion over the accommodation 
of religious difference, including the Islamic veil. In 1995, the Commission 
des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Provincial Human 
Rights Commission) convened to reflect on religious pluralism in Quebec 
made recommendations on the wearing of Islamic veils in public schools, 
a clear reference to the debate burgeoning in France.39 While no case had 
been publicized or brought to court, the commission examined the issue 
and stated unambiguously that prohibiting the hijab in public schools would 
amount to direct discrimination on the basis of religion if the prohibition 
targeted the hijab only, or to indirect discrimination if the rule was to forbid 
in neutral terms specific types of garment that would include the hijab. The 
commission added that such a prohibition would also be contrary to the re-
ligious freedom protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and contrary 
to Canada’s international commitment to the UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. Finally, the commission also pointed out that 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence had developed the obligation 
of reasonable accommodation as an important addition to formal equality— 
that is, a positive duty to accommodate difference— and that the hijab in 
public schools met the desired criteria for such a positive accommodation. 
All in all, this public recommendation did not raise objections, and Quebec 
seemed firmly anchored on the liberal side of secularism, protecting religious 
freedom and the right to education. However, this political consensus proved 
fragile as it was tested by a succession of debates in the following decade.
Sexularism controversies first appeared in 2004 at the margins of the 
Quebecois public space, in Ontario, when some key players in the Canadian 
feminist movements engaged in a legal battle against procedures of alterna-
tive dispute resolution using religious principles for family issues. Despite 
an independent review process on religious arbitration that recognized the 
necessity of accommodating and monitoring religious arbitration practices 
rather than prohibiting them, Ontario’s premier took a position against 
“sharia courts” in the fall of 2005. The Ontario Arbitration Act of 1991 was 
revised in February 2006 in order to ban the use of any religious principle 
when arbitrating family matters, and Ontarian family law was revised to 
introduce legal safeguards for alternative dispute resolution procedures.40 
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While some feminist voices clearly stated their opposition to this framing of 
the debate and the resulting policy outcome, they were marginalized in the 
public sphere.41 Also to be noted is that among the opposition to religious 
arbitration were several important organizations of Muslim women that, de-
spite internal dissent over the issue, favored a ban, which seemed, in their 
view, to better protect devout and nondevout Muslim women.42
Echoes of the Ontarian debate filtered to Quebec, in particular with a 
point of debate introduced at the Quebecois Parliament by MP Fatima 
Houda- Pépin to forbid the establishment of religious tribunals in Quebec 
and Canada. The point was debated and adopted symbolically by the 
Quebecois National Assembly.43 Many Quebecois women’s rights activists 
and the provincial women’s rights federation, the Fédération des femmes 
du Québec (FFQ), followed the debate in Ontario and identified religious 
arbitration as a typical excess of Canadian multiculturalist policies that had 
to be circumvented, and lent their support to the No Religious Arbitration 
Coalition. However, this was only the prequel to a wider public storm de-
bating reasonable accommodations, which would contribute to redefining 
Quebec’s conception of nationhood and secularism.44
Indeed, in February 2007, Quebec’s premier, Jean Charest, nominated two 
important Quebecois public figures, Gérard Bouchard, francophone sociol-
ogist, and Charles Taylor, anglophone philosopher, to constitute a consulta-
tive commission (the Bouchard- Taylor Commission) that would deliver to 
the Quebecois government a series of recommendations on accommodation 
practices related to cultural differences in Quebec. The creation of this com-
mission was meant to assuage anxieties about the supposed proliferation of 
religious accommodation claims in the province.45 While sex equality did 
not figure as an issue in the controversial court cases regarding religious 
accommodation that originated in Quebec,46 things changed rapidly as 
women’s rights organizations voiced their concern that sex equality should 
figure more centrally as a national value to be fostered.47 This point of view 
was backed up by Quebec’s premier when he stated, as he announced the cre-
ation of the Bouchard- Taylor Commission, that the “Québécois Nation has 
values, solid values, that is: equality between women and men, primacy of the 
French language and the separation between Church and State.”48 Important 
provincial women’s rights institutions, such as the Conseil du statut de la 
femme (the provincial women’s policy agency), pressed for the inclusion of 
gender equality issues in the discussion, as did intersectional groups such as 
No One Is Illegal– Montréal— although in opposition, as they criticized as 
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racist and sexist the dominant feminist framing of the debate pitting women’s 
rights against ethnic and religious communities.49 The centering of women’s 
rights in the public debate about reasonable accommodation led Quebecois 
MPs to propose and adopt Bill 63, amending the Quebecois Charter of Rights 
to include a sex equality clause on June 10, 2008.50
This act was more than anything a symbolic gesture, as gender equality was 
already entrenched in the Quebecois Charter.51 But it was also the public le-
gitimation of a dominant framing of the debate, one in which women’s rights 
and gender equality should be given a prominent place in the legal order, 
above the right to religious freedom. The attempt to organize a hierarchy of 
rights, which is contrary to the nature and aim of the Quebecois Charter, 
displays the typical feature of sexularism debates:  a dichotomous under-
standing of women’s rights as opposed to minority/ religious rights, a belief 
that secularism is inherently propitious to gender equality, and a framing of 
migrants and Muslims as adhering to backward values incompatible with the 
democratic nature and values of the national community.
However, enshrining sex equality in the Quebecois Charter of Rights did 
not put an end to the debate. Quite the contrary, the Bouchard- Taylor report, 
made public in 2008, was vividly contested from all corners of Quebecois so-
ciety, including in some feminist ranks. Here again, what started as a question 
of punctual religious accommodation became, quite consciously— since the 
mission of the Bouchard- Taylor Commission was framed in these terms— a 
province- wide debate on national identity, immigrant integration, and the 
limits of tolerance. The liberal government, trying not to lose too much elec-
toral ground to an emerging right- wing populist party52 and to the nation-
alist Quebecois Party, decided to legislate on religious accommodation with 
the project Bill 94, introduced by Minister of Justice Kathleen Veil, which, 
among other measures, introduced in ambiguous terms the requirement for 
public service employees, and potentially for clients, to have their faces un-
covered.53 The occasion to introduce the bill was found with a concrete case, 
that of Naima Atef Ahmed, who had been expelled from French language 
classes in Montreal on the grounds of wearing a niqab and who lodged a com-
plaint with the Quebec Human Rights Commission in March 2010.54 During 
the lengthy consultation process in the provincial parliament, many feminist 
organizations were called and voiced different concerns and positions on the 
bill, as I detail below. The parliamentary debate was finally closed in the fall of 
2011 with no vote, since the Liberal Party feared that the Canadian Supreme 
Court might overrule the bill.
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This absence of definite closure to the debate left the door open for the na-
tionalist Quebecois Party to take on the issue for electoral purposes in 2012 
and to campaign on a project of a Charte de la laïcité (Secularism Charter). 
Its victory in the fall 2012 legislative elections led to the opening of parlia-
mentary debate on Bill 60, introduced in 2013 by the nationalist government, 
proposing the Charte des valeurs (Charter of Quebecois Values), a name 
deemed more proper for the project at hand of redefining the boundaries of 
the Quebecois political community around core values, including secularism 
and gender equality. Hence, the debate on the Charte des valeurs was, as in 
many European countries, a debate about the boundaries of national iden-
tity.55 Religious difference was heavily racialized, focusing on Muslims and 
attributed to migrants that had failed to interiorize the values of the province. 
The Quebecois Party’s severe defeat in the general elections of spring 2014 
put an end to these legislative attempts. The Liberal Party, back in power, 
was aware of the complex nature of any claim to redefine the legal grounds 
of Quebec’s secularism in the context of Canadian federalism and the lib-
eral jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court with respect to religious 
freedom.56 It therefore proceeded with more caution and at a slower pace. 
A bill was introduced in June 2015, with debates and public consultations 
beginning only in the fall of 2016. With the Quebecois Party agitating na-
tionalist issues in the public sphere, and a vast majority of the public opinion 
in favor of what it perceived as an act to finally regulate and put a limit on 
reasonable accommodations for religious minorities,57 the conditions were 
met for the Quebecois National Assembly to act. Although the debates 
lasted for more than a year, and although the vote was not an overwhelming 
one (with sixty- six deputies in favor of the ban and fifty- five against), the 
law was passed on October 18, 2017. It states that public servants and many 
employees working in parapublic institutions and publicly funded bodies— 
such as day care centers— must work with their face visible, and that users of 
public services (which include public transportation) must also unveil for 
identification or service provision (an interpretation of the law concerning 
users of public service is so far wanting). The law preserves the possibility of 
reasonable accommodation if the accommodation that is requested “respects 
the right to women and men’s equality.”58 In a typical double- standard ra-
tionale about minority and majority religion, the law states that Christian 
religious symbols, such as the cross still hanging in the Quebecois National 
Assembly “blue room,” are not susceptible to being forbidden in the name of 
state neutrality.
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It took longer in Quebec to redefine legally the nature and scope of sec-
ularism, and the law finally adopted is less stringent than those in France 
(and is still on hold as it faces judicial review); however, these public debates 
and legal regulations have not been without consequences for women’s rights 
organizations. Quite the contrary, they have contributed to the surfacing 
and development of tensions and of reconfigurations of the movements. In 
particular, a chasm emerged starting in 2008 between on the one hand the 
Quebecois women’s policy agency, the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF)— 
a nominally independent body but a close ally of the Quebecois government 
(and funded as a governmental agency)— and on the other hand the lar-
gest umbrella organization of women’s rights centers and organizations in 
Quebec, the FFQ, as well as organizations self- identified as run by and for 
women from ethnic minorities, such as the South- Asian Women’s Center of 
Montreal (SAWC).59 SAWC insisted that women’s rights implied their right 
to wear a headscarf and practice their religion and that diversity should be 
nurtured in Quebec. At the opposite of the spectrum of positions on the issue 
of veiling in public institutions, the CSF opted for a framing opposing in 
radical terms religious accommodation and women’s rights, and promoted 
a muscular version of secularism— as opposed to the “open secularism” 
encouraged by the Bouchard- Taylor report. While the CSF started with a 
middle- ground position— interrogating the question of women’s rights in a 
context of diversity of faiths— with a conference organized in 2006, the same 
year, the nomination of its new head, Christiane Pelchat, a former MP from 
the Liberal Party, legal scholar, and strong advocate in favor of secularism, 
led to a hardening of the CSF line.60 It interpreted the role of religion and of 
ostentatious religious symbols such as full veils as vehicles for patriarchy and 
women’s oppression in unambiguous ways, arguing that a naked face is, in 
Quebec, a protection against patriarchal religious traditions and the best way 
to protect women’s rights.61 The position of the CSF displays all the tropes 
familiar to sexularism debates. Veiling is understood as a sign of oppression 
and secularism identified as the natural ally of women’s rights under attack 
by Islamic religious fundamentalism. The CSF calls for the state to protect 
public order, which means that it
cannot tolerate that some individuals renounce to their right to human dig-
nity. In our opinion the argument of a willful consent must be rejected for 
all act that is opposed to human dignity, including those accomplished in 
the name of a religious belief.62
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As early as 2007, and clearly borrowing from the new French secularist vo-
cabulary, the CSF demanded that the Quebecois state prohibit the wearing 
of any ostentatious religious symbols63 by civil servants and representatives 
of the state. While the CSF declared all religions as women’s potential enemy, 
using examples of far- right Christians and evangelists in Canada along with 
examples of Muslims in its 2011 opinion on secularism, its lengthy discus-
sion on the history and nature of secularism interestingly ends with a devel-
opment on interculturalism, the Quebecois model of immigrant integration, 
thereby shifting the grounds of discussion from the relationship between the 
state and religions to the issue of migrant integration and (excessive) cultural 
difference.64 In a typical cross- fertilization of public debates, in 2008 Quebec 
adopted a declaration that immigrants must sign a statement upon arrival in 
which they affirm their adhesion to Quebecois values, including a recogni-
tion that “political and religious powers are separated in Quebec . . . women 
and men have the same rights.”65
In the case of Quebec, numerous references to Quebec’s Catholic past 
and the identification of the struggle for women’s rights with the Révolution 
tranquille (the Quiet Revolution, which led to the secularization of Quebecois 
society and the rise of Quebec nationalism) are meant to assert that women’s 
rights are strongly tied to what is perceived as a Quebecois model of secu-
larism that has pushed the church out of the public sphere and out of polit-
ical institutions.66 This narrative is all the more evocative in that Quebec’s 
identity as a nation, not as a province, is based on its long- lasting opposi-
tion to anglophone Canada, not only as a territory with a linguistic difference 
but as a nation with different views on nationhood and immigrant integra-
tion. Quebec’s rejection of the Canadian Charter of Rights, which enshrined 
in its section 27 the value of multiculturalism, indicated its opposition to a 
certain model of race relations and immigrant integration. In this context, 
Quebecois secularism has been defined during the reasonable accommoda-
tion debate as a model opposed to Canadian multiculturalism, one in which 
multiculturalism’s excesses of tolerance are limited by state power through 
the refusal to accommodate religion’s visibility in public spaces and religious 
practices in public institutions.67
While the CSF adhered to a nationalist narrative of secularism as freeing 
women and implying that Islamic veiling practices should be forbidden 
in public institutions, the FFQ tried to articulate a position that would 
not pit women’s rights against religious freedom— a position that would 
not alienate those of its members who strongly adhered to the Quebecois 
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nationalist project, and that would not fuel rampant Islamophobia. As the 
FFQ’s 2007 position paper for the Bouchard- Taylor consultations argued in 
its introduction:
The defense of the principle of equality between women and men should 
not and cannot be used to elaborate a racist discourse against immigrants 
belonging to specific religious communities (such as Muslim and Jewish 
communities). In other words, the instrumentalization of feminism cannot 
cover up racism.68
The FFQ’s position advocated an inclusive feminism that does not presup-
pose that religious freedom is the enemy of women’s rights.69 This position 
was a complex move for the FFQ, given the proximity it had developed 
during the 1990s to the nationalist Quebecois Party, a party that now claimed 
a muscular version of secularism and flirted with a populist antimigrant dis-
course.70 The FFQ also pointed to the implicit link between racism, migra-
tion, and religion, used by the CSF and many Quebecois politicians to argue 
against multiculturalism. Instead, for example, in a document to its mem-
bership in 2009 the FFQ remarked that the CSF’s proposal to ban ostenta-
tious religious symbols would disparately impact Muslim women wearing 
the veil and added: “This question is being asked in a context in which mi-
grant and racialized women and non- veiled Muslim women . . . are already 
underrepresented in our public administration. Shouldn’t we fight for the 
improvement of their integration and their representation?”71 In its public 
statements the FFQ always clearly linked its discourse on secularism with 
the Quebecois social context marked by racism and systemic discrimination 
against immigrant women.
As many of the FFQ’s publications claim, its implication during the 
1990s with the organization of the World March of Women and its estab-
lishment of an internal committee representing women from cultural com-
munities in 2003 had contributed to an increased awareness of differences 
among women and of discrimination against racialized women among 
the FFQ members.72 The framing that the FFQ developed was therefore 
oriented toward the idea of a “feminist secularism” (laïcité feministe) 
that takes into consideration intersectionality. However, the FFQ distin-
guished between accommodating religious symbols in public service, such 
as clients wearing a niqab, and the wearing of the niqab by public service 
employees, which it rejected (a point criticized by organizations such as 
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SAWC). Not surprisingly, the FFQ position— summarized by “no obliga-
tion (to wear the veil) no prohibition”— which aimed at critiquing reli-
gious fundamentalism’s treatment of women’s rights and, at the same time, 
at supporting women’s right to choose their faith and the degree to which 
they want to practice it, was not easy to reach among the constituency of 
the organization and proved constantly contested during the following 
decade.73 Some members left the FFQ, accusing it of being infiltrated by 
Islamists, and interpreted the FFQ’s position on religious accommoda-
tion as a betrayal of the nationalist secular project that the FFQ had sup-
posedly historically endorsed for Quebecois society. They expressed their 
grievances in vivid terms, lamenting the silencing of their secular voices in-
side the organization and contesting the accusations of racism that targeted 
them. A typical narrative of the tensions that characterized the 2013 Estate 
Generals of the FFQ, published by an ex- member of the FFQ, opposes the 
historical commitment of the FFQ to defend “all women” and a common 
project for Quebecois society with particular divisive religious claims 
aiming at leveling differences at the expense of gender and the fight against 
patriarchy.74 Interestingly, in this narrative the author regards the term 
“intersectionality” as akin to the Marxist claim in the 1970s Quebecois fem-
inist movement that class should be taken into account— that is, as a dan-
gerous, divisive difference. Use of the term “racialized” instead of “women 
from migrant and cultural communities” in the official vocabulary of the 
organization is interpreted as a form of propaganda to “guilt white women.” 
The obvious moral overtones of this discourse display well- known features 
of white feminists’ resistance to antiracist discourse:  claiming the need 
to universalize the feminist subject and interpreting identity politics by 
women of color as divisive, and refusing to acknowledge responsibility for 
white privilege.75
Hence, in Quebec, while sexularism debates gave rise to clear tensions 
among feminists, the umbrella organization representing the leadership 
of the movement opted for accommodation and articulated an analysis 
that placed Muslim women at the center of the policy issue— rather than 
the “protection” of the supposedly Quebecois value of gender equality. 
The FFQ’s reaction to the 2017 ban in public service illustrates its ability 
to denounce the racism and Islamophobia inherent to the law, and to ar-
ticulate the fight against racism as a primary feminist concern. The vice 
president of the FFQ at the time, Marlihan Lopez, reacted to the law in the 
following terms:
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While only a very small number of women wear the niqab or the burqa 
here in Quebec, this law affects all women. It is a feminist issue because this 
“religious neutrality” law, which pretends to have as its overt goal ensuring 
women’s security and promoting their liberation, in fact only produces the 
exclusion of a specific group of women from the public space, and therefore 
their marginalization. Law 62 victimizes some women and makes them 
vulnerable to gendered violence.76
Hence, in the end, the FFQ managed to articulate a critical position against 
femonationalism and denounce the instrumentalization of women’s rights 
while also pointing to the harm done to pious Muslim women by the law. This 
is not to suggest that the feminist movement in Quebec is homogeneous and 
deprived of tensions. Quite the contrary, racialized women’s organizations 
have their own organizations, and created their own umbrella committee, the 
“committee of women from diverse origins,” in 2002. However, this separate 
committee was not spurred by debates over veiling or religious accommoda-
tion. Rather, it arose from the desire to self- represent as a component of the 
Quebecois feminist movement, and it has not meant a break in the collabora-
tion with the FFQ. While, as I will detail in  chapter 5, many self- identified in-
tersectional and racialized Quebecois feminists were not satisfied with how 
the FFQ handled the debate, it is nonetheless notable, especially when one 
compares the situation in France, as I do below, that the FFQ did distance 
itself from the national narrative of secularism implying the invisibility of 
(minority) religious symbols, and from the discourse using the fight against 
sexism to legitimize anti- Muslim and racist policies. What can account for 
the FFQ’s ability to keep a critical distance from femonationalist discourses?
Remaining Critical
How can a “mainstream” and mostly white women’s rights coalition such as 
the FFQ maintain a critical distance from femonationalist discourses in the 
context of increased Islamophobia in the public sphere? What type of femi-
nist practice and legacy leads a majority of nonracialized feminist organiza-
tions to adopt an intersectional perspective and discourse? The literature on 
feminist movements and intersectional coalitions delineates various factors 
that foster the adoption of intersectionality, as well as various strategies that 
minority women’s organizations or “mainstream” women’s organizations 
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deploy to achieve their political goals, strategies that can foster or impede co-
alition politics across differences.77 Among the factors that might foster co-
alition politics, a central one is the acknowledgment of power relationships 
among participants in the coalitions. Such acknowledgment may take various 
institutional forms, such as separate commissions, veto power, commitment 
to descriptive representation of marginalized groups,78 and antiracism work 
inside feminist organizations. While the acknowledgment of power relations 
leading to the institutionalization of dissent, separatism, or descriptive rep-
resentation inside a coalition is certainly necessary for it to maintain itself 
in an inclusive way without suppressing conflicts or excluding differences, 
one may wonder what factors explain the adoption of these practices in the 
first place. What makes feminist organizations aware that they should ac-
knowledge power relations along lines of race, religion, or migration status? 
A first answer that the Quebecois case highlights is the strength of racialized 
women’s self- organizing. The power relations between racialized/ immigrant 
women’s organizations and white women’s organizations will determine in 
great part the ability and willingness of feminist coalitions among these ac-
tors to adopt inclusive practices. Indeed, the ability of racialized/ immigrant 
feminists to self- organize in Quebec since the 1980s has provided them with 
an institutional support structure, funding, and a public voice in Quebecois 
feminism that has put them in the position of deciding their own terms for 
their collaboration with white feminists. This has not been the case in France, 
for example, and I develop in more detail the consequences of this ability 
to self- organize, or not, for racialized feminists’ political subjectivations in 
 chapter 5.
I propose to analyze more closely two other and interrelated historical 
legacies that, I argue, influence the FFQ’s ability to remain critical during 
sexularism debates. The first one is the historical legacy of the FFQ’s posi-
tion in the broader field of radical left protest politics— that is, the history 
of intermovement relations. A feminist coalition’s relation to other segments 
of the protest arena and formal politics shapes its organizational capacity to 
include differences.79 The second historical process that shapes a feminist 
coalition’s ability to adopt intersectionality is its history and memory of or-
ganizational relationships across racial differences. How were race and ethnic 
diversity historically articulated and addressed within white feminist organ-
izations in Quebec such as the FFQ? To answer this question we must retrace 
the history of the politicization of race within white and racialized feminists’ 
discourses. Of course, this history is also dependent on the strength of 
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racialized/ immigrant women’s self- organizing in each context, but it should 
not be reduced to it.
The FFQ is almost fifty years old, with historical roots in a reformist- liberal 
approach to feminism and, during the last decade has had on average a five- 
person permanent staff, important funding from the federal and the provin-
cial governments,80 and numerous individual (an average of three hundred) 
and organizational members (around two hundred during my fieldwork). 
FFQ members are, for the most part, grassroots women’s rights organiza-
tions, and the FFQ does not accept membership from political parties (or 
their women’s groups) but does accept union’s women’s committees. To un-
derstand the FFQ’s positions on the Islamic veil it is important to go back 
to its historical roots as a feminist organization, and to its relationship with 
other important actors in the field of protest politics.
The FFQ was founded by Thérèse Casgrain in 1966 to push for more 
women in Quebecois politics: twenty- five years after Quebecois women had 
been granted the right to vote, their absence in elected bodies called for more 
action. Initially a reformist, apolitical, and moderate organization with ties 
to the main Quebecois union, the Confédération des syndicats nationaux, 
the FFQ has lobbied for the creation of state feminist institutions in Quebec 
and issued numerous memoirs and reports on women’s condition in Quebec 
over the years. The FFQ evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, becoming more rad-
ical and more clearly in favor of Quebec’s independence. While during the 
Quiet Revolution the FFQ did not have ties with the radical Left and was 
closer to the Liberal Party (despite its formal commitment not to be politi-
cally identifiable with a specific party), in the 1980s, a crisis in the leadership 
and the continuing social mobilization around the constitutional status of 
Quebec within the Canadian federation altered the FFQ’s initial DNA.81 The 
ties of some of the members of the FFQ with the nationalist Parti Québécois 
contributed to changing the position of the FFQ, which, without pledging 
allegiance to any party, decided to affirm itself, in the name of Quebecois 
women’s interests, in favor of Quebec’s sovereignty.
Despite intense political involvement in the debates on Quebec’s political 
future, the economic crisis and the budget cuts initiated by the right- wing 
government in the first half of the 1990s negatively impacted the FFQ’s mem-
bership, then at one of the lowest points of its history. To remobilize feminists 
across the province, then FFQ president Françoise David organized a large 
Bread and Roses March in 1995, which drew media attention and mobi-
lized feminists around concrete demands directed toward the government, 
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especially alleviation of poverty. This provincial mobilization would morph, 
five years later, into the World March of Women, coordinated from Quebec 
with a team originating from the Bread and Roses March.82 This decade of 
intense activism drew more members to the FFQ and increased its public 
profile. In 2009, an anglophone self- identified lesbian and mother, Alexa 
Conradi, took over the leadership of the FFQ and therefore headed the or-
ganization through the turmoil of the charter debate.83 One of few anglo-
phone leaders of the FFQ and with an immigrant background (from Britain), 
as well as the first out lesbian to be president, she embodied the politicization 
and radicalization of the FFQ in the 2000s.84
The weakness of the radical Left in the 1970s in Quebec meant that the FFQ 
was not really challenged by a radical fringe. The more radical Québécois 
Front de Libération des Femmes, (Women’s Liberation Front, FLF, founded 
in 1969 and close to the Quebec nationalist party) sought alliances with the 
FFQ.85 The FLF and the FFQ shared analyses about women’s oppression but 
diverged on the means to be used, without expressing antagonism toward 
each other. Moreover, the FFQ was founded in the 1960s, before radical- left 
politics really emerged on the Quebecois political scene. This heritage gave 
the FFQ anteriority and exteriority vis- à- vis leftist and nationalist political 
parties. Today, left- wing parties on the Quebecois political stage are headed 
by former FFQ members (rather than the reverse), and the FFQ therefore 
appears as an autonomous actor that can ally with the radical Left but has 
organizational and political autonomy. Hence, the FFQ reflects the history 
of the Quebecois feminist movement: although often allied with leftist/ na-
tionalist movements, it did not depend on or compete with them to exist, 
and did not have to struggle against them, as was the case for second- wave 
movements in many other Western countries, France and the United States 
included. This specificity is important because, as Benita Roth has argued for 
the United States, the competition of the women’s liberation movement with 
radical- left politics during the second wave encouraged white feminists to 
frame their claims as universal in order to resist the tendency in radical- left 
politics to sideline gender issues.86 Not facing such a strong pressure from 
radical- left allies, the FFQ did not have to universalize gender equality issues 
and could remain more attentive to differences between women. However, 
the ties of the FFQ to the Parti Québécois, which strengthened during the 
1990s, have had an impact on some of its members’ ability to remain critical 
toward Quebecois nationalism. With important ties to nationalist leaders 
and a history of adhesion to Quebecois nationalist discourses, several white 
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feminists from the FFQ decided to leave the organization, in the name of 
their adhesion to secularism but also because of their refusal to critically re-
flect on Quebecois nationalist claims.87
The second important historical process that has shaped the FFQ’s ability 
to remain critical about femonationalism, and to elaborate a critical femi-
nist discourse on female religious agency, secularism, and nationhood, is its 
legacy of addressing racial differences and power asymmetries at an insti-
tutional level. Indeed, the FFQ was confronted early in its history with the 
question of the inclusion of what was then conceived as ethnic difference. Its 
foundational charter from 1966 states that the FFQ’s mission is to assemble 
“without distinctions based on race, ethnic origin, color or belief, women 
and organizations willing to coordinate their activities in the domain of so-
cial action.” This commitment reflects the specific Quebecois situation of the 
1960s, marked by the emergence of indigenous claims and the historical seg-
regation between anglophones and francophones (considered as “races” or 
ethnic groups at the time). As early as the mid- 1960s, the FFQ defined it-
self as a “bridge between three solitudes,” mainly francophone, anglophone, 
and Jewish communities, while maintaining its religious neutrality.88 While 
many Jewish women in Quebec were arriving as immigrants from Morocco 
or Hungary, the FFQ was keenly aware of the need to integrate them in the 
organization. As Amanda Ricci notes about the period from the 1960s to the 
1980s, the FFQ was well aware of the importance of being inclusive, while 
admitting difficulties in implementing this priority, especially with respect to 
actually recruiting non- Catholics and non- Protestants. The election in 1977 
of the first Jewish president of the FFQ, Sheila Finestone, marked an impor-
tant step in this process.
In 1973, the FFQ held a joint meeting with Canadian Black women’s or-
ganizations. It reflected on the opportunity of organizing, inside the FFQ, a 
specific conference on women doubly discriminated against as indigenous, 
immigrants, or Black. However, here again, there was no concrete outcome 
of this symbolic statement.89 Things began to change in the early 1980s, 
when under the auspices of the Quebecois ministry of immigration and 
cultural communities, the FFQ organized a conference titled “Immigrant 
Women, Our Turn to Speak.”90 It led to heightened networking and visibility 
of migrant women’s organizations, which helped them articulate in a more 
forceful way their critique of the invisibility of their issues and concerns in 
“mainstream” Quebecois women’s rights organizations such as the FFQ. 
Simultaneously, in the 1980s the FFQ was forced to consider its relationship 
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with the Fédération des Femmes Autochtones du Québec (Federation of 
Indigenous Women from Québec, FAQ).91 In 1991, the FAQ decided to leave 
the FFQ, stating that it did not recognize itself in the cultural Quebecois 
identity promoted by the FFQ. This breakup encouraged the FFQ to critically 
reflect on the question of colonial domination and to include in its 1994 po-
litical platform the idea that Quebec’s sovereignty (openly promoted since 
the mid- 1980s by the FFQ) should have constitutional bases “just and equi-
table for women, for cultural minorities and for indigenous nations,” thereby 
breaking with traditional sovereigntist discourses.92 In 2004, a mutual soli-
darity protocol was signed between the two organizations. This relationship 
with indigenous women paved the way for critical reflection inside the FFQ 
about other forms of oppression than gender that the FFQ could not simply 
dismiss from its analysis.
In line with its work to establish a relationship with indigenous women 
that was free of domination or racism, and reacting to the pressure exerted 
by the Coordination of Migrant Women, founded in 1983, the FFQ began 
to reflect on its own practices with respect to racism and inclusion of immi-
grant women in the early 1990s. Many activists argue that the first official 
commitment of the FFQ to represent minority women goes back to the 1992 
presidential declaration: “The [feminist] movement will no longer ignore the 
issue of cultural pluralism. We must achieve a real articulation between the 
feminist movement and women from ethnocultural communities.” However, 
this commitment was put into practice only in January 2000, when the FFQ 
created the Comité des femmes des communautés culturelles (Committee 
of Women from Cultural Communities, CFCC). This committee, which was 
composed mostly of immigrant and racialized women, had a mandate to
defend the rights and interests of women from ethnocultural communities 
as a marginalized group, by fostering the openness of the women’s move-
ment to cultural diversity and national and international solidarity and 
reinforcing the relationship between women from cultural communities 
and visible minorities and women from the majority.93
Following this commitment, in 2004 the FFQ launched a three- year- long 
process to develop “an inclusive perspective and a shared leadership with cul-
tural communities’ organizations . . . a strategy to fight racism and ethnic and 
religious discrimination.”94 The CCFC surveyed minority women’s status 
inside member organizations of the FFQ and the distribution of resources 
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among member organizations to conclude that a rebalancing of resources 
toward migrant women’s organizations was in order, as well as an increase in 
their descriptive representation inside the FFQ structures.95 What is more, 
the fact that the FFQ initiated the World March of Women at the end of the 
1990s is also important to explain why the abstract commitment to cultural 
diversity enshrined in 1992 became a concrete policy in 2000. Indeed, orga-
nizing a worldwide event with women from different nationalities and with 
pressing concerns regarding imperialism or poverty meant acknowledging 
other types of oppression than gender alone. As an FFQ activist notes:
This march is an important moment in our reflection process. We have 
decided to widen our perspective to consider multiple discriminations 
and also to think in terms of and to apply intersectional analysis. . . . We 
wanted this fight against discriminations to be totally integrated into the 
federation’s work.96
In March 2015, the FFQ held a general assembly to orient its future actions 
and proposed to its members adopting the fight for the elimination of all 
forms of oppression (including racism and colonialism) in its charter, as well 
as intersectionality as an analytical tool shaping the FFQ’s position in the 
public sphere.97 This adoption was not smooth— far from it— and left marks 
for many racialized Quebecois feminists, as I examine in  chapter 5. However, 
it does appear to be the result of a decades- long history of partial, and then 
more sustained, attention to the question of race. The various institutional 
forms that have been devised by the FFQ to address the question of race also 
show an increasing politicization of this issue. The institutional vocabulary 
evolved from the promotion of “plurality” among women in 1992, to the es-
tablishment of a special committee of “women from immigrant and cultural 
communities” in the early 2000s with a mandate to investigate the presence 
of immigrant women in the organization’s membership, to the institutional-
ization of the descriptive representation of “racialized women” on the board 
of the organization and the hiring of an officer in charge of “intersectionality.” 
While the FFQ’s efforts to institutionalize and politicize race may still appear 
insufficient or devoid of concrete effects on its mainly white constituency,98 
they denote a capacity to articulate a critical discourse on race that not only 
provides a social critique of racism in Quebecois society but also reflects on 
racism within the Quebecois feminist movement and aims at revising its 
practices.99 This legacy of being accountable on the issue of racial privileges 
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and racism certainly provided the grounds for the organization to elaborate a 
feminist analysis critical— to some extant— of the rampant femonationalism 
championed by the Quebecois government. Of course, a gap remains, 
as in many other organizations, between the rhetorical commitment to 
intersectionality and actual intersectional practices, a gap that attest to what 
Sara Ahmed has termed the “nonperformativity” of antiracism.100 However, 
critical public discourses against femonationalist projects, and the election at 
the head of the FFQ in 2018 of a trans* woman, also attest of the capacity of 
the organization to critically reflect on the privileges of white cis- women in 
its ranks, and to enlarge its definition of who can embody the good feminist 
subject. The unfolding of sexularism debates within the French public sphere 
and within the French women’s movements since the beginning of the 2000s 
provides a strikingly different, and darker, picture.
Feminists’ Divides in France
The veil(s) debates in France have been well documented, and the conflicts 
and crises they precipitated within feminism have also been analyzed, al-
though only punctually.101 Indeed, while the first law prohibiting veiling 
in public school shattered the feminist movement to the ground, subse-
quent laws and debates (in 2010 with the legal ban on face- veiling in public 
space and in 2016 with the public debate on the burkini) revealed the long- 
term consequences of these conflicts on women’s rights organizations and 
their relations with each other, which have been less scrutinized. I retrace 
here the most important fractures that have delineated the grounds upon 
which women’s rights are discussed and implemented in the French public 
sphere today.
The story of the 2004 law banning Islamic veiling in public school has been 
told often.102 Its consequences for the French conception of secularism (and 
of immigrant integration) have also been analyzed. Among the effects of this 
piece of legislation and the vast public debate it occasioned, the conflicts 
it raised among feminists (but also within labor unions, human rights or-
ganizations, and the radical Left in general)103 are noticeable but much 
less investigated. However, they are crucial to understanding the rise of 
femonationalism in France: with the 2004 debate, the issue of postcolonialism 
finally emerged with force within the French feminist movements, and 
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revealed many women’s rights activists’ adhesion to the French republican 
universalism and its color- blind, secularist narrative.104
While feminists did not initiate the 2004 law, they took part in the public 
debate and defended opposing views on the legitimacy of a ban on head-
scarves in public schools. Their contribution to the debate started when, 
in the spring of 2003, the controversy over headscarves emerged through a 
passing mention by then minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy— despite 
a historic low number of girls wearing headscarves in public schools that 
year— and was rapidly instrumentalized by several political actors, leading to 
both a parliamentary commission (Commission Debré) and a presidentially 
mandated commission, appointed by President Jacques Chirac and headed 
by Bernard Stasi, to provide the government with recommendations on the 
implementation of secularism in France.105 Leaders of the wider national 
umbrella organization for women’s rights in France, the Collectif national 
pour les droits des femmes (CNDF) stated in January 2004106 that their orga-
nization was divided on this issue, and that personaly they opposed both the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf and the right- wing government’s intention 
to legislate against the headscarf in public schools. While they acknowledged 
discriminations against Muslims and migrants in France, they interpreted 
the choice made by “some young people of Muslim faith, inspired or not by 
fundamentalist imams, to fight for the right of young girls to wear their head-
scarves in school, or in public service as employees” as the “wrong struggle,” 
a strategic error in their fight against humiliations.107 In a typical leftist vein, 
the heads of the CNDF denounced the focus on religious symbols at a time 
when socioeconomic questions, poverty, and austerity should have occupied 
center stage and could have united feminist movements and the Left around 
a common agenda. Furthermore, in their view:
Whatever the meaning that a minority of young women give, at a personal 
level, to the wearing of the veil (and we know this meaning is plural), the 
wearing of the veil takes on the same meaning in all monotheist religion 
when it is presented as a compulsory religious requirement. It is not at all a 
symbol of emancipation.108
Interestingly, the acknowledgment of the multiple meanings that a head-
scarf can be invested with is quickly made irrelevant by the claim that the veil 
as a religious symbol cannot be emancipatory. This authoritative argument 
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simultaneously erases the agency of this “small minority of young women” 
previously mentioned by the authors.
The CNDF leaders’ position, while representative of the positions of 
many members from the “class struggle” trend inherited from the second 
wave of the French feminist movement,109 did not manage to build con-
sensus among women’s rights organizations, despite the CNDF’s status 
as the umbrella organization and main network for women’s rights in 
France. Indeed, on one side a novel alignment emerged, grouping together 
feminists who often had participated in the second- wave movement’s “au-
tonomist” trend (meaning autonomous from radical- left organizations or 
from the Communist Party), such as Anne Zélensky, Anne Vigerie, and 
Liliane Kandel, and who started to define themselves as secularist feminists 
(féministes laïcardes),110 feminist members of women’s rights organizations 
close to the Communist Party,111 and a rising women’s rights NGO, Ni 
putes ni soumises (NPNS), founded by Fadela Amara to represent young 
girls from the ghetto who wish to be emancipated from religious and ethnic 
communities.112 While the vast majority of the individual and institu-
tional members of this formation were not representatives of racialized/ 
immigrant groups, some of them, like Fadela Amara and her organization, 
specifically defined themselves as such.113 Prominent figures presented 
as witnesses of the horrors of religious fundamentalism, like Bangladeshi 
writer Taslima Nasreen, activist Zazi Sadou (at the time president of 
Algerian Democratic Women), and Algerian activist Wassyla Tamzali,114 
joined these secularist voices. All these components identified the defense 
of republicanism and secularism as the most important battle to be fought, 
and the Islamic headscarf as a dangerous sign of religious proselytism and 
of the dismantlement of republican values. In an op- ed published in May 
2003, Anne Vigerie and Anne Zélensky wrote:
The question of the veil . . . has been a source of anxiety for feminists for 
a long time. Young women or girls wear it in the name of the freedom to 
practice their religion. But the wearing of the veil is not a sign of religious 
belief. It symbolizes women’s place as defined by Islamism. This place is 
in the shadow, the relegation, the submission to man. That women claim 
this right does not change anything about the meaning of the veil. It is 
well known that the oppressed are the most fervent advocates of their own 
oppression.115
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They further identified a public space devoid of any religious symbols as 
the only way to preserve women’s rights and the Republic’s heritage and 
denounced a “postcolonial guilt” that encouraged leftist activists to accept 
encroachment on women’s rights in the name of cultural tolerance. NPNS 
as well presented the veil as a regression in women’s rights and a strategy of 
young girls in urban ghettos to protect themselves from the violence of their 
male counterparts.116 After having accused the CNDF of being infiltrated by 
“Islamists,” and in order to voice disapproval of the CNDF’s opposition to 
the law, in NPNS decided to organize a demonstration for women’s rights on 
March 6, 2005, so as not to demonstrate side by side with the CNDF’s dem-
onstration on March 8.
On the other side of the feminist spectrum, op- eds were published in May 
and in December 2003117 by prominent intellectuals and politicians asso-
ciated with the Left118 stressing the context of discrimination and racism 
against Muslims and the colonialist overtones of the debate. Cautious not to 
appear as proponents of veiling, they did not insist on religious freedom or 
women’s agency but on the emancipatory nature of public schools and the 
importance of including Muslim girls:
How can feminists support a law that excludes these young women from 
school, often the only place where they can emancipate themselves, to send 
them back into their families that supposedly oppressed them?119
These public appeals coalesced with the creation of a new network, Une 
école pour tou- te- s, contre les lois d’exclusion,120 and a new organization, the 
Collectif feministe pour l’égalité (CFPE), in which prominent radical second- 
wave feminist Christine Delphy participated. Members represented a heter-
ogeneous mix that never managed to form an effective political coalition.121 
However, with respect to the transformation of the feminist movements, 
this network marked the emergence of a new discourse and identity, which 
denounced a misinterpretation of secularism and, more than anything else, 
the rampant Islamophobia122 and postcolonial aphasia123 present in the de-
bate. In feminist terms, they denounced the implicit paternalism that the ban 
fueled toward Muslim women as well as the idea that the Islamic headscarf 
could have only one meaning, that of women’s oppression. Here again the 
coalition was a mix of feminists who identified as postcolonial subjects or 
indigènes, such as Houria Bouteldja, who participated in the creation of the 
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CFPE,124 and nonracialized feminists coming from human rights organiza-
tions or women’s rights organizations. Of importance, this coalition for the 
first time addressed the issue of racism and of the colonial continuum within 
French feminism itself. They presented the necessity of jointly addressing 
feminism and racism as a precondition for any true feminist project. The di-
vide with the CNDF (as well as with NPNS)125 crystallized for the celebra-
tion of international women’s day on March 8, 2004, as the CNDF refused 
to include the CFPE in its call for demonstrations. This scission would lead, 
slowly but surely, some years later to parallel demonstrations in Paris on 
March 8, one organized by the CNDF,126 and marching toward the Place de 
la République, and the other organized by the CFPE, Afro- feminists, femi-
nist organizations from the Parisian suburbs, LGBT organizations, and the 
union of sex workers in Belleville, a neighborhood with an important mi-
grant population.
The debate on Islamic veiling continued beyond the 2004 law, as the con-
servative right- wing party of Nicolas Sarkozy tried to preserve its electoral 
gain against a populist far- right National Front in constant progression 
during the 2000s. Attempts to enlarge the prohibition to other spaces than 
public schools surfaced first with a discrete jurisprudence by the highest ad-
ministrative court (the Conseil d’État) in which it refused to grant French 
citizenship to a woman wearing a niqab in 2008,127 and later with a public de-
bate and subsequent legislative ban on full veiling in public spaces in 2010.128 
The scope of the prohibition of Islamic veils in public schools broadened with 
the “Circulaire Chatel,” a regulation by the minister of education that for-
bade mothers wearing a hijab from accompanying pupils during excursions 
organized by schools, as well as with an ongoing judicial battle over the 
wearing of Islamic headscarves by an educator in a publicly subsidized pri-
vate day care center, the crèche Baby- Loup.129 This constant widening of the 
scope of prohibition led Socialist president François Hollande to suggest, 
on March 24, 2013, the possibility of regulating/ prohibiting Islamic veiling 
and religious symbols in private workplaces in France. Feminists were not 
indifferent to this evolution and expansion of the legislation against Islamic 
veiling. Indeed, on the one hand, organizations such as NPNS were instru-
mental in the birth of the 2010 law. They contributed largely to the publicity 
around the debate on full veiling and made dramatic calls to the legislature 
to take action.130 NPNS argued that the French state could not leave women 
in deprived neighborhoods at the hands of their oppressive husbands and 
brothers and that republican values had to be extended to these French 
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citizens and these remote territories. NPNS described the banlieues as a war 
zone for women, using usual feminist tropes about one’s right to control her 
body and sexuality.131
While feminist organizations were divided over the 2004 law, a majority 
was in favor of the 2010 ban on full veiling in public spaces— with the ex-
ception of the CFPE and some feminists from the former “class struggle” 
trend.132 At the other end of the spectrum, new petitions appeared in 2013 
to counter Hollande’s proposal to legislate veiling practices in the workplace, 
especially regarding jobs where one interacts with children. They declared, 
“We are all veiled women” and argued that
such a new law would be racist for it would, under the guise of protecting 
children from some sort of imagined contamination, subject women 
to domination by proponents of national purification and reduce their 
conditions to unemployment or invisibility.133
While the signatories used “we women” rather than “we feminists,” they also 
used the feminist trope of control over one’s body: “The imposition of any 
dress code whatsoever, whether it involves prohibiting the veil or making 
wearing it mandatory, is a form of violence and we condemn it as such. Our 
bodies belong to us and our choice of clothing too.” In 2016, feminist fig-
ures mobilized again to oppose the multiplication of municipal bans on 
burkinis.134 Their open letter clearly articulated the chasm among French 
feminists, firmly criticizing what they called the “feminist” argument from 
which women wearing burkinis are alienated:
We should liberate them from men’s oppression by unveiling them. But 
what do the persons concerned think about this? And where does this idea 
that a woman must undress to be free come from? This is, alas, an argument 
used by many “feminists” that has trouble hiding a conception of “emanci-
pation” that is totally dependent on Western ethnocentrism.135
While both initiatives gathered support from prestigious feminist scholars 
in France and abroad, the absence of any major women’s rights organization 
among those who signed the petitions is telling. The CFPE, which introduced 
the 2013 petition, was the only feminist organization to sign it. This isolation 
highlights its marginalization within the landscape of women’s rights organ-
izations, as well as the weakness of Muslim women’s mobilization in such 
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an adversarial context.136 Conversely, the high number of signatories who 
belong to academia suggest a growing divide between grassroots women’s 
rights organizations and feminist academics over this issue. This is certainly 
not to say that feminist academics agree on the subject. Quite the contrary, 
the controversy over feminist colonial aphasia erupted in academia as well, 
in particular with the publication in 2012 of a book/ pamphlet Les féministes 
blanches et l’empire by Félix Boggio Éwanjé- Épée and Stella Magliani- 
Belkacem, which traced, albeit sometimes with historical partiality, white 
French feminists’ attitudes toward the veil debates back to colonial times and 
the complicity of the Third Republic feminists in the colonial campaigns.137
Both in France and in Quebec, sexularism debates reconfigured the 
relationship between secularism, national identity, citizenship, gender 
equality, and the nexus race/ religion/ migration/ Islam. Because of the 
heterogeneity of women’s rights organizations in both contexts, it is dif-
ficult to evaluate if public discourses voiced by prominent feminist or-
ganizations or feminist figures reflect the dominant opinions among 
grassroots feminist activists. In  chapters 4 and 5 I document the wide va-
riety of opinions among white and racialized feminists in both contexts. 
However, without reifying the complexity of the French and Quebecois 
feminist landscape, the comparative analysis of feminists’ public partici-
pation in the name of women’s rights in both contexts shows that French 
and Quebecois feminists did not elaborate similar discourses. The de-
sire to protect women’s rights and the feminist project led to different 
articulations of the issues at stake. In both contexts, some white feminists 
used a feminist discourse about women’s emancipation, the memory of 
women’s struggle against the Catholic Church, and a secularist discourse 
to promote restrictive policies with Islamophobic implications. However, 
the impact and visibility of this discourse was not comparable in France 
and Quebec. While a majority of Quebecois feminist organizations— 
white and nonwhite— maintained a critical distance toward the instru-
mental use of secularism, nationalism, and gender equality as vectors of 
anti- immigrant and racist policies, a majority of French feminist organ-
izations adopted a republican and nationalist discourse in which laïcité 
and universalism were heralded as the best safeguards of women’s rights 
in France. They were unable to develop a critical discourse about the suc-
cessful political attempts to redefine the boundaries of secularism and na-
tionhood with racist overtones.138 While attempts to legislate veiling did 
spur debates and tensions within the Quebecois feminist movements, it 
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literally shattered any feeling of unity and of common identity within the 
French feminist movement.
Perpetuating Ignorance, Participating 
in Femonationalism
How can we account for the way in which important French feminist or-
ganizations have adhered to femonationalism with a discourse that 
associates Muslim women’s religiosity with patriarchy, resorting to state 
power to regulate the practices and subjectivities of pious Muslim women? 
Notwithstanding the fact that these feminist organizations have dem-
onstrated historical commitment to antiracism and activism against 
restrictive immigration policies, how can we make sense of their lack of in-
tersectional critical reflexivity when it comes to assessing the concrete needs 
of pious Muslim women and girls, and their responsibility as feminists in 
representing, and caring for, these needs? To explore further this issue, I de-
tail the history of an important feminist organization in the French women’s 
rights landscape, the CNDF, focusing on its ties to radical- left politics and its 
institutional legacy of addressing racism in its midst, as important factors in 
explaining its inability to resist femonationalist discourses.
The CNDF is a coalition- type organization with no legal status, no per-
manent staff, and no budget of its own (because it is not a legal entity). The 
list of its members varies depending on the actions it launches and is not re-
corded anywhere (but is in sharp decline, in contrast with the late nineties). 
CNDF members represent political entities (the Green Party’s women’s 
group, unions’ women’s committees) and women’s rights organizations. In 
contrast to the reformist- turned- radical history of the FFQ, the CNDF has 
direct roots in the radical/ class struggle of the second- wave feminist move-
ment as well as in the broad social movement protest that destabilized the 
French public sphere and the right- wing government over pension reform in 
1995.139 In the beginning of the 1990s, new, spectacular forms of opposition 
to abortion rights emerged in France (with pro- life activists chaining them-
selves to clinics’ gates, interrupting medical operations, etc.). This attack on 
women’s rights alerted the already existing coalition for abortion and contra-
ception rights (CADAC),140 and in 1995, in response to a proposed legal am-
nesty for persons convicted of this offense,141 the CADAC called for a broad 
national demonstration on November 25, 1995. The date was unknowingly 
76 Feminist Trouble
scheduled for what would turn out to be the biggest French social movement 
since 1968. This timing enabled a large feminist mobilization (forty thousand 
people at the demonstration on November 25), and the CADAC was able 
to create strong solidarity links with unions and political parties, which led 
to the creation of a stable, although informal, coalition in January 1996: the 
CNDF. Very active at the turn of the century, with congresses in 1997 and 
2002, and active participation in the debate on the 2006 law against vio-
lence against women,142 the CNDF lost some of its initial steam late in the 
decade.143
From its creation up to 2016, the leadership of the CNDF has not 
changed: it was co- presided over by two historical figures of the second wave, 
who self- identify with the “class struggle” trend of the movement, and who 
were involved in radical- left politics in the 1970s. This leadership testifies to 
the strong historical links and legacy of the class struggle trend of the fem-
inist second wave that the CNDF harbors within its ranks and in its modus 
operandi. While radical- autonomous French feminists decided to break with 
leftist organizations during the 1970s in order to organize on their own and 
prioritize the struggle against patriarchy,144 class struggle feminists chose 
to address the two forms of oppression jointly, a strategy that put them in 
constant relation to leftist politics, trying to convince leftist organizations 
and unions to include a gender perspective while attempting to also exist 
on their own and to forge coalitions with the radical feminists during the 
1980s. Leaders from the CNDF were socialized in revolutionary groups (the 
Cercle Dimitriev and Revolution) and continued to have very strong links 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s with the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire 
(Communist Revolutionary League), and the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste 
(New Anticapitalist Party). The situation of the CNDF vis- à- vis the French 
field of radical/ leftist protest has had important consequences with respect 
to its positioning on the Islamic veil issue. While the FFQ in Quebec could 
provide its own analysis without fear of upsetting political allies, the CNDF, 
and in particular its leadership, could not ignore the positions taken by other 
leftist organizations. The fact that the CNDF comprises representatives of 
political parties and unions, and the fact that these organizations were inter-
nally divided over the issue, meant that it was very difficult for the CNDF to 
reach a common position on the 2004 proposed bill, or to impose its analysis 
on its political allies.
Another important feature that explains the CNDF’s inability to critically 
reflect on femonationalism and its participation in it relates to the CNDF’s 
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historical lack of institutionalization of antiracism. The class struggle trend 
of the second wave has always had punctual, and sometimes more perma-
nent, relationships with migrant women’s movements.145 While the current 
organizational landscape does not show many traces of the joint actions be-
tween feminists and migrant women that occurred during the 1980s and the 
first half of the 1990s, those relationships existed, and punctual solidarity 
and support was the norm. For example, one of the migrant women’s organ-
izations created in 1985 (the Nanas Beurs) was founded at a meeting that 
took place at the Parisian “Maison des femmes,” a place run by radical and 
class struggle feminists.146 However, the issues faced by migrant women 
and women of migrant descent were always quite marginal on the agenda of 
the class struggle second- wave feminist organizations and, subsequently, at 
the CNDF.
In 1997, the CNDF organized its first national convention on women’s 
rights, with over two thousand women participating in roundtables, 
workshops, and plenary talks. While supposedly the ambition of the two- 
day conference was to address all the concerns and needs of women, from 
work and family to politics, violence, and international solidarity, the CNDF 
did not plan any specific workshop or roundtable for migrant and racialized 
women. Racialized women and migrant women were represented in the pro-
gram only in the context of panels on female genital mutilation and inter-
national issues— for example, solidarity with women in Algeria and other 
African countries. While the proceedings addressed issues relating to work, 
family, and health, these themes were not analyzed with an intersectional 
lens. Women from migrant descent claimed, during the convention, the right 
for some space to discuss their concerns, which was granted in the round-
table dedicated to economic precariousness. Retrospectively the organizers 
simply stated that migrant women, “who had not participated in the prepar-
atory work for the convention, claimed and obtained a space to meet [un 
espace de parole]. .  .  . Was it not necessary that it would explode like this? 
That the unpredictable would happen? Beyond emotions and tensions, these 
voices [paroles] were heard.”147 This explosion, however, did not lead to any 
new items on the CNDF’s future agenda. The needs and priorities of migrant 
women were always left to a few specific organizations, mobilizing a very 
limited number of activists, and were not brought from the margins to the 
center of the CNDF’s attention.
Similarly, five years later, the proceedings from the 2002 forum “New 
Challenges for Feminism” organized by the CNDF148 also show little 
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inclusion of racialized women’s concerns (despite their symbolic presence 
on the cover of the book). Indeed, the CNDF this time chose three topics 
to discuss: freedom of choice in a globalized era, women’s unity in an age 
of increased inequalities, and the marketization of bodies. Of the more than 
three hundred pages of proceedings from the two days of debate, only five 
are dedicated to racism and discrimination experienced by migrant women 
in France (designated as such; whether they are indeed migrants or French 
citizens remains unaddressed).149 The question of racism within the French 
feminist movement’s structures and institutions is not addressed.150
Hence, despite relationships between CNDF’s members and migrant 
women’s organizations, despite punctual solidarity actions and regular 
discussions of migrant women’s issues, French organizations followed sep-
arate roads. While the fight against racism and imperialism might appear in 
the CNDF’s political statements in the public debate, the fight against capi-
talism is much more prominent, and the CNDF has not launched actions or 
a working group to address racism specifically. This lapse is in part due to 
its organizational structure: very limited funding, no permanent staff, and 
networking activities only. However, the material conditions of the CNDF’s 
political activities is only part of the answer. When confronted with the issue 
of Islamophobia and the first debate on veils in public schools, the CNDF 
was caught unprepared, caught in the webs of its own ignorance based on its 
unspoken privileges as a mainly white women’s organization. It had not de-
veloped a vocabulary or political grammar to reflect on these issues and used 
old leftist frames— that other problems such as poverty and unemployment 
matter more for women, even for those who are Muslim— to address what 
was in fact a new political configuration. While the “explosion” of migrant 
women’s voices was at least rhetorically welcomed by the CNDF, the punc-
tual presence and voice of veiled women in its organization was met with sus-
picion and hostility. In the absence of any collective effort to address racism 
and intersectionality inside the coalition, the presence of veiled women 
at the CNDF meetings in preparation for the 2004 International Women’s 
Day march, in the midst of the legislative debate over prohibiting the veil in 
public schools, provoked violent reactions from CNDF members. As one of 
the veiled participants recalled:
“Feminists” asked us, those who were wearing the veil, if we were for or 
against the right to abortion, if we were for or against equality between men 
and women, our position on homosexuality, and so on. We had to prove we 
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were feminists, but whatever our response, the piece of cloth on our head 
disqualified us.151
Nor did the CNDF anticipate tensions that occurred during the International 
Women’s Day marches of 2004 and 2005 between some feminist organiza-
tions and veiled women marching, and the subsequent alternate feminist 
march.152 Nor did it engage in a reflection on the descriptive representation 
of racialized women in these instances. The CNDF coordination meetings 
were deemed always “open” to whoever wanted to participate, and the issue 
of who was in fact represented was never addressed. Hence, despite a polit-
ical commitment to addressing the intersection of class and gender, inherited 
from the second wave, the intersection of gender and race or migration has 
remained a low priority, and there has been no particular institutional ef-
fort to address racism inside the organization. The CNDF’s participation in 
femonationalist discourses in France, its mild criticism of the 2004 law, and its 
support for the 2010 ban can thus be understood as the result of its privileged 
position of ignorance— not that the CNDF has not been active in fighting 
against racism, but it has been reluctant to perceive the instrumentalization 
of secularism in fueling Islamophobia. The absence of strong, organized, and 
recognized racialized women’s organizations during this period also meant 
that counterdiscourses that resist femonationalism were rarely publicly ar-
ticulated in feminist events and discourses. The two cases scrutinized here, 
Quebec and France, thus suggest that the strength of minority- feminist orga-
nizing is a crucial element in countering femonationalism.
* * *
These tensions and conflicts that arose within feminist movements in 
the context of policy regulations on Muslim women’s religious attire are 
not unique to France and Quebec. They have also characterized women’s 
movements in other European countries153 and penetrated the European 
public sphere in a time of rising populism. While not all women’s rights or-
ganizations have participated in this exclusionary discourse and process, it 
has been a major— and often dominant— feature of the new face of women’s 
rights in the European public sphere in “postsecular” times.
Still, we must explore feminist reactions and contributions to the contem-
porary politics of intersectionality in Europe beyond the simple dichotomy 
between inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, these debates have also revived, 
transformed, and challenged women’s rights organizations. The period 
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I scrutinize has been a time of intense activism and debates that, as I showed 
in this chapter, prompted new forms of alliance and transformed existing 
coalitions. I  have suggested in my analysis of Islamic veiling debates that 
the postcolonial, secular, nationalist, and racial issues that permeated and 
shaped the political conflicts they triggered within feminism were articu-
lated with the defense or activation of moral boundaries to define who can be 
the “good” subject of feminism and about what values feminist emancipation 
should uphold. These moral concerns were of course intimately articulated 
with hierarchies of power based on race, immigration, religion, class, and 
citizenship among feminist activists, but not reducible to them. In the next 
two chapters, I propose to deepen the analysis of the articulation between 
hierarchies of power and moral boundaries by examining more closely how 
the veiling debates reconfigured feminist political subjectivities. Shifting the 
gaze from organizations and coalitions to feminist activists themselves, I ex-
plore how exclusion is performed— and contested— and with what feminist 
values, identities, and emotions it may be articulated.
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 Feminist Whiteness
Reflecting on the formation of political subjects, Judith Butler has insisted 
that there is no such thing as a pregiven identity, a “pregiven point of depar-
ture for politics,” and that we must “remember that subjects are constituted 
through exclusion, that is through the creation of a domain of deauthorized 
subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view.”1 
It is therefore theoretically and politically necessary to trace the operations 
that have led to both the construction of the subject as seemingly pregiven, 
and the erasure of the deauthorized subjects it is based on.2 In this chapter, 
I attempt such a task by investigating the political subjectivations of white 
feminists, and the operations of construction and erasure they rely on. 
I argue in this chapter that debates on Islamic veiling not only reveal white-
ness as the privileged social location occupied by white feminists, but also 
produce contextualized forms of what I call feminist whiteness, the outcome 
of a process of political subjectivation as a white feminist. Feminist white-
ness is a location of privilege to articulate and enforce the moral and political 
boundaries of the legitimate feminist subject, a location based on ignorance 
of its own constitution and on the creation of “deauthorized subjects.”
Feminists of color, from Audre Lorde to Sara Ahmed, have conceptualized 
whiteness as an invisible and unmarked category— for those who inhabit it, 
not for those marked as nonwhite— as a position of privilege and ignorance,3 
as an effect of racialization processes that mark some bodies as others, and as 
an orientation toward the world that shapes subjectivities.4 Whiteness as a 
critical concept must be understood as a process of subjectivation that results 
from racism and racialization,5 rather than as a given identity. Whiteness is a 
material, cultural, and subjective location of privilege; it cannot be reified to a 
skin color.6 It changes over time and, as Ruth Frankenberg notes, “It is a com-
plexly constructed product of local, regional, national, and global relations, 
past and present. . . . It is also a relational category, one that is co- constructed 
with a range of other racial and cultural categories, with class and with 
gender.”7 As Ahmed has underscored, whiteness reveals how racial privilege 
assigns race to others and impacts those bodies recognized as nonwhite.8 In 
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these ways, the process of whiteness/ whitening is premised upon the active 
effects of racism in marking others as others.
In this chapter I  argue that whiteness shapes white feminists’ political 
subjectivation, their relationships to feminism and to other feminists, and, 
by doing so, deeply affects feminism as a political project. In studying the for-
mation of white feminists’ whiteness in this chapter I thus wish to document 
how whiteness informs white feminists’ political subjectivation as feminists, 
and how it changes over time and depending on the context. My interest here 
is not to give an account of white feminists’ subjectivities,9 but rather to inves-
tigate how this location, which is both political and subjective, is constructed 
in the context of white feminists’ activism, and how it is premised on a set 
of discourses and rhetorical devices that universalizes white feminists’ 
experiences while marking other feminist subjects as nonwhite— as well as 
on a set of memories and legacies, and on political hegemonic discourses. 
I am interested in particular in how white feminists are constituted as polit-
ical subjects through their relationships to nonwhite feminists, and to those 
whom they perceive as “bad” feminist subjects. Indeed, I argue that feminism 
is made white through a set of discourses that label nonwhite feminists as bad 
and improper subjects, to be cast away or educated in order to be reclaimed 
by feminism. By focusing on whiteness, I do not want to suggest that other 
axes of inequalities and power within feminism and between feminists do 
not matter. Certainly, class and sexuality have produced important conflicts 
over who is a good or bad feminist and what feminist emancipation should 
look like,10 and they have shaped forms of feminist political subjectivation— 
in interaction with race. However, I do argue that in order to understand the 
Islamic veil debates and the ways in which they have shattered, disrupted, and 
fragmented feminist organizations and the feminist project, we must focus 
on whiteness, as a location of privilege and ignorance. While there are many 
different instances of feminist whiteness, not all fueling femonationalism, 
I argue that some hegemonic forms of feminist whiteness are instrumental in 
doing so, and they are the focus of this chapter.
Many critical race scholars have noted that whiteness is partly discur-
sively produced, through a specific set of discourses and, mostly, through 
an absence- presence of race.11 Hence, tracing the construction of feminist 
whiteness means documenting how feminism is discursively made white, 
how white feminists’ desire to ignore realities of racism preserves their “in-
nocence,”12 and how they contribute to mark nonwhite feminist subjects as 
others, racialized and improper subjects to be excluded from the feminist 
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collective project.13 In this chapter, I first reconstruct whiteness, its contents 
and markers, through an analysis of how white feminists talk about their ac-
tivism, their organizational practices with respect to cultural or religious dif-
ference, and how they describe migrant women or Muslim women as good 
or bad feminist subjects. I identify a variety of discourses that contribute to 
construct and position white feminists as white feminists: that is, discourses 
that denote feminist whiteness as a process of political subjectivation. These 
discourses vary greatly, and this variation is as important as the common 
whiteness shared by these interviewees. In fact, in describing feminist com-
mitment and practice, white feminists also share many discursive repertoires 
with nonwhite feminists. This approach allows for a dynamic exploration of 
variations and contradictions, and understands whiteness as a historical and 
contextual social process.14 I show how in two contexts, France and Quebec, 
white feminists use different repertoires to address race issues. Some work 
around or evade race, while others recognize its political salience. These dif-
ferent repertoires therefore point to different ways in which (and extents to 
which) feminism is made white and the location of white feminist privilege 
made invisible or acknowledged.
Exploring further how whiteness shapes white feminists’ political 
subjectivations, I  then investigate how specific moral dispositions and 
emotions displayed by white feminists effectively draw boundaries that close 
the feminist subject and produce “deauthorized” subjects. In her study of 
white innocence as it is present in the Dutch cultural archive, Gloria Wekker 
notes that whiteness is saturated by affects and moral dispositions— such as 
entitlement— and that postcolonial melancholia also feeds anger and vio-
lence.15 Similarly, I document the contours of affective responses to race dis-
played by white feminists. I argue that women marked as “others” by white 
feminists— the woman migrant, the veiled woman, the non- white woman— 
elicit two types of moral, political, and emotional dispositions on the part of 
white feminists.
A first orientation of white feminists toward “othered” women, and in par-
ticular toward migrant woman, is animated by a conception of feminism and 
feminist practice as a social project— that of responding to the need of vul-
nerable women. In this conception, which characterizes in particular, but not 
only, white feminists working in service- providing organizations, feminist 
whiteness translates into specific feminist moral dispositions such as the sus-
pension of judgment, self- improvement, benevolence, and the ignorance of 
white privilege. It also gives rise to specific emotions such as satisfaction, but 
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also ambivalence. In the second case, which entails an understanding of fem-
inism as a historical political collective project of transformation that bonds 
women together, feminism fuels a different process of political subjectivation 
as white feminist. Here religious and racial differences are highly politicized 
and define improper feminist subjects. This process of political subjectivation 
as white feminist entails moral dispositions such as disapproval, indignation, 
and self- righteousness, and emotions such as melancholy, fear, and anger.
In the last section in this chapter I argue that debates on Islamic veiling 
have, in particular, operated a shift in feminist whiteness, from feminist 
whiteness as ignorance to feminist whiteness as an active participation 
in national identity, or what Sarah Farris has called “femonationalism.”16 
Characterizing feminist whiteness as a form of ignorance does not mean 
that it is not actively socially produced. Following feminist epistemologies 
and epistemologies of ignorance’s tenets, what we know and what we ignore 
are shaped by our social location, and privilege entails the ability to actively 
ignore relationality with those situated across power lines.17 I  argue that 
feminist whiteness in the context of femonationalism is not only based on 
ignorance: the shift I describe emphasizes the more overt and active embrace 
of republican and nationalist discourses by white feminists in the wake of the 
laws banning Islamic veiling in France.
Because whiteness is not the product of a preexisting identity, but a polit-
ical and social construction, the analysis of feminist whiteness I propose is 
an inductive one; it is reconstructed from the empirical material collected, 
tracing discourses that retrace processes of political subjectivation.18 The 
feminist activists that I interviewed and categorized as white feminists self- 
identified as members of the ethnic majority group.19 Or, more precisely, they 
did not identify racially, thereby adhering to the idea typical of whiteness 
that they are not marked, even when some might have some parents with a 
migrant background. They were also officers or volunteers in organizations 
that did not self- identify as representing a specific ethnic or national group. 
These organizations— shelters, community centers, and advocacy groups— 
identified as feminist or women’s organizations20 and, often in Quebec, as 
multicultural as well.21 In both France and Quebec race and racism have 
been publicly problematized in recent history (since the 1980s) in conjunc-
tion with issues of immigration and, more recently, religion— meaning in fact 
Islam, the religion of the formerly colonized, persons who became the immi-
grant, and then have become, in public debates since the 1990s in France and 
the 2000s in Quebec, the Muslim man/ woman.22 Hence, my focus here is on 
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how feminist whiteness has been produced in the last decade in relation to 
women and feminists who are marked as others through the racialization 
of religion and immigration. Evidently, other historical repertoires, such 
as colonialism, immigrant integration, secularism, leftist internationalism, 
republicanism, multiculturalism, and intersectionality, also constitute the 
discursive field of race and racism in both contexts and contribute to shape 
different forms of feminist whiteness beyond the focus on Islam.
In France, interviews were realized after the 2010 law prohibiting full 
veiling in public spaces— less controversial within feminist circles than 
the 2004 law prohibiting religious symbols in public schools but still a 
topic that demanded feminists take a position— and while new femi-
nist forces emerged to counter pinkwashing, colonialist discourses and 
Islamophobia.23 In Quebec those were also active times. The debate over 
the Quebecois “charter of values” that unfolded during my fieldwork forced 
many feminist organizations to take a stand and to articulate their position 
vis- à- vis Quebecois nationalism and its Islamophobic undertones. A lot has 
happened since then as well. New feminist organizations have formed and 
others have disbanded, new feminist voices have emerged and claimed new 
public identities, while others may have turned away from activism. This 
means that new white and nonwhite feminist political subjectivities are in 
the making, subjectivities that this book has not captured.24 This sample 
thus does not exhaust the variation of feminist whiteness in both contexts. 
It is not representative of the diversity of white feminists in France and 
Quebec. What is more, I selected excerpts that display more obviously fem-
inist whiteness, especially in France, and which may seem to reflect extreme 
positions, easy to ignore as nonrepresentative of the broader movement (be-
cause of their racist overtones or their association of Islam with extremism). 
However, while they may be overrepresented in the quotations illustrating 
my argument in this chapter, these discourses are not marginal, especially in 
France at the time of my fieldwork. The tendency to universalize gender and 
to associate Islam with women’s subordination was well represented in my 
sample of feminist volunteers, activists, and NGO officers. Hence, while this 
chapter overrepresents certain forms of feminist whiteness, concentrating 
on the effects of privilege and ignorance rather than on what Frankenberg 
has termed “race cognizant” whiteness, this strategy allows for identifying 
common repertoires and identifying the effects of whiteness on feminist 
subjectivation, an important step, I argue, in the direction of understanding 
the current feminist trouble.
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Evading Race: French Repertoires of Feminist Whiteness
In her analysis of the social construction of whiteness in the United States, 
Ruth Frankenberg pays particular attention to white feminists. In her sample 
of white women interviewed in her research, white feminists are the most 
“race cognizant”— that is, aware of race pervasiveness in the American so-
ciety of the 1980s, of its historical significance and links with colonization, 
and aware that they are themselves white, occupying a position of privi-
lege and power in these relations. Their repertoire contrasts with the dom-
inant repertoire used by most of Frankenberg’s interviewees, which evades 
race, using color- blindness as a way to evade racialization, racism, and 
power inequalities.25 Frankenberg presents white feminists’ repertoire of 
race cognizance as a result of the historical events of desegregation and the 
civil rights movements of the 1960s, as well as a result of the vivid conflicts 
that occurred within US second- wave feminism, and the product of the 
challenges and critiques formulated by US Black feminists and other women 
of color through texts, public interventions, and activism within feminist or-
ganizations. While Frankenberg noticed the relative race cognizance of US 
white feminists she interviewed, other works have also insisted on the per-
vasiveness of whiteness as a discursive formation that shapes feminism and 
secures a privileged position for white feminists in feminist movements and 
theory.26 Recent scholarship on whiteness in third- wave feminist movements 
describes a new set of repertoires of whiteness, which express a desire for “di-
versity” and the rhetorical inclusion of feminists of color’s works.27 However, 
these repertoires often reproduce whiteness as privilege, instead of displacing 
its centrality in feminism, for example through an understanding of diversity 
as a proliferation of differences. What is more, the gap between the avowed 
desire for inclusion and the lack of concrete engagement to remedy the ab-
sence of nonwhite women from feminist organizations displays what Sara 
Ahmed has termed a “declaration of whiteness that performs a recognition of 
privilege without actually dislodging it.28
Repertoires used by white feminists in France in the 2010s contrast in im-
portant ways with the narratives reproduced by Frankenberg, or with third- 
wave accounts of whiteness. Race cognizance, as described by Frankenberg, 
is a marginal repertoire within white feminists’ discourses, mainly found in 
Quebec. This marginality denotes that dominant repertoires on race and 
racism in France and Quebec differ from those in the United States described 
by Frankenberg, and also that white feminists’ relationship to dominant 
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repertoires on race differs in France from the American context. This mar-
ginality also suggests that conflicts about racism within feminism have not 
unfolded in similar ways in France (or in Quebec). There has been an in-
ternational diffusion of US feminist debates and arguments, as well as a 
reappropriation of Black US feminist writings by racialized feminist groups, 
for example in France,29 and a (contested) importation of the vocabulary of 
intersectionality.30 Nevertheless, these processes of diffusion and appropria-
tion have not always impacted white feminists’ political subjectivations, and 
notable differences remain.
While all French women working or volunteering in white/ ethnic majority 
organizations who were interviewed insisted that the 2004 law banning the 
veil in public schools had raised thorny issues and heated discussions among 
their members (contrary to the 2010 law banning full veiling in public spaces, 
which was presented as quite consensus- based), revealing therefore strong 
disagreements and political conflicts among them, their discourses never-
theless reflect common narratives that position white feminists in a specific 
location of privilege, within society and, what I will focus on here, within 
feminism. Two main discursive repertoires allow French white feminists 
to work around, in potent ways, the reality of the racialization of Muslims 
and of Islamophobia, and shape their feminist whiteness: universalism, and 
locating race outside the nation. The repertoires are interconnected, but are 
unevenly distributed across the sample of feminist officers and volunteers 
I interviewed, following differences of generation and of politicization be-
cause they are products of history, reflecting the evolution of French feminist 
movements and of their relationship with republican institutions.31
A first potent repertoire in the French context is universalism.32 This ideal 
irrigates many aspects of white French feminists’ relationship to racial or 
religious difference, which I detail: their understanding of women’s rights, 
their ideas on the proper forms of feminist organizing, and their opinions 
on antiracism. A first way in which universalism shapes feminist whiteness 
is by downplaying differences between women based on race or religion in 
order to insist on the primacy of gender as a site of oppression. This hier-
archy of oppressions denotes a lack of intersectional analysis and posits white 
women as the main subjects of feminism. For instance, Elsa, a young white 
feminist in her late twenties who volunteers in an organization created in 
2009, Feminists Dare,33 and is part of the executive as well as in charge of 
communications, sums up the priorities of her association, listing typical 
“universalist” priorities:
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We launched this campaign with a website that aims to show that femi-
nism is political, that we can change things, that we can change the lives of 
millions of women. We chose six themes, parenthood . . . , sexism, women’s 
image in the media, equal pay, economic precariousness, women’s rights 
over their bodies . . . , violence, so that includes prostitution obviously, and 
parity. . . . We don’t really address different groups of women, although of 
course we are aware that there is a great heterogeneity. . . . We would like 
not to forget women living in the projects; we don’t forget that they have 
daily lives marked by discrimination that are specific to them. But, let’s face 
it . . . we don’t come from there. Feminist Dare is not a group of women 
from the projects. So it’s not that easy. We don’t want to mess it up. We try to 
do some meetings, to understand some things.
Elsa uses the descriptor “women from the projects” (femmes des quartiers) to 
convey class and racial difference, thereby performing a social distance that 
she indeed acknowledges a minute later in her interview when she admits 
that these women are in fact mostly absent from her organization. However, 
this absence, even coupled with the admission that racialized women have in 
fact specific problems and interests, does not lead her to call into question the 
universalist platform of her organization. Later in her interview, when asked 
if her organization has reflected upon the question of discrimination in em-
ployment against veiled women, she admits that the subject has not been 
raised. Hence the universalist approach to the feminist project of her organi-
zation makes invisible important issues that concern Muslim women— and 
also invisibilizes how class shapes gender- based inequalities. Social distance 
and social exclusion are acknowledged, but never interpreted as producing 
power asymmetries between feminists.
Claudine, a white woman in her early sixties, the daughter of Polish Jewish 
immigrants, used to be part of a feminist group for rape victims and now 
heads (as a volunteer) an umbrella organization called Women’s Rights 
Collective, connecting the major French women’s rights organizations and 
women’s sections in leftist political parties and labor unions. She acknow-
ledges that the public of her former and current organizations is not really 
diverse but she does not perceive the lack of any initiative to remedy the 
whiteness of the organization (in both her former and her current organiza-
tions) as an effect of institutional racism, but rather as an effect of geograph-
ical segregation: her organization is located within Paris and she argues that 
this prevents recruiting a more diverse constituency. However, questioned 
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about the past and the relationships during the 1980s between her organiza-
tion and migrant and racialized women, she states:
Well, to go back to the issue of race, in quotation marks. . . . I still don’t like 
that term. . . . I know less but I don’t think we did not do anything. . . . There 
was a coordination of Black women in the seventies. There was a feminist 
collective against racism in 1984 in the Maison des femmes in Paris and 
everybody was there. One should not say we did not do anything.
Hence, she simultaneously argues that the white feminist “we” acted in sol-
idarity with migrant and racialized women in the past, and that the issue of 
diversity of the membership is not really relevant in the present.34 Race is 
defined in her discourse either as an American import that does not fit the 
French context, or as a side effect of an “external” event— that is, immigration. 
It is rarely articulated with colonialism and never acknowledged as a struc-
turing feature of French history, or a pervasive ground for exclusion from full 
citizenship.35 This logic illustrates in a striking way what Paola Bacchetta has 
defined as internal discourses of colonial feminisms. These discourses univer-
salize “feminist analyses and categories” and display “amnesia about racism 
and colonialism.”36 The invisibilization of Muslim women through “univer-
salist” feminist claims from the feminist membership enacts a closure of the 
feminist collective subject around whiteness, which is perceived as legitimate 
because it is equated with universalism.37
Interestingly, this universalist discourse on gender oppression shares 
many commonalities with the gender universalist ideology upheld by white 
American feminists in the early 1970s and analyzed by Benita Roth. Roth 
argues that white American feminists developed this discourse in part as a 
response to the claims of the New Left that feminists’ interests were divisive 
and narrower than those of the working class or other liberationist move-
ment. She states: “Gender universalism was constructed, then, because it was 
a strategic answer to concerns that white feminists had about the potentially 
problematic nature of their new political concerns.”38 I have also described 
elsewhere how the policing of political boundaries with radical- left organiza-
tions in the seventies led some quarters of the French second- wave feminist 
movement to promote the theoretical and political primacy of gender over 
other differences.39 It is therefore remarkable to see how gender universalism 
is produced and reproduced, in changing historical contexts, and how the re-
lationship of feminist claims to other claims of social justice is an important 
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part of that process. However, this strategic dimension is only one part of 
the story. Only because white feminists were white and could represent and 
imagine themselves as unmarked by race could they actually mobilize such 
a universalist repertoire to counter radical- left antagonist discourses with 
so much ease and political legitimacy. Hence, white ignorance is also at the 
heart of these universalist discourses.
A second universalist repertoire that contributes to produce and maintain 
the social and political distance with racialized women, and to anchor the 
position of white women as the preferred subject of feminist claims and mo-
bilization, is the delegitimization of racialized women’s organizing based on 
ethnic identity. Here again, universalism is the favored identity of the femi-
nist collective subject. The idea that organizing along ethnic lines goes against 
the grain of proper feminist politics fuels a move that operates a closure of 
the feminist subject around whiteness. Julie, a young Jewish woman who is 
not of immigrant descent and is employed to manage the public relations of 
the French organization Girls on the Rise, which identifies as representing 
marginalized women and girls, in particular those from the “projects” (i.e., 
daughters of immigrants),40 makes universalism clear in her response:
This logic [to organize on an ethnic or national origin basis] is not ours. And 
I think it’s not the right way to do it. Today we are the voice of all the women 
who believe in the feminist conception of equality under the Republic, that’s 
our conception, and who needs help at one point or another, whatever their 
origin, their color, their sexual orientation. . . . As far as I am concerned 
[organizing along ethnic identities] does not bother me, but me I like so-
cial diversity. . . . I find it enriching and it’s a shame to lose that. Now if it 
happens that there is, first, a community organization because of language, 
because of community ties, because of a common experience  .  .  . which 
helps free the discourse [libérer la parole]. Then of course it’s necessary. But 
if it’s a discourse that says that nobody other than a Congolese woman is 
better placed to talk to another Congolese woman . . . it bothers me. Here 
we never assigned people based on their origins.
Julie insisted during her interview that the philosophy of her organization 
is in fact to bring universal women’s rights to all women, including Muslim 
girls and women depicted as particularly vulnerable to patriarchal oppres-
sion because of their economic and social marginality, and because of the 
specificity of religion as a vehicle of women’s oppression.
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The previous excerpts reveal several processes through which femi-
nist whiteness is produced. The social distance between white women and 
racialized women is accepted and lamented, but not challenged. Quite the 
contrary: the focus on “universal” issues that put gender as the main relation 
of oppression to be fought, and the mild dismissal of racialized women orga-
nizing on an ethnic or community basis converge to position white feminists 
as the proper and preferred subject of feminism. The color- blindness that 
characterizes these discourses echoes the French legal, social, and political 
model of color- blindness and the disapproval of ethnic- based organizations 
reproduces the very tenets of the French immigrant integration model, fol-
lowing which integration is not mediated by ethnic and cultural communi-
ties and arguing that instances of recognition of such communities may lead 
to the demise of the unity of the French republic.41 In fact, their conception 
of racism and antiracism is strongly influenced by French republican uni-
versalism.42 These discourses are striking because they display a total lack of 
race cognizance, that is, an awareness and recognition of race as structuring 
major inequalities, and of whiteness as providing privileges and a power 
position within the racial order. Or more precisely, while they denounce 
racism as a social problem, and while they identify as antiracist, these white 
feminists never indicate that racism might shape the relationships between 
white feminists and feminists of color and may place them in a position of 
power. Doing so, they help sustain a privileged and preferred subject of fem-
inism that is white.
Another way in which race is downplayed is by arguing that class inequal-
ities are more important that inequalities related to race. This repertoire 
finds its roots in part of the second- wave feminist movement— the class 
struggle trend— which has had enduring effects on some women’s rights 
organizations. Claudine, who heads the Women’s Rights Collective, was 
politicized in her teens and youth through her participation in leftist revolu-
tionary groups. They sent her to infiltrate feminist organizations in the sev-
enties, and she ended up “staying there” and breaking up with her political 
group.43 However, she kept her strong commitment to class issues and anti-
capitalist struggle. While class is therefore an important structure of power 
that Claudine’s organization always considers when framing its claims and 
preparing its demonstrations— she proudly notes that female workers were 
present in the last demonstration she organized, proof that the movement 
was truly representative of economically disadvantaged women— it is dif-
ficult for her to imagine taking into account other structures of inequality. 
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This omission comforts the invisibility of her whiteness and the privileges 
attached to it. She develops her thoughts as she concludes:
Well, okay, but I don’t give up on inequalities. That’s it. . . . There needs to be 
a transmission of what the class struggle trend did— intersectional. I think 
we are intersectional, but truly, truly, not a veiled woman, a transsexual 
woman and a sex worker!
Here there is no omission of race but rather a clear priority of “real” struggles 
to be fought, and others to be marginalized because they are deemed spe-
cific and unimportant. In a similar vein, Anick, the founder of a network of 
support for immigrant and refugee women who was a leftist lesbian white 
feminist in the 1970s, in the revolutionary group Proletarian Left, decries the 
fact that for some, race trumps class, and condemns the idea that race may 
structure political priorities:
Me, personally, I  am against the fact that the social question has been 
transformed into an ethnic, or even racial, question. And when it comes to 
the legacy of the colonial system, of course it exists, as much in the former 
colonies as in the former metropolitan states, but I don’t think it is the cen-
tral glass through which to see history, be it of the former colonies or the 
former metropolitan states. . . . It is an oversimplification that leads to the 
racialization of society, and that’s very dangerous.
For white French feminists who came of age in the leftist nebulae of the 1970s 
and were politicized in revolutionary organizations, the legacy of this political 
subjectivation has left a profound mark on their vision of feminism. Anick, 
who volunteers on a daily basis to support undocumented migrant women and 
was part of support groups for immigrants within the Left as early as the 1970s, 
knows that racism is pervasive and that it is tightly articulated with economic 
deprivation. However, she firmly rejects the idea that race could provide a pos-
itive basis for identification and politicization. For her, as for Claudine, the po-
liticization of race runs the risk of fragmenting further an already fragmented 
feminist movement. Anick’s refusal of a hierarchy of struggles in fact implicitly 
maintains the primacy of gender over other struggles, and the position of invis-
ible privilege of the white feminist subject is therefore secured.
A second prevalent repertoire that evades and works around race, meaning 
that it bypasses the questions of the racialization of religion, the legacy of 
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French colonialism and institutional racism, is a repertoire that, in the name 
of international solidarity, locates race outside the national borders. Asked 
about their positions on the 2004 law banning the veil in public schools, 
many white feminists mentioned that they had followed the advice of 
Algerian or Iranian friends and that in fact, by supporting the ban, they had 
expressed solidarity with Muslim women . . . abroad. These discourses allow 
white feminists to situate themselves not in the configuration of racial rela-
tions in the French contemporary context, but in racial configurations of in-
ternational solidarity. For example, Corinne, , a white feminist in her forties 
who heads Sisters Unite, a network of women’s rights community centers, 
elaborates:
At the beginning [of the debate] we didn’t know. Each time we take a posi-
tion on a law . . . we try to ask: Can we have a feminist look at it? Should we 
position ourselves? We listened, we listened a lot . . . and thanks to the di-
versity within our ranks, that’s our diversity, thanks to these women coming 
from different countries, different horizons, different social strata .  .  . we 
exchanged. We exchanged with Iranians, with Algerians, with women from 
different countries and continents and we could say: if we retreat on this, if 
we open the door to this . . . we opened the door to a religious sign in the 
secular space, a sign of domination . . . at least we consider it as such. Well, if 
we do this, everybody will regress and we open a Pandora’s box.
Corinne’s reflections start with a declaration of ignorance— “at the beginning 
we didn’t know”— which is typical of whiteness as a privilege of ignorance of 
racialized women’s lives, a denial of relationality with nonwhite people and 
an erasure of their presence as subjects.44 Corinne positions herself as what 
Mariana Ortega would call a “lovingly ignorant” white feminist, who “cares” 
about Muslim women but expect to be educated on the topic, to gain proper 
knowledge.45 However, interestingly, while the law directly impacted French 
Muslim girls in public schools, Corinne seeks proper knowledge from other 
Muslim women, not French but Iranian— who fled an oppressive regime in 
the 1980s— and Algerian— who fled terrorism in the 1990s. Indeed, these 
women who were persecuted for their feminist activities embody proper 
Muslim emancipated subjects who adhere to recognizable feminist values.46 
In response to further questioning about what will happen to the young 
French Muslim girls eventually expelled from school as a result of the law, 
she elaborates further:
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That’s not true in fact [that they will be expelled]. Our Algerian friends 
were telling us: don’t fall into that trap. It’s false. It’s not true. And people 
who truly are into wearing a religious sign, whatever it is in fact, it could 
be the skullcap for Jews, and so on— well, there are private schools, which 
are not secular schools, which are religious schools. So they will go there. 
So one should not say precisely that we will exclude girls, that they won’t 
go to school. It’s false. It’s false. And in fact, no more than twenty girls were 
expelled in the whole national territory. . . . In the end, we can tell ourselves 
that we saved a lot of girls. And what’s more, we sent a strong message to 
our friends who were arriving here in 1994 [from Algeria], saying: if I don’t 
wear the veil well, my life is in danger. . . . So we had our friends in front of 
us telling us no, if you do this . . . it’s impossible. We will regress everywhere 
because France, well, we know that France for the rest of the world is the 
country of human rights.
This long quotation interweaves several narratives that intimately shape 
French feminist whiteness. Religion is understood as inherently oppressive 
to women; feminists must “save” the Muslim girls who do not want to wear 
the headscarf, but are much less concerned with those that wish to do so and 
will admittedly be excluded from public education and confined to a religious 
school. The paradox of sending Muslim girls portrayed as oppressed by reli-
gion deeper into the arms of their supposed oppressor is not remarked upon 
by Corinne— nor by many of her white feminist counterparts who opposed 
the 2004 ban. Corinne identifies with French universalism— as the country 
of human rights— as an exemplary stance that not only shows solidarity 
with Muslim women who are victims of state violence in Muslim countries 
but also pursues the saving of women all over the world. Interestingly, the 
interviewee’s constant denials (“it’s false. It’s not true”) suggest a tension in 
her narrative, which is resolved thanks to a focus on international solidarity. 
Such a focus bypasses race as a local/ national issue and constructs a diverse 
collective feminist subject across borders, rather than at home. In a move typ-
ical of feminist whiteness and described also by Françoise Vergès about the 
French second wave, women victims of institutional racism are not seen here, 
at home. White feminists proclaim solidarity with racialized women in other 
countries, in a place that is always far away from home, while they stay blind 
to and ignorant of racism at home.47 Expulsing race from the borders of the 
nation48 bolsters their attempt at denying the racist component of the policy 
they support. Also noteworthy in this quotation, and intimately articulated 
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with whiteness, is the denial of relationality that is expressed by the inter-
viewee with regards to young Muslim girls. The interviewee’s moral horizon 
is suddenly drastically curbed when it comes to relating and empathizing 
with Muslim schoolgirls. This closure of the moral impulse contributes to 
producing Muslim schoolgirls as radical others— a point whose ethical 
consequences I explore further in  chapter 6.49
In France, white feminists thus work around race in different ways that al-
ways deny race its political dimension by universalizing gender oppression, 
by privileging class over race, or by locating race outside the national borders. 
Importantly, while the repertoire that insists on class as more important than 
race may have a generational component50— it characterizes white feminists 
socialized politically in the 1970s— the other repertoires I  identified are 
shared across generations of activists. These various discursive strategies 
constitute active resistance to intersectionality. They contribute to producing 
and maintaining a white feminist subject whose privileges remain untold 
and invisible, and who is positioned as the preferred subject of feminism. 
These discourses that work around race— acknowledging it as a social phe-
nomenon and a basis of inequalities but evading it as a legitimate ground 
for politicized identities— produce a feminist whiteness that is specific to the 
French context and shaped by it. As Ruth Frankenberg argued, discourses on 
race are part of wider historical and cultural repertoires. The discourses of 
white feminists I interviewed appear singularly compatible with the repub-
lican universalism that has been promoted by French institutions since the 
1990s through a staunch politics of color- blindness, a rejection of a multicul-
tural approach to immigrant integration,51 and the championing of repub-
lican laïcité. They also exemplify the rhetorical device by which race is made 
irrelevant, as it is associated with an “outside” of the nation. It is presented by 
some as an American import, or sometimes associated with a past era— that 
of colonization— but never quite accepted as a present political issue, rele-
vant for feminist action.
Race Cognizance and Multiculturalism: Feminist 
Whiteness in Quebec
The picture of the Quebecois women’s movement, and the discursive modal-
ities through which feminist whiteness is produced, stands in stark contrast 
with the French case. While Quebecois feminism also witnessed a second 
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wave, which coincided with the Quiet Revolution and the rise of nationalism 
in Quebec, the weakness of the revolutionary Left in Quebec and the strength 
of Quebecois nationalism— associated with a social- democrat vision of 
the Quebecois welfare state— shaped the feminist Quebecois movement. 
Quebecois feminism is organized around grassroots community centers and 
shelters, with one umbrella organization, the FFQ, which adhered openly 
to the nationalist and socially liberal project in the 1990s. Quebecois fem-
inist organizations are, for the vast majority, service oriented; they cater to 
populations of vulnerable women and, since the 1980s, they have been im-
portant actors in immigrant integration policy, providing French classes 
and designing their services for immigrant populations. They carry out so-
cial service missions (migrant integration, mental health referrals, helping 
women finding work or housing, etc.), work closely with the social services, 
and, for the most part, receive funding from social service and/ or immigra-
tion ministries. Many organizations were founded on an ethnic or nation-
ality basis, starting with women immigrants from Italy in the 1970s, then 
women from North Africa, Latin America, India, and the Philippines in the 
early 1990s. Grassroots organizations that were not founded by immigrant 
women define themselves as multicultural in their identity or in their mis-
sion statement.52
While French feminists’ discourses seem to work around and sometimes 
evade race as power, locating power “outside” the reality of their feminist 
practice, in Quebec, white feminists display forms of race cognizance. Two 
main repertoires characterize Quebecois feminist whiteness. The first one 
interprets race relations within the policy framework of interculturalism. 
Following the Canadian multiculturalist policy, the Quebecois govern-
ment has elaborated an intercultural approach to immigrant integration.53 
This repertoire celebrates cultural differences, but reenacts a dichotomy 
between racialized immigrant women who must learn to integrate, and 
white Quebecois feminists who provide services and are the holders of 
Quebecois values. A  second repertoire is that of intersectionality. More 
and more widespread in Quebecois organizations, the term refers to 
tools or approaches that must be adopted to ensure inclusion. While 
interculturalism tends to depoliticize race relations, it does legitimize self- 
organizing by migrant women and their presence, as active members and 
not just as clients, in feminist grassroots organizations. Intersectionality 
more clearly acknowledges race as a power relation, but also raises much 
more criticism and resistance.
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Working with a very diverse public, Quebecois feminist organizations 
have in recent decades developed an intercultural approach and redefined 
themselves as multicultural. This move toward interculturalism is per-
ceived as the “logical” consequence of the new demography of Montreal and 
Quebec. Acting as delegates for social services, feminist organizations have 
been taking part in the Quebecois welfare- state policy of interculturalism 
since the 1980s. Sandrine, who heads a network on domestic violence in the 
Montreal region, asserts:
In Montreal, of course, we are situated in a multicultural milieu . . . so one 
of our first priorities was the issue of identifying and adapting intervention 
to the reality of ethnocultural communities. It is a challenge for all our part-
ners in the network, the shelters, the police, the social services, the justice 
system.
Interculturalism is presented as a tool, an approach, something one needs 
to be trained about, and an argument to diversify the workforce in women’s 
rights organizations. This discourse operates a twofold move. It positions 
white Quebecois women as knowledgeable about other cultures and as 
possessing the ability to communicate with women from other cultures, 
and, at the same time it also legitimizes the inclusion of racialized and mi-
grant women within women’s rights organizations, hence fostering an ac-
tual multicultural setting for feminist practice. Ethnic and racial diversity 
within Quebecois women’s organizations’ staff does not mean that racism is 
acknowledged or has disappeared.54 It indicates that cultural diversity is rec-
ognized as socially important, and the object of a specific expertise to be de-
veloped by feminist volunteers.
The dominant approach to interculturalism is a professional— rather 
than political— one. It is a tool, a skill white women develop to enable them 
to more easily “understand” migrant women, and therefore to perform in 
a more professional and efficient way their intervention as social workers. 
As Marion, a young white Quebecois officer in a multicultural women’s 
center, states in her interview, “We always need more training” on the sub-
ject of interculturalism. This approach is consistent with the concrete work 
performed by most women’s community centers and shelters as service 
providers involved in the broader Quebecois politics of immigrant integra-
tion. This approach may thus position white women as knowledgeable, le-
gitimate representatives of the Quebecois culture who can educate migrant 
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women in order to smooth their process of integration in Quebec. Diane, a 
white employee in a multicultural women’s community center founded by 
migrant women in the 1980s in an eastern neighborhood of Montreal, details 
what an awareness of cultural difference means in her daily work:
Well, the main approach we have here, I  would say, is to see with the 
woman what she wants, how she wants, what she is thinking. So from 
there, the intercultural approach is important. . . . We are going to start by 
looking . . . “Tell me, you, what do you want? Why do you think in this way? 
How was it back home? Well, see, here it works a little bit differently.” . . . So 
from there, our work is to make them talk, make connections, Then, at 
some point, to give them references. . . . So cultural differences are taken 
into account. Does it sometimes come with frictions? Yes, we’re not perfect. 
Sometimes we say something and we think: ohhhhh, I just made a mistake. 
But it’s part of the work. We make a lot of efforts so that women do not see 
us like . . . “we’re the ones who know, and you, you don’t know.”
Interculturalism’s ambivalence appears in the tension between the position 
of a knower that “gives references” and the ideal of the feminist social worker 
who does not position herself as above her migrant client. While this move 
toward a form of equality in the service relationship is consistent with the 
feminist practice of letting women make their own choices on their own 
terms, it also tends to erase the power asymmetry that is linked to whiteness 
in the interaction since the only asymmetry that is acknowledged, in order 
to be undone, is that of the service relation. In this vein of feminist profes-
sionalism, interculturalism appears as a tool that can prevent cultural mis-
communication. Racial difference is circumscribed by cultural differences, 
which may lead to errors, but which will be corrected thanks to experience 
and training with the proper expert tools.
The cultural diversity highlighted by the interviewees is not limited to 
their clientele. Importantly, interculturalism legitimates the hiring of mi-
grant women within women’s centers. In 2010, a network of women’s rights 
organizations fighting against violence against women decided to research 
how and if immigrant women who did not speak French or English could 
have access to their services. In the report, the network underlined that 
health services, social services, and women’s centers should hire women 
with a migrant background in order to offer services in the language of the 
clientele. What is more, the interculturalist repertoire also legitimizes the 
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fact that nonwhite women may organize on the basis of similar migrant or 
ethnic identity. While in France the idea of separate organizations for non-
white women raised suspicion, in Quebec it was seldom called into question. 
The Quebecois multicultural policy of migrant integration based on “cultural 
communities” self- organizing is widely accepted as relevant for feminist in-
tervention in the social domain as well.
Interculturalism acknowledges racial difference, but mainly as cultural 
difference. The fact that Quebec is historically a white settler colony is not 
mentioned in these discourses, and while racism is acknowledged as a social 
reality, feminist intervention is focused on bridging cultural difference and 
equipping migrant women with the right set of skills to navigate their inte-
gration into Quebecois society. Of course, the prevalence of this repertoire is 
explained both by the official Quebecois politics of migrant integration and 
by the important part that many women’s community centers play in it (to 
the point where an important part of their funding depends on these activ-
ities), and by the concrete social work that feminists who work in commu-
nity centers and shelters perform daily. Interculturalism is first and foremost 
part of their identity as good social workers and, as a consequence, as good 
feminists as well.
Intersectionality is a second repertoire used by Quebecois women’s rights 
organizations. The term “intersectionality” was officially adopted in 2015 by 
the umbrella organization comprising the majority of Quebecois women’s 
rights centers and organizations, the FFQ, as well as by the network of over 
twenty feminist centers and shelters, founded in the 1970s– 1980s, which 
fights violence against women throughout Quebec. It has also been une-
venly adopted by the women’s community centers that form a feminist net-
work of over ninety centers in Quebec. Thus, at the time of fieldwork, the 
term “intersectionality” was familiar to most white interviewees in Quebec 
(which was not the case in France). Intersectionality is conceived as a tool 
for proper feminist work in centers and shelters welcoming immigrant and 
racialized women, but, and this goes a step further than interculturalism, it is 
also presented as a tool for self- criticism and reflexivity, associated with ideas 
of discrimination and power between women based on racialization. Eliane, 
a white Quebecois feminist in her thirties working in a multiethnic women’s 
center, Northern Montreal, who says that the staff in her organization is fa-
miliar with the intersectional approach, explains that the process of adopting 
an intersectional approach has been like “self- criticism, so that we don’t get 
stuck in our little Quebecois affairs.” She explains:
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We all did some work with the network of women’s groups in Montreal on 
the hiring of migrant women and on maintaining them in their jobs. Very 
few women’s groups really did the exercise. But we are so happy we did it, 
because it changed our evaluation tools. When we form a selection com-
mittee for a job opening, the vocabulary we will use. . . sometimes we’re not 
aware of it but it can be colored with some prejudice. . . . If we use the term 
“popular education,” well, sometimes for the woman it does not ring a bell. 
Surely she must have done some in her country, but it was just not named 
that. . . . So that’s it, opening up . . . looking beyond, opening up. . . . I think 
women’s centers still have a long road to travel to be representative of the 
diversity of the population in Montreal— inclusion, working toward inclu-
sion, opening up to diversity. It has started to change, changing recruitment 
tools, activities . . . we really need to change.
Several interviewees, especially the youngest ones, noted that inclusion of 
women from “cultural communities” should be a priority for the movement, 
and that meant that they, as Quebecois feminists, had to change their practice 
and mindset. They did not shy away from the idea that power asymmetries 
structure relations between women based on racialization, or, as they also 
refer to it, based on cultural diversity. The question of power relations is more 
closely articulated with race and intersectionality by some activists, such as 
Lorie, who works at the umbrella organization for Quebecois women’s rights 
organizations. She reflects on the discussions that arose during the 2015 ge-
neral assembly of her organization on the question of intersectionality. She 
recalls that a lot of the debates were focused on the term “intersectionality” 
itself, as a strategy of avoiding discussing what it is actually about— that is, 
inequalities between women based on racialization (she described how 
a similar nominalist strategy had already been deployed about the word 
“racialized” a couple of years before).
Then we don’t discuss the real issue and about the violence that can be ex-
perienced by these women. So certainly some [nonwhite] women have left 
frustrated . . . because some discourses were felt as violent . . . like this feeling 
that “You constantly ask us to wait because you need to be trained. . . . This 
kind of relationship— well, there are some issues we want to deal with now. 
We want to build solidarity and you kind of reject us.” This was a little bit 
like this, so of course we have to work, to question the way we bring dis-
cussion about topics that we know will be disputed— because we knew it 
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would— so how to do it so that these discussions will not in fact be det-
rimental to the people who are concerned in the first place, and have the 
courage to come to those spaces that are not always welcoming and safe 
spaces . . . because sometimes we feel that we did not do it intentionally, but 
we put some activists on the spot, women who pay the price; so it calls into 
question our practices.
Lorie’s reflection suggests both an awareness of asymmetries of power be-
tween feminists linked to racialization, and a desire not to be considered re-
sponsible for these inequalities. While she rightly analyzes her organization’s 
general assembly meeting as a space that is not safe for nonwhite women, and 
while she identifies racialized women as “paying the price” for the lack of at-
tention paid to institutional racism, she simultaneously denies responsibility 
for what happened by stressing that it was not intentional. Hence, this reper-
toire of feminist whiteness oscillates between an acknowledgment of racism 
as a structural system of domination, which also pervades feminist organi-
zations themselves, and a conception of racism as an intentional action, the 
product of an individual’s will to discriminate or treat unequally. However, 
importantly, this repertoire leads Lorie to acknowledge race and racism since 
she does insist on the need for institutional self- reflexivity in order to avoid 
similar tensions in the future.
The intersectionality repertoire therefore identifies racialization and 
racism as important concerns for feminists and between women. The need 
to “work,” to be trained and aware— particularly present among younger 
feminists— denotes a conception in which white feminists must work 
on themselves in order not to unintentionally reproduce discriminatory 
practices. While often feminist whiteness presents itself as the desire to be ed-
ucated by feminists of color,55 here white Quebecois feminists insist that they 
must educate themselves; the responsibility is therefore theirs. It is specifi-
cally this idea of learning and self- transformation conveyed by the repertoire 
of intersectionality in Quebec that has attracted most resistance on the part of 
white Quebecois feminists. Lorie acknowledges that for some white women 
in her organization there is a deep- seated political opposition to the use of 
intersectionality as a tool for feminist intervention and as a political principle 
guiding feminist action in Quebec. For some members, the problem is that 
intersectionality puts an end to the primacy of gender over other grounds of 
inequality in feminist mobilization. For other members, who left the orga-
nization when it failed to support Bill 94 and the Quebecois laïcité charter, 
102 Feminist Trouble
intersectionality denotes the fact that Quebecois feminist organizations 
have been infiltrated by conservative Islamic women with a hidden political 
agenda. However, the most prevalent form of resistance to intersectionality56 
is noticeable in the discourse that insists on a type of “learning fatigue” from 
white feminists, a reluctance to be self- reflexive under the guise of a work 
overload, and a demand for “more time” to implement intersectionality in 
their daily practices. Lorie illustrates this resistance in the following terms:
There are wide discrepancies in the ways intersectionality has been adopted 
in the various community centers working on violence against women. . . . 
There are indeed tensions. Some centers have adopted it easily; for others 
there is a blockage, it bothers them. . . . There is a form of political resistance 
that comes from individuals and from some centers that is part of a femi-
nist tradition, more second- wave type if you want. But what I heard several 
times is that it shakes up women who say, “I spent twenty years to construct 
my feminist analyses with facts, knowledge and all that, and now I have the 
feeling that with the intersectional approach, or with queer theories, I am 
asked to learn many more things and I cannot, I cannot. It took me twenty 
years to get there. I don’t have twenty more years to invest.”
The idea that with intersectionality one needs to learn a new approach 
reveals that what is at stake is more than knowledge. It is in fact an identity, 
based on “twenty years” of investment in learning feminist theory, but also, 
one might suggest, in being a feminist, that is shaken up by the adoption of 
intersectionality in women’s centers. A profound desire not to trouble the 
established boundaries of feminist whiteness and of the acquired feminist 
subjectivity is therefore expressed through a resistance to “new” tools and 
theories. Of course, Lorie’s account also implicitly opposes her own attitude 
of positive adoption of intersectionality with the attitude of the preceding 
generation of Quebecois white feminists, revealing that a generational gap is 
at play in the adoption/ refusal of intersectionality in Quebec.
These two repertoires are of course not exhaustive. Marginally, white 
Quebecois interviewees developed, like white French interviewees, anal-
yses that stressed the universality of gender oppression. They also some-
times criticized the ethnic “ghettos” that migrant women’s organizations may 
foster, and argued that the role of grassroots feminist community centers is 
to bring migrant women to adhere to their feminist charter, as it has been 
defined by the historically white Quebecois feminist movement. In these 
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instances, Quebecois women are depicted as having defined the content of 
the Quebecois feminist project, with important ties to the Quebecois project 
of national sovereignty,57 and it is a project to which migrant women should 
adhere and which is not transformed by their inclusion in it.58 Reciprocally, 
in France some white interviewees working in organizations providing serv-
ices to women with a diversity of ethnic origins mentioned the need to cul-
turally adapt their practices and reflect on their routines to improve their 
inclusivity. Some newly founded French organizations have also adopted the 
vocabulary of intersectionality.59 Hence, intersectionality also enters French 
feminist discourses, and the need to articulate the fight against sexism and 
racism also exists in some white French feminist organizations.
However, the differences between the two contexts remain more signif-
icant than the commonalities. Quebecois repertoires of feminist white-
ness contrast with the French repertoires I have examined. They reveal a 
more widespread form of race cognizance among white feminists, even if 
processes of evading race are also visible. Tellingly, multicultural and grass-
roots feminist organizations in Quebec all systematically provide training 
on intercultural dialogue to their members. This practice was, at the time 
of the interviews, very marginal in France. Many Quebecois grassroots 
organizations that define themselves as multicultural do indeed have a di-
verse staff and board, a fact they proudly stress in interviews, along with the 
many language skills that their staff displays. While white French feminists 
are reluctant to use the term “race” and to refer to racialized women with 
this term, prominent Quebecois feminist organizations used the term 
“racialized women” (femmes racisées) in their documentation and their dis-
course. The term raised debates and opposition when it was introduced but 
is nevertheless now part of the common feminist vocabulary. Quebecois 
white feminists’ race cognizance is, of course, shaped by the context of 
Quebecois multiculturalist politics, by the role women’s centers play in im-
migrant integration policy, and, importantly, by the institutional reflexivity 
that has been developed since the mid- 2000s with respect to racism. Indeed, 
as I retraced in the previous chapter, the FFQ has promoted a committee 
for racialized and migrant women and a survey of migrant and racialized 
women’s positions within its members’ organizations. These steps have been 
crucial in politicizing the question of racial inequalities and marginaliza-
tion within the (white) Quebecois movement, initiating a decentering of 
the white privileged subject and of gender oppression as the unique ground 
for feminist action— a decentering that has elicited debates, tensions, and 
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conflicts within the main Quebecois feminist organizations but that has 
been ultimately accepted.
Feminist Whiteness: Moral Dispositions and Emotions
The various repertoires I have described must be understood as discourses 
that produce feminist whiteness— that is, a process of political subjectivation 
as white feminist— in each context. These discursive repertoires are not only 
words. They are in fact articulated with moral dispositions and layered with 
emotions. As Ruth Frankenberg and Gloria Wekker notice in their respective 
studies, whiteness is secured by a set of emotions, such as fear, anger, or in-
difference. Similarly, feminist whiteness is not only a set of discourses: it also 
comes to exist through moral feminist dispositions and specific emotions. 
These emotions and moral dispositions are relational: they define simulta-
neously the good feminist subject— and the bad ones. For example, anger 
toward or moral disapproval of Afro- feminists effectively polices the bound-
aries of the “good” feminist subject, excludes some women from the feminist 
project, and secures the privileges attached to feminist whiteness.
I identify two types of moral dispositions associated with feminist white-
ness. In the first one, the relationship between white feminists and nonwhite 
women is one of benevolent help and respect, but also ambivalence toward 
nonwhite women’s autonomy. Contrastingly, the second type of moral dispo-
sition is marked by a severe criticism and harsh moral judgment from white 
feminists of the ability of, especially, nonwhite veiled women to embody the 
feminist subject and to be autonomous. While the repertoires of feminist 
whiteness differ between France and Quebec, the types of moral disposition 
displayed by white feminists do not differ depending on the historical and 
social context— Quebec or France— but rather depend on the status that is 
conferred to nonwhite women, and especially to veiled women; that is, either 
that of being an object of benevolent feminist attention, or that of being a pos-
sible feminist subject.
This distinction between women as an object of feminist attention and 
as a potential feminist subject draws on Linda Zerilli’s contrast between 
feminism understood as a social question and feminism understood as a 
political question. Indeed, Zerilli follows Hannah Arendt’s idea that the 
political is too often assimilated to the social, that questions of freedom 
are too often transformed into social questions that should be solved by 
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politico- bureaucratic means, transforming citizens into passive recipients 
of state care and political life into an “instrumental, means- ends ac-
tivity.”60 Applied to feminism, this tendency means that the movement’s 
goal is reduced to “the social advancement of the group in whose name 
members . . . claim to speak.”61 It has meant, in the history of feminism, that 
more often than not feminists have articulated their claims for freedom and 
participation in politics in the language of social utility.62 Zerilli underlines 
that “the displacement of the political by the social is intrinsic to the his-
tory of democratic politics” and a strategy used by many disenfranchised 
groups.63 Zerilli see this displacement as crippling feminist arguments 
for freedom and crippling democratic politics in general. She opposes to 
this feminism confined to the social question a conception of feminism as 
a political relationship, a form of “political freedom in the sense of world- 
building .  .  . [that] must involve, from the start, relations with a plurality 
of other people in a public space created by action.”64 This conception of 
feminism as a form of political freedom is deeply indebted to Hannah 
Arendt’s reflections on freedom in democratic politics.65 Applied to femi-
nism, it draws attention not so much to the collective subject of feminism as 
predetermined by a shared sociological identity, “women,” but, on the con-
trary, to the collective subject as a political construction, the product of a 
world- building activity by which feminists enter into relation; but not any 
type of relation, for these relations must be, Zerilli insists, free relations.
I take up Zerilli’s distinction between feminism as a social question and 
feminism as a political practice of freedom because it captures the fact that 
both the individual and the collective subjects of feminism can be conceived 
in opposite ways. When feminism becomes a social question, all women can 
presumably be enrolled, as beneficiaries, in the project of the social advance-
ment of this category (whether the category is conceived in sociological, bi-
ological, or political terms in fact does not matter). Feminism then does not 
need to reflect on relationships between women. Rather, it is preoccupied with 
women as an object of care and political attention. Contrastingly, Zerilli’s in-
sistence that feminism should be understood as a political practice opens up 
another conception of feminism. Zerilli promotes an understanding of femi-
nism as a practice of freedom, which means that, for her, feminism’s political 
project is about creating free relations between women. While I do not want 
here to elaborate on how Zerilli, following Arendt, defines free relations and 
their relationship to democratic politics— which is her main concern— I do 
want to retain the idea that in this political conception of the feminist subject 
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what is at stake is not “women” as a social category to be advanced, but rather 
the creation of a collective subject: the feminists.
Hence, feminists themselves, rather than women, are the subject of this 
political claim, which implies the reciprocal recognition of other women as 
part of the collective feminist subject. These two conceptions of feminism 
are not mutually exclusive. Feminists may alternatively refer to one or the 
other depending on the type of political claim they want to make in the 
public space, the outcome they are looking for, the practical action they are 
engaged in, and, importantly, whom they are taking and recognizing as legit-
imate interlocutors. Indeed, as I will show, what matters is who is considered 
a legitimate interlocutor in defining what is feminism and who can embody 
this political project. I argue that these two different conceptions of femi-
nism elicit two types of moral dispositions that white feminists in France and 
Quebec display vis- à- vis racialized women. Hence, feminist whiteness is ar-
ticulated in different ways when the political subjectivation as white feminist 
occurs through an interaction with racialized women who are the object of 
a feminist intervention, and when they are considered as possible feminist 
subjects and interlocutors.
Racialized Women as Object of Benevolent and Ambivalent 
Feminist Care
In many interviews, racialized/ migrant/ veiled women are conceived as the 
object of benevolent feminist care and attention. When talking about their 
feminist practice, white feminists insist that migrant women’s choices must 
be respected and that migrant women themselves can make the choices that 
correspond to their needs. This moral disposition is particularly displayed 
by white feminists working in organizations that deliver services to women 
(such as shelters and community centers). Indeed, it corresponds to a femi-
nist intervention credo, shared across the Atlantic, that women are best posi-
tioned to know what they need, and that they should define on their own 
terms what they want. In other words, while feminist officers and workers 
in shelters and community centers might have their own vision of what is 
freedom and emancipation, they should not impose their definition on 
women who come to receive support. Feminist intervention means giving 
the woman who comes for help the tools to make her decision. More pre-
cisely, as Martine, a French officer at Women’s Health put it, “We don’t give 
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her the tools, she finds them.” In fact, in the context of service provision, fem-
inist ideals are pragmatically revised and adapted to correspond to women’s 
needs because it is not expected that these women will become feminist 
subjects. What is sought is not their emancipation in the feminist terms held 
by white feminist activists and volunteers, but a “balance” that works for 
them. Sandrine, a white feminist officer who heads a network against do-
mestic violence in Montreal, explains:
Feminist intervention is not always the best for all the women from migrant 
communities. That is, yes, gender equality— it’s perfect, it’s fine, it’s great, 
and it is what we must continue to claim. But, on the other hand, divorce or 
separation, for some women, are not the solutions that should be promoted, 
and if I must choose between proposing this solution and the woman never 
comes back in our center to get help, and another solution, which is to adapt 
the intervention to ensure that, step by step, this woman, she receives, she 
hears the message, and, finally . . . she puts herself in a safer situation, she 
puts her kids in a safer place, not necessarily by leaving her husband but by 
taking more space and keeping herself safe . . . everybody wins.
While here this attitude is presented as an adaption of a feminist practice 
to the reality of what is framed as cultural difference, this moral disposi-
tion expresses a feminist tenet that does not apply only to nonwhite women. 
Claudine, who used to be an officer in a French organization for rape victims, 
remembers that while pressing charges was her favored solution, she never 
encouraged victims to do so because she “always refused to dictate” solutions 
to women and because of the variety of reactions among victims.
Hence, both in Quebec and in France the vast majority of feminists who 
work in service- oriented organizations will insist that women should be wel-
comed, listened to, and respected on their own terms. This translates, for 
example, into a pragmatic (and sometimes principled) inclusion of women 
wearing religious symbols in all Quebecois women’s centers and shelters that 
I  interviewed. While many women’s rights community centers have shied 
away from taking a public stance in the political debates around laws ban-
ning the Islamic veil in Quebec, for fear that it would divide their member-
ship and staff, they have adopted a policy of tolerance in their day- to- day 
practice. Eliane, a young officer in the women’s community center Northern 
Montreal, reflects on the questions of Islamic veiling for her organization in 
these terms:
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We think about it, we reflect, we revise. . . . We discussed about: Are we open 
to all women? A veiled woman who enters here, what do we do? A volun-
teer here at the front desk who wears the veil . . . what do we do? All these 
situations can spur conflicts. Those are topics that, this year, we thought we 
should not keep that in the team. We must discuss with women who come 
here. In fact, veiled women— it’s absolutely fine, in the sense that a woman 
who wears the veil is totally welcome here.
For many Quebecois women’s center the central issue of inclusivity— that 
is, the idea that “all” women should be welcome— has overcome uneasi-
ness or anxiety about religious difference and in particular Islamic veiling 
practices. Hence, what is displayed and valorized is a benevolent care that 
does not discriminate among women and is faithful to the feminist com-
mitment of helping “women.” Yet, importantly, these women are mostly 
perceived as passive feminist subjects:  they are included in the femi-
nist project as recipients of help and empathy, which brings to the white 
feminist subject who provides help an enhanced form of morality and 
respectability.66
The situation is slightly different in France, where the veil sometimes raises 
“discomfort,” “tension,” and ambivalence among white feminist volunteers 
and employees. While most white interviewees declared that they would 
never turn away a woman in need of help because she wears an Islamic veil, 
this attitude was not based on the idea of inclusivity of their organization 
but rather on a principle of helping women in need. Martine describes what 
tends to happen when young veiled Muslim women ask for false certificates 
of virginity in order to satisfy their family’s demands before their marital 
engagement:
For some counselors, these cases are really difficult ones. There is always 
this tension, and it’s even tenser for certificates of virginity. There’s a tension 
because it’s difficult to perceive them as alienated. . . . It’s not right either. 
Some counselors are okay with it; it depends on their individual history if 
they can help, if they can discuss with the girls, to try to understand why 
they wear the veil, why they don’t, what it means for them. When a girl 
comes to the center veiled, it’s true, it’s a real question for us. It questions 
feminism. This fact that a woman can accept this ideological domina-
tion . . . it questions us.
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The moral disposition of benevolent care is here rife with tension and am-
bivalence. Interestingly, the internal moral debate brought forth by the en-
counter with religious Muslim women is expressed as relating to her feminist 
identity and ideals. The question becomes how “our” feminism can make 
sense of the agency of Muslim women, bringing an intrusive inquiry into 
the motivations and the moral disposition of Muslim women. This narra-
tive, and the us/ them binary that structures it, denotes, once again, that fem-
inist whiteness positions itself as the privileged feminist subject. While the 
same interviewee presented the need to let women make their own choices 
as the basis of feminist intervention, when it comes to Muslim women this 
principle is in fact amended with a higher scrutiny for “proper” motives and 
moral dispositions. Yet this quotation also suggests a possible decentering of 
feminist whiteness, which is left unsaid and unresolved, but rather hovering 
over the interviewee’s consciousness: “It questions us.”
Hence, when feminist practice is about “helping” “all” women, nonwhite 
women are easily conceived as passive recipients of help. Feminist whiteness 
is characterized here by benevolence and ambivalence toward these passive 
subjects, who are, on the one hand, proper feminist objects of intervention 
and, on the other hand, at odds with some of the feminist ideals that they 
hold dear. These moral dispositions are also perceptible in the emotional vo-
cabulary conveyed when discussing these issues, which denotes both con-
tentment with the proper and professional way of practicing feminism, and 
anxiety over the challenge that Muslim women’s agency brings to a feminist 
intervention that wants to perceive them as alienated.
However, not all women’s centers approach nonwhite women as passive 
recipients. In some centers, in particular those who have signed a common 
Quebecois feminist charter, the aim of feminist intervention is also to enroll 
women in the feminist project, understood as a project for the Quebecois so-
ciety as well.67 A white officer in such a women’s center explains:
We are feminists. But of course the majority of women who come here, they 
don’t care if we are feminist or not. They really come for a service, an ac-
tivity. And we don’t start to discuss feminism from the moment they adhere 
to the center. We wait for a woman to come here, to gain her trust, to let her 
develop a network and feelings of belonging . . . and a few months later, we 
start discussing topics like women’s rights, violence against women . . . so 
that slowly she becomes conscious of her own condition.  .  .  . All these 
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topics, we discuss them, but only after we gain women’s trust. This is the 
compromise that we make to keep all these women at the center.
Here a tension is perceptible between the benevolent care for a passive re-
cipient and the active engagement with a woman in order to enroll her in the 
feminist project, to make her a feminist subject. This political subjectivation 
of migrant women is realized through “feelings of belonging,” that is, the 
enrollment in a collective subject, the closing of the initial social distance. 
However, even if the feminist intervention is designed to politicize migrant 
women, rather than include them as passive subjects, their more active in-
clusion in the Quebecois feminist project does not imply that white feminists 
should change their own feminist values. Quite the contrary, it is about 
enrolling nonwhite women in a predefined collective subject. Here benev-
olence meets a patronizing impulse that mirrors the asymmetry along racial 
and class lines that characterizes the white volunteer / nonwhite recipient re-
lationship. This is also the case, in a more blatant way, in some French shelters 
that, like some Quebecois organizations, adhere to a feminist approach that 
implies not only helping women on their own terms but also providing them 
with a “feminist analytical framework on gender inequalities” to show them 
that violence against women is not an individual problem but a collective 
issue, as Chantal, a white feminist in her late forties who runs a shelter in a 
Parisian suburb, puts it.
Chantal: I was discussing with a young woman who arrived veiled for the 
admission interview in our living center, but I asked her to take off her 
veil because here . . . here there is no [veiling]. . . . She explained to me that 
she chose to wear the veil. She was twelve at the time she chose to wear 
it. It's a little bit young to make a choice. But it's true it's a woman who 
has gone to undergrad, she claims her right to wear the veil, she says it's 
not compulsory to wear it. So . . . she follows her own path. Maybe with 
discussions that we will have on women's rights she may evolve or not on 
this issue of wearing her veil.
Question: And she accepted your proposal not to wear the veil while she was 
at the center?
Chantal: Oh yes, of course.
Question: Why did you ask that from her?
Chantal: Because, indeed, I think as far as I am concerned it is a sign of 
women’s oppression.
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While Chantal insisted that not wearing the veil was not a precondition for 
being received for an admission interview at the shelter, it appears as a pre-
condition for staying and benefiting from the protection of the shelter and 
the services it provides. Interestingly, though she does not deny the agency 
of her interlocutor, Chantal places herself in the position to actually decide 
what is a proper age for consent and, what is more, what is the meaning of 
the Islamic veil. In a move typical of whiteness, she creates a social distance 
with her interlocutor that is only mitigated by a possible class proximity re-
lated to academic achievement.68 She also omits to reflect on the power re-
lation at play during the interview and on the power she exercises over the 
woman she interviews, although her position of authority surreptitiously 
shows in her flat avowal of the result of her demand: “of course” the woman 
took off her veil— what other choice did she have in her situation? Here be-
nevolent care and respect for a woman’s choice have been replaced by moral 
judgment, righteousness, and a unilateral definition of what type of practices 
feminist emancipation should entail. This difference in moral dispositions 
is clearly linked to the fact that in this shelter, women who come for help are 
conceived as subjects of care but also as subjects enrolled in a political pro-
ject, that of making women into feminists. As the “Muslim veiled woman” 
changes status in the relationship with the white feminist, from benevolent 
object of care to potential feminist subject— and therefore imaginably equal 
in the relationship— she must be made white by removing her veil. In this 
transaction, and to use Sara Ahmed’s terms, feminism is made white. Other 
moral dispositions that lead feminist whiteness to more extreme emotions, 
such as anger, as well as to forms of melancholy, contribute to this process, 
and I now turn to explore them.
Racialized Women as Would- Be Feminist Equal: White 
Feminists’ Anger and Melancholy
When racialized, migrant or Muslim women are conceived as possible femi-
nist subjects— that is, when their relationship with white feminists might be 
defined by reciprocal recognition and equality, rather than by benevolence 
and asymmetry— moral dispositions and emotions shift. I have described 
how in Quebec the topic of intersectionality and the inclusion of racialized 
women into the Quebecois feminist project raised some objections, on the 
ground that white feminists already had their own feminist analysis and did 
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not want to be challenged and their whiteness to be decentered. However, 
as I related in  chapter 3, these objections have not stalled the efforts of many 
Quebecois organizations to include politically racialized women. Some 
isolated white Quebecois feminists have vocally opposed this process and 
have sometimes left their feminist organization because of this political di-
vergence.69 However, interviewees working in Montreal’s women’s rights 
organizations never adopted this type of position in interviews. The situa-
tion was strikingly different in France, where several interviewees displayed 
harsh moral judgments about veiled Muslim women and lamented the loss 
of a true feminist subject.70 Their moral dispositions and their emotions ef-
ficiently drew the boundary between a good feminist subject and a bad one.
When feminism is understood as a social question, all women might be 
enrolled in the feminist project as passive beneficiaries. However, when fem-
inism is understood, and lived, as a political practice defining political rela-
tions between women, feminist whiteness takes on a new face. Indeed, when 
Muslim or racialized women are perceived as possible feminist peers (and 
all the more so when they make this claim politically), some white feminists 
may use moral judgment, indignation, and disapproval alongside anger and 
melancholy to police the boundaries of what they perceive to be the good, 
and the right, feminist subject. Asked about her analysis of the mobilization 
of racialized women in an alternate International Women’s Day march in 
Paris, the “March 8 for all,” Claudine declares:
When I think about the “March 8 for all” I think that these groups of migrant 
girls— I don’t like the term “racialized” at all— I think that these groups of 
migrant girls who go there are completely wrong. It’s true it comes from a 
divergence on the veil issue, certainly, but I don’t think that these people 
will help them— well, if they need help— because I find this is really a kind 
of “maternalist”71 attitude. . . . They don’t even know we exist! . . . They hold 
a lot of wrong ideas about us.
Moral judgments about the right type of feminism and the right type of fem-
inist subjectivity surface and draw boundaries between “us” and “them” in 
an effective way. On the one hand, Claudine places her conception of fem-
inism, and herself, as a reference point (which should not be ignored or 
misinterpreted by racialized women, as she thinks it is)— a moral and polit-
ical standard to be adopted if one wishes to be called and recognized as a fem-
inist. On the other hand, she rejects any responsibility for the deep rift that 
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has emerged between her organization, which is supposed to be inclusive 
and representative of the French women’s rights movement, and racialized 
women demonstrating on their own terms and in opposition to the official 
International Women’s Day march. A comrade of Claudine’s, Nelly, a white 
woman in her seventies who was also a former member of the class struggle 
trend during the second wave, talks about a prominent white French feminist 
who denounced the 2004 law in these terms:
Nelly: She allied with the “Indigenous”!72 They are our enemies! . . . And the 
veil, is it not a symbol of women's oppression? To pretend that there are 
islamiste73 women who are feminists, it's a fundamental contradiction 
for us.
Question: Everybody agrees in your organization on this?
Nelly: Yes, yes.
Question: Did it lead to scissions with some feminist groups?
Nelly: Well . . . there is the “March 8 for all.” I don't know, well, they are pro- 
veil and pro- prostitution. . . . That's new. We never had this type of confu-
sion before.
Question: Did you talk with the organizing committee of this 
alternate march?
Nelly: No, no . . . it’s like with fascists, you don’t talk with them, it’s useless.
Anger as well as political and moral indignation saturates this interview se-
quence.74 The Islamic feminist subject is defined, a priori, as an impossible— 
and a wrong— one, and dialogue, discussion, or any kind of relationship with 
this feminist subject is presented as impossible and pointless. What is more, 
the claims made by racialized women as feminists— since the “March 8 for 
all” is a self- defined feminist march— are presented as bringing confusion, 
troubling the boundaries and the identity of the proper feminist collective 
subject. A trace of melancholy is also perceptible, and in fact melancholy per-
meated Nelly’s interview. She longed for the unity of the feminist movement 
that characterized, in her memories, the early 1980s and the creation of the 
Maison des femmes in Paris. Hence, racialized women’s claim to constitute 
their own collective feminist subject is perceived as troubling both the inter-
viewee and to feminism.
In a similar vein, the following two quotations from interviews illustrate 
the ways in which white feminists whose political subjectivation was marked 
by the revolutionary Left in the seventies police the boundaries of the proper 
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white feminist subject and reject any claim from racialized women to be 
real feminist subjects, accusing them of false consciousness or attributing 
to them wrong modes of political subjectivation. Anick comments on the 
short- lived group that self- defined as “indigenous feminist,” one of the first 
feminist collectives in the mid- 2000s to articulate a postcolonial feminist po-
sition in the French public sphere:
Anick: Well, they don't bother me. They can continue with their ravings. I'm 
not gonna forbid them. Their message, it's not . . . it's a nationalist and ra-
cialist vision of the world . . . like other women who decide to assemble on 
some basis, be it . . . religious or geographical, etc. It's not a problem, but 
it's not a message. It's not new.
Question: They had a critique of the feminist movement that did not 
include . . .
Anick: First it’s not true, and second it’s never justified, it’s never proven.
This attitude of moral reprobation and feigned indifference of course 
contrasts with the benevolent care that characterized relationships with 
racialized women in the context of service provision by feminist or-
ganizations. The harsh delegitimation and disqualification of the in-
digenous feminist message and its strong critique of white feminism 
denotes the adoption by Anick of a moral standpoint of authority and 
self- righteousness. Here again, discussion with self- identified nonwhite 
feminists is presented as pointless in the name of irreconcilable positions 
on what is (proper) feminism. Presenting the dispute as one between right 
and wrong political conceptions of feminism obscures and evades discus-
sion about racism and whiteness within the movement. Asked about her 
thoughts on a newly created group of Afro- feminists in Paris, Claudine 
seems at pains to understand why a Black French feminist would create 
her own organization and participate in the “March 8 for all.” Feeling 
that her organization has been accused of not doing anything to include 
racialized women, she explains:
Claudine: But Annie and Leila, they published a book [on migrant women 
organizing]. . . ! She can go to libraries and documentation centers also! 
Who will teach her that? It's us! There is a generation problem as well. 
Why didn't she go to the network for migrant and refugee women. . . ?
Question: Well, it's a network for migrant women.
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Claudine: But at least she will see real work; she won't be able to say that we 
did not do anything. . . . Why doesn't she go to the organization against 
female mutilations? There are African women there!
Question: I'm not sure that is what she is looking for.
Claudine: She wants a nonspecialist organization.  .  .  ? What does she 
want?! . . . I can talk with her, but it’s a little bit tricky if she is pro- veil and 
for the legalization of prostitution. . . . But we can still talk to her, teach her 
things, because some things that are being said about us are totally false!
Claudine’s exasperation during this exchange denotes her feeling that the 
demands made by French Black feminists are illegitimate. Her responses op-
erate several shifts that are strategies of deflection and blame avoidance. She 
suggests the problem is one of “generation” rather than racism, and as she tries 
to prove that there are some organizations that fit nonwhite women’s needs, 
she operates a series of shifts that work around race and racism. She refers 
to several organizations or networks for migrant women, or organizations 
with African women that lobby against female genital mutilation, thereby 
confusing racialization and migration, and dismissing the very identity of 
the activist who is the object of the discussion as both French and Black. She 
then shifts grounds, from trying to “fix” Afro- feminists in an already existing 
“specialized” feminist niche, to declaring that the question is not the inclu-
siveness of the white feminist movement, but one of political standing on the 
veil and prostitution. Here political boundary making preserves Claudine’s 
moral high ground and prevents any challenge to her feminist authority. 
Her irritated exclamation, “What does she want?!”— while an unintended 
avowal of ignorance on her part— strangely echoes the second- wave fem-
inist motto “What do they [women] want?” an ironical portrayal of men’s 
angry and ignorant reaction to feminist demands. Finally, throughout her 
response, Claudine continues to situate herself in the position of the knowl-
edgeable educator, correcting mistakes and establishing a truth that absolves 
her from criticism and racism: “She won’t be able to say we didn’t do any-
thing.” Initiated to inquire about white feminist organizations’ inclusiveness, 
the conversation spurs irritation and anger and ends with the drawing of a 
political and moral boundary that preserves the privileged position of fem-
inist whiteness. Hence, when the “other” racialized woman is perceived as 
a potential fellow feminist, as a possible part of a common political collec-
tive subject, she is either “returned” to “specific” organizations that suppos-
edly address her “specific” needs or she is excluded on the grounds that her 
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political position cannot be accommodated by a proper feminist collective 
subject. Never considered an equal or an interlocutor, she is dismissed before 
any interaction can occur, before any resentment or criticism she may utter 
can be heard and recognized as legitimate.
Anger and fear are not the only moral emotions that characterize white 
feminists’ discourse on race and racism inside the feminist movement. 
Another interesting moral emotion that pervades discourses from older 
white feminists is that of melancholy, a longing for a long- lost unity of the 
collective feminist “we.” One is here reminded of Cristina Beltrán’s interro-
gation on the subject of Latino politics in the United States. Indeed, she asks, 
“Is Latino politics a project defined by loss?” and “Does the memory of such 
passionate and participatory politics inspire future political action— or does 
it render all that follows a disappointment?”75 Several French interviewees 
in their sixties expressed deep melancholy, suggesting that true feminism 
existed in the past, but that now all that was left to do was to mourn a loss 
never to be replaced, the loss of unity, the loss of collective action and huge 
demonstrations. Nelly admits she sees “no future” for her umbrella organi-
zation that gathers women’s rights organizations at the national level. She 
remembers the 1990s as a time of great activity, and the 1970s as the time 
of true unity within the movement (despite the numerous conflicts that in 
fact characterized this period). Similarly, Claudine depicts the feminist 
movement as experiencing a setback, an in- between- waves moment, that 
translates into the impossibility of mobilizing a collective presence for street 
demonstrations. While in fact numerous new feminist organizations have 
been created in France in the last two decades, while new racialized feminist 
subjectivities have emerged, Claudine’s perception of the movement is one 
of a lost subject. One could argue that, in fact, at the very moment when ra-
cial difference becomes politicized in the French feminist public space, when 
racism becomes a political issue for new organizations headed by nonwhite 
feminists, suddenly, for some white feminists, the feminist subject itself is 
lost and to be mourned. Of course, turning to melancholy, lamenting the 
loss of the true feminist subject, evades the question of power and privileges 
within the current feminist collective subject. While the past is presented as 
a time of true unity and true feminism, present feminist contestations of per-
vasive white privilege inside the movement are made irrelevant and illegiti-
mate. Feminism is located in the past, and present- day challenge to feminist 
whiteness ignored.
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I thus described two types of moral disposition that are adopted by white 
feminists I interviewed when encountering nonwhite women. In the first in-
stance, racialized women are the object of benevolent and professional care. 
There feminist whiteness is characterized by some degree of ambivalence, 
because racialized/ migrant women are granted autonomy in their decisions, 
while at the same time portrayed as feminist subjects to be educated. The 
service relation that typically elicits this moral disposition encourages white 
feminists to be aware of their own prejudices and entails a self- reflection on 
the ethical dimension of the relationship with racialized/ migrant women. 
Indeed, white feminists working in shelters or community centers often re-
flect on the power relations that exist in the context of their social work with 
racialized/ migrant women and try to develop tools to mitigate the effects of 
these power asymmetries on racialized/ migrant women who are receiving 
help. However, these benevolent dispositions depend in large part on the 
assumption that racialized/ migrant women are part of the feminist project 
as the recipient of help, the object of care, embodying the social subject of 
feminism, women, and the concomitant expectation that they will not be 
transformed into feminists; that is, that the social, political, and moral dis-
tance that marks their relationship to white feminists providing service may 
not be reduced. Feminist intervention is, most of the time, not about creating 
a political relationship with service recipients.
A second type of moral disposition displayed by white feminists contrasts 
with this first benevolent and pragmatic attitude. It is elicited when racialized 
women are perceived as articulating feminist claims and a self- defined 
feminist identity. Some white French feminists especially display moral 
dispositions marked by anger, to some extent also fear— of being criticized 
and called racists76— and by self- righteousness. They work to preserve 
a moral high ground by rejecting claims by racialized women as illegiti-
mate. They portray veiled Muslim women as impossible or improper femi-
nist subjects, thereby policing the boundaries of what they consider to be 
the proper feminist subject. Because feminism, as a political project, rather 
than a social one, is a project of establishing free and equal relations with 
women, some white French feminists prefer no relations at all with racialized 
feminists. Indeed, any type of relation would entail answering legitimate 
questions about the historical exclusion of racialized women, and would 
mean transforming the boundaries of the feminist subject, a topic I go back 
to in  chapter 6.
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A powerful rationale that pervades the discourses that present veiled 
Muslim women as improper feminist subjects and that legitimize their ex-
clusion from the feminist project as defined by white feminists is that of sec-
ularism (see  chapter 3). To conclude this exploration of forms of feminist 
whiteness, I thus turn to the complex relationship between nationalism, sec-
ularism, and whiteness that is reshaping feminist whiteness, in particular in 
France.
Femonationalism, Secularism, and the Reshaping 
of Feminist Whiteness
In this last section, I  interrogate the emergence and consolidation of a 
form of hegemonic feminist whiteness that is intertwined with nation-
alism through a commitment to secularism. Indeed, an important fea-
ture of femonationalism, not always remarked upon, especially in France 
and Quebec, is that it is intimately articulated with secular discourse. 
Hence, to conclude this chapter I ask: Is femonationalism a new form of 
feminist whiteness? To what extent is it coextensive with whiteness and 
secularism?
The answers to these questions are complex: femonationalism is a dynamic 
process; new policies and laws are regularly put on the agenda of European 
countries, reflecting the conflation of women’s rights with xenophobic na-
tionalism.77 The adhesion of some white feminists to a femonationalist dis-
course happens mostly through an identification with secularism as a set 
of values that inherently protect women against religious oppression. This 
feminist adhesion to secularism has historical roots both in Quebec and in 
France, two historically Catholic countries where a majority of feminists 
fought actively against the Catholic Church until very recently. With the 
adoption of a secularist femonationalist discourse, feminist whiteness shifts 
from an active ignorance and avoidance of race to an active adhesion to a 
national identity that is premised on the exclusion or the reconfiguration of 
Islam and Muslim citizens themselves.78 With this shift, some white feminists 
position themselves as moral entrepreneurs who can decide under what 
conditions immigrant and Muslim women may be enrolled as good femi-
nist subjects. However, femonationalism is not restricted to white feminists. 
Quite the contrary, nonwhite feminists can also embrace this discourse and 
benefit from its public legitimacy.
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Repertoires of feminist whiteness vary with time and space. I argue here 
that sexularism debates that have agitated the feminist public space are not 
the product of preexisting forms of feminist whiteness within white women’s 
rights organizations, but rather historical moments in which feminist white-
ness has been reconfigured. However, this reconfiguration differs in its scope 
and direction in France and in Quebec. Indeed, in Quebec a minority of 
white and nonwhite feminists mobilized secularism as a proxy for national 
Quebecois identity and portrayed Islam as a menace to Quebecois women’s 
rights. They vocally demanded a charter of laïcité to curtail the visibility of 
Islam in Quebecois society, and the entrenchment of gender equality as a 
value that should precede freedom of religion in the legal order.79 As I retraced 
in the previous chapter, a majority of white Quebecois women’s rights organ-
izations nevertheless opted for more accommodating stances and affirmed 
their attachment to secularism, but a secularism that would not produce the 
exclusion of veiled women from public spaces or the job market. They tended 
to refuse the fusion between women’s rights and a bounded Quebecois iden-
tity that would necessitate the cultural assimilation of migrants and the invis-
ibility of their religious practices, and denounced the open racism of the new 
Bill 62 in 2017.80 Hence, sexularism debates in Quebec have precipitated the 
development and adoption of more critical repertoires of feminist whiteness 
such as intersectionality. They have put to the test the principled, and often 
only rhetorical, commitment of white feminist organizations to inclusivity 
that dates back to the 1960s with the foundation of the FFQ,81 producing a 
new and deep conflict between white Quebecois feminists.
The situation has been quite different in France. Indeed, in France, 
sexularism debates emerged in a context in which many major (white) 
women’s rights organizations have identified for several decades with the 
boundaries of the nation, and with the French Republic and its univer-
salism. As Françoise Vergès notes, after decolonization, French feminists 
adopted the idea that colonization was over, and that France was now con-
fined to its continental territory. This “mutilated geography,” as she calls it, 
constituted overseas territories that legally remained French as “outside” 
the borders of the nation, and outside of the political imaginary of French 
feminists from the continent.82 It marks, for Vergès, a form of adhesion of 
white French feminists to nationalism. More recently, in the context of the 
debate for gender parity in politics that animated the second half of the 
1990s, many white French feminists have identified with a republican uni-
versalist discourse. A large number of French women’s rights organizations 
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became republicanized through their adhesion to the parity motto and its 
discursive strategy, which claimed that women did not represent a “cate-
gory” or community that should be recognized by the republic, but rather 
“half of humanity,” a component of a universal difference, that could be rec-
ognized by the Republic.83 This adhesion to and identification with a univer-
salist conception of women’s rights that prioritizes gender over other axes of 
difference provided a favorable context for white French feminists’ endorse-
ment of laïcité, another cornerstone of the French Republic. In this context, 
feminist whiteness was reconfigured, with a new repertoire affirming that 
women’s rights and the secular Republic are inseparable. Of course, histor-
ically, secularism has been beneficial to women’s rights in the context of the 
overwhelming power of the Catholic Church in France until 1905, when the 
law separating church and state was adopted.84 However, the secularism pro-
moted in the 2000s by many white feminists differed considerably from the 
1905 law and contributed to the fashioning of femonationalism.
Secularism therefore appears as a new repertoire that reshapes French 
feminist whiteness. This repertoire argues that religion is inherently op-
pressive to women, and that French laïcité is the only efficient protection for 
women who are vulnerable to religious extremism. This repertoire has roots 
in French feminism’s anticlericalism. Indeed, the fight for the right to abor-
tion during the second wave was framed as a fight against the hold of the state 
and of the Catholic Church over women’s bodies. One cannot underestimate 
the influence that the Catholic Church had within French society when the 
second wave emerged at the end of the 1960s.85 In this context, the associ-
ation of feminism with secularism became uncontested among feminists 
from the “long” second wave.86
If memories of the second- wave struggle against the Catholic Church were 
often mentioned by older white feminists, the idea that the Republic and 
laïcité are the natural allies of women’s rights was present in many interviews 
across generations. For many white feminists, religion is understood as in-
herently oppressive to women, and the veil epitomizes this oppression. Elsa 
from Feminists Dare!, who is too young to have been part of the feminist fight 
against far- right Christian extremism in the late 1980s, nevertheless identi-
fies religion with oppression, and republican secularism with emancipation:
[Religions] have this ambition to intervene in the organization of society. 
France has this history of laïcité, and I think that globally it has protected 
women. . . . The three monotheist religions have a clear vision of the society 
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they want and there is no equality between women and men. So my thing 
is to fight this. For me laïcité . . . is an ideal. It’s like equality. . . . We know we 
will not reach it, but it can be a direction. And in a way, we are a laboratory 
in France because, well, there are very few secular countries.
This secularist repertoire reflects the adhesion of many white feminists to 
the renewed conception of laïcité elaborated by French institutions since the 
mid- 1990s. Following Cécile Laborde,87 one can define this conception of 
secularism as a republican conception that is perfectionist because it aims, in 
a typical Enlightenment narrative, at emancipating individuals, and is pre-
mised on the idea that the state is better placed than religion to achieve this 
aim. This republican conception of secularism also aims at fostering the na-
tional civic community, and is therefore identified with national identity. In 
fact, secularism defines a set of civic values and a public culture that draw the 
boundaries of the national community.88 Secularism is not a simple law or a 
set of rights protecting religious freedom; it has become a bond that unites 
the national community. The following quotation from Julie, the commu-
nication officer of Girls on the Rise, epitomizes the articulation between a 
defiance toward religion and the idea that the Republic must emancipate 
individuals from this negative and oppressive influence, as well as the idea 
that this goal amounts to a model, or, as Elsa stated in her interview, “a pro-
ject for society.” Julie comments on the 2010 law banning the full veil in 
public spaces:
There is this idea that equality does not depend, in any instance, on re-
ligion or sex. . . . Do we want that everybody is kind of satisfied, or do 
we clearly and totally take responsibility that we consider that there is a 
model, that we are universalists, that men and women are equal and that 
no religious or sectarian form should contravene this, and this is what 
we want?
Women’s rights are conceived as embodied by the universalism that 
characterizes republicanism, and protected by secularism.89 Women’s rights 
become equated with the French nation via this renewed conception of secu-
larism as a feature of national identity. Many white feminists were aware that 
their adhesion to secularism might fuel Islamophobia. However, they oper-
ated a hierarchy between women’s rights, to be defended only thanks to secu-
larism (understood as the banning of religious symbols from public spaces), 
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and the fight against racism. Anick states about the 2010 law preventing full 
veiling in public spaces:
I was hesitant in the beginning because it was about no more than a few 
hundred persons who wear the full veil. I told myself: it’s not that impor-
tant, etc., and it fuels racism against Muslims, and finally I told myself, yes, 
they are not numerous, but here again one must impose a limit. Otherwise 
this practice will develop even more.
Hence the French sexularism debates prompted a new repertoire of feminist 
whiteness, tightly articulated with secularism. While one may have expected 
a critical stance of white French feminists toward republican discourses and 
institutions, in the last two decades many women’s rights activists have ac-
tively identified with republican discourses and values and their implicit na-
tionalism. At the very moment when feminist whiteness based on the active 
ignorance of race within the movement was challenged by the emergence 
of new nonwhite feminist subjectivities and new public discourses on race, 
the French colonial past, and Islamophobia,90 a new repertoire of feminist 
whiteness, actively recuperating secularism— understood as distinct from 
race and racism— was forged. In this context, secularism presents itself as a 
race- neutral narrative and opens possibilities for articulating new forms of 
feminist whiteness. Secularism has enabled many white feminists to posi-
tion themselves as moral entrepreneurs who can decide if and how Muslim 
women might be good feminist subjects that can be enrolled in the feminist 
project, or should instead be cast away.
While this repertoire seems to avoid race, placing discussion on the ter-
rain of religious belief, it is nonetheless actively sustaining the privileges at-
tached to feminist whiteness as a hegemonic, racially privileged position. 
Muslim women become objects of scrutiny; their motivations are examined 
and deemed compatible, or not, with feminism. Corinne explains her ap-
proach with religious Muslim women:
So it’s that idea, that we are trying to give guidelines, because our aim is also 
to flag some issues for women with respect to these debates, not to stigma-
tize a community or a religion. It’s about saying, “Wait, let’s reflect on this. 
What does it mean? What does it endanger? Does it make us go forward? 
Does it make us regress backward? In what type of society do we want to 
live?” And from there we try to give guidelines to women.
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Corinne positions herself as knowledgeable and able to provide other women 
with answers about the type of society in which they should want to live, and 
how secularism is the right means to achieve this end of “progress” toward 
more gender equality, associated with republican institutions, rather than re-
gress under the influence of Islam. Chantal explains why she asked a veiled 
Muslim woman to take off her veil when she came to stay in the shelter:
Globally, in terms of how you can think about your femininity . . . To hide 
women  .  .  .  the analysis I  have, also with researchers who specialize on 
Islam, [is] there is no obligation. In many countries, Muslim women do not 
wear the veil. . . . Then it is our job to talk with them about this and about the 
enlightened choice they will give to their children.
Secularism and the conviction that religion is oppressive to women enables 
white feminists to bypass any discussion on racism and on the practical ex-
clusionary consequences of their secularist discourses. The good Muslim 
feminist subject is the one who will adopt secularism and make her reli-
gious identity private and invisible for her white non- Muslim counterparts. 
Secularist discourses elaborated by some white feminists draw a boundary 
between the good Muslim girl, who will take off her veil and understand the 
importance of French secularism and republican values, and transmit them 
to her children, future members of the national body politic, and the one 
who will not. The latter is considered an irredeemable feminist subject who 
is not an object of concern for secular feminists. For example, the fact that 
the 2004 law expelled young Muslim girls from school is often presented as 
of no concern to secular feminists, the product of a choice made by young girl 
not to adopt secularism, that thus entails their exclusion from school only 
because they chose so. Elsa presents the situation offered to Muslim girls in 
those terms:
The problem is that you encourage the wearing of the veil if you don’t put 
limits. As far as I am concerned the 2004 and 2010 laws protected girls who 
could resist the family pressure to wear the veil, since they could say, “Either 
I go to public school and I don’t wear the veil, or I go to private school,” and 
the parents had the choice to let her stay in the public school.
Anick reflects on the 2004 law banning religious symbols in public schools in 
similar terms:
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My position on the law changed because when the debate started, I was 
not in favor of a law. It seems useless. . . . I hesitated . . . the idea that the 
law would be a problem for these young girls, etc. And then I thought: no. 
After all, these girls, that’s what they want, they are not forced. They should 
bear the consequences, and in any case it’s just in schools, they can put 
their veils back on their head after. . . . And to see Islamic extremists, when 
I saw their street demonstration with these bearded guys and these veiled 
women . . . then no. I was so appalled that I told myself no. We need to stop 
this religious extremism.
The contrast in Anick’s discourse between her benevolent attitude toward 
“good” migrant women, objects of care by feminists like herself, and bad 
veiled women who cannot be included in the feminist project is startling. The 
contradiction between the secularist assumption that religion is oppressive 
to women and the assertion that veiled girls, after all, choose to veil, is never 
touched upon. Veiled Muslim girls are suddenly granted agency to choose 
between, on the one hand, adhering to secularism and becoming the object 
of benevolent care by white feminists, and, on the other hand, making visible 
their religious identity and being dropped altogether from feminist concern. 
What is more, secularism makes anger and even disgust expressed with re-
spect to veiled women appear as legitimate feminist reactions and emotions.
Not all white French feminists adhered to this new narrative of secularism 
and femonationalism. Reciprocally, not all nonwhite feminist rejected this 
narrative. In fact, prominent nonwhite feminist voices emerged as embodying 
the liberating forces of secularism for Muslim women themselves. For ex-
ample, in France, the hearing of Sihem Habchi, then president of the organi-
zation Ni putes ni soumises, in front of the Gérin parliamentary commission 
in 2009 was widely commented on for her vehement defense of secularism 
and republicanism, as well as for her performance of partly undressing her-
self to prove her legitimate belonging to the French nation.91 In France sev-
eral nonwhite activists for women’s rights have adopted comparable public 
discourses, stressing the necessity to enforce secularism in order to protect 
women from Islam. Narratives based on testimonies of women in the hand 
of oppressive Muslim men have also multiplied in bookshops, attesting to the 
success of the new literary genre of the “Muslim oppressed women” that fuels 
the rhetoric for muscular secularism in the name of women’s rights.92
Similar performances of adhesion to the secular femonationalist nar-
rative in Quebec by Muslim feminists include those enacted by Fatima 
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Houda- Pépin, an MP who vigorously defended the idea of a charter of 
laïcité in Quebec, and Djemila Benhabib, a public intellectual figure whose 
book Ma vie à contre- coran: Une femme témoigne sur les islamistes (My life 
against the Koran: A woman testifies against Islamists), published in 2009, 
was very well received in the Quebecois public sphere.93 In all these cases 
the adhesion of nonwhite feminists to femonationalism grants them access 
to public attention as well as social and political capital. It also simultane-
ously gives credit to the belief that secularist discourses are not about race. 
The use of femonationalist narratives by nonwhite feminists reveals the only 
partial overlap between femonationalism and feminist whiteness. However, 
while these public figures may use femonationalism as a strategy to gain ac-
cess to the public sphere, they remain very marginal voices among racialized 
feminists, as I document in the next chapter.
* * *
I explored in this chapter the various repertoires and forms of feminist white-
ness in Quebec and France, and the different moral dispositions and emotions 
that contribute to producing them. I showed how in many different ways and 
with a variety of discourses in both contexts, feminist whiteness produces 
white women as the privileged subject of feminism, how repertoires of fem-
inist whiteness work around race and depoliticize race and racism through 
a culturalist lens, but also how they can sometimes acknowledge power re-
lations along racial lines and attempt to decenter the privileged white fem-
inist subject. While some repertoires of feminist whiteness denote an active 
discursive resistance to intersectionality, others show how the concept can 
contribute to transforming feminist whiteness. I have also argued that fem-
inist whiteness and the moral dispositions that sustain it differ depending 
on the type of relationship white feminists envision between themselves 
and racialized women. Indeed, when the relationship is one of service pro-
vision, when migrant/ racialized women are conceived as objects of feminist 
care, the moral dispositions associated with feminist whiteness are benevo-
lence and ambivalence. On the contrary, in France, when the relationship is 
politicized— that is, when migrant/ racialized women are not perceived as in 
need of feminist care but as possible feminist subjects— moral dispositions 
are often self- righteousness, anger, and melancholy. That is, by expressing 
negative moral judgments, irritation, or exasperation when it comes to issues 
of racism within the feminist movement, white feminists efficiently police 
the boundaries of the proper feminist subject.
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Secularism has also been enrolled in this policing project, which more 
often than not demands racialized women silence their claims and their 
identities to be recognized as equals. Tellingly, young veiled girls have been 
dropped from the white feminist agenda in the name of protecting women’s 
rights through secularism. Finally, I argue that in France, sexularism debates 
have indeed changed and refashioned feminist whiteness. While feminist 
whiteness was based on typical forms of white ignorance and race evasion, 
since the mid- 1990s many white feminists have actively identified with re-
publican values, effectively forging a historically new white feminist subject 
under the guise of universalism and secularism. But this is only one part of 
the story: if sexularism debates have efficiently produced new forms of fem-
inist whiteness, they have simultaneously fashioned new processes of femi-
nist political subjectivation for racialized women, which I explore in the next 
chapter.
Feminist Trouble: Intersectional Politics in Postsecular Times. Éléonore Lépinard, Oxford University Press (2020). 
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 Resisting Whiteness, Claiming Feminism
Racialized Feminists’ Moral Addresses
It still matters that we feel more properly recognized by some people 
than we do by others.
— Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 33
You have to accept that we are here, and you have to love us. 
Otherwise it's not gonna work. You cannot just tolerate us!
— Mani, South Asian feminist activist, Montreal
When feminist discourses are dissociated from feminist whiteness, what 
kind of feminist identities, political ideals, and moral dispositions do they 
regulate? And how do they contribute to a critique of femonationalism? 
The sexularism debates that have reconfigured white feminists’ political 
subjectivations in many European countries have also impacted and shaped 
the organizing of racialized feminists and their political subjectivations in 
those contexts. While I described in the previous chapter the various dis-
cursive repertoires and moral dispositions mobilized by white feminists to 
produce a form of political subjectivation that I have called feminist white-
ness, I  turn in this chapter to racialized feminists and their modes of po-
litical subjectivation in relation to white feminists as they have unfolded 
in the same period of debates and conflicts among feminists. I argue that 
racialized feminists’ discourses constitute forms of moral address vis- à- vis 
white feminists, and that racialized feminists elaborate a critical discourse 
that resists the dominant assumptions that fuel femonationalism, and 
thereby provides alternative feminist visions, anchored in different moral 
dispositions and emotions. Of course, racialized feminists’ discourses about 
the sexularism debate and their feminist ideals are not solely directed at white 
feminists. They are also focused on racialized women, in order to create the 
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constituency they aim to represent. However, I am interested here in ana-
lyzing specifically how feminist whiteness is resisted.
My intention in this chapter is not to retrace the history of racialized 
women’s groups and movement in France and Quebec in the past decade, 
or to explain why they have emerged and perpetuated themselves or didn’t 
survive. While this chapter certainly contributes to documenting racialized 
women’s movements in both contexts— an important task given the fact that 
very few studies exist and that there is a socially organized lack and loss of 
memory of those movements— my main aim is different. Indeed, I analyze 
how sexularism debates have shaped different forms of feminist political 
subjectivities for racialized feminist groups, and in particular how racialized 
feminists have forged specific political vocabularies to name and politi-
cize their relationships with white feminists in this heated context. I  also 
argue that these political vocabularies are articulated with a set of emotions 
and moral dispositions that fashion specific forms of feminist political 
subjectivation. I propose in this chapter to capture the formation of (collec-
tively produced) moral, political, and ethical dispositions that are intimately 
linked to and shaped by the context of postcolonialism and postsecularism in 
France and Quebec. In particular, I ask: How do nonwhite feminists consider 
their political and moral relationship to the mainly white feminist move-
ment in both contexts? What are the moral dispositions and emotions that 
the encounters, conflicts, or alliances with white feminists elicit for racialized 
feminists? How do they resist racism and the exclusions from white feminist 
spaces it performs?
I argue that by calling themselves feminists, racialized feminists in both 
contexts enter— among other processes— in relation with white feminists, a 
relation that they attempt to fashion with their own vocabulary, concepts, 
and discourses. Since their emergence as organized social movements in dif-
ferent contexts, racialized feminists have produced analyses of their raison 
d’être and relationships with white feminist organizations. In the United 
States, Black and Chicana organizations that emerged at the same time as 
their white counterparts, at the end of the 1960s, produced writings re-
flecting on their identities, goals, and strategies in order to organize and sur-
vive as independent movements.1 In the contemporary context of sexularism 
debates and divisions on these issues within feminist movements, racialized 
feminists have elaborated specific discourses and counterdiscourses to em-
power themselves and resist the political ideals and identities imposed on 
them by hegemonic and secular feminist whiteness. Since they occupy a 
Resisting Whiteness, Claiming Feminism 129
minority position, in the Deleuzian sense— that is, not an identity or a so-
ciological “object,” but a position of endogenous conflictuality within a 
hegemonic normative system2— racialized feminists seek to create a new lan-
guage, a new position, from within a dominant discourse.
I insisted in the previous chapter that feminist whiteness is a relational 
process of political subjectivation. Likewise, racialized feminists’ forms of 
political subjectivation are relational. They are relationally connected to 
white/ mainstream/ hegemonic forms of feminist discourse. This relation-
ship is both political and moral. Indeed, I posit that calling oneself an Afro- 
feminist, a feminist of color, a Muslim feminist, or a South Asian feminist is 
not only a political choice in a given context. It is also a claim to be recog-
nized as such, by other fellow feminists; it is, to borrow Judith Butler’s words, 
to give an account of oneself3 as a racialized feminist; it is to enter a scene 
of address and therefore relations with others, relations that delineate a spe-
cific moral horizon and specific ethical responsibilities. In particular, I ex-
plore in this chapter the political emotions, such as indignation, frustration, 
pain, unease, anger, or lassitude, that sustain racialized feminists’ relation-
ship to white feminists, and the forms of moral address they convey. I argue 
that racialized feminists’ political subjectivities are articulated through both 
resistance and resentment.
In her analysis of theories and practices of French lesbians of color, Paola 
Bacchetta contends that resistance can be transgressive, transformative, or 
oppositional, and that these various forms of resistance allow for the creation 
of subjectivities and imaginaries thanks to the creation of a collective “we” 
formed by intersubjective relations.4 Hence, she insists that queer- of- color 
subjectivities are coconstituted by various power relations that they resist, 
leading to the production of new subjectivities and to disidentification pro-
cesses. I document such forms of resistance through discourses that are op-
posed to the hegemony of feminist whiteness.
I also document forms of resentment, which I interpret as moral and po-
litical addresses that racialized feminists direct to white feminists. There is a 
philosophical tradition that interprets resentment as a negative political pas-
sion. For example, Wendy Brown suggests that resentment fixates wounded 
identities on their injuries, preventing them from unfolding politically in 
more positive and productive ways.5 Resentment tends to orient political 
action toward the claiming of rights— rights to protection, which reinstate 
the status of victim. Sara Ahmed insists that feminists of color are assigned 
the position of a feminist killjoy within feminist spaces:  as they raise the 
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subject of racism, they are perceived as the problem, because they threaten 
the preservation of “white fragility” by their very presence.6 Racialized 
women’s resentment may be described as the product of being a feminist- of- 
color killjoy, that is, a feminist who “does not make the happiness of others 
[here white feminists] her cause.”7 However, resentment, like the figure of 
the killjoy, exceeds negativity. It also bears the mark of a will. Indeed, like 
the willful subject described by Ahmed,8 resentment also creates the possi-
bility for a we, at the same time as it interrupts the “flow of a conversation.”9 
Indeed, following Audre Lorde10 and bell hooks,11 Ahmed underlines that 
bringing up the question of racism within feminism, that is, politicizing race 
in the context of feminism, means interrupting the flow of the conversation 
of white feminists. Resentment is therefore a form of willfulness.
In this vein, I  argue that resentment is not a way of adopting and 
safeguarding an identity as a victim, but rather a way to attempt to fashion 
new relations. It is both a moral disposition and a political action directed 
at white feminists. Resentment can thus be interpreted as a moral ad-
dress, as Margaret Walker has argued,12 directed toward those who have 
wronged others. Thomas Brudholm has shown that, in the dramatic after-
math of World War II, Jean Améry’s writings as a Holocaust survivor had no 
other aim than to posit resentment as a positive moral demand expressed 
to his German contemporaries.13 Harboring resentment may therefore 
be a political and moral action that is not limited to the foreclosure of po-
litical subjectivation on the figure of the victim but rather an action that is 
principally oriented toward others. While analyses of racialized women’s 
movements often rightly focus on their claim to their own identity and their 
difference from white feminist movements, I suggest in this chapter that re-
sentment is, among other emotions and moral dispositions, a way to recog-
nize what Hannah Arendt calls “the world between us.”
I first explore the contexts of racialized feminists’ activism in France and 
Quebec to underline the difference in their dynamics of self- organization 
and politicization of their racial identities. I show that they share, across the 
Atlantic, similar repertoires of collective self- organizing, but also that they 
approach religious and racial identities in contrasting ways, and that they 
hold a diversity of positions with respect to sexularism debates, depending in 
part on the type of organization they are part of, that is, organizations devoted 
to providing services to women in their communities or consciousness- 
raising groups. Then I analyze what intersectionality means for racialized 
feminists, that is, both a lived experience that is conducive to developing a 
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form of feminist subjectivity, and a tool to resist whiteness and claim more 
and better representation among feminist movements. Finally, exploring 
further the political subjectivations of racialized feminists, I investigate the 
range of political and moral emotions that they express with respect to white 
women. I argue that these feelings nourish both resistance to whiteness and 
resentment toward white feminists as a form of moral and political appeal to 
refashion feminist relations.
The Politics of Racialized Feminists “Organizing 
One’s Own”
In most countries where feminism experienced a second wave, during that 
period racialized women self- organized and produced theoretical reflections 
on their relationship to the white feminist movement. However, it took quite 
some time before their dynamics as social movements became the object 
of scholarship that interrogates and revisits central themes of social move-
ment theories such as identity formation,14 movement’s success,15 or coali-
tion building.16 Today there is a developing field of social movement studies 
that analyzes racialized women’s movements and their relationships with 
white women’s movements,17 and that also investigates the extent to which 
racialized feminists’ claims and identities have been discursively or practi-
cally integrated in the political agenda of white/ mainstream feminist organi-
zations, through intersectionality discourses and practices.18 However, these 
developments are of uneven nature depending on the case under scrutiny. 
In particular, while there have been several important studies on racialized 
women’s movements in the United States and the United Kingdom,19 there 
is a dearth of studies on other European countries and Canada,20 and the 
history of Black French women’s movements has only recently begun to 
burgeon.21 The timing and scope of these processes of self- organizing differ 
depending on the historical and social context. It is important to under-
stand these differences because they delineate the backdrop against which 
racialized feminists’ political subjectivation unfolds.
In the United States, Black and Chicana feminists organized early on at 
the end of the sixties and produced an important legacy of writings that 
formed the foundations of Black feminism and intersectionality as a field of 
studies, thereby cementing a lasting impact on feminism as a field of protest 
and as a field of theory.22 Studies on racialized women’s movements in the 
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United States have brought important insights on the dynamics of forma-
tion and dissolution or fading of these organizations. They have in particular 
underscored that Black and Chicana women’s organizations are not the “nat-
ural” product of race relations in a given context. As Benita Roth suggests, 
“Selecting the label ‘feminist’ was not a simple or automatic act but a polit-
ical choice among other political choices,”23 and Black and Chicana women 
in the United States could have opted at the end of the 1960s to participate 
in their respective racial groups’ social and revolutionary movements rather 
than create their own organizations. Kimberly Springer also points out the 
risk of homogenizing these groups, erasing their internal class and sexual 
diversity. As she outlines in her history of Black women organizing in the 
United States between 1968 and 1980, the desire to center organizations 
around Black women’s identity, rather than Black women’s identities, created 
new margins in these movements.24 Equally important, Chicana and Black 
feminists in the United States decided to create their own organizations fol-
lowing two impulses of different nature. First, in a crowded social move-
ment field, they felt the need to “organize one’s own,” an activist ethos that 
was typical of that time, as Benita Roth has argued. Second, white women’s 
desire to preserve their class and racial privileges made alliances difficult or 
impossible, despite existing relationships between Black, Chicana, and white 
women’s movements.
France and Quebec provides contrasting pictures to the US history of 
racialized women’s organizing. Racialized feminist’s organizations have 
emerged in France and Quebec at different times and places, and with dif-
ferent political logics and genealogies. In France, despite the existence of 
racialized feminist activism in overseas territories during the same period 
and the emergence of migrant women’s activism in the 1980s, no such pro-
cess occurred.25 Rather, each generation of racialized feminists has strived to 
achieve visibility, recognition, and influence within the feminist movement. 
In Quebec, indigenous women’s activism and migrant women’s activism 
not only emerged in the 1980s but also were partially institutionalized and 
funded by the government, thereby impacting the organizational landscape 
of Quebecois feminist activism.26
Differences between France and Quebec, and between these two contexts 
and the United States, are in great part due to the different histories of the poli-
tics of race and immigration that provide the backdrop for racialized feminists 
to organize. Indeed, Quebec and France offer two contrasting models of cit-
izenship, immigrant integration, and race politics. Quebec, as a Canadian 
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province and despite its official claims to the contrary— including the use of 
another label, that of interculturalism— has, since the 1980s, implemented a 
close variant of the Canadian policy of multiculturalism, which has become 
well entrenched legally and institutionally, especially at the federal level but 
also in the bureaucratic structures of the Quebec state.27 In Quebec, mobi-
lization around ethnic and immigrant identity is common and encouraged 
by public authorities as an important dimension of multicultural and immi-
grant integration politics, and the use of ethnic categories, as well as claims 
based on ethnic identities, do not raise public debates in Canada.28 Logically, 
racialized women’s organizations in Quebec take for granted that cultural 
and ethnic identities are important elements to consider when counseling 
a woman, thereby following the precepts of multiculturalist policies. Most 
organizations self- identify on the basis of an ethnic and/ or regional origin 
(South Asian, Philippine), on the basis of a religious identity (i.e., Muslim), 
or on a shared identity as immigrant women. All these organizations provide 
services (i.e., counseling, shelter, language classes) to women and are part of 
Quebecois feminist networks (such as l’R des centres de femmes, a network 
that asks its members to sign a feminist charter), which enables them to get 
funding from the Quebecois government as women’s rights organizations. 
However, most of the funding of the self- identified ethnic/ religious women’s 
organizations I interviewed came primarily from the then- called Ministry 
of Cultural Communities and Immigration in Quebec. Finally, these organ-
izations also actively engage in advocacy in the name of their community, 
lobbying the government on issues of immigration reform, secularism bills, 
women’s rights, and welfare policies.
Conversely, what has been labeled the French “republican model” 
promotes a contrasting philosophy of integration, which emphasizes a 
common, national, civic culture instead of pluralism, an abstract concept 
of citizenship, color- blindness, and civic and cultural assimilation on the 
part of migrants29 as well as religious minorities. In this context, ethnic 
categories are deemed suspicious in public debates and often controversial, 
which has made mobilization around ethnic identity difficult.30 Hence, 
while in Quebec the ministry for immigration and cultural communities 
funds organizations that organize on an ethnic basis, in France the admin-
istrative agencies in charge of immigrant integration have mostly used ter-
ritorial categories (such as housing projects or banlieues defined by urban 
planning policies) or economic categories (such as poverty) to define 
their beneficiaries, rather than ethnic categories. In this context, while in 
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France, too, racialized women’s organizations sometimes receive funding 
from governmental agencies dedicated to immigrant integration, these 
agencies encourage organizations to present themselves as defined terri-
torially (an identity bounded by the quartier, i.e., neighborhood) rather 
than ethnically. Often, women’s centers’ funding comes from local polit-
ical and administrative bodies (at the municipal or regional level) in charge 
of social welfare. What legitimizes their funding is the social work they 
do— language classes, literacy classes, afterschool programs for children, 
support for administrative procedures, shelter, counseling— in specific de-
prived neighborhoods, not their self- organizing within an ethnic commu-
nity. Hence, in the Parisian region where I conducted interviews, the few 
racialized women’s organizations that provide services in their communi-
ties often have names that do not refer to a specific ethnic origin or to racial 
identity, but rather stress their local roots in the neighborhood, or adopt 
a mix of both that underlines their immigrant identity (such as “Franco- 
African women in Paris”). Finally, a handful of organizations that operate 
as consciousness- raising and activist groups— which do not provide serv-
ices to women in their communities— put forth feminist of color identities 
that politicize both their racial and gender (and sometimes sexual) identi-
ties, but not specific ties to ethnic communities.
The contexts and timing of the emergence of racialized women’s organiza-
tions in Quebec and France are therefore quite different. In Quebec, women 
from immigrant communities were encouraged as early as the beginning of 
the 1980s to self- organize on an ethnic basis to provide services that would 
foster immigrant integration (language classes in particular) and simultane-
ously empower women (screening for domestic violence, temporary free day 
care for young immigrant mothers, etc.). These women’s rights organizations 
have adopted the vocabulary and political project of multiculturalism, pro-
moting their ethnic and religious difference.31 However, their involvement 
in the multiculturalist project is often also a critical one: they tend to ques-
tion the culturalization of difference at the expense of a class analysis, contest 
many Quebec policies for immigrant integration as reproducing inequalities 
and power asymmetries, and often actively lobby against racism (instead of 
promoting multiculturalism per se).32 Many immigrant women’s organiza-
tions based in francophone Quebec are run by anglophone immigrants and 
have also developed a critical stance toward Quebecois nationalism. Some 
organizations operated by migrant women and women of migrant descent 
have also developed ties of solidarity with native women’s organizations, as a 
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way to recognize their own participation in the Canadian settlement project 
and its ongoing colonial legacy for indigenous peoples.33
In France, several groups of immigrant women were created at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, but they mostly assembled women from Latin American 
and North African countries who were in political exile in Paris.34 Their po-
litical activism was geared toward their country of origin or toward interna-
tional organizations. In 1976, a Black Women’s Coordination (Coordination 
des femmes noires) was created to voice the concerns of racialized and immi-
grant women; however, it was short- lived and was disbanded in 1980.35 At the 
beginning of the 1980s, women of migrant descent started to be politically 
active, but mostly in organizations devoted to fighting racism or to fostering 
immigrant solidarity. Only in the mid- 1980s did specific migrant women’s 
organizations start to form.36 The first organizations were generally short- 
lived, but new organizations quickly formed to replace them. These groups 
constitute nowadays a much more heterogeneous and less visible activist 
field than in Quebec, with some organizations based on national origin and 
politically active with respect to their home country’s politics, while others 
are much more grassroots and cater to a specific neighborhood’s diverse pop-
ulation of migrant women and women of migrant descent, and with a few or-
ganizations doing critical political lobbying in the name of racialized women 
and with a postcolonial perspective, which emerged a few years after the turn 
of the century. This late emergence and singular weakness of an activist field 
of racialized women within the French feminist field of protest is striking in 
a country with such a long colonial history and resulting postcolonial migra-
tion policies, and which still comprises overseas territories that are legacies 
from its colonial project. As Françoise Vergès notes, it reflects a French ide-
ology of “decolonization” that has excluded the French overseas territories 
from French modernity and performs an erasure of colonial history.37 In this 
context, the politicization of race and racial identities has been stalled and 
obscured.
Politicizing Intersectional Identities: Culture, 
Race, Postcoloniality
This short overview of migrant and racialized women’s activism in both 
contexts indicates that there is a wide variety of organizations in this field, 
with various forms of politicization of racial and postcolonial identities. How 
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are these different contexts shaping the political subjectivations of racialized 
feminists? How do legitimate discourses about race and racial identities 
impact the politics of intersectionality that racialized feminists promote? 
In each context, different processes of politicization of racial, immigrant, 
and religious identities provide the backdrop against which the political 
subjectivation of racialized feminists is set. The politics of intersectionality 
displayed by racialized feminists is thus variegated. It is shaped by the con-
text in which they organize as feminists, and by the political legitimacy of 
categories such as culture, race, or religion. It is also shaped by their own 
trajectory and the generation they belong to. With respect to race, three 
main types of narratives define intersectional identities. A first one, used by 
many organizations that deliver services to migrant and racialized women, 
tends to insist on the cultural dimension of racial and migrant differences. 
Contrastingly, several organizations that provide services to racialized 
women tend to downplay or suspend the role of race or culture as an im-
portant factor in their intervention work. Finally, both in Quebec and in 
France, some racialized feminists propose an elaborated social critique of 
racism and postcolonialism that informs their feminist practice. With re-
spect to religion, and more specifically Islam, racialized feminists elaborate 
also a variety of discourses, marked by ambivalence, tolerance, and rejection. 
The intersection between religion, race, and gender is thus perceived and 
politicized differently by racialized feminists, depending on their context 
and their own trajectory of becoming a feminist. These variations underline 
how each context— France and Quebec— and its hegemonic politics of race 
and secularism contribute to shape the political subjectivations of racialized 
feminists.
Many organizations in Montreal that provide services to racialized/ mi-
grant women insist on the specific needs that cultural difference generates 
for the women they seek to help. They underscore that in other organiza-
tions that are not run by racialized/ migrant women, the women in their 
community will not find adequate help, because their cultural needs will not 
be understood or taken into consideration. Nandita, a woman in her fifties 
from South Asia who works in a center for South Asian women in Montreal, 
explains her organization’s approach:
We want to make sure her rights are respected, because in some place, in 
shelters, they try to enforce certain things. They say: you don’t have to be in 
that situation, you can divorce. . . . But we don’t do that. It’s her decision. She 
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has to understand and take it. . . . What I feel is the social workers who work 
there, they are not from South Asia. They don’t know our culture, they don’t 
know the family values . . . so if they don’t know, they will make a decision 
by thinking about their side. . . . Maybe they don’t want to see the culture 
and the family values. They think the woman is here and she has to adapt to 
the Quebec society, to live like that. I don’t agree with that.
A common discourse among racialized immigrant feminists in Quebec 
stresses the fact that women from their communities are not adequately 
served by mainstream feminist shelters because these tend to be insensitive 
to the cultural dimensions that structure immigrant women’s situations of 
domestic violence. Shelter officers who are not immigrant women them-
selves are perceived as pushing immigrant women to separate and divorce, 
while in fact this may not be what these women really want, or it may come 
at a cost that is not suspected by nonimmigrant women. Naima, an officer in 
a center for Muslim women in Montreal who is from the Middle East, tells a 
similar story:
For newcomers, I find that if the person is from the same culture, it will 
be easier. They trust you more easily, they are more open. Often they will 
feel like they don’t have to explain themselves .  .  . in some ways, women 
who are in a relationship, who are married, and they’re being abused. . . . To 
understand why they’re not leaving, in the sense of what are the stakes. . . . 
And I don’t say this is specific in our culture. This happens in all cultural 
communities, but the idea of losing faith, of bringing dishonor to the 
family . . . how important it is to keep the family together. All these things. 
Because I realize how important it is. If I feel like the woman is not ready 
to take certain steps, I won’t force her. I will let her know if I feel she is in a 
dangerous situation.
What is noticeable is that these discourses share to a large extent the feminist 
motto that women should make their choice on their own terms and that 
feminist intervention is about respecting a woman’s choice, whatever it is. 
However, immigrant feminists argue that white feminist organizations tend 
not to respect this feminist tenet because they are insensitive and unaware of 
the importance of culture and cultural differences. Hence, self- organization 
on the basis of shared culture and cultural experience is necessary to provide 
an adequate feminist response to migrant women’s needs.
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These discourses echo the narrative of interculturalism and benevolent 
care expressed by white women working in multicultural organizations. 
However, while for white feminists interculturalism was a tool that had to 
be learned, for racialized/ immigrant feminists the emphasis on cultural dif-
ference is based on lived experience. Of course, the idea that there is a com-
monality of experience between immigrant women who work or volunteer 
in immigrant women’s organizations and their public, a commonality that 
guarantees a form of authenticity, is partly fictional.38 Migration trajectories, 
class background, and education are often very different between volunteers 
or managers and beneficiaries.39 Nonetheless, in Quebec this idea is central 
to migrant women’s self- organizing and their emphasis on cultural differ-
ence. Hence culture, rather than race, is politicized and operates as a ground 
for identification and feminist practice.
In a French context in which race talk is politically risky, some racialized/ 
immigrant women refute the idea that a common racial or cultural identity 
is necessary to perform a good feminist intervention with racialized/ immi-
grant women. Samira, whose parents are from Algeria and who now manages 
her own organization in a Parisian suburb, and who argues in her interview 
for the necessity to self- organize on the basis of a shared immigrant experi-
ence and a shared experience of racism, rejects the idea that one must be of a 
similar cultural background to perform the right intervention:
I think that when somebody suffers or was victim of violence, etc., it’s inter-
national. She is here with her suffering. . . . You just have to be yourself and 
to be open. Suffering is universal. What’s good here is that we have a lot of 
volunteers from very different cultural origins, different ethnic origins.
Samira’s opinion at the same time contests the idea that a shared cultural 
background enables the right intervention, and, simultaneously, promotes 
the variety of cultures that are represented through her volunteers, thereby 
implicitly endorsing the idea that this variety allows the organization to ad-
dress the cultural and ethnic variety that is found among its beneficiaries. 
Recognizing that immigration and cultural difference shape women’s 
experiences and their needs, and therefore should be taken into account— in 
part through the experiences and identities of the volunteers themselves— 
and believing that a woman’s suffering is universal reflect two competing 
narratives that orient Samira’s and other racialized feminist activists’ 
practices. On the one hand, her own experience of racism and exclusion 
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from other types of social services underlines the structural and political na-
ture of racism and justifies self- organization on the basis of immigrant or 
racialized identity. On the other hand, the feminist ethos of intervention that 
advocates helping women on their own terms suggests that the identity of 
the listener does not matter; rather professional and activist experience do. 
Underlying this discourse is the idea that “suffering is universal,” that is, that 
the women who seek help and support from her organization are victims 
primarily as women. The forms of violence they experience are culturally 
defined— Samira evokes forced marriage among other cases her organiza-
tion deals with— but mostly, they fall on the spectrum of violence against 
women. They are rarely presented as the product of institutional racism or 
discrimination. In that sense, gender identity comes first in Samira’s analysis.
Mariam, a woman from Mali who heads Women Mediators in a northern 
Parisian suburb, also argues that a common racial or cultural identity is not 
necessary to perform well in one’s job of helping immigrant and racialized 
women. Mariam gives the example of one of her white French employees 
who can perform the same job as Mariam does once she establishes trust 
with the woman with whom she is working, and as long as she abides by the 
principle of not making decisions in the name of the woman she is helping. 
Mariam further explains:
Among our officers now there are a lot of French women. All nationali-
ties . . . French, Greeks . . . some are recognized because they speak several 
languages. I have Maghrebi women, also South Africans in the team. I don’t 
look at immigration; I look at the person’s experience, her ability to listen to 
people. It’s important. At the start, we said we would be immigrant women 
to help and support immigrant women. That was at the start, but it changed 
a lot. Even the French, they can intervene with these populations. You just 
need to listen, to have empathy, to be trained, just to be human, that’s all.
As in Samira’s discourse, there is both a valorization of ethnic and cultural 
diversity within the organization, and the clear refusal of the idea that one 
must share the same culture or immigrant background to provide the right 
service and support to immigrant women. However, this principled position 
that rejects the idea of a community- based feminist organization reflects a 
larger constraint that is specific to the French context. Indeed, asked whether 
she would prefer to have an organization only for women from Mali, Mariam 
replies:
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Mariam: No, no, no. If we do that . . . I am against this also. I don't want to 
be trapped in my culture. And if you do that the state will say: now these 
associations are based on ethnicity, and well . . .
Question: You might not get funding from institutions then?
Mariam: No, certainly not.
Hence Mariam’s refusal to organize only within her own immigrant and 
cultural community reflects both the primacy of gender as the basis for 
her organization’s identity, and a political constraint specific to the French 
context that makes organizing on the basis of racial identity suspicious and 
unlikely to be funded. In France, a deep tension is perceptible between the 
claim that a shared cultural or immigrant experience is a necessity and jus-
tifies self- organization, and the claim that the cultural or racial identity 
of the volunteers does not matter in providing immigrant and racialized 
women with the support they need. This tension means that sometimes, 
in racialized feminists’ discourse, the centrality of race is interrupted, 
suspended.
In contrast to this repertoire, a handful of organizations in Quebec and 
France politicize racial identity as an important dimension of their iden-
tity. For them, fighting against racial discrimination is as important as 
empowering women in their community. These groups generally are oriented 
toward advocacy or consciousness- raising, with no institutional funding and 
often no office space, and do not provide services to women. These organi-
zations articulate a discourse that politicizes race and colonialism as a social 
relationship of domination that is as important as gender in understanding 
racialized/ immigrant women’s position in society.
Representing a network of racialized and migrant women in Quebec, 
Karima, an immigrant woman from Algeria in her early fifties and an ac-
tivist in Montreal, provides a related analysis that centers on colonialism 
and on the intersectionality that characterizes migrant women’s situation in 
Quebec:
We consider that our priority is to fight against the neocolonial oppres-
sion we are experiencing, because the majority of immigrant and racialized 
women. . . we come, especially in the past ten years, we come from former 
colonized countries, [colonized] by the same colonizers, France and Great 
Britain. And today, when you look closely . . . you realize that there is almost 
a colonial relationship that is imposed on immigrants.
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Immigration and race are politicized within a post and neocolonial frame-
work of analysis. Immigrant women are not presented as defined by their 
culture and as having specific needs related to their situation as immigrants. 
Rather, they are presented as oppressed by an interlocking set of cultural 
and economic relations of domination, which form a system that is de-
fined and denounced as perpetuating under a new guise the former colonial 
domination. While Quebec was not a colonial power in the usual sense, the 
comparison with indigenous women allows Karima to draw a parallel be-
tween Quebec’s settler and colonial policy vis- à- vis indigenous people and 
the European colonial powers that colonized, among others, her country of 
birth. Doing so, she draws a historical and political line between colonization 
and the contemporary politics of immigration in Quebec.
In a similar vein, in France some racialized feminist organizations politi-
cize race and the legacy of colonialism in their discourse and identity as an 
organization. Maleiha, a woman in her mid- thirties originally from North 
Africa, who founded a group of lesbians who define themselves as lesbians of 
color, explains her reasons for creating a group based on a double separation 
from men and from white women:
We say “of color,” as in the United States. I will answer you like Aimé Césaire 
when he was asked about Negritude. . . . It’s a movement of analysis, of re-
sistance. So I will tell you maybe “of color” is not totally satisfying. But we 
chose the term because . . . it seemed full of the meaning and analysis of our 
American predecessors. When you say “of color,” there is this recognition of 
all the work of intersectional analysis. And also, it seemed a broad enough 
term to encompass all the lesbians who have a history linked to coloniza-
tion and slavery, to memory, exile, immigration, be they of immigrant or-
igin or migrant themselves, etc. Because if you use “racialized,” I don’t like 
that term that much, it reduces women of color to only one oppression, that 
of racism. “Of color” is more open. It is more political.
For Maleiha, her organization must tackle the various oppressions that 
lesbians of color experience at once, without introducing a hierarchy be-
tween them. The politicization of racial identity is evidenced in the impor-
tance of the separation from white women and white lesbians— which was 
one of the reason to create the organization, after Maleiha experienced un-
productive collaborations with white lesbians in a former group. In a similar 
vein, Sandra, a young woman in her twenties originally from central Africa, 
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who founded an Afro- feminist group in Paris with other women of African 
descent, explains the reasons for the creation of her association:
Well, whatever the type of feminism, it always comes from your experi-
ence as a woman, and that’s the start, starting from your experience as a 
woman in a given context, and for us, we are Black women who live in a 
white and patriarchal society. . . . Clearly we live in a white and heteronor-
mative patriarchy, so it’s becoming aware that our position exposes us to 
several oppressions that are interlocked because of sexism and racism, and 
that many other oppressions can be added; the idea is not to create a hier-
archy between these oppressions; they are an integral part of our trajectory, 
our experience.
Sandra’s and Maleiha’s analyses echo the discourses of Black American 
feminists in the 1970s as analyzed by Kimberly Springer,40 as well as the anal-
ysis of intersectionality proposed by Kimberlé Crenshaw.41 A specific posi-
tion at the intersection of several relations of oppression shapes a specific 
social experience. To politically represent and address this experience cor-
rectly, one must not, as is usually the case in social movements, introduce a 
hierarchy between oppressions but, on the contrary, one must consider si-
multaneously their effects. This intersectional analysis clearly politicizes race 
and posits that race is as important as gender for political action.
Intersectionality with Religion: Ambivalence, Tensions, 
and Redefining the Feminist Subject
Given the various ways in which racialized feminists conceptualize racial 
and immigrant identities, it is not surprising that they also have different 
discourses regarding Islamic veiling practices and the sexularism debates 
that have unfolded both in Quebec and in France. For a vast majority of 
racialized feminists, race and religion do not raise the same issues: religious 
identities cannot be subsumed under racial categorizations, and intersec-
tional identities that concern Islam differ from those that concern immigrant 
and racialized women. While race raised the question of culture, racism, 
and systemic discrimination, religion is mainly understood as a question of 
choice— from the women who decide to wear the veil— rather than as prima-
rily a practice linked to culture or as a ground for systemic discrimination. 
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Because of the centrality of the idea of choice and freedom, racialized 
feminists’ discourses on religion differ from those they elaborate on race.
Indeed, religious beliefs raise the question of the relationship between 
feminism and emancipation. When discussing Islamic veiling, racialized 
feminists redefine the contours of the good and the bad feminist subjects. 
While some racialized feminists insist on the notion of choice and there-
fore the duty to respect religious identities and practices, others condemn 
the display of religious beliefs, and some express tensions and ambivalence 
in their discourses between their feminist commitments that condemn 
what they perceive as oppressive religious practices, and their awareness 
of Islamophobia. Others wish to recuperate discursively veiled women in 
the feminist project or propose to place the needs and experiences of these 
women at the center of their feminist analysis.
In Quebec, the majority of women activists share an accommodating po-
sition, be it on the niqab or on the hijab, and reject the government’s attempts 
to regulate these religious practices. Adhering to a multicultural framework 
that protects religious freedom and legitimizes the expression of cultural 
difference, they favor solutions that place the decision in the hands of the 
women who would be targeted by the possible regulations, be it at a collective 
or individual level. Nandita places the issue of the hijab within the broader 
framework of multiculturalism and cultural difference:
When you see a woman’s point of view, how she sees that . . . for example, 
the hijab, if she’s comfortable with that, what is the problem? All these years 
it never came out as an issue. Why is it coming now? The whole process of 
reasonable accommodation— I feel it has to be in two ways. When you re-
spect every culture and all values, there won’t be a problem. What I feel is 
we shouldn’t mix the values of the cultures with abuse and control. That’s 
two different things. A woman who is wearing a hijab or who is not wearing 
a hijab, that has nothing to do with the family and control. That’s her own 
way to define herself. Not all the women wear hijabs. That’s her own wish. 
and I think it should be respected. . . . Before they get in the issue of going 
into seeing that, they should have consulted these women first, how they 
feel about that.
Paola, one of the founding members of the same center for South Asian 
women in Montreal, recalls that her organization took a stand against the 
project of restriction of reasonable accommodation and against the position 
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of the FFQ, which was to authorize hijabs but to forbid niqabs (in public ser-
vice, for employees and also possibly for clients). Paola summarizes the posi-
tion of her organization saying, “Any kind of interference, like telling women 
what to do, is a problem.” Kahina, a young woman in her twenties of Algerian 
descent who works in a Muslim women’s center in Montreal, holds a slightly 
different position. While Paola and Nandita defend veiled women’s right to 
choose for themselves, whatever the religious garment they decide to wear, in 
the name of women’s agency and the respect for culture and religion that is 
typical of Canadian multiculturalism, Kahina denounces the bill project for 
more pragmatic reasons:
Will interdiction of the niqab in public institutions eradicate niqabs? I don’t 
think so. Did the interdiction of the veil in France eradicate the veil? Did 
we free these women? I don’t think so. For women who are forced, it did 
not change a thing. And today, in the West, are there really women who are 
forced to wear the veil? I did not see any.
Kahina also draws a line between the veil and the full- face veil, however, and 
here again she privileges a pragmatic approach that places women’s needs at 
the center of her analysis
Personally, it’s clear that [with] the niqab, there is a security question, the 
question of interpersonal relations also. It’s clear it has an impact. However, 
I am against the bill project in Quebec because it would prevent women 
from consulting social workers or from going to learn French. . . . You will 
keep them isolated, that’s what bothers me.
Despite some uneasiness, most immigrant and racialized women’s activists 
in Quebec are critical of the desire to regulate forms of Islamic veiling and 
denounce the racist discourse that the sexularism debates have encouraged 
in the public sphere and popular culture. Their analysis draws both on the 
Canadian multiculturalist discourse that promotes respect for cultural differ-
ence and on a feminist analysis that considers that women are able to choose 
for themselves. Even those who might disapprove of the practice of veiling 
assert that these regulations will in fact not benefit the women they are sup-
posed to “protect.” Hence, what is being elaborated in these discourse is an al-
ternative definition of the feminist project, one in which the goal of feminism 
is not to endorse and enforce abstract feminist principles (emancipation, 
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gender equality), but rather, in a more pragmatic fashion, to place racialized 
women, perceived as already vulnerable to racism, at the center of attention 
and care. Rather than defining what is the right feminist politics by meas-
uring it up to ideals such as emancipation, racialized feminists suggest that 
the concrete consequences of veiling ban policies should be scrutinized. 
Feminism therefore becomes a project of caring what will happen to these 
vulnerable subjects, rather than deciding how they should be emancipated.
In France, racialized feminists hold a wider range of opinions on politics 
regulating Islamic veiling practices. Several of them express tensions and 
uneasiness about the issue of the Islamic veil, especially, but not only, those 
who are Muslim themselves. While they also denounce the practical nega-
tive effects that the 2004 and 2010 laws have had, they are also often critical 
of girls who decide to veil. Mariam, who migrated from Mali and is now in 
her fifties, explains about the 2004 law forbidding religious symbols in public 
schools:
Everybody agreed in our organization. Me I am against this law. . . . In the 
public space it depends where you wear it. At our offices, a lot of women 
come for French classes and they wear a veil, because there are some Turks, 
Maghrebi women, African women who veil. What bothers me are the 
young girls who were born in France, are French, our children who veil. . . . 
This bothers me, it bothers me a lot, because they are just children. . . . I am 
tolerant, I tolerate everybody. . . . My interns, I have one who is an educator. 
She is in her third year, she wears a veil. She is from Mali like me. She came 
with her CV. We were a little bit surprised, but well, I said to myself, a future 
educator who wears the veil? But I looked at her CV; she started her intern-
ship. And she does a very good job. As long as you do your job well and you 
are not telling the others what they should do . . . but here everybody agreed 
that there was no reason to pass a law. It’s like saying to nuns they cannot 
wear their head covers.
Mariam both mildly disapproves of young women wearing the veil, and 
denounces a law that was useless and unfair because it targeted only Muslim 
women. Her decision to hire a veiled woman as an intern is not presented 
as a political act of resistance, and she does not hide that she was surprised 
when she received the application. However, she advocates for a neutral and 
fair approach based on abilities rather than religious identity. Samira, who 
is originally from Algeria and runs a grassroots organization for migrant/ 
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racialized women in a northern Parisian suburb, is much more critical than 
Mariam of veil- wearing girls and women:
Some girls wear it naturally because they grew up in societies where you 
wear it at the youngest age. These women, I know very well it might be very 
hard for them to take it off, but it’s not compulsory to wear it. But many girls 
wear it as a provocation. They consider themselves victims and they add 
something on top. You just have to take it off to find a job. They are a pain, 
you see. So it’s something I really don’t understand. I am full of prejudices 
on this. . . . The ones I have met, most of them, they don’t really know why 
they wear it. Some could not find jobs before while they were not wearing 
it . . . and it’s like they tell themselves, well, I will lock myself up with some 
social recognition. They switch from unemployed to good practicing 
Muslim. . . . I met women who are active in organizations and did a con-
ference on Muslim women’s volunteering in civil society; there was a lot 
of veiled women. . . . I told myself, it’s not possible, all these feminists with 
veils, what is happening?
Samira’s own trajectory is important in understanding her position. She is 
old enough to have witnessed as an adult, from France, the Algerian civil 
war in the early 1990s, and the terrorism of the Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS) in Algeria. In fact, at the time (1992– 1993), she even founded an or-
ganization to support democratic and feminist activists from Algeria. She 
associates veiling with “regression” for women’s rights, as has been the case in 
her home country. While she interprets young Muslim women’s decision to 
veil also as the result of a legitimate “anger,” especially against colonization— 
an anger she admits that she shares— she rejects their strategy of resisting 
through veiling. Not only does she question the motivation— and religious 
knowledge— of young Muslim women who veil, she also affirms that she 
cannot ally with veiled women’s associations or allow a veiled woman to sit 
on the board of her own organization because she is convinced that these 
women are “antidemocratic” and are not truly in favor of women’s emancipa-
tion. What is more, she interprets white feminists’ position against the 2004 
ban on the veil in public schools as a mistake due to their privileged location, 
as women from the bourgeoisie:
They came here to put us back on the right track, to explain. They were 
against the ban and we were in favor of the ban. . . . I told them: “You are in 
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your nice little bourgeois neighborhoods in Paris and you want to think in 
our place.” I think that law is crucial, because otherwise a majority of young 
girls will wear the veil. It will be a catastrophe.
For Samira, class differences are as important as race when it comes to under-
standing the complexity of the politics of veiling and its regulation by author-
ities. In this case, and because of her own trajectory, she positioned herself 
within a common class background with the girls who are targeted by the law 
(rather than a common racial or religious identity). Her common class posi-
tion authorizes her both to know what’s best for veiled girls in public schools 
and to refute white bourgeois feminists’ analysis objecting to the ban in the 
name of choice.
In both Mariam’s and Samira’s accounts of their relationship to Islamic 
veiling practices and veiled women, one recognizes, in a minor mode, a dis-
course prevalent in the French sexularism debates and following which girls 
born in France should not veil because this practice denotes a refusal to as-
similate and to be fully French.42 However, this does not mean that they are 
not critical of racism or that they euphemize the importance of colonial lega-
cies and neocolonial policies in France.
Maleiha, who heads an organization of lesbians of color in Paris, illustrates 
this paradoxical position, that is, one that strongly rejects Islamic veiling and, 
at the same time, clearly politicizes the veil bans as racist laws.
The problem I have is that I am totally against the veil. And I say this while 
I claim my own Muslim spirituality. . . . I have the chance to know Islam 
and to critique it from within, and from a Muslim point of view I  am 
against the veil. . . . I am upset, upset. It upsets me because once again these 
girls . . . claim the right to wear the veil or the niqab, and then they fuel poli-
cies that are racist, xenophobic, etc. So our thinking is not settled. . . . I don’t 
think that in the name of fighting racism I will support the demand for seg-
regated swimming pools for veiled women.  .  .  . It’s complicated, because 
I fight against a racist government, and against some feminists . . . because 
it’s true some white feminists are Islamophobic. . . . We denounced the 2004 
and 2010 laws, which are xenophobic and racist, not republican and sec-
ular. That’s very clear. But for the reasons I mentioned, I think feminists of 
color are trapped. . . . It’s very unhealthy because they are against the veil but 
at the same time they feel obligated to support veiled girls. The line is thin. 
That’s why I haven’t yet settled my thinking.
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Maleiha’s complex position is torn between her understanding of veiling as 
a form of traditional practice that is not religiously founded and is oppres-
sive to women, and her reading of veil bans as fundamentally racist laws. 
Her commitment to French secularism clashes with her critique of institu-
tional racism. Interestingly, however, she does not position veiled women at 
the center of her analysis, contrary to Quebecois racialized feminists. While 
Mariam is mostly benevolently indifferent to young women who veil, despite 
her admitted lack of understanding of their motivations, Samira presents 
them at best as driven by false consciousness and at worst as antifeminist 
enemies, and Maleiha only reluctantly supports them. In all these instances, 
veiled women are not presented as active agents or possible feminists. 
Despite the fact that the three interviewees disapprove of the 2004 and 2010 
bans, the needs and rights of veiled women are not put at the center of their 
critical analysis of the law. These discourses testify to the strength of hege-
monic discourses in the French public sphere about secularism as necessary 
to emancipate women, and about the veil as a sign of oppression.
Sandra, who is younger than the three previous interviewees, offers a dif-
ferent discourse that does not oppose feminism to Islamic veiling. She shares 
the analysis of veil bans as racist policies and criticizes feminists who oppose 
veiling. However, while other racialized feminists admit their apprehension 
or refusal to work with veiled Muslim women or Muslim feminists, Sandra, 
on the contrary, welcomes such an opportunity, drawing a connection and a 
political alliance between her own fight against racism and the fight against 
Islamophobia:
In our group, on the question of the veil, at the last March 8 women’s march 
we clearly positioned ourselves: we are not at all against the veil and if there 
are possible events or alliances to do with groups of Muslim women, it will 
be discussed collectively, but we share the same perspective: it will not be a 
problem. At the moment, there is so much Islamophobia, including in many 
[feminist] groups, it seems really difficult to work with these groups. . . . 
As far as we are concerned, we would really like to welcome veiled Black 
women in our group, clearly, to support them.
The variety of positions that racialized women activists hold is produced 
both by the different politics of race and secularism that characterize France 
and Quebec, and by their individual backgrounds as feminist activists. The 
Canadian multiculturalist discourse provides racialized feminists in Quebec 
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with a legitimate narrative to critique the government’s attempts to reg-
ulate and/ or partially ban veils or niqabs. By contrast, in France racialized 
feminists sometimes adhere to some of the hegemonic republican and sec-
ular rationale that presents veiling as an oppressive practice incompatible 
with true belonging to the French nation and its modernity.43 They therefore 
sit uneasily between their commitment to feminist emancipation and their 
critique of the veil bans as racist and neocolonial policies. In this perspec-
tive, one can argue, following Françoise Vergès’s insight that an important di-
mension of the coloniality of power is its ability to fragment the subalterns,44 
that veil bans— along with the hegemonic discourses they have produced 
in the French public sphere— fragment the possible solidarity of racialized 
populations and racialized feminists. Pitting feminism against religion, in 
a context in which Islam is heavily racialized, produces a fragmentation of 
racialized feminists over the veil. It may also produce alliances, as Sandra’s 
case shows, but they have remained, so far, marginal.
Differences in activists’ trajectories and their belonging to different micro- 
cohorts45 also matter to understand these various discourses on Islamic 
veiling. Activists who are older, especially those with ties to Algeria or Iran, 
tend to remain very critical of veiling practices. For young activists coming of 
age as feminists in France in the 1980s or early 1990s, veiling was not really a 
desirable or possible option. The practice was much less prevalent, and their 
route toward feminism, given the scarcity of racialized feminists organiza-
tions at that time, often was through participation in white feminist groups, 
as I detail below. In this context of relative absence of Black or Islamic femi-
nism, their “sense of social location”— to borrow Jo Reger’s expression46— is 
marked by a dominant white feminist discourse, inherited from the 1970s, 
that presents religion as incompatible with women’s rights. The situation of 
younger racialized feminists such as Sandra, who came of age as feminists in 
the 2010s— that is, at a moment in which the ideological discourse of Black 
feminism and the critique of Islamophobia were much more available in the 
French public sphere— is that of a different micro- cohort who, “although 
sharing a set of experiences that largely aligns with the overall ethos of the 
generation, experience some significant differences in ideology, identity, or 
goals.”47 In Quebec, activists from Algeria also tend to be more critical of the 
veil than their South Asian counterparts, suggesting here again that their po-
litical subjectivation as feminists did not happen in similar ways. In this case, 
the politics of language matters. Indeed, South Asian feminists are mostly 
anglophone and therefore endorse the multiculturalist Canadian discourse, 
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contrary to francophone feminists from the Maghreb (often educated 
in French schools in their home countries) who identify more easily with 
Quebec’s nationalist discourse and its corollary critique of multiculturalism.
As for white feminists, debates over Islamic veiling have thus produced 
new forms of political subjectivations among racialized feminists. As 
those debates have transformed the political vocabulary about race and 
postcoloniality in both contexts, opening up avenues for new forms of in-
jurious racist and nationalist discourses, they have provided racialized 
feminists with new issues to address, new realities to contest. They have led, 
as the case of Sandra shows, to new forms of politicization of the articulation 
of race and religion and to a displacement of the boundaries of the good and 
bad feminist subjects. While for some racialized feminists, the Islamic veil re-
mains the marker of an impossible authentic feminist subject, for the vast ma-
jority of others, especially in younger generations, the Islamic veil reveals the 
problematic boundaries of the feminist subject, its foreclosure around white-
ness and its ignorance of its own postcolonial legacy. The desire to include 
veiled women in Sandra’s collective thus expresses not only a political will 
for inclusion, but also a desire for relationality with those supposedly abject 
feminist subjects, a will and a wish to expand the boundaries of feminism’s 
moral universe and its promise of treating equally its members. Such a moral 
desire strikes at the heart of the feminist project of emancipation, a project 
it proposes to dismantle, or at least to critically question. Indeed, Sandra 
reflects in those terms on the feminist promise of emancipation
What is emancipation? . . . It goes back to a simple question: well, is a woman 
free to choose how she dresses, what she wears? . . . There is this paternalist 
impulse. We want to save them, but to save them from what exactly? That 
questions us, to save them from what? From big bearded machos? So . . . the 
problem behind this is, what type of feminism do we want? . . . A pater-
nalist feminism, or maternalism, that is moralizing but is not mindful of the 
trajectories, the histories of those persons, those women’s histories? . . . It 
puzzles me.
Sandra’s puzzlement manifests her radical questioning of feminism’s ambi-
tion to emancipate female subjects. Her practice of questioning, which leaves 
the answer open, expresses her ability to remain critical of the feminist pro-
ject, all the while she defines herself a feminist. This questioning enables a 
nonclosure of the feminist subject that becomes hospitable to “bad” subjects 
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such as veiled Muslim women and prostitutes. Importantly, this critical re-
turn on feminism’s ideals is made possible by a distinction Sandra makes 
between moral principles, and a form of moral pragmatism, one attentive 
to singular stories and histories. This opposition opens up a moral space to 
think the who of the feminist subject in different terms. I return to this issue 
in the next chapter.
Racialized and immigrant feminists both strongly adhere to feminist prin-
ciples that are shared by white feminists— such as the idea that women should 
choose for themselves and that a proper feminist intervention should not im-
pose specific choices on women, even if they are in a vulnerable situation— 
and, at the same time, they often argue that a common cultural or immigrant 
background is necessary to rightly perform this feminist intervention with 
other racialized/ immigrant women. This discourse clearly positions them 
both within the ambit of feminism, a term and an approach they claim for 
themselves, and in a position to resist and contest the domination of white 
feminists in this field. However, differences are also perceptible in the ways 
in which racialized and immigrant feminists politicize their racial and immi-
grant identities.48 These differences show that the context of each country’s 
politics of race deeply impacts feminist discourses and identities. What is 
more, belonging to different micro- cohorts and working in an organiza-
tion that is more oriented toward service provision or consciousness raising 
also impact how they conceptualize the intersection of gender and race.49 
However, and despite these variations, racialized feminists also develop sim-
ilar narratives, accounts of themselves as racialized feminists, narratives in 
which they resist and challenge feminist whiteness.
Becoming Feminist in a White Space
Racialized feminists in France and Quebec have come to call themselves 
feminists through various paths depending on their immigrant or native 
background, their generation, and the context in which they became po-
litically active. However, they all have encountered the whiteness of main-
stream and dominant feminist movements. These encounters shape their 
activism as racialized feminists and the ways in which they politicize their 
racial or immigrant identities as feminists. What is more, they develop 
counterdiscourses and practices to contest and resist the whiteness that 
characterizes dominant feminist discourses— especially those feminist 
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discourses that aim at regulating their identity. They challenge in particular 
their marginalization in terms of representation, using intersectionality to 
claim visibility and representation as racialized feminists; they challenge the 
collusion between feminism and nationalism; and, finally, they resist white 
feminists’ attempts to fetishize their racial difference. All these processes, 
which constitute, following Paola Bacchetta’s insights, circuits of resistance,50 
shape racialized feminists’ identities, as well as their active disidentification 
with white feminists. In that perspective, the political subjectivations of 
racialized feminists attest to the importance of collective action as an avenue 
toward challenging subordination.
As Amy Allen notes in her discussion of Judith Butler’s account of psy-
chic subjection, an account that insists on the idea that subjection implies the 
attachment of the subordinated subject to its own subordination: “What is 
missing is the realization that a possible way out of this attachment to subjec-
tion lies in collective social experimentation and political transformation.”51 
Racialized feminists’ narratives precisely illustrate how giving an account of 
oneself as a racialized feminist, rather than as a feminist, constitutes a col-
lective political experimentation that challenges feminist whiteness and the 
subordination it perpetuates.
Racialized/ immigrant activists have come to call themselves feminists 
through different paths. Giving an account of oneself as a feminist is the 
product of a process of political subjectivation; that is, the elaboration of a 
specific relationship to oneself, made possible in a given context that provides 
discourses that sustain, and norms that constrain, this identity. The practice 
of calling oneself a feminist is, by definition and like other ethical practices, 
also an exercise in social critique that exposes the limits of norms histori-
cally produced. As Judith Butler argues, following Foucault, any practice of 
subjectivation is a creative practice of self- constitution because “To make 
oneself in such a way that one exposes those limits is precisely to engage in 
an aesthetics of the self that maintains a critical relation to existing norms.”52 
The process of political subjectivation as a feminist is both the elaboration of 
a specific relationship to oneself that politicizes one’s gender identity, and a 
relationship to the world that becomes critical of social/ gender norms. For 
racialized/ immigrant feminists, this process of subjectivation as a feminist 
is intimately tied to their racialized identity and their position as a minority 
subject within feminist discourse.
Three different generations of French racialized feminists describe quite 
a similar story of exclusion and invisibility in white feminist spaces as they 
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came of age as feminists, and their need to organize among racialized women 
to counter this invisibility. However, each of these women belongs to a dif-
ferent micro- cohort, and therefore the discourses and possibilities to self- 
organize varied for each of them. Samira, the oldest, is in her late forties. Born 
in France of Algerian descent, she was socialized and politicized as a femi-
nist through her encounter in the early 1990s with radical feminists who had 
been part of the Mouvement de libération des femmes (Women’s Liberation 
Movement, MLF) and often of the Communist Revolutionary League as 
well. While she praises the women she encountered as true radical feminists, 
she questions their sense of solidarity and their heavily Marxist ideolog-
ical framework. Hence, despite participating in meetings at the Maison des 
femmes, the iconic feminist space inherited from the MLF in Paris, she felt a 
great gap between her own trajectory and the socialization within this group. 
While Samira recalls she had already read Simone de Beauvoir and Benoîte 
Groult, and that she found some themes really interesting, she felt unease 
and a sense of violence during these meetings.
There was such a gap between my desire to become involved in some fem-
inist activity. .  .  . If you like, these women from the Maison des femmes, 
they scared me. They are feminist and reject everything that is feminine. . . . 
They were so negative about heterosexuality. They were so very politicized. 
Honestly, I did not know what the Communist Revolutionary League was. 
When you don’t know and you want to discover, you really feel a great vi-
olence in words, expressions. It freezes you. I  found their opinion like a 
sword that did not leave any place for exchange. . . . I think they were open 
to all women, except that all women did not find their place in this organi-
zation, did not feel welcome. But well, they are political activists, after all.
Samira’s reaction to the politicized and radical feminist discourses directly 
inherited from the 1970s struggles shows how generation and the “sense of 
location” matter: the set of experiences that have socialized these activists 
and Samira are radically different. In this context, she feels alienated; and 
what is for the MLF activists a common and obvious feminist vocabulary 
is received by Samira as a form of violence. In the early 1990s, while MLF 
feminists were still active (mostly in their forties and fifties), there were not 
many feminist organizations run by younger women who had not been part 
of the MLF. Samira’s choice was therefore limited. However, this feeling of a 
generational and political gap was reinforced by an experience that framed 
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Samira’s understanding of the limits of feminist solidarity across class and 
racial boundaries. Indeed, she recalls:
At the time, I lived in the Parisian suburbs, and I had to commute through 
all Paris [to come to meetings]. I had more than an hour on public trans-
port, and one night I stayed late, and at half past midnight I did not have 
any public transport, nothing. And that’s when I  thought:  it’s funny be-
cause they talk about solidarity, but none of them was concerned that I had 
to commute back, and that I had no public transport. . . . And that’s when 
I thought, you political activists, you really are bitches. You talk about in-
ternational solidarity with women who suffer in the world and you did not 
even notice that I had a problem.
Samira contrasts MLF feminists’ abstract desire to care for remote others, 
“women in the world,” and their inability to care about a concrete other, be-
cause they actively ignore the complex class and racial difference that lies be-
tween them and shapes their relation. In Samira’s story MLF feminists appear 
unable to take into account this difference in their practice of solidarity. This 
experience explains why, when Samira encountered a woman from Morocco 
who had founded an organization for women of immigrant descent, she sud-
denly felt the desire to get involved.
In the mid- 2000s, Maleiha encounters a different situation in the radical 
lesbian feminist movement in Paris. Maleiha characterizes her position, and 
that of other lesbians of color, at the time as a “contradictory experience of 
exclusion and inclusion in the LGBT milieu and the feminist milieu,” an ex-
perience that encouraged her to develop a strategy of separation from white 
lesbians. Indeed, in the early 2000s Maleiha had first founded a group with 
white lesbians and lesbians of color to fight against discrimination. However, 
this group proved limited in its ability to provide a space in which lesbians 
of color could recognize themselves without having to decide on a hierarchy 
between the oppressions they wanted to address.
First, it was not based on an intersectional approach because there were 
white members, obviously. And whites who were part of the organization 
said that they were aware of racism from white women, which they wanted 
to fight. But where it got complicated is that as soon as we wanted to dig 
deeper to analyze racism and its consequences . . . discriminations, lack of 
interest for the memory of people of color, etc., well, we could not discuss 
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in a coherent way with white women. I don’t mean it was impossible, but 
we could not deepen our analysis with people who were not concerned. We 
were concerned as [women] of color because we suffer these oppressions. 
They don’t. So, I  thought, we cannot continue to think about racism to-
gether with this logic. We need a more specific group.
Maleiha’s experience was shaped by a new context in the French feminist 
movement. New organizations appeared at the end of the 1990s and a group 
of lesbians of color, the Groupe du 6 novembre, had already produced its 
own analyses and translated some work from American Black feminists.53 
Moreover, starting a few years into the twenty- first century, translations in 
French of seminal works on intersectionality and feminism of color started 
to appear, as well as the diffusion of French research adopting an intersec-
tional perspective.54 The context was therefore more favorable to an anal-
ysis based on a conception of intersectionality that encouraged a separation 
from white feminists as an important step. While Maleiha did not denounce 
feminist whiteness as an active form of racism or complete exclusion in the 
LGBT milieu, she felt that feminist whiteness meant a form of indifference 
and distance from white feminist lesbians vis- à- vis issues that were, for her 
and other lesbians of color, crucial to their understanding of their experience 
and their identity as feminists and lesbians.
A decade after Maleiha, Sandra encountered yet another context, and 
she constitutes with other fellow Afro- feminists another micro- cohort 
of racialized feminists in Paris. Here again, her feminist identity as a 
racialized feminist who politicizes race and gender is not a given or the 
natural product of her experience, but the result of a process by which she 
has come to politicize, as interrelated, experiences of racism and sexism, 
and through which she has encountered a collective identity and feminist 
discourses that can sustain this account of herself as an Afro- feminist. In 
her twenties in the 2010s, Sandra encountered feminist discourses and 
Black feminism at university during her work toward a master’s degree. 
This encounter with feminism not through activism first but through ac-
ademic knowledge testifies to the transformation of French academia 
after the turn of the century and the incorporation of gender studies in 
academic programs, fueling a new generation of feminist identifications. 
What is more, that same year the law enabling gay marriage in France was 
discussed and intensely contested by the Catholic right wing, prompting 
intense politicization not only of LGBT rights but also of gender politics.55 
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In this context Sandra became aware of many feminist and LGBT organiza-
tions. However:
Rapidly, as I  got involved in these spaces, I  became aware that there 
were very few nonwhite or racialized persons, and it’s true I found it in-
triguing. . . . And still issues of gender matter for us, issues of sexuality as 
well, so from then on I started asking myself questions, and rapidly in fem-
inist spaces I realized that when it was time to address issues of racism, 
the question of race, there was a blockage, as in movements that are really 
leftist, that give a priority to class struggle that will liberate us all.
Sandra’s experience in a way joins that of Samira, as she also encountered a 
strong leftist ideological framework and discourse that did not leave room to 
analyze racism, testifying to the ability of this political trend to sustain itself 
over time in the French political space.56 What is more, Sandra’s account also 
suggests that Marxist- oriented leftist organizations are particularly inimical 
political settings for racialized women.57 In this context, Sandra felt literally 
voiceless:
I did not question them because, truth be told, in these spaces I did not talk; 
that is, I observed a lot. I was starting to get involved and it felt complicated 
to express myself and take the floor.
Sandra’s voicelessness manifests how, in those white spaces, she could not 
find an adequate expression for her own political subjectivity. The language 
of feminism as it is elaborated and conveyed in those spaces does not provide 
her with the possibility of finding her voice through this language, to partici-
pate in this community of locutors. Here, we are reminded of Stanley Cavell’s 
and Sandra Laugier’s analysis of language and voice: we are in agreement in 
language, that is, our agreement in language makes a we possible and, at the 
same time, makes my own voice possible.58 In order for my voice to exist, 
to be found, it must be recognized and spoken by others, and my words ac-
cepted by them.59 For Sandra to find her voice, as she later describes in her 
interview, she needed to share a language with others, a collective voice and a 
collective identity: Afro- feminism.
The unease and ethical violence Sandra felt is similar to that described by 
Samira, of getting involved but still feeling that one does not fit, that one’s 
voice finds no place in the language that is shared by the feminist community. 
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A specific incident marked, for Sandra, the necessity to organize collectively 
as racialized feminists without white feminists:
Once I  had the chance to participate in a consciousness- raising group 
[groupe de parole] on intersectionality in a lesbian and trans bar in Paris 
where nonwhite, racialized persons had made the choice to organize a 
group in which white persons could not talk. . . . I was struck by the fact 
that despite the guidelines that were given, white people expressed them-
selves with discourse like, “I feel uneasy about this talk about race and 
racism. I don’t understand why you are so . . . with your hair. Why you don’t 
like it when we comment on the fact we like your hair?” . . . I told myself, 
this is really a serious problem, and I was impressed by racialized persons 
who took the floor and said they were fed up with explaining again and 
like, “First, you cannot talk because these are the guidelines, and beyond 
these, exoticization, you see, does not come from nowhere. Touching our 
hair, there is a history, and how come you have the guts to say this here 
when we are trying to do something interesting”— in a space where we 
deconstruct, a space that presents itself as willing to fight any form of 
racism, LGBTphobia. . . . That was the most memorable experience for me 
and I realized that in the end the issue of race, whiteness, was not at all 
questioned. . . . And that’s when I started to have this feminist conscious-
ness, and I wanted to affirm myself as a feminist, and rapidly I discovered 
blogs by Black women, like Mrs Roots, miss Dreadfull.
Sandra admits that it took her some time to call herself a feminist, in part 
because this form of political subjectivation is not recognized in her cultural 
community, and for her feminism remained “something white.” While she 
admits she could have used another word than “feminism,” she thinks the 
word should not be left to others and claims it as hers. Her coming of age 
as a feminist happens in a context in which consciousness- raising groups 
of feminists of color are a recognized (although still contested by white 
feminists) form of feminist practice, texts are available through academic 
training and, more importantly, blogs; and a first feminist documentary film 
on the experience of Afro- descendant women in France is being shot by an 
Afro- feminist activist and artist, Amandine Gay, giving visibility to the expe-
rience of women like Sandra.60 In this context, Sandra does not invest prima-
rily in feminist spaces with white feminists, like Maleiha did for several years. 
She observes the absence of racialized persons in these groups and rapidly 
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decides to organize collectively with other Afro- feminists. Contrary to two 
decades earlier, this mode of organizing is self- evident; it has become an 
available repertoire of organization for racialized feminists, in part through 
the diffusion of texts from American feminists of color, and through the pro-
duction of blogs and texts from French Afro- feminists.
These three trajectories of becoming a racialized feminist in a white space 
show how different contexts shape different micro- cohorts of racialized 
feminists who do not politicize race in the exact same ways. However, they do 
share the experience of exclusion from white feminist discourses and spaces, 
an exclusion that is felt as a silencing or a feeling of not being welcomed and 
recognized, of not “fitting” into the preexisting white feminist discourse.
Claiming Representation and Challenging Whiteness
An important way in which racialized feminists resist feminist whiteness 
is by claiming self- representation and visibility within the feminist move-
ment. This means both privileging self- organizing to self- represent and 
using intersectionality discourse to claim adequate visibility and represen-
tation within the broader feminist movement. Sandra insists that separation 
from both men in the African diaspora community and white women was a 
very important principle in forming her organization, in order to “claim back 
[their] own voices.” Maleiha describes a similar process in which the members 
of her organization wanted to come together “without self- justification, to 
decide our actions, our reflections, our analyses, our struggles, with organ-
izational autonomy from a political point of view, and a better consistency 
with our lives and claims with respect to intersecting oppressions.” The need 
and desire to self- organize seems to operate along the same lines throughout 
the decades represented by these women. Soraya, a Muslim feminist activist 
in her thirties who emigrated from the Middle East to Montreal as a child, 
was part of a committee of racialized women in a mainstream Quebecois 
feminist organization. She explains why she now desires to create her own 
group with only racialized feminists after having experienced on several 
occasions how white feminists she knew personally “forgot” to invite Muslim 
feminists to events regarding the Charter of Quebecois Values promoted by 
the government, which is a primary concern for Muslim feminists because of 
its secular, anti- religious- symbols approach:
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We don’t pretend to create something that will compete with mainstream 
organizations, but what has been important in this experience, even if it 
was painful, is to realize, as many racialized women before us, many Black 
women that (sigh) there is this idea that if you don’t participate in recog-
nized, institutional white spaces, you don’t work. But it’s not true. .  .  . In 
big mainstream organizations your work is short term, in damage control 
mode, reacting to crisis, as always when it comes to Muslim activists. . . . But 
instead of working against something, we will start working for something, 
and that something is us.
Sandra’s words, in Paris, echo Soraya’s in Montreal. Assessing the changes 
that the creation of her Afro- feminist organization brought, she insists on the 
ability to self- represent collectively to articulate her own feminist discourse 
that she can now voice:
Now we take the floor, we voice, and I think that is the power of this kind 
of project. . . . Until then you did not talk. . . . The fact of having a collec-
tive group, to do things together— in fact, our organization is about giving 
each other power. I think that is what feminism is about, giving each other 
power, and when you don’t have it anymore, another sister can give it to 
you, and that’s good.
Here again, the voice appears in Sandra’s discourse, not so much as a met-
aphor but as the material embodiment of her political subjectivation as an 
Afro- feminist, a political subjectivation that is made possible through the 
constitution of a collective subject. This collective subject enacts a form of 
care, giving to one another, which is lived as powerful and is a materialization 
of feminism as a form of life.61 This will to self- organize and self- represent 
is also presented as a way to ensure the representation of racialized women’s 
voice within the women’s movement, forcing white feminists to acknowledge 
their presence and their discourse. Liz, who runs an organization of Filipina 
women in Montreal, explains why she created this organization:
The idea is to have . . . to be visible, for our groups to be visible. For ex-
ample, the issue of domestic workers, the issue of the minimum wage, 
was not supported by the main feminist organizations. And then, on the 
International Women’s Day, we were kind of invited. . . . So you sit on the 
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chair and you never hear us. The idea was to be out and to present what our 
problems are because nobody else will talk about them except us.
Not only did she create her own organization, starting in the 2000s she or-
ganized with other racialized women’s groups their own demonstration for 
International Women’s Day. Her colleague Mary recalls:
There was one year that we really became disillusioned with the women’s 
movement in Quebec. We were ignored as immigrant women, ethnic com-
munity women . . . and besides, we want to represent ourselves, not a white 
woman representing us, because you know it’s like being a system of patri-
archy. It’s the authority who has the voice, not us. It will remain like that if 
we don’t bring up our voice.
Mary’s explanation of how racialized women’s groups came together to or-
ganize their own march shows how self- representation also means visibility 
inside the women’s movement, which is understood as a place of power re-
lations that needs to be challenged collectively. Similarly, in France, Maleiha 
recalls the motivation to create her own group of lesbians of color in Paris:
The objective was for lesbians of color . . . to reinforce our visibility in terms 
of analysis, of struggle, in terms of the specificities in the LGBT milieu and 
in the feminist milieu, to enable a space of expression and autonomous 
struggle for lesbians of color, to fight against racism and invisibilization.
For racialized/ immigrant feminists, the claim to self- represent is intimately 
linked with a challenge to the whiteness of the movement. Self- organizing 
is a way to challenge white hegemony in feminist discourses and feminist 
practices. Paola, who runs a South Asian women’s organization in Montreal, 
explains why she allied with other racialized women’s groups in Montreal 
such as Liz’s to organize their own march of racialized and immigrant women 
on International Women’s Day. Interestingly, this march was later on recog-
nized as the official event for International Women’s Day by the Quebecois 
Women’s Federation.
For many years, there was a women’s March 8 event [organized by main-
stream women’s rights organizations] and then that stopped, but the unions, 
the big unions often had something and would bring their members from 
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the region and big trucks and balloons. But it was very white; we said, we 
need to have a women’s event that represents, you know, all kind of women, 
and that’s why we chose the name “diverse origins,” class, race, age, etc.
For racialized/ immigrant feminists, the concept of intersectionality is used to 
combine the struggle against patriarchy with the struggle against racism and 
to unveil whiteness and privileges. While for white feminists it was a tool for 
intercultural feminist intervention and a tool to try to account for differences 
between women and to attempt inclusion in practice, for racialized feminists 
it is a claim for the representation of their interests and analyses, a means to 
challenge whiteness and its privileges. Maleiha explains:
The LGBT milieu and the feminist milieu in general as well, it’s really a 
milieu which is very white. As long as they haven’t elaborated a solid re-
flection, and acknowledged that they have privileges as whites, they won’t 
understand the intersectional approach and intersectional claim. That’s 
what we bring.
Challenging whiteness in the feminist movement means also redefining 
some of its principles and priorities, first and foremost refuting the idea that 
gender oppression can be tackled on its own, independently from other re-
lations of power. Mary, a Filipina activist in Montreal, explains how her or-
ganization understands its feminist commitment as articulated with other 
struggles rather than independent:
Our goal is to push for workers. That’s the majority of our constituents. 
Class first  .  .  .  our members need their class conditions to change, but 
they are feminists. It’s another idea about feminism. Their condition as 
women . . . we fight to change it. This condition comes from exploitation 
based on gender, but also exploitation from social condition, race, class. 
But we also struggle. . . . We want the men from the same social condition to 
support us, because if we divide we cannot go forward.
In Quebec, the majority of racialized/ immigrant women’s grassroots organ-
izations stress the fact that they do not exclude men from their struggle and 
practice. They often accept that men accompany their spouses to their offices 
for consultation, a practice that is not tolerated by mainstream Quebecois 
feminist organizations and has raised tensions between racialized feminists 
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and white feminists. Indeed, in Quebec most feminist community centers 
are part of a network, l’R des femmes, which has a common charter of prin-
ciples (called a basis of political unity) that all organizations have to adopt. 
In return, they are granted the status of member and can benefit from gov-
ernment funding. In the charter the presence of men in women’s centers is 
forbidden. Mani, an activist at a South Asian women’s center in her late fifties 
who is Indian- Canadian and grew up in Montreal, recalls the discussion on 
this issue with white feminist organizations:
Yes, [the basis of unity] has three things that you need to do: you have to 
lobby the government, you have to educate your members, and the last 
thing . . . , I used to know it by heart, I would be like, “Yes, we do all those 
things!” And they would always say, “Don’t let the men in,” and I would al-
ways, like me and the Italian women and the Greek women, we would all 
go, “We serve women and their families. We don’t see a woman outside her 
family context because the culture does not allow it.” But they [men] are 
not allowed to vote, they’re not allowed to be members and are not allowed 
to speak at meetings, which is very hard for them. They have to sit at the 
edge and just shut up, and wait until their wives are finished. They mostly 
don’t come.
Not only does Mani refute the idea that what white Quebecois feminists de-
fine as proper feminist intervention is applicable to her organization and her 
community, she also challenges the idea that white feminists “invented” fem-
inist practice. She explains that her organization had been doing what is pre-
scribed in the basis of political unity long before it was formalized for white 
feminist organizations in Quebec:  “lobby the government, which we did 
anyways, . . . provide front- line services to women in abusive relationships 
and help them get out, and educate their members. We were always doing 
all those things. We could have written that basis of political unity even 
before they thought of it. We did all those things in the mid- 1980s!” This 
statement challenges the pervasive tale of the white origins of feminism 
that always presents white organizations as the precursors and pioneers of 
the movement. Mani also challenges the idea implicitly promoted by the 
white Quebecois feminist discourse that whiteness is the norm and that 
white women represent all women, contrary to racialized women who are 
not perceived as representing all women.62 In the end, Mani managed to 
convince her interlocutors to accept her organization in the network so it 
Resisting Whiteness, Claiming Feminism 163
could access provincial funding. However, she continuously challenged their 
whiteness. Similarly, when Mani was sent as a representative of her organiza-
tion to assemblies and boards of the Quebecois federation of women’s rights 
(FFQ), she fought to unveil the fake universalism of white Quebecois femi-
nist claims.
So a big part of this was me arguing at meetings all the time that groups 
like ours should be considered mainstream, right? Like if you have a 
South Asian women’s center and it has a feminist mandate and does po-
litical lobbying and helps women in sometimes very difficult situations, in 
their language it’s not marginal.  .  .  . Everybody would always say we are 
an ethno- specific center. It was the same with the network of community 
centers. That was tricky because they would say you have to be accessible 
to all women, and they would always say, “You are only for women from 
South Asia.”
During meetings with the FFQ in the 1990s, as she constantly confronted 
unacknowledged privileges and white women posing as the norm and as 
owners of Quebecois feminism, Mani invented a term, forged after the term 
“WASP,” to challenge their assumptions frontally:
When they would say, notre pays [our country] or nous autres pis vous autres 
[you people and us people], whenever they were really unaware of that, 
I would say, “When you say, ‘us people,’ you mean CFCB?” And they would 
say, “What is CFCB?” [I’d answer,] “Canadiennes Françaises Catholiques 
Blanches [White French- Canadian Catholic Women].” They really hated it 
(laughs). They would be really insulted, but I think these women got the 
point: if you have a label for us, you just gonna have to accept we have a label 
for you. Why don’t we stop using labels at all, but you have to stop first cause 
you started first!
By self- organizing and by challenging assumptions about feminist 
principles, racialized feminists unveil whiteness, and resist its various 
manifestations. However, the ability to challenge whiteness within a 
mainstream setting varies in Quebec and France. Indeed, in Quebec, 
racialized/ immigrant feminist organizations have been organized on an 
ethnic/ immigrant basis for decades and are recognized as such by the gov-
ernment. They have always engaged critically with the mainstream white 
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organization that associates all women’s rights organizations in the prov-
ince, the FFQ, both by participating on its board, as Mani did for years, 
and by setting up their own march for International Women’s Day, which 
means having a network for racialized/ immigrant women’s organizations. 
This strategy of both inclusion and separation has sometimes proved 
exhausting and disappointing because the FFQ has not always reacted 
promptly to racialized feminists’ demands. However, it testifies to a possi-
bility for punctual— and sometimes more lasting— alliances. This strategy 
is in part made possible by the fact that the FFQ itself allows racialized 
women to caucus during its meeting to elaborate their own propositions. 
This alliance with mainstream white women’s organizations is perceived 
as demanding by Paola, but also necessary to promote her organization’s 
political agenda:
When we are trying to confront the government position on honor crime 
or forced marriage, it’s very significant that the FFQ takes a position be-
cause they’re speaking for all the women of Quebec, so for us I see that as 
very significant.
Hence, despite disappointments regarding the pace of change in the 
FFQ, racialized women’s organizations manage to have alliances that are 
seen as productive. In France, by contrast, resisting whiteness and chal-
lenging white feminist organizations’ agenda means mostly voicing an ex-
ternal critique and organizing among racialized feminists, for example, 
in the context of the alternate International Women’s Day march, which 
is held in another part of Paris than the “official” march organized by the 
World March of Women. The organization of separate marches testifies 
to the very limited possibilities for alliances between white feminist or-
ganizations and racialized feminists who voice a critique of whiteness in 
the feminist movement. This critique is often articulated by advocacy or 
consciousness- raising groups rather than by organizations that provide 
services to racialized/ migrant women. Indeed, for the latter the situation 
is different: they are often part of networks or federations (of shelters or 
community centers) and therefore engaged in practical collaborations 
with white feminists. For them, confronting white feminists about their 
privileges seems almost impossible, as Mariam testifies about a recent 
event at which the head of a white women’s organization was rewarded with 
a medal of honor by the regional council:
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We have been around for more than twenty years. We had to get by, 
volunteering. . . . When I see this medal of honor thing . . . it hurts. You work 
like a dog, you work, you go to demonstrations . . . flyers, you are active. 
You fight, you get insulted, and they get the medal. The federation gets the 
medal, and the federation, it’s white women. . . . When I started I did not 
believe it, but it’s been twenty years I work in this field. I noticed it’s always 
the domination of white women over Black women. We were colonized in 
Africa and this colonization continues here, even if it’s veiled. . . . Nobody 
talks about it. The person who talks gets excluded.
Mariam’s analysis reflects the pervasiveness of racism within French femi-
nism and the power of whiteness in a context in which it is not legitimate 
to politicize race. The privileges attached to whiteness are impossible to 
challenge, and voicing critique means being sidelined, from organizational 
networks and related funding. While Mani could confront her white femi-
nist peers in the context of collaboration in a coalition, Mariam cannot voice 
her concerns and critiques to the white feminists she works with and who 
run bigger and better- funded women’s rights organizations in her city and 
region. Here again, the difference between Quebec and France highlights the 
ways in which the politics of race in each context shapes racialized feminists’ 
opportunities and constraints in their attempt to challenge and resist white-
ness within the feminist movement.
Challenging Nationalism, Resisting Fetishization
In Quebec, challenging the whiteness of the Quebecois women’s movement 
means also challenging its nationalism. Indeed, many grassroots women’s 
rights organizations that have been institutionalized through government- 
funded networks, as well as the Quebecois umbrella organization (the FFQ), 
have tended to define themselves through their francophone identity and 
as partners or allies of the Quebecois nationalist movement. In particular, 
since the 1990s the FFQ has deepened its links with the Parti Québécois,63 
the Quebecois sovereigntist party, and has advocated for Quebec’s sover-
eignty as a means to realize the feminist society it is fighting for. Racialized 
Quebecois feminist activists, who are often of migrant background and do 
not all have French as their mother tongue, have been critical of the nation-
alism that is implicit in many women’s rights organizations’ discourses and 
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practices. They have criticized the dominance of French inside women’s 
rights organizations when most immigrant women speak another language 
as their mother tongue, sometimes English. For years, racialized/ migrant 
women’s organizations have asked that all the documents produced by the 
FFQ be produced in French and in English, without much success. Mary, 
who volunteers in a Filipina domestic workers organization, recalls how, 
in the 1990s, her organization fought with the FFQ about language in the 
context of the organization of a broad movement against women’s poverty 
throughout Quebec:
We worked so hard, but nothing was being put forward of our issues. We 
had meetings. . . . The thing was the language barrier, you know. They were 
so strict in the meetings not to, to do the meeting in French, so how can we, 
the minority, understand what is being said?
Of course, language is one of the vehicles of Quebecois nationalism. Mani, 
a colleague of Paola, recalls her meetings at the FFQ board in the 1990s and 
their position on this issue. She explained to white Quebecois feminists her 
organization’s position in these terms:
You need to realize that the centers you have built, which are great, cannot 
serve these women because these women don’t speak French! And you guys 
don’t even speak English. How can you help them? It was a huge battle. 
I got so tired cause I had to say the same thing at the same meetings. . . . 
The FFQ is a clique kind of organization. It’s very political and nationalist, 
and because we are not at all nationalist in the Quebecois sense— we are 
federalist— so each time they would say something nationalist, I would say 
something, I would be a dissenting voice. But I was not speaking for me, 
I was speaking for my group, I was always representing my group. I would 
always have to say, “On est pas d’accord. Je veux que ça soit sur le rapport” 
[We don’t agree. I want this noted in the report]. “Oh, okay, right.”
Racialized feminists also critique what they perceive as a tendency of 
French- speaking Quebecois feminists to take on the role of the victim 
 (as francophone Quebecois who have been oppressed by the power of the 
English- speaking elite in Canada)64 without scrutinizing the ways in which 
they might as well contribute to relations of oppression. Soraya comments on 
this tendency:
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It’s race, it’s the Quebecois people, it’s impossible. . . . There is a discourse of 
exceptionalism, of total and exclusive appropriation of the label of victim. 
Nobody else can be a victim because Quebecois, and Québécoises in partic-
ular, it’s impossible for them to share this. The nationalist discourse is really 
one of “We are the ones who have been oppressed and it’s unimaginable that 
we may be oppressors now.”
Soraya analyses the nationalist discourse as a protection that white feminists 
use against accusations of racism and exclusion. This hegemonic discourse 
sustains feminist whiteness as a position of invisibilized privilege by making 
the identity of victim still available to white Quebecois feminists, despite the 
historical changes that have happened since the 1980s. The inability of white 
Quebecois feminists to recognize the complexity of the power relations they 
participate in is supported by their political commitment to Quebecois na-
tionalism. In that sense, Quebecois nationalism works like a powerful legit-
imizing discourse by which Quebecois feminism is made white. It fuels an 
epistemology of ignorance that blinds white Quebecois feminists to other 
forms of oppression, in a way similar to what republican values and secu-
larism have done in France,65 providing hegemonic discourses that obscure 
inequalities inside the national territory.
Another important way in which racialized/ immigrant feminists resist 
whiteness is by resisting postcolonial fetishization of Black bodies. Indeed, 
as Franz Fanon captured,66 race power relations work in part through pro-
cesses of fetishization of nonwhite bodies, bodies made vulnerable to racist 
injuries.67 Both in France and in Quebec racialized feminist activists recall 
moments in which they have refused this process of fetishization, thereby 
putting a halt to the ongoing, power- infused postcolonial racialization that 
is projected onto them by white feminists. Sandra recalls her participation in 
a demonstration to celebrate the forty- year anniversary of the law decrimin-
alizing abortion in Paris, and the tension she felt with white feminists during 
the march:
Exoticization, it also exists in activist spaces, and with our Afro- feminist 
signs, we encountered attitudes that we felt were totally out of place, 
discourses, for example people telling us that we were beautiful  .  .  .  like 
“Girls, you’re beautiful!” So we did not really understand, that’s not pos-
sible. And this hymn, this song about women that played a lot during the 
demonstration . . . this parallel between the history of slavery, that is about 
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Black peoples, and the parallel with women, that’s a problem, when they say 
they are the Black continent, we really did not feel at ease.
Sandra presents the creation of her Afro- feminist group as a precise response 
to this type of event, a way to voice her own claims on her own terms and to 
resist the postcolonial fetishization that is still going on in feminist activist 
spaces and which reproduces the colonial gaze onto nonwhite bodies. This 
racial fetishization operates in a typical postcolonial manner, linking the co-
lonial past to the present, imposing on racialized bodies racialized markers 
from colonial times.68 Sandra’s critique of the women’s hymn69 recalls the 
debate in the United States on the comparison between women and Black 
people during the 1970s (and reactivated in the context of slut walks, and 
in particular the one in New York City).70 However, in France, it was only 
in the 2010s that a similar critique could finally emerge, thanks to the self- 
organizing of Afro- feminists.
Similarly, in Quebec, Soraya recalls how she managed to resist fetish-
ization during a conference panel she organized on Islamic feminism in 
Montreal in 2015. After her presentation about women participating in 
Quebecois mosques, a white feminist asked her about “the difficulties that 
Muslim women face in mosques.” Soraya analyzes the dynamic of the fol-
lowing exchange with this white feminist:
You know, it’s porn, it’s porn about Muslim women’s oppression. It’s vo-
yeurism. I just told her, “It’s not original you know, madam, it’s not exotic. 
It’s sexism, basic misogyny. I don’t need to go further. Apply what you know 
in your own context and you will find the same thing.” And you know for 
me it was an intense moment because I refused to go into the terrain of 
“Give us Scheherazade histories of Muslim women oppressions.”
In this pivotal moment, Soraya, who was in a position to define the rules of 
the interaction because she organized the panel and sat on it, had the means 
to stop the process of fetishization and to reframe the discussion in the terms 
she chose. As she explains, the problem of participating in white feminist 
institutions, such as the conference she mentions, is that instead of devel-
oping her own reflections, she spends her time doing “popular education” 
to prove that “yes, you can be feminist and Muslim.” On this occasion, she 
could, however, change the terms of the debate by refusing to engage in a 
fruitless discussion that fetishizes Muslim women and their oppression.
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Racialized feminists in Quebec and France resist whiteness through var-
ious strategies and discourses. They contest exclusion by organizing on their 
own, both to elaborate their own claims— claims that give as much impor-
tance to gender oppression as to racial oppression— and to become visible in 
the eyes of white feminists. By self- organizing, they ensure their representa-
tion inside the feminist movement. Challenging the whiteness of other fem-
inist organizations means often calling into question their priorities, making 
race and racism visible, critiquing the implicit nationalist bias and resisting 
fetishization. These strategies demonstrate that racialized feminists are not 
outside of the mainstream white women’s movement. Rather they occupy the 
political position of a minority, a position of insider dissent that relentlessly 
proposes to reframe what “true” feminism should be. Doing so, they con-
stantly displace the boundaries of the “good” and the “bad” feminist subject, 
expanding the moral and political horizon of the feminist project as it is de-
fined by many white feminists. In that sense, racialized feminists’ strategies 
aim both at constituting their own constituency and configuring their own 
collective identity, and at challenging whiteness, which means reformulating 
feminism in new terms. By doing so, racialized feminists are addressing 
white feminists in political and moral terms about their definition of fem-
inism and of the collective feminist subject. This address is often rooted in 
experiences of failed coalition and failed promises of inclusion, and it there-
fore expresses itself in the form of resentment and of political emotions such 
as indignation, frustration, or pain.
Resentment and the Failed Promises of Equality
As several previous quotations have made clear, racialized feminists’ 
discourses are often rife with emotions: anger, frustration, tiredness, indig-
nation, uneasiness, and pain. These emotions are rooted in political and 
ethical grounds. They express the difficulties that arise when one is put in 
a minority position, forced to articulate her claims with a language that has 
been forged by others to express another consciousness and another sensi-
tivity, that of a hegemonic and empty universal norm.71 As Paola Bacchetta 
suggests, using a Foucauldian lens to analyze the coformation of lesbians of 
color groups in Paris, these minoritized political subjects are created as an 
effect of the power exerted over them and, principally, through resistance to 
this power.72 This resistance can be oppositional or centered on the creation 
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of a collective identity, but, for Bacchetta, what matters is that subjects are 
coformed; formed through a variety of processes of circulation of power. 
These subjects are an effect of power but still remain in the process of being 
formed and reformed through their resistance. While her approach captures 
the process of political subjectivation as both an effect of power relations and 
of the resistance to these relations, it does not, however, consider these rela-
tions as also moral relations.
I argue here that the emotions expressed by racialized feminists are cer-
tainly an expression of their resistance to power, as Bacchetta suggests, but 
should also be interpreted as moral demands. While certainly the emotions 
and discourses of racialized feminists denote their resistance to power— as it 
manifests itself in patriarchy, racism, and heteronormativity— and the simul-
taneous affirmation of their collective identities through this resistance, these 
emotions and discourses also manifest, I argue, a certain form of relationality 
with white feminists that is not reducible to an effect of power. Racialized 
feminists contest the various forms of political and ethical violence that they 
are submitted to by the hegemony of feminist whiteness. However, they also 
make claims that white feminists acknowledge relationality, that is, their par-
ticipation in the feminist collective subject.
Demands for recognition from oppressed minorities and the resentment— 
ressentiment— that they express are often interpreted, in a Nietzschean 
fashion, as demands for the recognition of a fixed identity or of an injury, 
that is, as demands for revenge that in fact may repeat the injury and trans-
form it into a desirable identity, although one that is locked in the past.73 
However, this interpretation may be misreading these manifestations of 
resentment. Indeed, I  argue that expressions of resentment also point to 
a desire for political action and to establish moral relations on the basis of 
equality and freedom rather than on the basis of an asymmetrical relation 
between universal and particular. Resentment and the desire for recognition 
operate, as Linda Zerilli suggests,74 following Hannah Arendt, as a way to 
make the “world between us” appear and exist. Resentment is also an eth-
ical call to action. Calling themselves feminists, racialized feminists create 
the political space of a possible “we.” Mani’s powerful words at the incep-
tion of this chapter ask for more than tolerance, recognition, or solidarity. 
They ask for reciprocity and love,75 a powerful metaphor for a collective po-
litical and moral bond:  love is unconditional and demands that one place 
herself in the perspective of the other. Love acknowledges the existence of a 
reciprocal relation and of the responsibility it equally creates for both parties. 
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In this respect, resentment here is an ethical disposition that reminds white 
feminists of their failed promises of inclusion, and opens up a political space 
for action for racialized feminists.
Racialized feminists’ resentment often expresses a demand to white 
feminists to relinquish power and space. Their demand is not a demand to 
recognize differences or to promote a pluralism based on a diversity of iden-
tities. Rather, they ask, as Soraya puts it, for the right to be at the table and to 
not be treated like “a little sister” but rather like a feminist peer. This means, 
among other things, that their concerns should not be considered as partic-
ular or accessory, which is often the case. Nadia, a volunteer in an organiza-
tion that promotes Iranian women’s rights in Paris, recalls how the rights of 
immigrant women are regularly forgotten by white feminist organizations 
when petitions and demonstrations are organized:
The minute you are not there, and it’s forgotten. I lived it myself [during] the 
call for the March 8 demonstration. I could not be present at the meeting, 
and I saw the list of claims, not a line on [immigrant women]. So the next 
meeting I  said it, it was immediately accepted, and they said they were 
sorry. But it got me thinking. . . . They should know— our physical presence 
should not be the reminder.
Hence even on a consensual topic such as migrant women’s rights, white 
feminist organizations need a constant reminder to include these issues on 
their political platform. Best intentions seem not to be met by a change in 
practices, which fuels resentment from racialized feminists. This resentment 
sometimes surfaces as what Sabrina Marchetti has called postcolonial resent-
ment,76 that is, a resentment that links the relationships between white and 
racialized feminists today with colonial relations in the past. Karima insists 
that while feminist movements may recognize colonialism as a historical 
fact, the persistence of colonial relations within Quebecois society remains 
largely ignored:
Even if it recognizes that there was colonial domination on countries in the 
South, the feminist movement has a hard time admitting that this domi-
nation continues here through immigration. Why is it so difficult for the 
feminist movement to recognize this? Because the feminist movement 
is part of the problem. .  .  . Where are immigrant women in the feminist 
movement here?
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Karima’s resentment toward Quebecois feminists points to the ways in which 
white feminists ignore the realities of racism and neocolonialism, circum-
scribing colonial relations in the past and in another place and hence pre-
serving their innocence here and now. In Quebec, several racialized feminist 
groups were also particularly disappointed in the outcome of an extended 
process of consultation organized by the FFQ in 2013 and 2014. The process 
was supposed to lead to the adoption of intersectionality as a principle for the 
FFQ and to improve the inclusion not only of racialized feminists but also of 
trans activists. These aims were formally reached during the Estates General 
of feminism in Quebec, organized by the FFQ, with the adoption of new 
principles that included intersectionality. However, the process by which 
intersectionality was finally adopted, and the resistance with which this 
claim was met, filled racialized feminists with frustration and anger. Indeed, 
during the consultation process, a group of white feminists, self- named Les 
Yvettes, decided to leave the FFQ, arguing that it was infiltrated with Islamic 
feminists. A year later, when the general assembly had to vote on the propos-
itions formalized during the Estates General, opposition to intersectionality 
surfaced once again. Some representatives of grassroots feminist community 
centers, especially from outside Montreal, argued that intersectionality was 
too complex a principle and impossible for them to implement, at least for 
now. They asked for more time and contested the idea that intersectionality 
was necessary for their feminist praxis. In the face of this resistance, Soraya 
expresses her frustration, disappointment, and tiredness:
I’m on my way out. We are tired, it’s enough (sigh). The conclusion is a lot 
of effort, not a lot of gains. . . . You realize at some point it’s really violent, 
you still go back. People said the Estates General were a great victory, but 
you realize organizations have not changed their practices. People voted 
almost unanimously to integrate diverse women, indigenous women, 
intersectionality, but a year later, last spring, you have people from grass-
roots centers saying, “We don’t want to vote on this.” They say, “Women in 
our center are not ready for this.”
Paola expresses a similar dismay at the resistance that emerged against 
intersectionality during the process. While finally the vote went through de-
spite the opposition, the voicing of resistance against intersectionality, as well 
as asking racialized women to delay their claims, was interpreted and felt as a 
form of political violence and a painful moment:
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It felt a bit sad. They said, “Look, we are not racist, but you have to under-
stand that not everybody— and we represent women’s centers throughout 
Quebec— not everybody is on the same page. So give us some time so we 
can go back and work with them and when we’re ready . . .” And we asked, 
“Does that mean we have to face the oppression until they are ready? They’re 
not ready, we are ready, but we have to . . . ?” It’s like telling Black people, 
“Wait for apartheid to end till everybody gets that it’s really not correct.”
For both Soraya and Paola, this event became a sign of the difficulty that 
white feminists have in relinquishing power. Soraya analyzes the resistance 
from grassroots organizations as a lack of political will but also as a way to 
refuse to relinquish power: “You know, it’s like ‘We have been the guardians, 
the pillars of the feminist movement, in Quebec for forty years and we don’t 
want to leave some space for others.’ ” This event thus made visible a latent 
conflict over who really represents the feminist cause, as well as the common 
space that feminists are supposed to share equally.
The claim that white feminists must relinquish power is both political and 
moral. It is a claim for the recognition of equal participation in the feminist 
project, as well as equal moral worth in this project. Indeed, Soraya’s pain 
and frustration display features like those Noémi Michel has described as the 
reactions to racialized discursive injuries in postcolonial contexts.77 Michel 
reads claims against racial injurious discourses as claims for equality, rather 
than identity, because racial injuries enact a form of exclusion from full hu-
manity for racialized subjects. While racialized feminists have not been 
victims of racialized discursive injuries in the context of the FFQ’s meetings, 
they have felt injured by the way in which their own claims have met with 
new demands to be patient, to wait for equality. Paola’s comparison with 
apartheid and Soraya’s feeling that she has been subjected to forms of vio-
lence both capture the injurious power and unjust character of the demand 
for patience, tolerance, and self- restraint that white feminists have placed on 
racialized feminists. In this context, anger and resentment do not reveal a 
feeling of exclusion from humanity, but rather an exclusion from the feminist 
project, from the collective subject that it is supposed to create. Hence, what 
is being claimed by Soraya when she contests demands placed on her to be 
patient, is that those demands exclude her from the feminist collective sub-
ject and perform, discursively and socially, a form of inequality and a form of 
ethical violence. These demands to be patient breach the promise of equality 
intrinsic to the feminist project. Her resentment thus expresses a demand for 
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equality, as equal participation and equal discursive presence in the feminist 
project, a demand to recognize her equal moral worth as a feminist subject. It 
thus troubles and displaces the usual boundaries between the particular and 
the universal, the “good” and the “bad” feminist subjects.
Resentment here performs a refusal to abide by postcolonial structures 
of power and discourses. Michel argues, following Butler, that it is our fun-
damental relationality with others, our ontological condition as subjects of 
language, that makes us injurable because we are in need of the recognition 
of others for our existence.78 For Michel the postcolonial condition, the his-
torical legacy of colonialism, makes racialized subject specifically vulnerable 
to racialized discursive injuries. I bring this insight to bear on the analysis 
of Soraya’s discourse to highlight how, in her case, the injury is located at 
the level of the nonrecognition of her equal moral worth as a feminist sub-
ject. White feminists’ discourses asking for patience are not interpreted by 
Soraya as performing a racialized injury that denies her belonging to full hu-
manity, but rather as an injury that denies her belonging as a feminist subject 
to the political community created in the name of feminism. While this in-
jury is of course related to her racialized body, what she resents specifically 
is the denial of equality performed in the context of a feminist community 
that is supposed to be a community of equals. This reading of resentment 
as manifesting a claim to equality, rather than the repetition of an injury, is 
confirmed by the joy Soraya first felt when the FFQ voted during a special 
assembly on the issue of the hijab and did adopt a position against the ban in 
question. She recalls how she felt then:
The majority went for the position of the executive [of the FFQ], which was 
no to banning the veil, no to forcing women to wear it. We were so happy, 
we were filled with joy, it was great, everybody was giving hugs to each 
other, everybody was happy. I remember my friend, who wears the hijab, 
and she tells me, “Today”— and I still shiver when I think about it— “today 
I feel like I could really belong to this society.” . . . So there you are.
This event was for Soraya full of promises. Promises of inclusion, belonging, 
and participation. Promises that her voice would be not only heard but 
would shape the agenda of the FFQ for the coming years. A promise that she 
would be considered as belonging, as a feminist subject, as a feminist equal. 
Her disappointment was all the greater that these promises did not mate-
rialize as she had wished. Failed promises have broken the possibility of a 
Resisting Whiteness, Claiming Feminism 175
common “we” she aspired to. On another occasion, she experienced a lack 
of solidarity from white feminists that also led her to question the possibility 
of a common future. When the debate on the Charter of Quebecois Values 
emerged in 2013, she asked white feminists with whom she had a history 
of common activism to express their solidarity with an informal network of 
Muslim women in Quebec, and to publicly take a position against the pro-
posed Charter. However, none of them agreed, and this refusal performed 
once again a form of injury and denial of equality.
If promises have failed, making a collective “we” difficult to imagine, at 
least in Quebec promises have been made, and some may be kept. Soraya her-
self recognizes that the FFQ has shown solidarity and made efforts to include 
racialized feminists and has paid a price with the departure of some members. 
Paola also recognizes that the FFQ has supported the International Women’s 
Day march organized by racialized women’s groups for several years:
We often invite the president of FFQ to speak, and the FFQ has been great 
about that to say, “It’s your league, you organize, tell us what you want us to 
do.” . . . So I think maybe things like that have been heard, and the fact that 
the FFQ president sees us as allies too means there is a recognition that we 
have a common cause.
Importantly, Paola’s remarks show both that on this occasion her position is 
not that of a minority and that the relationship with mainstream white or-
ganizations may be envisioned as one of common cause, a collective “we” 
in which they are equal interlocutors. Similarly, in France, Maleiha explains 
that some strategic and punctual alliances with white women’s organizations 
may prove productive. While Maleiha argues that there is a need to decolo-
nize feminist activism, here alliances were possible because her organization 
decided the terms that would frame their solidarity:
They talk very clearly about violence against lesbians, and this is thanks 
to us and other organizations that the fight against lesbophobia is on the 
agenda . . . but also double violence against immigrant women. . . . It started 
last year and it was clear. And we are satisfied because we were very clear. 
We said we agree to come but you need to articulate these issues clearly.
Hence, under specific circumstances, coalitions might succeed. While 
all racialized/ immigrant feminists express in various forms discontent, 
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criticism, and resentment toward white feminists, they also recognize possi-
bilities for alliances, if they are not placed in a minority position but can use 
their own language and priorities, and see these recognized and adopted by 
white feminists. Importantly, they demand that their equal moral worth as 
feminist subjects be recognized. I explore more fully in the next chapter the 
implications of these politics of coalitions.
***
In this chapter I have described and analyzed a variety of processes of polit-
ical subjectivation by which racialized feminists come to give an account of 
themselves as racialized feminists. These processes and these accounts vary. 
In particular, racialized feminists politicize race and religion in different 
ways, depending on the context and the feminist generation to which they 
belong. Despite their differences, they all provide trenchant critiques of their 
encounters with white feminists, and recount their attempts at challenging 
the whitening of feminism by claiming feminism for themselves, outside of 
the universalist narrative provided by many white feminists. The discourses 
through which racialized feminists resist the regulation imposed by femi-
nist whiteness on good and bad feminist subjects are of course eminently 
political. They denote their resistance to power, and how it contributes to 
shape their identities and subjectivations as racialized feminists. They also 
convey moral issues at the heart of the relationship between white and non-
white feminists.
Failed promises of solidarity and inclusion leave the possibility of ethical 
violence looming. Indeed, following Adorno’s reflections on violence and the 
emergence of morality, Judith Butler notes that morality emerges from a di-
vergence between what is posited as a universal interest and what is posited 
as the interests of particular individuals. This division happens when the uni-
versal “fails to agree with or include the individual.”79 In this context, univer-
sality “can exercise violence” because it ignores “the social conditions under 
which a living appropriation might become possible.”80 Transposed to the 
issue and subject of feminism, Adorno’s and Butler’s reflections on univer-
sality illuminate how the ignorance by white feminists of the social conditions 
under which the appropriation of feminism by racialized feminists becomes 
possible performs a form of ethical violence, which is felt as such. The di-
alectic between the minority position occupied by racialized feminists and 
the dominant one, parading as universal and occupied by white feminists, is 
therefore one of structural conflict. Deleuze has described well the position 
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and the dialectic of minority subjects:  speaking from within a dominant 
language that they have not forged themselves, they also try to subvert its 
meaning in order to account for their position outside of its claimed uni-
versality. Deleuze’s concept of minority is important because it shows how 
minority claims seek to deterritorialize the majority’s claim to universality, a 
process clearly at play in racialized feminists’ discourses.
However, Deleuze overlooks the question of the attachment of minor-
ities to their identity category and their moral relations to the majority. 
Deleuze’s analysis of the minority position is mainly a political one, looking 
for strategies of alliances among minorities to rethink emancipation and a 
revolutionary becoming outside of the narratives of the hegemony of uni-
versal subjects. While Deleuze recognizes that minorities are tied to “ob-
jective” identities (such as ethnicity or gender), he argues that they must be 
detached from these identities to become politically relevant, to be articu-
lated with other minorities and to become a “universal minority conscious-
ness.”81 Hence in the dialectic between minorities and universality that must 
allow for forging a revolutionary political subject, the question of emotional 
attachments to minority identities,82 and the moral dimension of the rela-
tionship to the majority— marked by resentment in the case of racialized 
feminists— is left unexplored. Revisiting Deleuze’s metaphor of the minority 
position as similar to that of a minor/ minoritized language or dialect forged 
from within the majoritarian language, one can perceive how a minority 
position carries more than just resistance to power, and how minority sub-
jectivity is not engulfed in or produced only through power. Indeed, lan-
guage is not just a set of hegemonic rules to be subverted from within by 
its minoritized iterations, as Deleuze suggests. Language is also spoken; it 
is what enables my voice and my being a subject. As Sandra Laugier beauti-
fully remarks in her analysis of Wittgenstein’s and Stanley Cavell’s approach 
to language as spoken: “The voice is both a subjective and a general expres-
sion: it is what makes it possible for my individual voice to become shared. 
In voice, there is the idea of a claim. The singular claims a shared, common 
validity.”83 Language, as the voice, is therefore this locus of my subjectivity 
and, at the same time, the place and the form in which I seek commonality, 
the possibility of being recognized by others.84
In this perspective, the minority position is not only one of subversion or 
deterritorialization of the majority, it is also a position that seeks common 
validity. The resentment and emotional grievance that racialized/ immi-
grant feminists justly feel fuel in that respect a call to responsibility that they 
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address to white feminists, a moral call. Hence, while for Deleuze the mi-
nority is first and foremost a political position, one that articulates a tension 
and a conflict from within the hegemonic norm, racialized feminists also af-
firm their full participation in the feminist project not only at the political 
level but also in moral terms, through an address to white feminists.
Here Drucilla Cornell’s words about the recognition of differences be-
tween women come to mind: “This call to responsibility inheres in the as-
piration to the ethical relationship and is, as a result, a crucial aspect of what 
I call ethical feminism. It can call us to both acts of identification and dis- 
identification. But it demands of us that we deconstruct the claim that there 
is an identity that we share as women and that the differences between us 
are secondary.”85 As racialized/ immigrant feminists invent various new lan-
guages from within the hegemonic feminist norm to describe and politicize 
their own experience and thereby resist whiteness, this invention brings with 
it conflicts but also implies a possibility and a promise, the promise that this 
language, as a voice, both singular and claiming common validity, might 
open up a common space for collective political action, a space defined by 
feminist moral relations of equality.
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 Toward a Feminist Ethic of Responsibility
“Solidarity” as an ideal of a political altruism is rooted in some de-
gree of identification, which it will also transcend. But its invocation 
is immensely delicate.
— Denise Riley, The Words of Selves, 9
Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same 
struggles, or that our pain is the same pain, or that our hope is for the 
same future. Solidarity involves commitment, and work, as well as 
the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the 
same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground.
— Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics Of Emotions, 189
Already two and a half decades ago, Judith Butler reflected on the modern 
feminist project in the following terms:
Through what exclusions has the feminist subject been constructed, and 
how do those excluded domains return to haunt the “integrity” and “unity” 
of the feminist “we”? And how is it that the very category, the subject, the 
“we,” that is supposed to be presumed for the purpose of solidarity, produces 
the very factionalization it is supposed to quell? Do women want to become 
subjects on the model which requires and produces an anterior rejoin of ab-
jection, or must feminism become a process which is self- critical about the 
processes that produce and destabilize identity categories?1
Butler’s considerations find a profound echo in the current politics of femi-
nism in a majority of Western countries. As I have documented in previous 
chapters, far from having rejected or critically reflected upon the false uni-
versalism and unity of the “we women,” numerous contemporary feminist 
organizations in Europe and beyond have been enrolled in an exclusionary 
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project contributing in many respects to the “rise of femonationalism”;2 that 
is, the enrollment of feminist values in nationalist far- right political projects. 
However, as Butler predicted, these excluded domains return to haunt, chal-
lenge, and disrupt this exclusionary discourse, also in the name of women’s 
rights, simultaneously shattering liberal categories of emancipation and 
agency.
In the previous chapters I  have documented and analyzed these two 
processes— the exclusion and the haunting. I  have first shown how femi-
nist whiteness, in its many forms and incarnations, polices the boundaries 
of the feminist collective subject, performing the symbolic and practical ex-
clusion of “bad” subjects and/ or positing that nonwhite feminists’ political 
subjectivities must be regulated and put in line with feminist ideals histori-
cally and socially defined as white (and secular). This process can be critically 
read as the product of power relations within feminism based on race and re-
ligion. These discourses delineate the boundaries of feminist whiteness and 
secure for many white feminists their already privileged position within the 
movement. Moreover, and as Butler’s citation suggests, this process of polit-
ical subjectivation is also profoundly intertwined with emotions and moral 
dispositions. Attachment to identity categories, to the unified “we,” is also the 
product of a psychic and emotional impulse. I have also shown how race es-
pecially comes back to haunt this feminist project, as Butler predicted. I have 
considered how racialized feminists reclaim the feminist subject on their 
own terms, contesting the boundaries drawn by white feminists, while, at 
the same time, seeking recognition of their belonging to the feminist project, 
first among themselves, but also in relation to white feminists. In that sense, 
racialized feminists’ discourse must also be heard as a moral address directed 
at white feminists.
The exploration of the political subjectivations of white and racialized 
feminists in the context of sexularism debates has therefore exposed the dy-
adic nature of feminism, as both a political and a moral project. Conflicts 
about what gender equality means, or what freedom means, and the im-
possibility of ever agreeing on this topic are, I maintain with Linda Zerilli 
and others, inherent to the feminist project. That those values are debated 
and contested is the very mark that feminism is a political project. As Zerilli 
notes: “There can no more be the final or conclusive argument for the equality 
of the sexes than there can be the final and conclusive argument for the beau-
tiful. Every political or aesthetic argument must be articulated in relation to 
a set of particulars.”3 In this perspective, feminism is thus a political activity 
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that is defined neither by a shared identity nor by an agreement on political 
values such as gender equality or autonomy, but rather by its aim to create 
a political community. Hence, to critically think about the feminist project 
and its future, we should not be concerned with defining gender equality 
or female autonomy in a way that would assuage the conflicts within femi-
nism sparked by sexularism debates, but rather reflect on the conditions that 
enable this political community to be sustained and define its nature (as a 
community of equals, for example).4 Instead of inquiring about the limits or 
the impossibility of a subject, a “we women,” that would found or embody 
feminism, we should then interrogate what political community feminism 
pretends to create, and on what moral bonds this community might be based, 
questions I explore in this chapter.
Indeed, feminism, I argue, is also a moral project. Debates over Islamic 
veiling reveal conflicts about what gender equality and female autonomy 
mean for feminists, but they also reveal that some subjects may be con-
sidered proper feminists subjects while others are considered improper 
subjects, outside the scope of the feminist project of emancipation. In that 
perspective, the future of the feminist project does not only depend on an 
ability to be critical about the “we” that it invokes in its claims, a subject that 
has fueled much of feminist theory’s inquiries.5 It also lies in our ability to 
critically reflect on the moral boundaries and moral relations that the fem-
inist project creates. The moral relationships that characterize the political 
subjectivations of white and racialized feminists— from benevolence or in-
dignation to resentment— indicate that moral relations between feminists 
are at the heart of feminism. Hence, I am concerned with the moral dimen-
sion of the feminist project, the bonds that enable feminism to be embodied 
in a political community.
In that sense, I argue that we need to be self- critical not only about the 
boundaries of the “we” that we intend to claim when we make claims as 
feminists, as Butler suggests, but that we also need to be self- critical about 
the relationships we forge or imagine between those who might claim that 
“we” with us, in the very process of claiming it. Indeed, disagreeing on po-
litical outcomes should not lead to ignoring power asymmetries between 
feminists, and should not reinforce moral boundaries and exclusion. On the 
contrary, feminism should be an exercise in critique of moral boundaries. 
I argue that we must therefore concern ourselves with the moral dimension 
of the feminist project, the bonds that enable feminism to be embodied in a 
community, and that ensure that its claims will be picked up by others. This 
182 Feminist Trouble
is not a turn to morality as opposed to politics. Rather it is an attempt to elu-
cidate what moral relations can create a political community of equals. How 
can feminism define a community that is not marked by hierarchies between 
“good” and “bad” feminist subjects? How can our feminist imagination de-
fine bonds between its members that do not reproduce exclusions, abjections, 
and privilege?
In this chapter, I argue that such a conception of feminism as a moral and 
political project, which creates bonds between those who declare them-
selves feminists, can reorient our critical inquiry. Grappling with sexularism 
debates, our attention has been fixated on the subject of feminism, debating 
who can be part of this project— with religious Muslim women being evalu-
ated as proper or improper subjects of feminist consideration— and the type 
of agency these subjects should display to be included in a political project of 
emancipation. Rather, I suggest concentrating our attention not on the sub-
ject of feminism but on the relationships that feminists create among them-
selves, the nature of the bonds that a feminist project requires. Hence, what 
we must explore are the moral bonds we create when we invoke feminism. 
Can we imagine feminist moral bounds that sustain a community of equals?
While Butler is right to promote a nonfoundationalist account of femi-
nism, one in which this political project does not rely on the belief of a “we” 
grounded in a common identity, this does not mean that feminism should 
not aim at creating a community, in the sense of creating and sustaining 
moral and political bonds between its participants. What I have described 
in the preceding chapters, thanks to the concept of political subjectivation, 
is not only a problematic passionate attachment to the category or identity 
of “women,” but also a passionate desire to name oneself a feminist and to 
be recognized by other feminists as a feminist. The passionate attachment to 
feminist ideals such as gender equality and autonomy is matched in intensity 
only by the affective and moral bonds created between feminists. Whether 
this community is based on an identity category or is self- critical about this 
identity, feminism as a political activity generates emotional attachment, not 
only to the identity category or to its destabilization (I can be as emotionally 
invested in the maintaining of the category “women” as I can be affectively 
engaged in its dislocation) but to the other participants in that project.
This chapter is an exercise in political imagination. As Amy Allen has 
emphasized, any critical analysis rests in fact on an anticipated future for the 
feminist project.6 This utopian dimension must be specified; otherwise it 
will necessarily create new exclusionary domains, as has been the case in the 
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past— for example, with feminism’s uncritical adhesion to liberal values and 
its attachment to modernity.7 I therefore here explore in normative terms the 
moral bonds that feminists may create among feminists, and that may avoid 
reproducing hierarchies, privileges, and exclusions.
The figure of the coalition is a good place to start such an inquiry. 
Coalitions have been repeatedly presented as a solution to the problem of 
differences and of power relations among women. Most of the literature has 
focused on the organizational modalities of coalitions, exploring what makes 
feminist coalitions succeed or fail as political endeavors. I argue that while 
indeed we learn important pragmatic feminist politics from these studies, 
coalitions are not only attempts at broader political inclusion or political 
alliances between minorities that may ally on tactical issues. They also con-
stitute moral endeavors that necessitate forging specific moral bonds and 
developing a form of feminist ethics. I  then explore different theoretical 
propositions of such a feminist ethics. In particular, I discuss how the con-
cept of enlarged mentality, or enlarged thought, first elaborated by Hannah 
Arendt in her theory of judgment, has been used by feminist theorists such 
as Linda Zerilli and Iris Young to capture the type of moral disposition that 
could define a feminist ethics. In the last section, I propose to build on and 
nuance these insights into the ethical dispositions that can create a femi-
nist political community. I argue that what I call a feminist ethic of respon-
sibility may provide normative yardsticks that take into account the affects 
and moral dispositions that characterize feminists’ political subjectivations, 
and redirect them toward the aim of disestablishing the moral hierarchies 
and political exclusions within feminism. I show how such an ethics can ad-
dress the pitfalls described at length in this book and by others, and help us 
conceive feminism as a political community of equals, while leaving open 
political disagreements about the values at the heart of this project, such as 
autonomy and equality.
Coalition as a Political and Moral Promise
Many feminist scholars have presented coalitions as the solution to the 
problem of the exclusionary domains created by the “we women,” a “we” too 
often appropriated by white and privileged feminists. Coalitions are said to 
offer a solution by acknowledging differences, especially differences in priv-
ilege and power, while at the same time creating a temporary united “we.” 
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I first review theoretical arguments in favor of this mode of feminist orga-
nizing, and I specify, using my fieldwork in France and Quebec, under which 
conditions coalitions are said to have reached their objective or to have been 
experienced as successful. These experiences of “successful” coalitions give 
us insights about their nature— as strategic, political alliances— but also 
about the ethical dispositions they require from their participants, a dimen-
sion rarely explored in the literature. Indeed, as the quotation from Sara 
Ahmed that opens this chapter suggests, solidarity, expressed through coa-
lition building, requires that we recognize that “we live on common ground.” 
However, this requirement and its ethical implications are rarely fully articu-
lated within coalition politics or in feminist theory.
Talking about Black feminist politics in the United States, Bernice Johnson 
Reagon famously opposed “home” and coalition: “You don’t go into coalition 
because you like it. The only reason you would consider trying to team up 
with somebody who could possibly kill you, is because that’s the only way you 
can figure you can stay alive.”8 To the safety and recognition of home, Reagon 
contrasted coalition politics as hard work, a place that is not safe but is a ne-
cessity. She emphasized that feminist work for the twenty- first century must 
be about coalescing, which entails a risk, and therefore carefulness because 
“you can’t know everything when you start to coalesce with these people 
who sorta look like you in just one aspect but really they belong to another 
group.”9 Hence, belonging is about home and people who look just like me 
in every aspect, while coalition is about not belonging, not looking alike, not 
recognizing myself in the others, and, however, working with them. Because 
coalition work is based on the premise that the participants do not share a 
similar identity, or a similar pain as Ahmed remarks, it supposedly quenches 
the question of differences and recognition. It proposes a self- critical under-
standing of the feminist “we” that has been upheld as the practical solution to 
the “problem” of the “we women” by many theorists from various theoretical 
traditions.10 Central among the reasons that explain the theoretical success 
of coalition as a viable figure for feminist politics is thus the idea that coali-
tion is centered around work, action, or communication rather than identity.
This antiessentialist predicate supposedly offers a guarantee that calls for 
commonality and identity will not be used to mask power disparities nor 
to protect the privileged subjects of feminism at the expense of those who 
are multiply marginalized. Coalitions are supposed to avoid what María 
Lugones calls a logic of purity, a logic based on the “fundamental assumption 
that there is unity underlying multiplicity.”11 This assumption is misleading 
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for feminist practice or for any emancipatory politics because it rests on a 
longing for unity, community, and shared subjectivity as a premise and pre-
condition for political action, whereas such a premise is always flawed and 
exclusionary, enacting a closure of the political subject, and whereas this 
premise ignores, or travesties, the fact that identity building is the product 
of political work.12 In fact, coalition may be the model to follow even for 
groups that present themselves as identity- based. Indeed, and as  chapter 5 
illustrated, identity- based feminist groups are not the product of an imme-
diate, prepolitical identity. They also are the product of collective processes 
of political subjectivation that necessitate work to create a common identity, 
a feeling of security and a vocabulary to politicize the intersectional nature of 
their identity.13
Hence, coalition may be a model for feminist practice not only to bridge 
across difference but for any type of feminist collective action. Coalition is 
thus favored by feminist theorists of recognition who value communicative 
ethics as a way to foster understanding across differences,14 as well as inter-
sectional theorists who wish to ensure minoritized women’s inclusion in the 
feminist project as well as their self- organizing.15 Coalition can offer a figure 
of inclusive feminism, by multiplying the available and accepted feminist fig-
ures, like in the intersectional version of the Rosie the Riveter poster, an image 
with three racialized women posing as Rosie, used by racialized feminist 
groups in Paris (and in the United States) in 2015,16 or in material metaphors 
such as the quilt seamed by different women groups in over fifty countries for 
the World March of Women organized by Quebecois feminists in 2005. In 
both these visual and material metaphors the feminist subject is multiplied, 
embodied by a multiplicity of figures rather than by a univocal one.
Beyond the theoretical assumption that coalition is an adequate form for 
feminist practice, scholars of social movements have also documented under 
which conditions coalitions succeed, meaning that they manage to forge a 
short- term alliance on specific issues. Empirical studies show that for a coali-
tion to sustain itself, despite difference in identities and power, there needs to 
be a recognition of the power differential17 and a specific representation for 
the disadvantaged group so that their viewpoint is not suppressed through 
the coalition building.18 The institutionalization of what Laurel Weldon calls 
“norms of inclusivity,” to secure the self- organizing of minorities within 
the coalition and their descriptive representation, provides the necessary 
safeguards to ensure minorities’ interests are taken into account and for the 
coalition to thus be sustainable.
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However, both the theoretical account of coalition and empirical studies 
of successful coalitions tend to sideline important dimensions of coalition 
work. Here I explore further these affective and moral dimensions of coali-
tion, both between racialized and nonracialized feminists and between dif-
ferently racialized or marginalized feminist groups, in France and Quebec, 
to delineate when and why feminists experience a coalition as successful or 
as a failure, and what these moral and political evaluations tell us about the 
potential and the limits of coalition as a figure of inclusive feminism. I argue 
that while, as has been noted by other scholars, acknowledging power within 
a coalition is a prerequisite posited by racialized feminists for a coalition to 
be possible, coalition work— with other racialized feminists or with white 
feminists— also entails cultivating specific moral dispositions. I first docu-
ment empirically this claim, and then elaborate theoretically its implications.
Discourses about coalitions across racial and religious divides vary 
depending on standpoint. While coalition is a leitmotiv of the narratives 
from racialized feminists in France and Quebec, showing the necessity of 
including their views if one is to reflect on this feminist practice, it is much 
less so for a majority of white feminists I interviewed, especially in France. 
In some cases, the failure of coalition, even for symbolic short- term 
events, such as the International Women’s Day demonstration on March 
8, is accounted for by white French feminists by underlining irreducible 
differences over feminist values and ideals (for example, on the Islamic 
veil or on sex work)— rather than power, privilege, and racism. In Quebec, 
the provincial umbrella organization for women’s rights, the FFQ, mainly 
run by white women, has engaged reflexively on this issue since the begin-
ning of this century, mainly through the institutionalization of a specific 
representation of racialized women inside the organization— an initia-
tive welcomed by racialized feminists, but one that did not appease their 
concern about the organization’s lack of diversity and continued implicit 
support for Quebecois nationalism. As Mani, an activist and volunteer in 
a South Asian women’s center in Montreal underlines, descriptive rep-
resentation does not mean inclusion, and the concerns of her organiza-
tion remain marginalized in the coalition’s agenda despite her continued 
presence there:
Of course, we were invited to go to the exceptional General Assembly again 
this September and I looked at their program and I said there is no way 
I have three days to listen to them all doing all that stuff again, and arguing 
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about nationalism probably. . . . So I don’t know, I don’t have the patience 
for it anymore.
Contrary to the relative lack of discourse about coalition from nonracialized 
feminists, racialized feminists in France and Quebec expose their disillusions, 
but also the conditions that have been conducive to successful coalitions with 
white women.19 In line with the literature on feminist coalition, interviewees 
in Quebec and France underscore that a lack of acknowledgment of the 
power differential is an impediment to forging effective coalitions. Soraya, 
a Muslim feminist activist in her early forties who has been a member of 
the provincial federation for many years and cofounded a Muslim feminist 
group in Montreal, critically reflects on her experience of organizing with 
white Quebecois feminists and being included in the events they organize:
In fact, a real integration of intersectional practice would lead, I think, in 
this context, to take into account the vulnerabilities of different groups, 
but their attitude is to say, “It’s a level playing field, you just have to make 
your mark, it’s the same rules for everybody, and they apply to everyone 
fairly.” . . . The same women who said fifty years ago to men that they should 
favor women’s participation, and they cannot see the link.
Lack of awareness of power differentials, the very absence of a level playing 
field, makes coalition work impossible in this case. Acknowledging racism 
inside the movement and material power differentials is thus a precondition 
for a feasible coalition. However, examples of successful coalition— where 
power asymmetries are recognized— show that racialized feminists define 
this work as temporary, strategic, and on their own terms. Maleiha, who 
facilitates a group of lesbians of color in Paris, insists on both the temporal 
limit and the protection of her group’s autonomy in coalition work:
We have reflected on practices of strategic and short- term alliances. That is, 
we are a radical group, but we find it necessary and useful to have actions 
with others, we are not closed. . . . Why short term? Because we protect our 
autonomy, an autonomous organization, to produce our own reflections 
and analyses. This idea of temporariness enables us to circumscribe our 
alliances, so that we are not in the long term, so we’re safe. We won’t be 
assimilated, and our conditions will be very clear. With white lesbians, first 
we ally only with those we know well, and this affective side, this friendship 
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is very important because, in fact, political lesbians that fight racism, there’s 
not a lot of them around.
As this long quotation makes clear, while the scope and dynamics of the coa-
lition must ensure racialized feminists that their participation will be defined 
on their own terms, as already exemplified in  chapter 5, coalition work is also 
rife with emotions and affects. Successful coalitions are based on trust, built 
over time, as well as on friendship and emotional bonds. Indeed, Maleiha 
emphasizes the need for trust and affective relations even to sustain strategic 
and temporary coalitions with carefully picked allies. While the literature 
often opposes identity groups, characterized by emotional safety and shared 
identity, and coalition work, this distinction seems, on some level, to be in-
adequate. It is clear that identity groups, such as the one founded by Maleiha, 
provide her with a collective sense of belonging and with political autonomy, 
as she often emphasizes in her interview. But this belonging does not sup-
press the need for affective and trustful relations in the coalition work she 
engages in as well. Coalition work does not render the affective and emo-
tional dimensions of feminist political subjectivation irrelevant, as Soraya’s 
and Maleiha’s words suggest.
Reciprocally, failed coalitions display not only a lack of awareness 
of inequalities and racism within feminist movements, but also moral 
dispositions that prevent working together. The political recognition of power 
asymmetries— or its refusal— is intimately intertwined with moral and af-
fective dispositions. This interweaving can be identified in the following ex-
ample. When she mentions the organization of an event on Islamic feminism 
where no Muslim feminist was in fact invited, Soraya contrasts the theoret-
ical commitment of white feminists toward diversity and intersectionality 
with the practical lack of financial solidarity:
I can’t believe there is no money to have [a Muslim feminist] come from 
Morocco. It’s impossible for me to imagine that there is no possibility of fi-
nancing her. . . . But if I say this, it is presented as completely wacky on my 
part, emotional, as if I was asking for preferential treatment. But in theory if 
you ask them if it’s important to take into consideration race, sexual orien-
tation, they will say yes.
Soraya’s critique goes beyond the lack of acknowledgment of economic asym-
metries. Her demand to recognize power differentials, including financial 
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ones, is met with a moral gaze that delegitimizes this demand and categorizes 
the one who utters it as “unfit” for proper feminist practice. What is more, 
and as Soraya develops her reflection, the ability to embody the “good” femi-
nist subject is always disputed by white feminists, especially when it comes to 
acknowledging Muslim feminists as feminists:
There is often this, “Well, it would be nice to see you at a demonstration for 
abortion rights.” They put conditions on acceptance, on integration, criteria 
we are supposed to meet. . . . The answer is “prove yourself and you will be 
accepted.”
Hence the moral gaze of feminist whiteness that ascribes to racialized 
feminists a position of “bad” feminist subject, or of a subject who still needs 
to be regulated, to prove itself, makes coalition work with white feminists 
very problematic for racialized feminists. The emotional and moral 
implications of such coalition work also appear clearly in this quote. Beyond 
the recognition of power asymmetries, racialized feminists recognize coa-
lition with white feminist organizations as also morally meaningful when, 
contrary to the example given by Soraya, a common belonging to the femi-
nist project is fully acknowledged. Paola, who heads a South Asian women’s 
center in Montreal, reflects on the relationship of her organization with the 
mainstream umbrella feminist organization, the FFQ— after the latter pro-
posed that racialized feminist organizations grouped under the banner of 
“women from diverse origins” would from now on organize the March 8 
demonstration— in these terms: “The fact that the president [of the organiza-
tion] sees us as allies too means there is a recognition that we have a common 
cause” (my emphasis). Importantly, the acknowledgment that feminists 
share a common cause, and live on common ground, implies a recognition 
not only of equal moral worth but also of relationality— which I will develop 
further.
The interweaving of political and moral disposition as a precondition 
for coalition is not limited to coalitions of racialized feminists with white 
feminists. Indeed, racialized feminists’ organizations also need to build 
coalitions among women of color, or with other oppressed categories.20 
Paola, for example, explains the logic guiding the relationship that her or-
ganization tries to build with indigenous women’s groups in Quebec. While 
she states that they do not have a formal working relationship, she explains 
that they asked the head of the federation of indigenous women in Quebec 
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to come give a talk so that the members of her organization would inform 
themselves about indigenous women’s multiple discrimination and history 
of colonial oppression in Quebec.
The will to self- educate might therefore be one way to express solidarity. 
Another is apologizing to groups that one has sidelined in political work. 
Soraya relates an event that happened during the Estates General of femi-
nism in Quebec, a wide gathering of all feminist organizations, organized 
by the FFQ but rallying beyond its usual membership. A  long discussion 
occurred to decide if trans* and intersex women should be named as inter-
sectional categories or subsumed under a “sexual diversity” label within the 
charter that was being drafted. Soraya’s group opted for the latter, a political 
and moral fault as she explains:
For her [a trans* activist] and another intersex activist it was really impor-
tant to name them, because they have never been named, and, see, this was 
a big blunder on the part of racialized women, because we did not vote with 
them. It was a tragic moment. We thought we were doing the right thing by 
skipping the list [of sexual minorities]. . . . We really had a hard time. We 
apologized, but these women will not come back.
Here again, the issue is not only about the right political position to take in 
order to acknowledge the identities and the needs of multiply marginalized 
groups within the feminist coalition. It is also an issue of acknowledging 
relationality and a common moral ground between feminists. The fact that 
Soraya describes this event as tragic underlines both the passion with which 
she invests it as she recalls it, and the unspoken idea that exclusion is una-
voidable, a fate that one tries to escape but that repeats itself, despite the best 
intentions. However, the fact that her group apologized suggests that, to use 
Hannah Arendt’s metaphor, even if promises of solidarity have not been kept, 
new promises may be made again, and coalition rebuilt. Hence, here again, 
political stakes, moral dispositions and emotions are intimately interwoven 
in Soraya’s understanding of what has been missed. The failure she expresses 
is both political and moral. Her moral dismay echoes, and illuminates, Linda 
Zerilli’s analysis, relating the story of a feminist collective in Milan, when she 
remarks that such collective is based on “a promise to make good a claim to 
community and acknowledge a debt.”21
Reflecting on these examples, we see that coalition is not only strategic 
allying or the multiplication of figures that may embody or represent the 
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feminist subject. Coalitions are rife with emotional stakes and moral rela-
tions. Failed coalitions between racialized and nonracialized feminists reflect 
not only a cognitive and political failure on the part of some feminists— that 
of not acknowledging asymmetries in power along racial lines— they also 
result from a lack of moral reciprocity, the absence of an acknowledgment 
of common ground. Conversely, successful coalition work rests not only on 
institutionalizing norms of inclusivity but also on trust, emotional bonds, 
and the moral acknowledgment of relationality and, therefore, responsi-
bility, between feminists— I will develop this point further in the following 
sections.
Hence, coalitions are not only strategic alliances, necessitating that the 
right norms of inclusivity be institutionalized in order to be successful. 
Coalitions are also moral endeavors, putting to the test the moral relations 
that unite— or separate— their participants. The examples of coalitions be-
tween minority groups illustrate as well this moral and emotional nature 
of coalition. Indeed, as the last example, Soraya’s tragic mistake, showed, 
communication between oppressed minorities is neither transparent nor 
obvious. As minorities, trans* feminists and racialized feminists shared a 
common critique of the dominant feminist discourse imposed by white 
cis- feminists; however, this shared critique did not automatically translate 
into adequate practices of solidarity. There might always be an intersecting 
power relation, or a logic of resistance, that one might omit.22 But, maybe 
more importantly, Soraya stressed the need to apologize, asking for forgive-
ness, thereby revealing the deeply moral nature of the bond she aimed to 
preserve. The vision of coalition as mostly strategic, resting upon commu-
nicative ethics or on institutionalized norms of inclusivity, thus falls short of 
capturing what is at stake in coalition work.
These examples of coalitions between racialized feminists and white 
feminists, as well as among differently marginalized feminists, indicate that 
coalition is also a promise, a promise one must want to make and that one 
must try to keep. I want to argue that for this reason, coalition should not be 
presented as the solution to the problem of differences among women. The 
foreshadowing of coalition as the future of feminism is not satisfactory, de-
spite its endearing visual representation of feminism as a collective reuniting 
different identities in a common project. While coalition politics have proven 
to be, under the right circumstances, potent ways to organize across racial 
divides and across sexual orientation or class, I argue that coalitions are the 
product of already existing inclusive political practices, and of specific ethical 
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dispositions, rather than a mode of coalescing that could create new political 
and moral understandings. Indeed, in many contexts, coalition efforts fail, or, 
as the case of France suggests, a coalition is not even envisioned as a possible 
form for a common feminist subject. In a context in which representations of 
“good” and “bad” feminist subjects are radically entrenched and opposed, via 
processes of political subjectivation that reproduce feminist whiteness, coa-
lition is not thinkable, nor desirable, and cannot therefore provide a produc-
tive site to imagine a common feminist future. While we know from political 
science that successful coalitions are built on specific practices of inclusion 
and representation of minoritized groups within the coalition, what is left 
untold by this account is that, before any inclusionary practice may be put in 
place, feminists have to desire coalition in the first place.
The question then becomes, What are the moral dispositions that must 
be nurtured, learned, and practiced so that coalition becomes desirable? So 
that promises might be made? In this perspective coalition is the result of a 
successful moral and political endeavor. It is a promise that has been made. 
But what are the feminist moral dispositions that can sustain a desire for fem-
inism as a coalition, a recognition that feminists share common ground? This 
question directs us toward an investigation of the ethic of feminism. I now 
review different theoretical proposals that have attempted to delineate the 
ethical relations that should sustain the feminist project. A first proposal, 
elaborated by Brenda Lyshaug, is the development of “enlarged sympathy.” 
I  argue that this proposal, centered on self- investigation and imaginary 
projections onto other women’s experiences, is flawed for several reasons. 
I then turn to proposals by Iris Young and Linda Zerilli that both use Hannah 
Arendt’s concept of “enlarged mentality” as a principle that could, with some 
alterations, be fit for the purpose of sustaining a feminist collective project. 
I argue that while those proposals point to important issues, they fall short 
of offering the fully- fledged feminist ethic of responsibility that postsecular 
times and intersectional feminism demand.
A Self- Involved Ethics: Enlarged Sympathy
The insight that coalition cannot only be envisioned as strategic, but needs 
to be based on ethical self- practice, has been developed by Brenda Lyshaug 
in her account of the ethic of coalition building.23 I first review here her pro-
posal in favor of the cultivation of “enlarged sympathy” as a way to foster 
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coalition, and the feminist project more broadly. While I share Lyshaug’s ar-
gument that feminism is a moral project and therefore implies specific eth-
ical dispositions, I argue that “enlarged sympathy” is not the right candidate 
because it remains focused on the feminist subject, on feminism as grounded 
in a (wounded) identity.
Lyshaug critiques the strategic orientation of coalition building as femi-
nist practice, as well as the idea that what coalition building needs is more 
communicative action across differences. Indeed, Lyshaug argues that the 
question of coalition is not one of cognitive redress— that is, the need for 
more knowledge or for more equal and symmetrical communicative ac-
tion of the type promoted by Seyla Benhabib in her account of the “enlarged 
mentality,”24 as a way to reverse perspectives and enable deliberation across 
asymmetries of power. For Lyshaug, the problem is not one of cognitive 
failure, but one of identification and, therefore, emotions. To ensure inclu-
sion despite differences, Lyshaug contends that ethical self- practices pro-
moting tolerance of ambiguity and receptivity to what may seem threatening 
must be nurtured among feminists.25 She finds that what she calls “enlarged 
sympathy”— a disposition toward others that can sustain attentiveness and 
a sense of accountability and connection with others despite the fact that 
we do not identify with them— is an important complement to strategic ac-
counts of coalition.26 For Lyshaug, reflecting on accounts of failed sisterhood 
alliances during the US second wave, the main issue is that of identifying, 
ensuring a connection, without ever falling into the trap of imagining that 
one’s feelings and experiences are similar to others’, or that one can fully un-
derstand and experience the feelings of others. This concern rises from ac-
counts of appropriation of racialized women’s experience by white feminists, 
made possible not only by a cognitive failure— the lack of knowledge about 
racialized women’s concrete experiences— but also by a misplaced form of 
identification, for example, when white women believe they can understand 
and share racialized women’s suffering. Lyshaug’s aim is to make coalition 
possible without suppressing or denying differences; to promote sympathy 
and identification, which implies emotional relations, without pretending to 
abolish the distance that remains between one’s experience and others’.
This orientation shares some of the concerns raised by María Lugones 
that identities are not transparent but multiple, and thus that some degree 
of opacity always persists in any form of communication.27 Lyshaug’s con-
cept of enlarged sympathy, borrowed from Sandra Bartky and George Kateb, 
is supposed to achieve this trick of promoting feelings of sympathy, finding 
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connections with others, recognizing some of their experiences as shared 
with mine, while at the same time recognizing that they are different and 
therefore avoiding the illusion of transparent sisterhood. Lyshaug’s enlarged 
sympathy is therefore, first and foremost, an “introspective achievement.”28 
If Lyshaug calls this disposition an ethical one, it revolves mostly around the 
cultivation of specific feeling— openness to threat and ambivalence— and a 
focus on one’s identity, in order to learn to perceive it as multiple and chan-
ging rather than fixed. Indeed, only if identity is envisioned in this way can 
the “introjection of differences into the self,”29 which is necessary to find 
overlap with and sympathy toward others’ experiences, be realized. Lyshaug 
elaborates this proposal in the context of thinking about what could sustain 
inclusive coalitions that respect differences. However, if we agree that even 
feminist identity groups are, by nature, coalitional, because they also entail 
work across differences to build a common identity,30 this proposal can in 
fact be understood more broadly as that of a feminist ethics that can sustain 
any feminist project that acknowledges differences.
While I  agree with Lyshaug that a successful coalition, or an inclusive 
feminist project, needs more than an effort to ensure cognitive rectification, 
I remain unconvinced by her proposal to nurture “enlarged sympathy” as 
the solution to working across differences, especially in postsecular times. 
Indeed, while Lyshaug tries to find an ethical disposition, or rather emo-
tional attitudes, that could ensure sympathy without suppressing differences, 
the challenge today for coalition building is rather to find common ground. 
Differences are not suppressed; they are rather often posited as irreconcil-
able. Lyshaug wants to emphasize attentiveness to difference, so that empathy 
and sisterhood do not, deceptively, mean feeling like the other. She aims 
at ensuring sisterhood while recognizing that differences in positions and 
identities— and one would add, more importantly, in power— matter and 
shape experience. In the context of sexularism debates, what prevents coali-
tion building is rather the absence of acknowledgment that feminists might 
share common grounds. The discourses that police the borders of good and 
bad feminist subjects exclude from the feminist imagination specific fig-
ures with whom they do not particularly want to empathize. The exclusion 
of those abject subjects from the feminist imagination is often a premise of 
white feminists’ political subjectivation, making it difficult to imagine that 
sympathy may be nurtured to promote identification with them. Hence, 
while Lyshaug’s argument presupposes that one may desire to identify with 
other members of one’s group (i.e., women), across some internal differences 
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within this group, I question this very assumption, both as a credible account 
of feminist practice, and as a normative goal to pursue. As I underlined, there 
may not be any desire for coalition in the first place because separation from 
abject figures, rather than coalition with them, sustains some processes of 
political subjectivation as feminist. In these conditions Lyshaug’s focus on 
emotions and “imaginative impersonation”— to imaginatively enter into 
sympathy with others— may prove misguided because it cannot account for, 
nor instill, the desire to identify with subjects that have been, precisely, de-
fined as outside the perimeter of the good feminist subject.
Lyshaug uses the example of literature as a way to cultivate enlarged sym-
pathy with people and groups that have different experiences of oppression. 
But if one thinks of the vast literature that summons the image of “the op-
pressed Muslim woman,”31 the ambivalent uses of this fictional vehicle to ac-
cess experiences of oppression appear clearly. Indeed, this literature, based 
on the sharing of “authentic” narratives of oppression, reproduces stereo-
types about Muslim women’s specific plight as victims of their religion and 
their culture and presents their agency in reified ways. Doing so, they pre-
sent feminist ideals of emancipation as incompatible with cultural diversity 
and especially Islam.32 Rather than trouble the boundaries of “good” and 
“bad” feminist subjects, such a reading of the experience of oppression of 
“othered” women may indeed nurture enlarged sympathy, but only toward 
those Muslim women who fit the identity of absolute victim of patriarchy. 
Here enlarged sympathy might in fact reinforce the boundary between the 
good and the bad feminist subjects, instilling the conviction that Muslim 
women may either be absolute victims of their religion or adhere to Western 
feminist ideals and, if possible, reject their religious identities. More broadly, 
the strategy of enlarged sympathy poses the question of whose experience 
I shall try to enter into sympathy with. Are all experiences and all identities 
comparable and to be included in the feminist project? Are only experiences 
of oppression worth identifying with?
The ethical disposition proposed by Lyshaug is plagued with another 
problem, as it tends to suggest that, in fine, the feminist project revolves 
around an identity, that of women— and one might add, oppressed women. 
While it acknowledges that women may be oppressed in very different 
ways, the ethical disposition of enlarged sympathy is supposed to make 
possible connections between these experiences of oppression, without 
denying their different nature, degree, or content, as a precondition for 
feminist coalition. The focus on oppression as a prime locus of feminist 
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identity thus implicitly rests on a common identity; an imaginary sharing 
of experience that strives for commonality, defined as a partial overlap, 
fostered by enlarged sympathy, between a variety of experiences of op-
pression. This idea that the feminist project is in fact about sisterhood, 
forging a common identity and sharing a partial overlap in experiences of 
oppression— even while recognizing that there may be wide differences 
between these experiences— constitutes the feminist project mainly as 
an identity project. A last assumption central to this proposal seems mis-
placed. Indeed, Lyshaug presents these ethical dispositions as first and 
foremost an introspective achievement, that is, focused on a relationship 
of the self to the self. There are many good reasons to think that a feminist 
ethics based on such a form of solipsism cannot provide a fertile ground 
for a collective project in the postsecular context.
Zerilli’s Enlarged Mentality: Judgment and 
Feminist Ethics
Insights from the theoretical perspective elaborated by Linda Zerilli on fem-
inism as a political project can help us explore why an ethics based on self- 
investigation is misdirected. Indeed, Zerilli has provided a trenchant critique 
of the focus of feminist theory on the “subject” of feminism rather than on 
action.33 Promoting a conception of feminism that envisions it as a practice 
of freedom, rather than as an identity, Zerilli has argued convincingly that 
the wish to ground feminism in a common subject, “women,” comes with 
a cost of which we should be wary. This cost is, simply put, that of losing 
the potential of feminism as a project of world- building. Indeed, freedom, 
as Zerilli understands it following Hannah Arendt, is an I- can, rather than 
an I- am. The focus on identity and on the subject of feminism, a focus that 
implies that emancipation rests ultimately in a form of self- transformation of 
subjectivity (from oppressed victim to emancipated subject), is misleading 
because, for Zerilli, it ignores the fact that freedom is a relational creation, 
not the possession or property of the subject: “No subjective relation of the 
self to itself, freedom requires a certain kind of relation to others in the space 
defined by plurality that Arendt calls the ‘common world.’ ”34 Read in this 
light, Lyshaug’s proposal to direct ethical inquiry toward the self— to im-
prove one’s ability for imaginative impersonation— is misguided because it 
suggests that what needs to be salvaged and championed is some form of 
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common identity, and that feminist practice is mostly a practice of the self, 
centered on the transformation of subjectivity.
Zerilli’s call for a shift away from the “subject” question in feminism— and 
from the feminist subject— to embrace a conception of feminism as a practice 
of freedom is powerful. It implies that what feminism needs is not an iden-
tity but the capacity to make and hold promises. Indeed, following Arendt’s 
argument presented in The Human Condition, Zerilli affirms that to address 
plurality, irreversibility, and the uncertainty of the world, what we have are 
promises and forgiveness. What makes possible and helps sustain a political 
we, a political action carried out as a collective entity, is the recognition of 
what Arendt calls our common world, or “the world between us.”35 Failing to 
honor this promise of political recognition of what unites and separates us, 
which is not a promise or illusion that we share a common identity, is what 
dooms the feminist project. In this perspective, it is not a common identity 
that grounds feminism as a political project, but the “world- building practice 
of publicly articulating matters of common concern.”36
Zerilli’s account of feminism directs our attention away from identity to 
the question of “free relations” among feminist subjects. It defines feminism 
as a project of articulating claims in the public space, claims that will materi-
alize a collective political subject. The capacity to articulate those claims, so 
that they can be picked up by others, depends on the ability to exercise im-
agination and judgment. Here Zerilli draws on Arendt’s concept of enlarged 
mentality that presupposes that one thinks and sees from the standpoint of 
others, thus viewing the world from different perspectives and, as a result, 
being able to make judgments.37 Hence, the ethical disposition that corres-
ponds to Zerilli’s account of feminism is an enlarged mentality, understood 
as the ability that will ensure that my claims can materialize a political com-
munity. Indeed, if I do not engage in the exercise of enlarged mentality, in 
judging from the standpoint of others, then chances are that my claims will 
not be picked up by others. What is more, envisioning feminism as the polit-
ical process by which political claims may be picked up by others means that 
those I might enroll, or exclude, can always “speak back to me.”38 Hence, the 
enlarged mentality also presupposes that I consider other feminists as my 
interlocutors, and that I cannot in advance decide who will or will not be part 
of that political project.
In this account of the feminist project, enlarged mentality is thus a femi-
nist ethics in the service of building a political community. In Lyshaug’s ac-
count, enlarged sympathy is a feminist ethics in the service of changing my 
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own subjectivity, my relationship to myself, as a way to understand others, 
without identifying with them. Zerilli’s proposal, on the contrary, is about 
forging a collective subject in the public space. Her account of enlarged men-
tality revolves around Arendt’s conception of judgment. Rather than iden-
tification, or self- investigation, what she proposes is to develop an ability to 
judge differences between women. Indeed, Zerilli’s theoretical proposal is a 
response to the debate about “differences” between women and the threat 
those differences supposedly represent for the feminist project. Using 
Arendt’s vocabulary, Zerilli operates a shift from differences— understood 
as social differences— to plurality, which is both an ontological and a polit-
ical concept. Indeed, for Arendt there is no such thing as two objects occu-
pying the same position (ontological premise) and, for Zerilli, our points 
of view on the world will shape the political claims we make in the public 
space. With this shift, Zerilli denounces the idea that feminism is a project 
rooted in a common identity, which intersectional differences may put in 
peril. She argues on the contrary that plurality is the condition of any polit-
ical community and that, at the same time, “plurality is a political relation 
that is irreducible to empirical differences.”39 Empirical, identity- based or 
social differences are objects, while the relations we establish between these 
differences, through judging, form the political relations that are the basis of 
a political community. Zerilli argues that the enlarged mentality enables us 
to learn how to acknowledge and judge such differences among women.40
Judging politically is not deliberating in search of a rational argument that 
everyone will agree upon. For Zerilli, it is rather, as in aesthetic judgment, an 
act based in a subjective validity that implies quarreling with others. Judging 
is a rhetorical ability used to persuade others, a creative act that “projects 
words into a new context.”41 It is not the logic we use that will convince others 
and enable us to judge differences among us, but, rather, our ability to see 
from different perspectives. Seeing the world from different perspectives, 
we can imagine relations between objects, we can judge differences. Hence, 
recognizing or celebrating empirical differences is not what a feminist pro-
ject requires. What feminism requires is the continuous building of a public 
space defined by equality. This space is constructed by the repeated acts of 
judging our political differences, or quarreling, because only through this ac-
tivity can I discover with whom I am in community.42 In this ongoing pro-
cess of judging and quarreling, I recognize and I sustain the plurality that 
characterizes my community. The space in which I perform this judgment 
is marked by equality: I recognize others as interlocutors. This recognition 
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means that I cannot speak for others, and that I can always be spoken back to. 
There is, therefore, in Zerilli’s account a fundamental reciprocity in the polit-
ical relationship that the act of judging establishes.
Zerilli’s account of feminism as an I- can, sustained by a community de-
fined as a public space of equal participants, is invigorating. It proposes a 
radical alternative to the conception of feminism as a political project based 
on a shared identity, often reified to a politics of representation of othered 
women, being spoken for instead of spoken to. Zerilli’s approach echoes the 
discourses of racialized feminists in Quebec and France when they claim 
the recognition by white feminists that they share common ground. Being 
recognized as an interlocutor is a condition for feminist coalition politics. 
However, her account of enlarged mentality as a feminist ethics that can sus-
tain this feminist project needs to be complemented. Indeed, while Zerilli 
argues that enlarged mentality enables me to judge politically, and that em-
pirical differences do not matter, her insistence on discarding issues linked 
to identity or social differences— which, along with Arendt, she expels from 
the domain of the political— might prove problematic. Racialized feminists 
claim that common ground should be recognized, and they also demand 
that asymmetries of power, entrenched in social differences, be recognized 
as well. Zerilli seems to believe that a space of equals can be created by sheer 
political will, abstracting social differences from relationships. But this dec-
laration of will might also obscure concrete asymmetries of power and how 
they shape the political space, delimiting the boundaries of the community 
I pretend to make appear. How can I make sure that judging differences will 
not mean reenacting exclusions or erecting boundaries between those I rec-
ognize as similar to me and those that I deem different from me? If I am in-
deed asking with whom I am in community, if I am tracing the boundaries 
of a community of equals to whom I speak, am I not also excluding some 
participants from my community because the claims I make they cannot take 
up, or because, while they speak back to me, I am deaf to their voices?
Zerilli seems to presuppose that social differences will not matter in de-
termining who is part of my feminist political community, because what 
matters are the claims I make. If I develop an enlarged mentality, I will 
be able to make those claims in ways that make them resonate for others. 
This belief contrasts starkly with the description I have given of how white 
feminists’ claims may be emotionally attached to the preservation of white 
privilege, and therefore impossible to be picked up by racialized feminists. 
If a claim to gender equality is intimately linked to a claim that religious 
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belief or Islamic veiling practices are inherently oppressive to women and 
irreconcilable with gender equality, then it will not be picked up by reli-
gious women, who will be excluded from the political community these 
claims are supposed to create. While white feminists might develop an 
enlarged mentality when it comes to taking the standpoint of Muslim 
women as victims of their community’s patriarchy, they might be incapable 
of using an enlarged mentality to see the world from the points of view of 
Muslim feminists. As I have stated already, asymmetries of power structure 
feminists’ moral dispositions:  whiteness consolidates the moral bound-
aries erected between “good” and “bad” feminist subjects, and claims by 
white feminists that they embody the “good” feminist subject will be im-
possible to pick up for those very subjects they define as “bad.” I remain 
unconvinced that the capacity for enlarged mentality, as defined by Zerilli, 
will translate into the necessary self- critique of experiences and claims that 
privileged feminists must engage in.
What is more, Zerilli’s defiance vis- à- vis social identity is problematic 
for racialized feminists, or any other minoritized group mobilizing for a 
voice in the public space and for emancipation. Indeed, as Bruno Perreau 
underlines, reflecting on queer politics in Europe, “Minorities do not have 
the luxury of disavowing, once and for all, their sense of belonging.”43 The 
symmetry that Zerilli suggests exists between all the participants that build, 
through their claims, a political community thus ignores that we are not 
positioned similarly toward our social identities, and evades the question 
of power asymmetries within the political community that is being formed. 
This inattentiveness toward our different social ascriptions and belonging 
make Zerilli’s conception of enlarged mentality insufficient for the project 
of forging and sustaining equal moral bonds within feminism. There is no 
guarantee that the enlarged mentality proposed by Zerilli will destabilize 
the boundary between “good” and “bad” feminist subjects and provide a 
feminist community that is more inclusive. While her approach rejects 
founding the feminist project on a common identity, it does not question 
the concrete conditions under which an enlarged mentality can avoid repro-
ducing similar exclusions. How can an enlarged mentality be developed in 
the context of asymmetries of power? What does it mean to see the world 
from the others’ point of view when points of view are shaped by different 
and intersecting power relations? This question is all the more crucial to ask 
when it comes to the ability of those in positions of privilege to develop an 
enlarged mentality.
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Young’s Enlarged Thought: Asymmetries and Inclusion
Iris Young addresses this issue in her reflection on enlarged thought. Indeed, 
she notes that there is no such thing as taking the standpoint of someone 
else in a context in which social asymmetries characterize my relationship 
with that person. What is missing in the account that Zerilli provides of the 
enlarged mentality is specifically the questioning of the relation that exists 
between the participants. While she defines this relationship as one of polit-
ical equality, she glosses over the concrete inequalities that will also certainly 
define it. More careful to take into account the impact that social asymmet-
ries might have on moral and political relations, Young states that an en-
counter carries me beyond my own standpoint but “does not carry me into 
the standpoint of the other person.”44 For Young, we cannot pretend to re-
verse position or to grasp the other’s position because such a claim “neglects 
to conceptualize the relation between us.”45 While Zerilli suggests a form 
of symmetry in the moral and political relation forged through enlarged 
mentality— speaking to and being spoken to, in a context in which both 
interlocutors are considered equals— Young insists that there are no sym-
metrical positions in the world. She insists that “this idea of a symmetry in 
our relation obscures the difference and particularity of the other position,” 
and risks misrepresenting its claims. Second, she continues, “It is ontologi-
cally impossible for people in one social position to adopt the perspective of 
those in the social positions with which they are related in social structures 
and interaction.”46 Hence, while Zerilli suggested that we make judgment 
by being outside of ourselves, seeing the world from others’ points of view, 
Young is more careful in her assessment of the conditions under which 
enlarged thought can flourish, and indicates that for our moral claims to be 
valid we must not only take into account one another’s interests and claims, 
but also consider “the collective social processes and relationships that lie 
between us.”47
Young’s reflection on moral relations in the context of social asymmetries 
complicates Zerilli’s account of enlarged mentality. Young’s examples and her 
analysis suggest that her prime concern in critiquing the idea of symmetrical 
moral respect is her concern for asymmetries of power. She writes: “When 
privileged people put themselves in the position of those who are less priv-
ileged, the assumptions derived from their privilege often allow them un-
knowingly to misrepresent the other’s situation.”48 To address this situation 
of social asymmetry, Young argues that in interactive communication with 
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less privileged individuals, privileged ones might refrain from identification, 
preserve a form of distance, and adopt an attitude of moral humility. Wary of 
identification with individuals situated in different social positions, Young 
argues that communication is not about identification but rather a creative 
act through which, by listening and remaining open to difference, I might 
transcend my own experience and point of view. For Young, such an ideal 
and practice of communication as asymmetrical reciprocity will make it pos-
sible to build relations of solidarity or similarity. It will foster possibilities of 
agreement by recognizing the plurality of experiences without presupposing 
that we must share similar experiences or positions to understand each other.
Hence, Young’s response to the acknowledgment of power asymmetries 
structuring social relations is to promote a form of enlarged thought that is 
based on “respectful distancing”49 and moral humility, as well as “wonder” 
and “gift giving.” Indeed, Young argues that communication is always a gift; it 
is an opening up to the other person, and all the more so when social asym-
metries structure relationships. Gift giving is a way to recognize the creative 
dimension of communication, to enact the sense of wonder— pleasurable 
surprise in the face of difference— that Young is calling for to define com-
municative ethics. She complements this proposal in her book Inclusion 
and Democracy, where she argues that real democratic inclusion demands 
that social differentiation be acknowledged within theorization of com-
municative ethics and democratic deliberation. She underlines that despite 
formal presence, “internal exclusion” can affect minorities marked by social 
differences when they are formally participants in the debate, but in fact are 
not heard and feel excluded.50 She therefore proposes several types of com-
municative practices, such as greetings, that might counteract this informal 
exclusion. Hence, Young’s proposal for ensuring moral respect in the process 
of communication is both based on the nurturing of moral dispositions, such 
as wonder and humility, and on practical forms of address intended to reflect 
and nurture these moral dispositions, such as greetings or what she calls the 
“affirmative use of rhetoric,” which recognizes that emotions participate in 
communication and orient one toward her audience.51
Several of Young’s insights about communicative ethics can be recaptured 
to define a feminist ethics. Her vision of enlarged thought— which acknow-
ledges the asymmetries of positions— and the various modalities of commu-
nicating that she suggests can enhance it are, I think, more adequate than 
the enlarged mentality proposed by Zerilli, which tends to obscure power 
relations between feminists. Young elaborates her perspective on enlarged 
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thought in the context of reflecting on inclusive democratic deliberation. 
Deliberation within feminist movements could certainly benefit from 
Young’s insights. Indeed, Young’s proposal to define communicative ethics 
in a way that will not exclude the groups whose identities and interests have 
been historically represented as marginal, and who have been formally or 
informally excluded from deliberation, echoes important issues within con-
temporary feminist movements. Her insights on inclusive political commu-
nication are certainly useful to promote feminist coalition building across 
divides of race, class, or sexuality.
However, Young’s aim is to ensure democratic inclusion in order to reach 
fairer decisions. Hers is an issue of justice in societies marked by plurality, 
and she acknowledges that the style of communicative ethics she advocates 
will not make agreement easier to reach because it will multiply standpoints 
and enliven discussions.52 While feminism is also marked by plurality, and 
while many feminist organizations must reach decisions while ensuring the 
inclusion of the viewpoints of their internal minorities, the questions that 
have been raised in the context of sexularism debates are not mainly about 
reaching fair decisions. They rather point to the moral hierarchies and 
exclusions that are perpetrated in the name of feminism’s values, and to the 
challenge of sustaining a political community of equals in the name of femi-
nism. Young’s proposals may seem unable to address these issues. In partic-
ular, while she acknowledges asymmetries of power, the enlarged thought 
and wonder for which she advocates may seem inadequate to disestablish 
whiteness and its corrosive effects.
There is a tension perceptible in Young’s Inclusion and Democracy between 
taking into account asymmetries of power and providing a theory of moral 
respect that, in fact, places all agents in equal moral positions. A tension thus 
emerges between recognizing how social injustices and inequalities shape 
our moral world, and recognizing that they position us in different moral 
positions. The communicative tactics that Young artfully describes to en-
sure ethical communication across differences and asymmetries, such as gift 
giving or storytelling, do take into account the asymmetrical positioning of 
the participants. Indeed, Young’s aim is to provide narrative spaces for the 
voiceless, and to dissociate the powerful from the belief that her experience 
can be made universal or that she embodies a “view from nowhere,” situated 
above the particular experiences of concrete others. Hence Young’s proposals 
demonstrate that she is keenly aware of how our positions of belonging to 
minority or majority groups— to groups historically discriminated against 
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or groups that have been considered to embody the universal standpoint— 
situate us on different moral grounds, or at least in different locations from 
where to engage in democratic deliberation.
However, she does not suggest that these positions may assign us different 
moral responsibilities. While she pays attention to the relation that defines 
asymmetrical positions, emphasizing that because of that very relation 
I cannot pretend to “put myself in the shoes” of someone else, she does not 
infer that this asymmetrical relation may place different moral responsibili-
ties on its participants. For example, discussing asymmetrical reciprocity be-
tween white and Black American feminists in the context of the Anita Hill 
Supreme Court hearings in 1991, Young advises that white feminists should 
have approached the issue with caution and moral humility. She advocates 
a form of respectful distance, rather than moral responsibility, on the part 
of those who are privileged because of their lack of appreciation of the com-
plexity of intersectional marginalization. Young considers differences in 
standpoints important because they produce a more democratic and inclu-
sive discussion, because “having to be accountable to people from diverse so-
cial positions with different needs, interests, and experience helps transform 
discourse from self- regard to appeals to justice.”53 However, she disregards 
here the fact that these differences are the product of relations, placing some 
in positions of power over others. Those different needs and interests are rela-
tional and therefore antagonistic: the needs of the privileged are based on the 
denial of the needs of those who are oppressed by those very same privileges.
Both Zerilli and Young focus their ethical inquiry into enlarged thought 
on communication across difference. Zerilli addresses the issue from the per-
spective of political equality, insisting that, when making claims in the public 
space that can be picked up by others and act as bonds for a political com-
munity, I must accept being spoken back to and, importantly, that my claims 
convey this promise of hearing when spoken back to. Young argues, from the 
perspective of communicative ethics, that equal moral respect entails in fact 
moral wonder, moral humility, and a form of “gift” by opening up a conversa-
tion in which I am not sure the other will reciprocate.54 Here too, then, I will 
be spoken back to in terms I have not chosen and cannot anticipate.
But is a posture of wonder and gift enough to ensure moral bonds in a 
common political project? Can my agreement to be spoken back to prove 
sufficient in a context of deep asymmetries of power? How should the fact 
of being spoken back to actually affect me? Does my responsibility lie only 
in listening, or should I be responsible to act upon what has been said to me? 
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Feminist whiteness, understood as a position of privilege that sustains moral 
boundaries and exclusions from the feminist project, poses these questions 
with an acute intensity. Zerilli’s and Young’s proposals to develop enlarged 
mentality/ thought remain unsatisfactory for reflecting on the types of moral 
bonds that can build and maintain a political community across differences, 
and, in particular, a community in which whiteness, as a site of privilege and 
moral superiority, is disestablished. Whiteness is no mere difference of per-
ception or of position in the world. A property procuring rights and config-
uring expectations of entitlement, it structures privileges and dispossessions, 
supremacy and subjection.55 I explore now what a consideration of feminist 
whiteness as a form of political and moral wrong can bring to reflection on 
the features of a feminist ethic of responsibility.
Whiteness and the Denial of Relationality
I argue that asymmetries of power within feminism call not only for equal 
moral respect, or asymmetrical reciprocity, but also for a feminist ethic of 
responsibility, and that such an ethics may provide an important normative 
principle to foster moral bonds invigorating a critical feminist community. 
My argument here is twofold. I first argue that a feminist ethic of responsi-
bility must acknowledge relationality between feminists. Such an acknowl-
edgment provides an important lever to disestablish whiteness and the moral 
hierarchies it sustains. Second, in the next section I argue that a feminist 
ethic of responsibility must be understood not as a virtue or disposition one 
must nurture, a self- involved reflection, but rather as an activity, an instance 
of moral pragmatism.
First, let’s remember again the of racialized feminists in France and 
Quebec presented in the previous chapter. Their words aim to make white 
feminists both acknowledge common ground and recognize power inequal-
ities and their privileges. However, they find in many cases resistance to their 
demands. In particular, what I have described as feminist whiteness— a pro-
pensity to universalize one’s experience and position of privilege and to draw 
moral boundaries between deserving and undeserving feminist subjects— 
presents a site of resistance to the claims made by racialized feminists. This 
resistance is all the more pervasive because emotions and moral dispositions, 
such as anger, self- righteousness, and benevolence, sustain many feminists’ 
attachment to feminist whiteness. Hence, despite voicing their discontent, 
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grievances, and resentment, despite formulating their moral address toward 
white feminists, racialized feminists rarely experience being spoken back to 
on equal terms or having their discourse picked up by others. This does not 
mean their moral address always fails and their discourses always remain un-
heard. As the various examples of coalition I have given in this chapter and 
the preceding one show, white feminists sometimes act upon— respond to— 
the discourses that are being spoken back to them by racialized feminists. 
However, I am interested here in challenging and dislocating the resistance 
entrenched in feminist whiteness, and in arguing for the necessity to ac-
knowledge common ground as a prerequisite for a critical feminist project.
I analyze here feminist whiteness as driving a denial of the relationality 
that links white and nonwhite feminists, a denial of common ground. 
Feminist whiteness secures moral hierarchies between good and bad fem-
inist subjects, as well as the privileged embodiment of feminism by white 
feminist subjects. In doing so, feminist whiteness also operates a denial of 
relationality between feminist subjects across racial or religious divides. 
Not only do some white feminists question the very possibility that pious 
Muslim women can be feminists, they also reject vehemently any possible 
ties, any common ground with them. This denial of relationality is not spe-
cific to feminist whiteness. Indeed, it is in fact an important feature of racial 
privilege. Reflecting on how racial privilege is based on an epistemology of 
ignorance, Sarah Lucia Hoagland argues that “epistemological and ethical 
practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a denial of relationality.”56 
Hence racial privilege is based upon, and secured, by practices of ignorance 
about the life and material conditions of those who are oppressed by racial 
subjection. In order to sustain this ignorance and the privileges it secures, 
whites have an interest in denying that their existence is interdependent with 
that of those who are oppressed by racism. While our subjectivities are rela-
tionally formed, whiteness performs an erasure of that relationality when it 
comes to acknowledging interdependence with people of color. As Hoagland 
surmises:  “Whiteness doesn’t exist independently from engagements with 
people of color, even, or especially, if those engagements are white practices 
of erasure.”57
I have described the practices of erasure and marginalization of 
racialized feminists that characterize the discourses of some white 
feminists, and their role in securing feminist whiteness. Understanding 
these practices as performing acts of denial of relationality helps us to 
characterize their profoundly moral implications. Different issues are at 
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stake in these accounts of whiteness that deny relationality with racialized 
feminists. One is ethical violence; the other is a moral posture that iden-
tifies feminism with whiteness and prevents the advent of an ethic of 
responsibility. One of the discursive repertoires sustaining feminist white-
ness that I have described in  chapter 4 uses the supposed universality of 
gender oppression to minimize the pervasiveness of racial oppression, or 
to justify ignoring it for the sake of political efficiency. This appropriation 
of universality can be defined, following Judith Butler’s reading of Adorno, 
as a form of ethical violence. Drawing on Adorno, who “uses the term vi-
olence in relation to ethics in the context of claims about universality,”58 
she affirms that if an ethos based on universality “ignores the existing 
social conditions which are also the conditions under which any ethics 
might be appropriated, that ethos becomes violent.”59 In other words, vi-
olence resides in discursive operations that render it impossible for some 
groups to appropriate universality. While Butler is more concerned about 
individual ethical formation, her reflection illuminates some of the eth-
ical stakes of feminist whiteness. By associating whiteness and gender 
universality, feminist whiteness performs a form of ethical violence. 
Furthermore, beyond the question of the appropriation of universality, 
there is, more broadly, ethical violence in the nonrecognition of race as a 
system of racial subjection and in the nonrecognition of white privilege.
However, as I described earlier, feminist whiteness is not always predi-
cated upon the appropriation of universalism, or on the denial of racism as 
a structure of power. More often, feminist whiteness hinges on the drawing 
of moral boundaries that expel “bad subjects” from the feminist community. 
While some white feminists may define themselves as antiracist activists and 
act upon that political claim, they may simultaneously perform exclusions, 
denying other feminists— or other women— the possibility of claiming 
themselves feminists, portraying them as improper feminist subjects in 
need of regulation. Analyzing this moral impulse as a denial of relationality 
with racialized feminists can help us trace its moral implications and delin-
eate an alternative moral account, based on a feminist ethic of responsibility. 
Indeed, to borrow the words of psychologist Pascale Molinier, “Any of us can, 
if she wants to, understand,”60 meaning, here, be attentive to the language 
of the other: I can choose to know or not to know. I can decide to focus my 
sustained attention on what will become of the young girls wearing a veil 
who are expelled from public school, or not to do so. Of course, as Molinier 
underlines with others ethicists of care, “Our responsibility is always limited 
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or restricted by its context; but no position of exteriority is legitimate, we 
cannot leave the world.”61
Relationality and Responsibility
Relational accounts of morality, such as those developed by Veena Das62 or 
Joan Tronto,63 ground the moral character of our actions in the social and 
relational nature of our lives and humanity. All these approaches, whether 
they define themselves as theories of care or ethics of the ordinary, place 
(inter)dependency and vulnerability at the heart of human life, and there-
fore at the center of moral relations.64 Both Das and Tronto draw on an in-
tellectual tradition, represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, 
that conceives morality as grounded in our concrete existence, our form of 
life. This tradition recognizes that our humanity and subjectivity exist only 
through the form of life to which they belong. Our voices, as subjects, exist 
because of language, which is “an inherited form of life.”65 Hence, as Sandra 
Laugier affirms, “The voice is both a subjective and a general expression: it 
is what makes it possible for my individual voice to become shared.”66 Here 
the interdependency between the individual and the context, a form of life, 
appears clearly. My very sense of being a subject depends on a language, a 
form of life, which is by definition collective. Theories of care and relational 
accounts of morality are thus attentive to ordinary life, to what makes pos-
sible the perpetuation of a life form, to concrete others and to their needs, 
always specific, and to the moral emotions and feelings they elicit in us. Far 
from grand theories of justice, an ethics of care concentrates on the moral 
implications of recognizing that we share a life form, that we share common 
ground.
In these relational and contextual accounts of morality,67 how I  re-
late to otherness is central in defining the moral nature of my actions and 
feelings. Joan Tronto, for example, starts her reflection in Moral Boundaries 
by stressing that the question of “what our relationship with other people 
who are close and distant should be” and “the need to be attentive to viewing 
others’ circumstances in a whole context”68 are the crucial questions for 
moral inquiry. Such a statement is not a repetition of otherness as differ-
ence. Rather, to reflect on our moral relations with others is to reflect on the 
form of life we share with them. This appears clearly in Veena Das’s account 
of morality, which also places concrete others at the heart of moral inquiry. 
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Rejecting accounts of morality that place its locus inside the subject, Das 
explains: “If the ethical subject here is the set of relations rather than an in-
dividual who is the locus of decision, then a moral life is crafted as much 
out of the affective force of an attunement to this other who is not wholly 
other. . . . The paths to a moral life do not lie here in either rule following or 
in taking recourse to technologies of self- making but rather in the attentive-
ness through which one ties one’s own fate to that of the other.”69 For Das, 
our moral response to others— for example, to their pain— which we identify 
not primarily thanks to cognitive reasoning but rather through the feelings 
it elicits, this response that I observe in myself, “reveals what stakes I have in 
our lives together.”70 Moral feelings are therefore crucial because they remind 
me that I share common ground with others and that this common ground 
obliges me: I have stakes in this common life. Refusing to acknowledge this 
common ground, denying relationality, is therefore a form of moral wrong. 
It is a moral wrong in the broad or general sense that doing so is to refuse re-
sponsibility for my relationships with others, and to strip them of their voice. 
Das expresses this idea when she states: “Not trusting the words of the other 
is in effect a lack of trust in the other and in our mutual capacity to have a fu-
ture together.”71
Sandra Laugier suggests, in the same vein, that, since we share language as 
a life form, when I refuse to accept the words of others, I am also depriving 
them of their voice. She asks: “If my society is my expression it should also 
allow me to find my voice. But is this really the case? If others stifle my voice, 
speak for me, I will always seem to consent. One does not have a voice, one’s 
own voice. It must be found so as to speak in the name of others and to let 
others speak in one’s name. For if others do not accept my words, I lose more 
than language: I lose my voice.”72 We hear echoes of Linda Zerilli’s analysis 
of the role of feminist claims in constituting a political community. Relying 
on Wittgenstein and the idea that we must always project words into new 
contexts, Zerilli also emphasizes that feminists make claims that must be 
picked up by others in order to constitute a community. For these claims to be 
picked up by others, she proposes that feminists nurture enlarged mentality 
so as to be able to see the world from others’ points of view. However, in her 
view, if my claims are not picked up by others, it is because I did not articulate 
them in a way that responds to their situation or that meets their judgment 
of the world. Laugier’s account differs here because she stresses that claims 
might not be picked up not only because our judgments of objects differ 
but also because my claim, as the expression of my voice, is not recognized, 
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because my words are not accepted. And this, she insists, constitutes a moral 
wrong, because I, or you, will be deprived of my/ your voice. Hence, denying 
common ground, denying relationality, constitutes a moral harm.
Having said so, the question remains of how we should acknowledge 
relationality and common ground in the context of feminism. With whom 
am I in community in such a way that that person can lay claims on me and 
that I  must acknowledge common ground with her? Because they focus 
on how we relate to others, and on how this relationality should shape our 
moral lives, relational accounts of morality seem to be a well- suited entry 
point into the question of how to delineate a feminist ethic of responsibility. 
Recognizing that we share common ground means that we let this common 
ground lay a claim on us, that of recognizing “what stakes I have in our lives 
together,” to use again Das’s words. Relationality implies here a reciprocal 
responsibility (which does not mean that it is symmetrical), of one toward 
another because we share common ground. If feminism is our common 
ground, because we have come to give an account of ourselves as feminists, 
therefore laying a claim on other feminists and accepting that they can lay 
claims on us, what type of responsibility does this political project, and the 
political community it proposes to constitute, imply?
In exploring this question, Joan Tronto’s ethic of care provides impor-
tant insights. Indeed, it understands morality and moral responsibility as 
shaped by and embedded in a social and political context. It does not shy 
away from acknowledging power and, rather, proposes to conceptualize how 
the political context and the power asymmetries it produces must be incor-
porated into how we think about moral responsibility.73 This premise has 
two implications. For one, care is not only about our relationships with those 
we care for in an intimate and personal way. Care, as an “ethical practice of 
making complex moral judgment”74 that implies attentiveness, responsi-
bility, competence, and responsiveness, can— and Tronto claims, should— 
also be understood as a political idea. She argues that “the practice of care 
describes the qualities necessary for democratic citizens to live together well 
in a pluralistic society, and that only in a just, pluralistic, democratic society 
can care flourish.”75 This approach makes her ethic of care particularly suited 
for reflecting on a feminist ethic of responsibility.
The second implication of Tronto’s premise that the moral and the polit-
ical cannot be separated is a proposal to acknowledge power asymmetries 
in terms of differential responsibilities. Similarly to Iris Young’s cautious re-
minder that we cannot put ourselves in the shoes of others, only meet them 
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halfway, Tronto insists that we cannot project our morality onto others 
without any consideration for the context in which they are situated. Hence, 
while her ethic of care recognizes, and is predicated upon, the fact that 
humans share an ontological position of interdependency— a premise shared 
also, for example, by Butler’s ethical proposal based on the precariousness of 
life— Tronto’s approach to the ethic of care is not confined to this ontological 
claim but articulates it with the political and social differences produced by 
the social world, differences that bring us closer together or further away, 
differences that give us power over others or place us in positions of vulnera-
bility to others’ power.
This approach thus complexifies our understanding of the moral claims 
that an ethic of care lays on us, depending on the context in which we respond 
to the moral questions that our political relationship with others asks of us. 
In this vein, Tronto states: “To make simple applications of moral precepts 
to another’s situation as if none of the constraints of power within which 
people’s lives should affect our moral judgments, results in moral thought 
that is ultimately unresponsive to the genuine lives and moral concerns of 
‘others.’ ”76 Power asymmetries therefore demand different types of respon-
siveness and attentiveness to others. While Tronto shares with Young the 
idea that we must be attentive to power asymmetries and, therefore, that we 
cannot assume that others will share our moral judgments, Tronto is not in-
terested in remedying this social distance, and this power imbalance, thanks 
to enlarged thought or wonder. Rather than exploring how we must nurture 
certain moral and affective qualities in order to empathize with or under-
stand others, she insists that what these asymmetries imply is rather a crit-
ical reflection toward our own position and what specific responsibility it 
entails. Indeed, she underscores that social privilege translates as “privileged 
irresponsibility”;77 that is, that those who are privileged usually don’t have to 
care: denial of relationality is also a denial of responsibility. On the contrary, 
she argues that privileges should entail more responsibility to care, a state 
of moral engagement rather than a condition of detachment or of denial of 
relationality and responsibility.
How and when should we be responsible to care? How and when do our 
relationships entail the responsibility for caring for others, or for working to 
redress injustices that affect them? Both Iris Young and Joan Tronto propose 
some reflections on this issue. Considering both that relationality entails re-
sponsibility, and that care— as a complex form of moral judgment— must 
be placed in its political and social context, means that, to borrow Tronto’s 
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expression, moral responsibility is relational.78 It will vary depending on 
the relations at stake. The relational conception of responsibility that Tronto 
advocates for shares important premises with Iris Young’s social connection 
model of responsibility, which argues that all agents who participate in one 
way or another in structural processes leading to injustice have a respon-
sibility to work to remedy it.79 Indeed, both conceptions of responsibility 
rest on the idea that what connects us, the relationships we nurture with 
others— partial or extensive and through different mediums, such as kinship, 
practices, environment, institutions, projects— defines the type of responsi-
bility that we will have to consider and the nature of the demands to which 
we must respond.80
However, how can we find out what type of relation implies what type of re-
sponsibility? In order to do so, both theorists explore different venues. Young 
insists on analyzing and taking into account the position of the moral agent, 
in terms of power, resources, and capacities to contribute to social change 
and to redress injustice.81 For a feminist ethic of responsibility this is obvi-
ously a very important principle. Positions of power, within the movement 
and within organizations, imply access to resources, and therefore a privi-
leged position to address situations of injustice within the movement. They 
should therefore also lead to a greater responsibility to do so. An example 
might be, in Quebec, the way that the province- wide federation for women’s 
rights (the FFQ) took responsibility for carrying out a survey of racialized 
women’s positions (their share and their status as officers or volunteers and 
the according salaries) within feminist organizations in the province. On 
the basis of this survey the federation suggested giving priority to racialized 
women in hiring processes in feminist organizations.
Joan Tronto provides another perspective on how to decide what type 
of relationship leads to what type of responsibility, which can complement 
Young’s proposal and help delineate a feminist ethic of responsibility. She 
proposes to “measure” responsibility by evaluating the harm done by irre-
sponsibility. Indeed, she notes: “From a relational approach, it is not simply 
the agent’s voluntarism, or the strength of the causal chain, but the conse-
quence of acting irresponsibly that determines the degree of harm that 
comes from irresponsibility. Some elements become more important in 
assessing the harm of irresponsibility. For example, the imbalances of power 
in relationships.”82 Assessing the nature of a relationship, and its concomi-
tant responsibility, through the notion of the harm done by irresponsibility 
in the context of such a relationship draws attention to the fact that it is the 
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quality of the relationship that produces a moral obligation, not the formal-
istic nature of this relationship. Tronto here takes an example from Marilyn 
Friedman: kinship in itself may not entail responsibility; the quality of the 
relationship with a family member will determine the type of responsibility 
brought about by kinship. Of course, power impacts the quality of the rela-
tionship, in particular because it means that some actions might have dif-
ferent consequences for both parties to the relationship. The Islamic veil is 
a good example. Feminist discourses in favor of veiling bans claim to rep-
resent the interests of all women, thereby creating a moral relationship be-
tween them. Nevertheless, when non- Muslim women favor a ban on Muslim 
headscarves, they will not bear the direct consequences of their action, while 
Muslim women will. Hence, the harm that irresponsibility brings with our 
actions is an important guide, in that it is also an indication of the quality of 
the relationship. In particular, for Tronto, it indicates the power imbalances 
that structure this relation. Power brings privilege and the possibility of 
irresponsibility.
A Feminist Ethic of Responsibility: Caring 
for Feminist Subjects
Now, thinking about the quality of the relationship and the harm done by 
irresponsibility, and bringing this discussion back to the question of a femi-
nist ethic of responsibility, I argue that we need to complement the accounts 
proposed by Iris Young and Joan Tronto if we want to characterize what in 
the nature of the feminist project creates a relationship, the nature of this re-
lationship, and the responsibilities it entails. Critics of the relational account 
of responsibility argue that we do not choose the relationships we are drawn 
into, or at least most of them, especially those that connect us to distant 
others, such as markets, institutions, or national communities.83 This cri-
tique does not hold for the responsibilities that arise from our commitment 
to feminism. We choose to give an account of ourselves as feminists— and 
indeed many people choose not to do so. There is here a commitment not 
only to a political ideal, but also to the political community that may embody 
this ideal.84 By claiming to speak in the name of women, we might imagine 
that we are representing all women, and that the political relationship that 
defines our feminist commitment is one of political representation. Thus, 
the claim to speak “in the name of women” does carry some political and 
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moral responsibility. Indeed, imagining oneself as representing other women 
is, to a certain extent, to make a promise to care about other women. The 
promise to care can manifest itself in weak ways, such as feeling affected by 
other women’s plight, reacting to their pain, or voicing concern about them. 
It can take a deeper form if I see myself as representing the interests of other 
women; I need then to take an interest in their lives, and I make a promise 
that I will represent them— their identities and their interests. Hence, under-
stood as a classic relationship of political representation, feminism already 
carries moral responsibilities to care about other women.
However, this conception of feminism— as producing relationships of 
political representation that would entail specific types of responsibilities, 
similar to those of a spokesperson or a political representative— is, I think, 
inadequate, both to describe the reality of the political community created 
by the feminist project, and to reflect on the type of moral relationships fem-
inism gives rise to. While this conception may capture some types of fem-
inist activism, especially in its encounter with institutions, bureaucracies, 
and international organizations, it does not apprehend the experiences 
of the grassroots feminist activists I  encountered, nor the subjectivities 
and moral relations described in many well- known feminist narratives 
retracing solidarity and conflicts among feminists.85 I have argued that to 
give an account of oneself as a feminist is the result of a process of political 
subjectivation, which entails deep moral and political connections, both 
to the subject herself— identifying as a feminist, adhering to a set of beliefs 
and transforming one’s subjectivity according to them— and to the collec-
tive subject, the political community, created by feminism. The emotional 
attachment to feminism as a collective political project that I have described 
thoroughly in the preceding chapters suggests a specific quality of the rela-
tionship that feminists may entertain with feminism as a collective project, 
and with the political community that may embody it in the context in which 
they are situated. This quality is not adequately expressed by the under-
standing of this relationship as one of political representation. In claiming to 
speak in the name of women, or in adhering to feminism as a political com-
munity, I make a promise, a promise not only to care about other women, but 
also to care about other feminists, to care about the political community that 
defines itself through this project.
Relational accounts of morality distinguish relationships, and the moral 
obligations they give rise to, depending on their nature. Not all relations will 
imply moral obligations. Soran Reader cites various grounds for relationships 
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that give rise to moral obligations: presence (if some stranger collapses in 
front of me, I shall help), biology (as creating kinship), history (intertwining 
of lives over time), practices, environment, institutions, play, and conversa-
tion all provide grounds of different nature for different moral obligations.86 
Reader also cites “shared projects” among the relationships creating some 
type of moral obligation. Feminism can be understood as a shared project, 
giving rise to moral obligations for its participants. How does a political com-
munity such as feminism qualify in specific ways the relationships among its 
members, and what are the responsibilities it may give rise to? While his-
tory and historical legacies, such as those of colonialism or historical femi-
nist struggles, certainly qualify the relationships that feminists may sustain 
among themselves, the promise that binds them, the promise to care about 
feminism as a collective project, also gives to these relationships a specific 
quality. Hence if, following Tronto, we must define the quality of the rela-
tionship that defines moral obligation, I argue that, with respect to feminists, 
it is the promise, a promise to care for other feminists as equals and for the 
collective project of feminism, that binds this political community together 
and that obligates feminists toward one another. Any discussion among 
feminists inevitably revolves around not only the right strategies to achieve 
specific goals, or the rights goods or ends to fight for (sexual safety or sexual 
freedom, equality or autonomy, etc.), but also the future of the feminist pro-
ject. Feminists voice a care for the future of their project, which denotes or 
expresses the quality of feminism as a political community. This commu-
nity is an exercise in political imagination. It can stretch to the size of the 
globe, but it is also always embodied in the very concrete relationships that 
feminists sustain among themselves in a specific context. Most importantly, 
this community matters for feminists, and connects them.
Caring for the feminist project is also expressed in the dismay, trouble, 
bitterness, or sorrow expressed by those feminists who feel that feminism 
is in peril, or that their political community, and the project it embodied, 
has disappeared. Hence the emotional attachment to feminism that I have 
described in the preceding chapters suggest that giving an account of oneself 
as a feminist is to claim to be part of a political community, to acknowledge 
that feminism matters to one’s life, and, subsequently, to make a promise 
that one will care about this community. Of course, as I have shown, who 
is supposed to be included in this community in practice, who can legiti-
mately embody the feminist subject, is a site of conflicts and competing 
moral evaluations. Nevertheless, aside from these conflicts— to which I will 
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return promptly— there is a common drive, what de Lauretis called “the 
ethical drive in feminism,”87 to be recognized by others as a feminist and to 
recognize them as such. From this drive a relationship is constituted, which 
entails responsibilities: first and foremost the responsibility to care, not only 
for women, but also, and more importantly, for other feminists. I cannot de-
cide in advance who will be part of this community, and I am morally obliged 
toward those whose claims relate them to me through feminism.
Is this care the one described by care theorists? I would like to defend 
the idea that the care that we can place at the center of a feminist ethic of 
responsibility has a strong family resemblance with the care that is tradi-
tionally the object of care theorists’ reflections. Tronto defines the values 
of caring as attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, and 
meeting others’ needs.88 In the context of feminism as the relationship that 
binds together a political community, attentiveness and responsibility cer-
tainly should be part of a feminist ethics. Nurturance and compassion may 
invoke sorority- like images that have been, for good reasons, criticized as 
the wrong metaphors to define relationships among feminists, metaphots 
which have erased power asymmetries within feminist communities. For 
Tronto, because an ethic of care should be attentive to particularity, it does 
not posit a “false sense of community or of identity among people within 
a community,”89 so that nurturing and compassion do not imply an em-
phasis on commonality over differences. However, attentiveness to partic-
ularity is difficult to enact in the context of relations defined by a common 
political project such as feminism, because these relations are, more often 
than not, relations with distant others, and the particularity of their situ-
ation will not always be properly grasped. What is more, defining a fem-
inist ethic of responsibility as centered on compassion may miss the very 
political nature of the feminist project. Linda Zerilli has proposed a useful 
distinction— drawn from Hannah Arendt’s critique of the displacement of 
the political by the social— between feminism as a project of taking care 
of a social question (i.e., meeting women’s needs) and feminism articu-
lated as a political community, which is the product of a world- building 
activity. While compassion may certainly be, in certain contexts, a moral 
force engaged in the building of a political community, I argue that it may 
not be the case for a feminist ethics. Feminism as a political project should 
not be defined around meeting needs, but rather should be defined from 
the perspective of the community it aims to create, the transformation it 
may bring to our lives.
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How could this be translated in moral terms? I draw here a connection be-
tween Joan Tronto and Veena Das that can help specify the contours of a fem-
inist ethic of responsibility. Indeed, Tronto comments that “caring requires 
that one starts from the standpoint of the one needing care or attention. It 
requires that we meet the other morally, adopt that person’s, or group’s, per-
spective and look at the world in those terms.”90 The question of adopting 
a person’s or group’s perspective, or meeting it halfway, has been discussed 
when I elaborated on the notion of “enlarged mentality.” It is often presented 
as an exercise of imagination, a demand to change one’s subjectivity. This 
subjective account is challenged by an analysis made by Soraya. She remarks 
about the FFQ, of which she is a member:
I am at pains to see more diversity than in this organization, but it does 
not mean that it translates into [changes in how the organization addresses 
racial issues]  .  .  . The members have not integrated, in their institutions, 
in their . . . practices. There is great resistance and a big emotional charge 
linked to this idea that we are trying to make them feel guilty, that they have 
no lesson to learn from anybody. . . . They refuse the political conscious-
ness that the movement is proposing to them, especially when it comes to 
Muslim women who continue to feel attachment to their culture of origin, 
their religion, their headscarf, etc.
Here we find several elements already discussed in previous chapters:  the 
interweaving of political, moral, and emotional issues when it comes to de-
fining the parameters of who should be included in the feminist project, and 
the perpetuation of white ignorance thanks to a posture of moral superiority, 
articulated with a rejection of responsibility through a rejection of guilt. 
Notable in this quotation is the nature of Soraya’s demand to white feminists 
who resist their own organization’s attempts to elaborate an inclusive dis-
course. She is critical about white feminists’ refusal to include, or to adopt, 
a certain political consciousness. She is not looking for compassion or for her 
needs to be understood. Rather, it is the very political nature of her claims, as 
claims that could foster and found a political community inclusive of Muslim 
women, that she wants to be heard and adopted by white feminists. In that 
sense, she is asking for what Veena Das describes as the ethical activity of 
“creating a space of possibility for the other.”91 I interpret Soraya’s words as a 
call to include in the life of the feminist political community “some aspects 
of the life of the other.”92 What is more, this space of possibility for the other 
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is one in which that other is considered an equal, a space that creates equal 
relationships, as Soraya’s rejection of the idea, latter in her interview, that she 
could join the “common table” as a “little sister” clearly states.
Creating this “space of possibility” should therefore be an important ele-
ment of a feminist ethic of responsibility, one of the ethical activities through 
which caring for feminism as a political project and a political community is 
enacted, a way to make the promise that Hannah Arendt deems necessary for 
a political community to be constituted.
Caring for Women / Caring for Feminist Subjects: A 
Feminist Politics of Emotions
Thinking about a feminist ethic of responsibility as a moral obligation to 
create this space of possibility for the other in the political community cre-
ated by feminism enables us to draw a distinction between a feminist ethic 
as caring for other women, and as caring for potential feminist subjects. 
This distinction encourages us, I  contend, to critically examine common 
feminist politics of emotions, and to nurture specific emotions and moral 
dispositions. When discussing feminist whiteness in  chapter 4, I contrasted 
the attitudes of some white feminist volunteers in women’s rights organiza-
tions toward racialized women when the latter are considered as benevolent 
objects of care, and when they are considered as potential feminist subjects. 
The distinction I want to draw now, from an ethical point of view, between 
caring for other women and caring for other feminists as members of a po-
litical community elaborates on the distinction between these two different 
moral dispositions. Indeed, I  argue that caring for other women, a moral 
disposition that is prevalent in the relationship that many (white) feminist 
volunteers and activists create with women who benefit from the services 
of their organization, may prove misguided. Indeed, more often than not, 
that caring does not take into account that the women that feminists intend 
to care about are distant others who look like them, to borrow Joan Tronto’s 
words: the distance and the power asymmetries that structure the relation-
ship with them tend to be ignored in the very name of the care that feminists 
want to express. Hence, distant “othered” women are made to embody spe-
cific qualities, often revolving around their need for help and vulnerability, 
that reproduce power asymmetries, as well as the injunction for the power-
less to address the powerful in the terms set by the latter.
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Caring for other women who are in fact more often than not distant others 
is a perilous exercise in some contexts: for example, when feminists do not 
know enough about the context of these distant others’ lives and moral 
concerns, or when they may have difficulty in discerning the terms in which 
the powerless express their claims, because the powerless might not have a 
recognized voice or access to public discourse.93 What is more, the emotions 
that sustain the moral disposition to care for distant other women may prove 
misguided for critical and reflexive feminist politics. Postcolonial feminist 
theorists have largely documented and criticized the posture of benevo-
lence and the emotions that sustain it as deeply embedded in postcolonial 
representations of the “Other.”94 Indeed, distant others are imagined, rather 
than encountered, and emotions such as compassion and benevolence, not 
rooted in actual relations, may evaporate if and when distant others reveal 
themselves to be different from the “good” subject that was imagined.
The ability to properly care for other women, as a specific feminist moral 
responsibility, will therefore depend both on distance and on the capacity 
of feminists to reflect upon power asymmetries. This is evident when com-
paring the discourses of feminists who work in grassroots organizations 
that provide services to women and feminists who do mostly lobbying work 
and are more remote from the field. Indeed, feminists who, through their 
volunteering or work, actually encounter racialized and othered women dis-
play a texture of attentiveness to the context of the women they encounter 
that leads them to moral reasonings that are much more complex. They 
evaluate their own political beliefs in the light of the concrete situations of, 
for example, young girls asking for a certificate of virginity in order to sat-
isfy their family’s inquiries or to be able to marry when in fact they are not 
virgins. In these instances of concrete encounters, feminists can care more 
appropriately in feminist terms because the distance has been reduced and a 
singular voice has been heard. What is more, the professional ethos of femi-
nist volunteers and workers is also often characterized by a commitment to 
respect a woman’s choice. This ethical attitude can avoid, to a certain extent, 
reproducing power asymmetries.
However, to adequately care in these feminist interventions, one would 
also need to critically and systematically engage with whiteness in order to 
contribute to disestablish hierarchies. These moral dispositions that do enact 
a certain form of care within a relationship of service to women contrast 
with the discourses of feminist activists who have much fewer opportunities 
to encounter distant others. In the context of this type of lobbying, claims 
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to care for other women may display the pitfalls I have described— that is, 
relying on certain accounts that better fit their moral views, such as that of 
“oppressed Muslim women,” instead of relying on more complex accounts 
of distant others’ forms of life to elaborate their judgments. Feminists may 
then end up “caring” for other women by ignoring their moral perspectives 
altogether.
Another point that makes caring for other women an inadequate principle 
for a feminist ethic of responsibility is that it does reiterate a foundationalist 
perspective about feminism, reinscribing the subject of feminism in a shared 
identity, women. Defining a feminist ethic of responsibility as caring for 
women thus fails to take into account the call to remain critical about iden-
tity categories and their exclusionary effects.
For all these reasons, I argue in favor of shifting our moral focus away 
from caring for other women as the basis for a feminist ethic of responsi-
bility. However, by critiquing the moral disposition of caring for women as 
central to a feminist ethics and to feminists’ political subjectivations, I do 
not want to suggest that feminists should be disengaged from other women. 
Especially with respect to privileged feminists, this would amount to a form 
of moral irresponsibility. However, I want to emphasize that in the case of 
feminism, caring must be specified and nuanced. It cannot be about meeting 
what are perceived to be the needs of other women, and it must be able to ac-
knowledge that often women are distant others. The very category that is the 
object of care, women— perceived as distant others who look like us— must 
also always be critically appraised. Hence, I would rather scale down, in the 
case of a feminist ethics, the substantial content of care toward other women, 
defining it as a form of attention, interest, and responsibility toward other 
women (but not exclusively women), rather than as an ability to adopt other 
women’s perspectives and to meet their needs.
More importantly, I argue that the subject of attention for a feminist ethic 
of responsibility should not be first and foremost women, but rather other 
feminist subjects: those who give an account of themselves as such and claim 
their rights to participate equally in this political community, and those who 
we imagine could do so as well, those who are put in relation with us through 
feminism. Articulating the political and the ethical in the framework of fem-
inism, I argue that creating a space of possibility for the other, within the polit-
ical community created by feminism, is the appropriate way to care about other 
feminists, and a defining principle for a feminist ethic of responsibility that 
takes into account power asymmetries. Indeed, creating a space of possibility 
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does not imply that I can see the world from the other’s perspective. Rather, 
it is about finding room within one’s own moral and political space to ac-
commodate the other’s perspectives and discourses, all the more so if the 
other is less privileged. Such a form of care, geared toward other feminists 
rather than other women, opens up a space for political action, without the 
need to found the feminist project on an identity category. I thus argue that 
we must distinguish between the responsibility that feminists must assume 
when they claim to politically represent women’s needs and interests (a duty 
for attentiveness and interest, and a responsibility to take into account power 
asymmetries and the limits of one’s ability to meet distant others’ needs), and 
the feminist ethic of responsibility that must preside over their relationships 
with other feminist subjects, and which aims at creating a space of possibility 
for these others within the feminist political community. I also argue that a 
political and moral focus on the first type of responsibility should be replaced 
by a focus on the second type of moral responsibility I have defined.
That the ethic of feminism is primarily oriented toward other feminists, un-
derstood as those women who are, in a certain context, at a certain time, put 
in relation with feminism and feminist claims, is beautifully illustrated by the 
name of a coalition in Turkey between LGBT feminists and religious Muslim 
women that formed in 2010 and is recounted by Eirini Avramopoulou. 
Indeed, this context- based coalition, which stretched way beyond the usual 
feminist politics to encompass pious Muslim women who did not define 
themselves as feminists, but considered themselves to be victims of state pa-
triarchy, and radical feminist and LGBT groups, called itself We Care about 
One Another. Most of the coalition’s effort was then geared toward finding, 
in a pragmatic fashion, the right way to care for one another across the divide 
of political positions and religious identifications.95
I also illustrate the idea that a feminist ethic of responsibility is oriented 
toward caring for other feminist subjects/ subjects put in relation with/ by 
feminism with the question of abandonment. Reflecting upon the type of 
moral harm that results from irresponsibility, Tronto cites abandonment as 
maybe the worst possible moral harm, because it terminates the relationship 
without any possibility for the other party to negotiate its terms. The harm of 
abandonment is also an indication of the power imbalance in the relationship 
because abandonment is often decided upon by the most powerful in the re-
lationship. I identify a moral regret resulting from having performed such a 
harm of abandonment in the following quote, again from Soraya. Reflecting 
on the stance taken by the umbrella organization for women’s rights in the 
222 Feminist Trouble
province, the FFQ— an organization she is a member of— opposing use of 
the niqab (full veil) in public offices or public services, but supporting the 
freedom to wear the headscarf, she states:
You know, for many Muslim women, we feel that in the end we allied with 
a position, we sacrificed the girls wearing the niqab. We willingly sacrificed 
them for the greater cause, the greater good, but in the end, it’s a lot of effort 
for not much.
Here the idea that some women have been sacrificed in the name of a greater 
cause— feminism— suggests that, in fact, in the name of feminism the harm 
of abandonment has been perpetrated. Women wearing the niqab have been 
abandoned, excluded from the feminist promise insofar as they have been 
considered as impossible feminist subjects, incapable of embodying the 
feminist community, of being part of that political project. This exclusion is 
abandonment because Soraya feels that, as feminists, they should have cared 
for niqab- wearing women. This care, the moral relation that is expressed 
through this feeling of moral wrong, is not linked to a specific, concrete so-
cial relationship with these women. They are “distant others,” to use Tronto’s 
vocabulary, and Soraya does not illustrate her feeling of moral wrong with 
specific cases of women she knows. However, she feels she should have cared 
more, because her promise to care for feminism as a political project should 
have made her care for those women, I argue, as possible feminist subjects, 
as women put in relation with her through feminist claims about Islamic 
veiling. By feeling a sense of moral failure, she manifests that there is indeed 
a relationship that binds her to these women, and that relationship is, I argue, 
feminism.
Just as I argued that Islamic veiling debates have reconfigured the moral 
and political features of feminist whiteness, these debates have put Muslim 
women in relation with feminists because claims have been made about them 
in the name of feminism. Being enrolled as subjects of feminist discourses, 
Muslim women become part of the moral horizon of feminism, and 
feminists thus carry a moral responsibility toward them. The abandonment 
of specific groups of Muslim women in both contexts (women wearing the 
niqab in Quebec, women wearing the full veil but also the Islamic headscarf 
in France) is therefore not only a political wrong— testifying to the lack of in-
tersectional analysis of some feminists, their active ignorance of racism and 
Islamophobia and of their material consequences for Muslim women— but 
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also a moral wrong. Indeed, both from the perspective of the consequences 
of this irresponsibility (the impossibility for these women to go to public 
school or become civil servants or just find a job) and from the point of view 
of the relationships that the feminist project is based upon, the support for 
veiling bans has enacted a form of abandonment.
Our moral responsibility increases with the specificity or the proximity 
of our relationships. The quality of the relationship matters to explore what 
type of moral obligations it may give rise to. I argue that in the case of fem-
inism, these moral responsibilities exist because we share a common polit-
ical project, not because we share a common identity. In this perspective, 
we may not so much have to care specifically about women as women but 
to care about women, or any other subjects, as possible or actual femi-
nist subjects, subjects put in relation with us through feminism. Not only 
should we desire a responsibility toward other women and other subjects 
of feminist attention for the sake of our political goal (to be an inclusive 
feminist movement, to be true to the political ambitions that animate this 
political community that claims to represent women), but we should also 
acknowledge that claiming to be a feminist, claiming to be part of this pro-
ject, endows us with a specific moral responsibility, an attentiveness toward 
the other subjects who are part of this project or enrolled in it by feminist 
discourses.
This moral responsibility is not equally distributed among feminists. 
The preceding explorations into theories of moral responsibility and care 
have provided ample moral justifications of why asymmetries of power in 
relationships matter for moral responsibilities. A feminist ethic of responsi-
bility must therefore consider the sets of harms that are produced by power 
asymmetries within relationships of responsibility. It must be not only at-
tentive to, but also critical of, epistemologies of ignorance that characterize 
whiteness, and assess the consequences of feminist claims with respect to 
these power asymmetries. Are my feminist claims reinforcing and exploiting 
asymmetries? Or are they contributing to discursively undermining these 
asymmetries? One of the most important consequences of this approach is 
also that the powerless, or the one who is vulnerable, should not have to ap-
peal to the powerful in the terms that they have had the power to set and 
impose. This assumption should certainly be part of a feminist ethic of re-
sponsibility and amounts to acknowledging responsibility in structures of 
power and agreeing on the importance of these structures within the femi-
nist political community.
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The project of caring for other subjects will, I argue, be based on other 
types of emotion than benevolence and compassion. Indeed, in the affective 
politics of caring for distant others, compassion is central. In a context of 
abstract relations, I will be moved to act, to claim a relation with a distant 
other, because I witness his or her suffering, a suffering with which I may 
identify.96 Caring for feminist subjects will entail other types of emotions, 
better captured by the affective politics of love. Let’s recall the words of Mani, 
a South- Asian feminist activist from Montreal. Addressing white Quebecois 
feminists, she exclaimed: “You have to accept that we are here, and you have 
to love us. Otherwise it’s not gonna work. You cannot just tolerate us!” Her 
injunction to go beyond tolerance, benevolence, and compassion recalls 
Jennifer Nash’s analysis of second- wave Black feminism’s “radical ethic of 
care.”97 Indeed, she argues that love for other Black women, as erotic, sexual, 
and nonsexual, was a powerful dimension of Black feminist politics, neces-
sary to create and imagine a public sphere in which Black feminism could 
appear, as an affective community that provides a space to redress harms. 
In a similar vein, Mani’s call for love is a call to challenge the usual affective 
politics that structure white feminists’ relations to racialized feminists, a rad-
ical call to envision new forms of political and moral relations. Redirecting 
powerful emotional drives that are usually put in the service of claims to ab-
stract relations with distant others might therefore be a crucial step in for-
ging a feminist ethic of responsibility based on concrete relations with other 
feminists.
I have so far drawn the contours of a feminist ethic of responsibility that 
arises from our commitment to the feminist project as a project to create and 
sustain a political community. The drive that manifests itself in this ethic of 
responsibility is one of caring for this political community. Moral qualities 
that make this caring possible are attentiveness, responsibility (understood 
as a responsibility to act that varies depending on power asymmetries), and 
the practice of creating a space of possibility for others in this community. 
However, beyond the moral qualities that such an ethic presupposes, how 
can this ethic manifest itself? How do these concepts take life in the context of 
feminist activism? Inspired by the ethic of care, the feminist ethic of respon-
sibility that I propose is a pragmatist ethic. I argue that we must focus on the 
consequences of our actions to reevaluate the moral quality of our intentions. 
Because a feminist ethic of responsibility is attentive to the political con-
text in which it is enunciated, it must take into account the consequences 
of the judgments and actions that I propose to make. Acknowledging the 
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pragmatist nature of this ethic helps us see how what have been perceived 
as feminist dilemmas may in fact be approached through an analysis of the 
consequences of the actions and policies that are proposed, thereby breaking 
with feminist moral evaluations centered around values such as freedom or 
autonomy.
Pragmatism and Feminist Responsibility
Applying a feminist ethic of responsibility to navigate issues such as debates 
on Islamic veiling (but sex work is another domain to which we could apply 
such an ethic) means being guided by the responsibility to care for the fem-
inist political community and creating a space of possibilities for others, in-
cluding those so far considered by some as “bad” feminist subjects. Such an 
ethic is fundamentally grounded in a particular context, addressing partic-
ular problems, and it cannot rely only on abstract principles and values to 
guide actions. Indeed, more often than not, relying on abstract principles in a 
decision will in fact privilege those who are already privileged.98 Embedded 
in relations of responsibilities, a feminist ethic of responsibility is therefore 
contextual. I cannot rely on abstract values such as autonomy, freedom, or 
emancipation to guide my actions and shape my relationships of respon-
sibility. Instead, to enact a feminist ethic of responsibility, I must take into 
consideration the consequences of my actions, because I  cannot separate 
the moral impulse I wish to act upon from its concrete consequences. My 
decisions on how to respond to claims made by others upon me as a feminist 
will have to take into account the context in which these claims are made, and 
in particular the positions of power or disempowerment from where they are 
enunciated.
In the context of Islamic veiling debates, the question of the position of dis-
empowerment at the intersection of race, religion, and gender would there-
fore pragmatically shape my response. While, as I documented in previous 
chapters, some French feminists, white and nonwhite, took a stand based 
on abstract principles— gender equality, secularism, female emancipation— 
that promoted the strict regulation or ban of forms of Islamic veiling, the 
context- based analysis of many feminist organizations in Quebec put at 
the center of the analysis, and of the decision, the impact that these policies 
would have on pious Muslim women. From that standpoint, a feminist ethic 
of responsibility demanded that restrictive policies be opposed, even while 
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some Quebecois feminists may have found that veiling was a patriarchal 
practice. Typically, here, we can see how— without entering the moral and 
political arguments that have characterized sexularism debates of whether 
religious practices such as (full) veiling are incompatible with agency or 
gender equality— an approach inspired by theories of care will first point to 
the need to address this issue from the point of view of the consequences 
that Muslim women, made vulnerable by potential bans on their practices, 
will bear. Placing the concrete needs and interests of those who are multiply 
marginalized at the center of the decision therefore responds to an impera-
tive both to contextualize a moral judgment and to act upon asymmetries of 
power. Such a principle can therefore prove particularly helpful in debating 
intersectional issues.99
Taking into account the needs and interests of others— in particular those 
who are disempowered in the context in which I am making a judgment— 
implies, I claim, that I engage in moral practices that are embedded in prag-
matism. This is not pragmatism understood as a moral order defined by 
necessity instead of values, but pragmatism in its philosophical sense, as the 
art of evaluating morally the consequences of our actions. Because it makes 
the consequences of our actions as a central guide to define what is ethical 
and what is not, pragmatism proposes a conception of responsibility that is 
both political and moral,100 and is therefore suitable for a feminist ethic. In 
order to delineate types of ethical practices that can adequately enact forms 
of care for distant others— women or feminists or both— I take inspiration 
here from pragmatist environmental philosopher Emilie Hache.101 Indeed, 
in her exploration of the moral responsibilities that fall on us as we are re-
lationally connected to the environment, and of how we can adequately re-
spond to the calls that our environment is making, she suggests two types of 
moral practices that, I argue, can also orient a feminist ethic of responsibility. 
The first one consists in putting our ends (and values) in relation. The second 
enjoins us to rely on concrete experience to elaborate our moral responses.
A first important moral practice that will help me to sustain a feminist 
ethic of care for others is, following Hache’s insight, that of relating the moral 
values that animate our commitment to feminism with other values. This 
means putting feminist values— such as autonomy or equality— in relation 
with other moral values that might be important for others in a given context. 
Putting in relation these moral ends is a way to try to care for them, rather 
than introducing a hierarchy of values and moral ends or instrumentalizing 
one value to promote another one. In the context of sexularism debates, such 
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an ethical practice of putting moral ends in relation would, for example, 
draw attention to the fact that we should promote both gender equality and 
antiracism, avoiding the instrumentalization of gender equality in favor of 
nationalism and Islamophobia. It would also mean combining the goal of 
caring for disempowered pious Muslim women and girls and the goal of 
protecting secularism or gender equality, rather than opposing them. Lastly, 
it could mean putting the goal of respecting secularism in perspective with 
veiled Muslim girls’ right to education or pious Muslim women’s right to 
work, including in public services.
Such an exercise of putting our ends in relation to one another exposes 
us to a risk, that of discovering that our values, what we value, may not be 
equally valued by others.102 However, the fear that our values will be mar-
ginalized by others’ values (such as gender equality being marginalized by 
religious freedom or by the right to education) should not lead us to refuse 
this risk and impose our ends as superior to others’ ends. While I value my 
attachment to feminism, I cannot impose on others that they be attached 
in similar ways and with the same intensity to this political community. 
Hence, a pragmatist feminist ethic here requires that I put my commitment 
in perspective with that of others. I cannot ask others to share my values in 
the same ways as a prerequisite to enter the conversation, or their values 
might never be considered in my exercise of moral judgment. On the con-
trary, I must put my ends in perspective with those of others so that they 
may feel part of my project as well, so that I may interest them in sharing my 
values. Such an ethic would, for example, discourage Quebecois feminists 
from asking for gender equality to be enshrined as a more important right 
than the right to religious freedom in the Quebecois Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.103
Creating a space of possibility for others in the feminist project, especially 
those others who have been often presented as “bad” feminist subjects, thus 
entails that I put my claims in relation with theirs. Such an exercise of put-
ting my ends in relations with other ends— and other people— will certainly 
encourage me to make compromises. Here Hache understands making 
compromises not as sacrificing one’s moral values,104 but rather as the result 
of treating well the others who are part of my project, who are involved in 
the problem I seek to address. Acknowledging relationality means that I will 
have to accept being morally engaged with others, and this cannot happen 
on my moral grounds only; I must leave room for the moral ends of others. 
To care well about others, to create a space for them, I will have to make 
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compromises. Otherwise I will have imposed on them my moral ends and 
values as a prerequisite for our being in relation.
A second ethical practice identified by Emilie Hache, and which can apply 
to a feminist ethic of responsibility, is that of relying on others’ experiences to 
elaborate our moral response. While Iris Young and to a certain extent Linda 
Zerilli consider the capacity for enlarged thought as crucial for communi-
cative ethics or feminist practice, this capacity relies mostly on moral imag-
ination or wonder— or, for Zerilli, on the ability to make judgment, because 
I can thus take the point of view of others. Hence, both emphasize a sup-
posed ability to imagine, envision, or adopt others’ viewpoints. Such a call 
to adopt others’ standpoints is always fraught with risks and limits. Young 
identifies these in the asymmetry that characterizes social relationships and 
thus insists that we can only meet others’ viewpoints “halfway.” Here, Hache’s 
proposal is to focus on experiences rather than viewpoints. What we should 
strive for is not to try to put ourselves in the shoes of others, trying to im-
agine or feel what others feel, but rather to make space for their experience— 
which remains, singularly, theirs and only theirs— in my moral and political 
space. Rather than projecting myself onto others to try to share their view-
point, I must open up my moral space and judgment to the narratives of their 
experiences. This act implies a form of copresence, a sharing of moral space, 
and therefore an acknowledgment of common ground. Such an ethical prac-
tice radically shifts the grounds of our moral inquiry. Indeed, for example, as 
a white secular feminist, or as a liberal or critical feminist theorist, instead 
of reflecting upon how pious Muslim women may be attached to their re-
ligious beliefs, and trying to reconstruct their moral perspective from this 
attachment that I do not share, I should rather include in my moral space and 
moral inquiry their concrete experiences, such as the experience of being 
expelled from school, or being discriminated against on the job market, or 
harboring resentment and feeling betrayed by fellow citizens. When I make 
these experiences available and present in my moral space, I agree to share 
the space that harbors my moral universe, my form of life, with the narratives 
and experiences of others. The sharing of this space will make me morally 
responsive— to the pain and suffering of others or to their joy— and therefore 
in a better position to respond adequately to the moral claims that have been 
addressed to me.
I add to these two ethical practices described by Hache, putting ends in 
relation and taking into account experiences, a third ethical practice that 
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I believe should be central to a feminist ethic. This practice is that of trans-
lating. Indeed, while feminist philosophers have insisted on our need to 
see the world from others’ points of view, such an endeavor is based on the 
premise that my moral imagination or my ability for judgment— carried on 
through conversation and argument with others— will lead me to understand 
their moral viewpoint. For Iris Young, communicative ethics— if it takes into 
account the various practices she recommends, such as greetings and the af-
firmative use of rhetoric— should lead me to understand and morally respect 
the point of view of others, leading to deeper forms of agreements.105 For 
Linda Zerilli, arguing about my political claims with others, using persua-
sion to make them see the world from my viewpoint, and being persuaded by 
some others in similar ways will provide me with an ability to judge, to adopt 
different viewpoints on an object or on the world. I argue that the risk of both 
ethical practices proposed is that of promoting only a limited and partial 
understanding of others’ viewpoints and morality. Young’s communicative 
ethics might be appropriate to foster an inclusive democracy with a deeper 
form of deliberation, as she suggests, but will not be sufficient to enroll new 
and old subjects in a political community that wishes to transform the world. 
I need more than exposure to others’ narratives to engage with them in a 
project of creating or sustaining a political community. As I stated earlier, 
I need to care for them as well. In the case of Zerilli’s argument, the risk of 
founding a political community on unending discussion and persuasive 
arguments is that debates may never end, and I might never be convinced 
by others’ viewpoints. I may be insensible to their persuasive rhetoric be-
cause I do not wish to put my ends in relation with them. While Zerilli argues 
that an argument has force because it makes us “see” things differently,106 
I may resist and stay blind. I may feel that compromising, for example, about 
what I believe “gender equality” should mean would endanger my claims, my 
convictions, and my very identity as a feminist. As I have documented, some 
white feminists are not persuaded by the arguments put forth by racialized 
or Muslim feminists, because those arguments seem to contradict radically 
what they have learned to believe is right for feminism, and therefore call into 
question their whole narrative of themselves as feminists committed to care 
for women.
For these reasons, I  argue that we must also learn to translate others’ 
claims into claims that are recognizable for us and that will enroll us in 
others’ projects. I borrow here the term “translation” from Bruno Latour, 
230 Feminist Trouble
who uses it to describe the process that creates communities (of humans 
and nonhumans): by translating the claims of a group or community, I try 
to enroll others in my group.107 Hence, translating is a way to put in re-
lation different actors, and will always imply also some transformation of 
my claim. I give here an example from Quebec that illustrates how claims 
can be translated. The commitment of the Quebecois federation of women 
(FFQ) to adopt a more intersectional perspective in its political agenda 
led its executive officers in the early 2010s to push for prioritizing claims 
in favor of migrant women in the FFQ’s program. However, the FFQ also 
wanted its base, which is not composed of a majority of migrant women, 
to support the inclusion of the question of the official recognition of for-
eign diplomas (an important policy for migrant women trying to access 
the Quebecois job market) as a top priority. In order to do so, the FFQ 
practiced a form of translation. It put this claim in relation to other, more 
traditional, Quebecois feminist claims about access to financial autonomy 
and work outside of the home. Translating is important because it extends 
common ground between feminists and enrolls other feminists in my pro-
ject. Finding connections in claims, translating them so that they echo 
previous struggles and speak to the moral and political universe of a di-
verse community of feminism can foster inclusion and create more space 
of possibilities for others.108 It can help us redirect and transform emotions 
usually put in the service of claiming to speak for distant others— such as 
compassion and benevolence— into a more radical and critical affective 
politics, based on care.
***
In this chapter I  have argued that debates and conflicts about forms of 
Islamic veiling require that we rethink the question of the moral ground 
of the feminist subject, and I have sought to reconceptualize political and 
moral relations among feminists so as to acknowledge relational responsi-
bilities between feminists as well as power differentials in order to delineate 
the moral relations that can sustain a collective project. While coalition is 
often presented as the right way to embody feminism so as to preserve the 
possibility of a collective project while acknowledging structural differences 
between women, I have argued that coalition cannot “solve” the question of 
differences and power asymmetries within feminism, because feminists need 
to desire coalition in the first place— that is, they must feel morally obliged to 
enter into coalition with other feminists’ subjects and emotionally invested 
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in doing so. I have argued that discourses that sustain feminist whiteness 
and depict certain racialized women or racialized feminists as “bad” feminist 
subjects prevent such a moral responsibility from materializing in the polit-
ical subjectivities of many white feminists. Hence, to disestablish feminist 
whiteness and to provide ways to think, reformulate, and imagine feminism 
as an inclusive political community, I have proposed to explore the moral re-
lations that feminism must create between the participants in its community, 
and the types of responsibilities these imply.
Feminists’ political subjectivations, the fact of giving an account of one-
self as a feminist, cannot be reduced to a set of sociological identities or 
to social positions. While acknowledging structural inequalities based on 
race or religion, and ensuring the full participation of racialized women 
in feminist organizations should be a central goal of the movement, this 
goal cannot suffice. Racialized feminists’ discourses, in particular those 
about coalitions with white feminists, express moral demands that go be-
yond their formal inclusion or the representation of their interests. They 
ask for the acknowledgment by white feminists that they share common 
moral ground. Doing so, they posit that they are in relation with white 
feminists, and that these relations imply specific moral responsibilities. 
Relying on this insight, I  have identified the moral impulse, the ethical 
drive within feminism, as one of being recognized by other feminists as 
sharing common ground. Such a drive means recognizing relationality and 
the moral responsibilities it creates for feminists. Those responsibilities 
vary depending on the position of privilege or disempowerment feminists 
occupy. Drawing on the ethic of care and on philosophical pragmatism, 
I have formulated a feminist ethic of responsibility that, I argue, is at the 
heart of the feminist project. This ethic is based on the recognition of power 
asymmetries and on the responsibility to care for other feminist subjects, 
defined as those subjects who make claims in the name of feminism, but 
also those who are put in relation with feminism through their claims— 
such as a claim to wear an Islamic veil in school or public spaces. Rather 
than a project to represent other women, feminism is therefore a project to 
care for those who could be part of this political community, who are put in 
relation with it through their claims or the claims that are made about them 
in the name of feminism.
The different ethical practices I have proposed as central to characterizing 
a feminist ethic of responsibility— putting ends in relation, taking into ac-
count experience, and translating— all aim at creating a space of possibility 
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for others in the moral and political project that defines itself as feminism. 
They foster what Cristina Beltrán call an “ethos of non- closure” for this po-
litical subject.109 These practices are meant to enact the broader moral en-
deavor of a feminist ethic of responsibility; that is, the moral obligation to 
recognize relationality with those subjects who make claims that put them 
in relation with feminism— self- identified feminist or potential feminist 
subjects— and to create a space of possibility for them in this political com-
munity. Importantly, I cannot choose or know in advance who will be part 
of my community. Claims to appropriate feminism, or to embody it in the 
“right” way, cannot sustain feminism as a political community and must 
therefore always be critically assessed. What is more, this community is of 
course defined by equality: I must recognize that those that may be enrolled 
in my claims can speak back to me. They are therefore equal interlocutors in 
this project, and feminism as a political community defines a space of moral 
and political equality.110
I argue that such an approach shifts the focus away from the who ques-
tion, or the subject question in feminism: who can claim to be a feminist— 
and a “good” feminist subject— and whether there is a subject (women?) 
for feminism. Moral inquiries and regulatory discourses about “good” and 
“bad” subjects become irrelevant because we acknowledge that the political 
community we seek to create will not be morally “pure” but rather based on 
compromises and, first and foremost, on our moral responsibility to care for 
these subjects that are put in relation with us through feminism. Focusing 
on ethical practices, and rooting them in what I have identified as an ethical 
drive within feminism that might be shared across power asymmetries, is a 
way to recognize that disputes over values— autonomy, gender equality, and 
so on— may not be solved, but that the exclusions that they perform, as they 
marginalize the identities and interests of some feminist subjects, must be 
combated. I contend that to struggle against the formation of these excluded 
domains, we should identify and denounce power asymmetries and racism 
and we should claim equal participation and representation of multiply mar-
ginalized groups. These are crucial tasks and political imperatives. But we 
must also harness the power of the ethical drive of feminism in order to dis-
establish whiteness and the resistances and hierarchies it creates. By refor-
mulating feminism as an ethical project that obliges us toward other feminist 
subjects, I hope we can achieve such a transformation. To do so we must con-
sider feminism also as an ethical commitment, one that means treating other 
feminists well and treating them equally. Of course, treating the other equally 
Toward a Feminist Ethic of Responsibility 233
is never a given. There is no measure by which I can be certain that I have 
achieved equality when it comes to relations between feminists. While I can 
evaluate statuses and responsibilities within feminist organizations and aim 
for just representation of racialized and underrepresented women, treating 
the other equally requires first acknowledging them as interlocutors.
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 Conclusion
Revisiting the “We” of Feminism
The “we” of feminism is not its foundation; it is an effect of the 
impressions made by others who take the risk of inhabiting its name. 
Of course, this “hopeful” narrative has another edge:  the “we” of 
feminism is shaped by some bodies, more than others.
— Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions, 189
Throughout this book, I have defined feminism as a political and moral pro-
ject, and I have explored its troubles and its reconfigurations in postsecular 
times. My aim has not been to settle feminist disputes over values such as 
gender equality, autonomy, or secularism— now debatably heralded as a fem-
inist value as well.1 Rather, I have sought to understand feminism’s trouble 
through an exploration of feminists’ variegated attachments to the feminist 
project, and of how these reproduce hierarchies of race and exclusions as well 
as provide terms for resistance to these exclusions. Indeed, my argument has 
been that if we are to understand how the recuperation of feminist values 
for nationalist and xenophobic agendas was made possible, and understand 
the intractable disputes over the subjects who may or may not be included, 
as equals, in the feminist project, we must comprehend how attachments to 
feminism are shaped by race, whiteness, class, sexuality and history, and we 
must consider their deeply moral nature.
The debates over Islamic veiling practices that have unfolded in the last 
two decades in liberal democracies, especially in Europe, have captured 
the imagination of the public with ready- made oppositions between secu-
larism and religious freedom, national identity and religious faith, gender 
equality and Islamic practices. Ideas about gender equality and emancipa-
tion have figured prominently in these discussions, providing a convenient 
vehicle for modernity— as is often the case— as well as a convenient veil over 
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postcolonial relations, racism, and Islamophobia. Logically, feminists have 
figured prominently in these debates, on various sides. Their disputes have 
reconfigured feminist movements in many contexts, creating new alliances 
and breaking up old ones.
At the same time, feminist discourses about gender equality have been 
enrolled in nationalist projects that have gained tremendous support in par-
ticular in Europe, in the context of the antimigrant politics that has consol-
idated since the “refugee crisis.” In that sense, in many national contexts, 
feminists’ inability to agree upon veiling policies has certainly played an im-
portant political role in the current recuperation of feminist discourses for 
xenophobic purposes. However, the active adhesion of a small or large frac-
tion of feminist activists to secularist discourses and veiling bans— which is 
not to be understated— does not explain the rise of femonationalism,2 that 
is, the appropriation of feminist values to pursue a nationalist and populist 
politics. Indeed, a vast majority of those very same feminists would openly 
oppose such a politics, and in fact, many feminists have actively resisted 
femonationalism and anti- immigrant politics. Rather, I argue that it is the 
inability to resist such a femonationalist discourse, and the ignorance of its 
roots and connections within the feminist movements themselves, that has 
paved the way to femonationalism, like the perfect epitome of the return of 
the repressed. In other words, the rise of femonationalism calls attention to 
the roads not taken, the alliances not forged in time, the foreclosure of cri-
tique, and the ignorance linked to privilege within feminism.
From that perspective, the sexularism debates provide an ideal vantage 
point from which to analyze the present— and future— of feminism as a polit-
ical project. What is more, these debates also had profound echoes in feminist 
theory. Indeed, by placing religious Muslim women at the center of attention 
and discourses, a subject depicted as not liberal enough, the debates have 
encountered a stream of critical reflections, analyses, and anxieties about the 
feminist subject, understood as the subject to be emancipated by feminism. 
Indeed, multiculturalist feminist theory has grappled with the conundrum 
of reconciling the liberal premises of gender equality with minority rights,3 
while critical feminist theory has chastised the political ambitions of fem-
inism to emancipate subjects whose form of life does not follow the polit-
ical and moral grammar of liberalism.4 These debates have revolved around 
the meaning of female agency and its role and centrality for feminist poli-
tics.5 They have therefore provided a critical return on feminism’s liberal and 
modern premises, revealing the extent of the exclusions these perform, but 
236 Feminist Trouble
they have also opened up a political and normative abyss— to be explored 
or to recoil from. It is no surprise, then, that sexularism debates have cap-
tured not only the public imagination in many European countries but also 
feminists’ imagination.
In this book, I have proposed to shift attention from female agency and 
emancipation— a subject at the heart of both the public debate on Islamic 
veiling and of numerous feminist theorizations— to feminists and the pro-
ject they inhabit, to use Sara Ahmed’s metaphor in the epigraph of this 
concluding chapter. Instead of scrutinizing the ability of pious women to 
display agency even in religiously orthodox settings or the potential of 
religiosity as a medium of emancipation— a site of important empirical 
and theoretical developments6— I have proposed to explore feminists’ 
political subjectivations in the contemporary postsecular moment. The 
concept of political subjectivation I  have forged aims at describing the 
process by which becoming a feminist implies not only adhering to a 
set of norms and political visions, but also tracing boundaries between 
“good” and “bad” feminist subjects, and entering into relations with these 
subjects accordingly. It thus captures the articulation between politics and 
morals that, I argue, is at the heart of the feminist project. This change in 
focus, from the subject of feminists’ attention— the nonliberal subject to 
be recuperated, or not, for the feminist project— to the subjects of femi-
nism, responded first to a desire to understand the tremendous emotional 
charge that these debates triggered for feminists on different sides and 
what these emotions revealed about the nature of the feminist project. 
Indeed, while analyzing feminist discourses in the context of sexularism 
debates, I have argued relentlessly in this book that we must consider fem-
inism not only as a political project of collective emancipation and subjec-
tive transformation, but also as a moral project. By creating and imagining 
political relationships, feminism also produces moral relations between 
its participants, envisioned as distant others to be saved or as possibly 
emancipated equals.
Second, this shift in focus responded to the ambition to explore Islamic 
veil debates as the return of the repressed in feminism, as the excluded 
domains coming back to haunt this project in various guises depending on 
the context. I  have documented how whiteness and its privileges remain 
actively concealed, through universalist discourses in particular, and how 
whiteness shapes feminist politics vis- à- vis Islamic veil regulations. Finally, 
the focus on feminists’ political subjectivations aimed not only at operating 
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a critical return on the repressed, but also, by outlining the moral dimension 
of the feminist project, at reflecting on how the ethical drive within this po-
litical project may be put in the service of an anticipatory- utopian moment,7 
reclaiming feminism’s imaginative and transformative powers. As I analyzed 
feminists’ discourses, I traced their moral dispositions— the contours of the 
ethical drive that characterizes this political project— and I  reflected crit-
ically on the moral harms that feminists may perpetrate, as well as on the 
asymmetries of power and privilege that shape their relations and the ways in 
which subjects may inhabit feminism. I also argued that we may harness the 
potential of this ethical drive in the service of expanding the moral bound-
aries of the feminist project, in particular to disestablish feminist whiteness.
Feminist Whiteness and Femonationalism
My approach thus shifts our focus and our understanding of Islamic veil 
debates and femonationalism. While many artful commentaries and anal-
yses of these debates have stressed how they have reconfigured secularism, 
gender, and sexual emancipation in racialized terms,8 I have focused on the 
ways in which they trigger feminists’ moral discourses about “good” and 
“bad” feminist subjects, and how these discourses are shaped by race and 
postcolonialism, as well as religion and secularism. Seen in this light, Islamic 
veil debates display well- known features of “difference” debates within fem-
inism. They reproduce what intersectional analyses of feminist movements 
have critiqued for decades— that is, the centrality of race and racism as 
mechanisms of privilege and exclusion within feminist movements, as 
well as the resulting invisibilization of multiple marginalized subjects and 
subjectivities from the feminist project.9
I also argue that these debates reveal new features as well. Indeed, because 
they revolve around issues such as female autonomy and emancipation, 
they elicit moral discourses that reveal the moral horizon and boundaries 
that feminism produces. By defining “good” and “bad” feminist subjects— 
subjects of equal respect and objects of benevolent care; subjects to be reg-
ulated, and abject subjects to be condemned— these discourses delimit who 
is to be part of the feminist project and benefit from its claims, and who is to 
be excluded. Doing so, they produce and reproduce power relations, hierar-
chies, and asymmetries in the very name of feminism, based on race, postco-
lonial relations, and Islamophobia.
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My focus on the moral dimension of feminism, and how it connects with 
politics, has thus led me to complement intersectional approaches of femi-
nist movements with an attention to whiteness and how it shapes the polit-
ical subjectivation of white feminists. Indeed, in order to account for white 
feminists’ emotional reactions and their desire to regulate Muslim women’s 
subjectivities in the name of feminism, I have relied mainly on the concept 
of feminist whiteness. This concept designates how feminism is made white 
through the discourses of white feminists. These discourses vary depending 
on the context, and they also convey different moral relations. I have in par-
ticular distinguished between, on the one hand, feminist whiteness as it is 
expressed in a benevolent relation of care for racialized women— understood 
as objects of care, beneficiaries of feminist claims made in their names— 
and on the other hand, feminist whiteness that enforces the exclusion of 
those racialized subjects who claim their part as equals in the feminist pro-
ject. Hence, feminist whiteness is shaped by the social context in which it 
is performed. It fashions feminism when it is conceived as a social project, 
one of taking care of vulnerable women and representing their needs, and 
it also fashions feminism understood as a political project creating political 
relationships among equals.
I argue that the approach focusing on feminist whiteness I have proposed 
in this book sheds new light on femonationalism and its political success. 
Femonationalism can be analyzed as resulting from a convergence of ma-
terial interests in neoliberal times,10 but it should also be understood as 
elicited by feminist whiteness; that is, as fueled by the political subjectivation 
of white feminists as white feminists. White ignorance11 and white inno-
cence12 explain why many white feminists did not consider the implications 
that their claims in favor of veiling bans would have for Muslim women, and 
how they could be instrumentalized for right- wing and xenophobic political 
agendas. Indeed, I have argued that feminist whiteness is often predicated 
upon a denial of relationality with racialized subjects, a denial that fuels the 
possibility of moral and political irresponsibility. Hence, the political and 
moral relations with racialized feminists that have been refused, denied, or 
marginalized by white feminists have transformed into political claims that 
consolidate and rigidify the boundaries of the national community on the 
basis of race, class, migration status, and religion.
However, feminist whiteness may be displaced and debunked, for example 
through the discourse of intersectionality— when it is indeed adopted as an 
important principle of feminist intervention, as is the case to some extent in 
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Quebec. Then issues of racism and white privilege become part of a more 
critical feminist practice. What is more, the feminist ethic of intervention in 
grassroots organizations, when it is critical of the power relations between 
the one providing service and counseling and the one receiving them, and 
considers that women should be listened to on their own terms, also provides 
a potential lever to critique white privilege by encouraging relationality and 
decentering feminist whiteness and its supposed epistemological superiority. 
Finally, the most important site of resistance to feminist whiteness is feminist 
activism and discourses by racialized feminists. Indeed, racialized feminists 
provide a trenchant analysis and critique of feminist whiteness within fem-
inist organizations and feminist movements at large. Their discourses also 
reveal the deeply moral nature of feminism. Racialized feminists’ just re-
sentment claims moral redress from white feminists. It demands that they 
be considered equal participants in the feminist project, and asks as a pre-
requisite that power relations and white privilege be acknowledged by white 
feminists. Racialized feminists’ moral address and their experiences of failed 
solidarity or of the promise of inclusion direct us to inquire more deeply into 
the moral bonds that the feminist promise holds. I explored those bonds, and 
the nature of the feminist project, in  chapter 6, arguing that we must develop 
and deepen what I called a feminist ethic of responsibility if we want to live 
up to the promise of caring for other feminist subjects that feminism entails 
and upon which it is based.
Feminist Trouble / Feminist Futures: Revisiting the “We” 
of Feminism
The question of foundations— of who is the “we” feminists claim to be, 
to represent, and to make claims about— has been a central one for femi-
nist theory.13 At the heart of antifoundationalist accounts of feminism is 
the premise that for feminism to be a transformative project, it cannot rest 
upon essentialist categorizations, especially when those have historically 
performed exclusions based on race, sexuality, or coloniality. While this 
claim has accomplished a critical return on the feminist project, contesting 
its boundaries and its normative horizon, it has not led to new ways to im-
agine what is the nature of the community that feminism claims to create. 
This anti- identitarian account of feminism has thus elicited what Judith 
Butler presents as a practice of critique, one that establishes a critical relation 
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to norms “in the sense that it will not comply with a given category, but 
rather constitute an interrogatory relation to the field of categorization it-
self, referring at least implicitly to the limits of the epistemological horizon 
within which practices are formed.”14 For antifoundationalist feminists such 
as Teresa de Lauretis, Judith Butler, and Linda Zerilli, the lack of founda-
tion of the “we” is what constitutes feminism as a critical project, although 
for different reasons. For de Lauretis, feminist theory and practice is based 
on a paradox, that of being at once limited by its social circumstances and 
identities, and “excessive to them.”15 For Butler, what constitutes feminism 
is precisely its critical relation to norms, a relation that is vital for any critical 
political project.16 For Zerilli, feminism is a project of freedom, creating free 
relations, rather than a project based on a shared identity, and the question of 
the “we” is, in fact, irrelevant for this political project.17
However, can this critical relation to the normativity embedded in the “we” 
that feminism pretends to incarnate constitute the basis of an anticipatory- 
utopian moment for feminism? Or can feminism dispense with its utopian 
dimension? While I agree with the antifoundationalist perspective on the 
feminist subject wholeheartedly, I ask: can and should another “we” than “we 
women” emerge from this operation of critique? For some feminist theorists 
like Judith Butler, there is no other moment than the moment of critique. 
There is no outside of norms, and new normative projects must elicit new 
critical ethics. The “we women” must be understood as undecidable, open to 
reinterpretations, as “permanent openness and resignifiability.”18 The prac-
tice of critique for feminism would then make visible the fact that there can 
be no anticipatory- utopian moment, only possibilities of mobilization pro-
duced by “existing configurations of discourse and power.”19
What type of political subject can then emerge from this critical practice? 
Two paths seem to have been opened by the antifoundationalist account of 
feminism. One is Judith Butler’s reflection on coalition based on vulnera-
bility and on a shared precarious life. Indeed, in her recent work Butler has 
argued that our vulnerability in the face of death and mourning and our so-
cial living condition of precariousness are shared conditions of existence— 
rather than ontological claims— that may lay the antifoundationalist basis 
for collective action. The precariousness of life, the fact that living makes us 
dependent on others, is a shared human condition, but also a condition that 
is unequally distributed among us, with some of us being more exposed to 
vulnerability than others— a situation denied by those who are shielded from 
vulnerability by their privileges. Vulnerability is therefore a political relation 
Conclusion 241
and can thus lead to political action, in the form of coalitions, presented by 
Butler as copresence in the public space in the name of a “we” the people, 
a “we” that exists as copresence and shared vulnerability rather than as an 
identity.20
Can such an account of the “we” delineate the contour of a feminist “we”? 
I argue that Butler’s proposal remains incomplete, in particular because it 
does not allow us to distinguish between those who are close and those who 
are distant from us, and this distinction is central for ethical and political 
purposes. Although we are differently exposed to vulnerability, Butler does 
not reflect more precisely on how those differences might forge specific po-
litical relations, across and within those differences, and therefore consti-
tute different collective subjects. More importantly, while Butler affirms that 
there is no normative horizon or foundation beyond critique, except a form 
of collective copresence in the public space to claim forms of protection from 
institutionalized vulnerability, the very act of claiming rights presupposes an 
outside of the “we,” an authority that one seeks to challenge and replace. There 
is, therefore, underlying critique, a desire— a utopia maybe— that the world 
could be different, that an authority could be replaced. Hence, some kind of 
anticipatory- utopian moment, unexamined in Butler’s claim, may be in fact 
shaping her critique. I agree here with Amy Allen’s important reminder that 
critical feminist theory needs to be both explanatory and anticipatory to be 
truly a critical project with political potential.21 This anticipatory moment 
must be articulated if we want to be able to expose its possible exclusions 
and limits. What is more, my fieldwork and numerous critical accounts of 
feminists’ relationship to feminism indicate that commitment to this “we,” 
even if an undecided “we” that is exposed to resignifications, exceeds a 
pure moment of critique and negativity. Hence, this path toward a potential 
antifoundationalist political “we” remains only partially explored.
A second path that follows from antifoundationalist accounts of fem-
inism is evidently queer theory on politics and identity, or rather on 
disidentification.22 While here I will not do a close reading of the various 
approaches that queer theory has developed to think through the question 
of collective action without foundations, I  want to underline two related 
concepts that open up a queer feminist theorization of politics. I purposely 
combine here the terms “queer” and “feminist” as one because, when it 
comes to antifoundationalist theorizing about politics, the two approaches 
have more similarities than differences and share the same genealogy.23 Both 
José Esteban Muñoz and Bruno Perreau argue in similar ways that a queer 
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conception of a political community implies a retrospective glance, a crit-
ical return on a political experience. Muñoz underlines the distinctive quality 
of queerness as an illumination, an ideality, a capacity for imagination es-
pecially, but not only, visible in queer aesthetics.24 Hence, for Muñoz, queer 
politics cannot be encapsulated in the negativity of critique. We must re-
capture its ideality as a concrete utopia, one of actualizing potentialities. In 
particular, Muñoz insists on the desire evidenced in queer aesthetic, a desire 
for a future and a desire for queer relationality, a sharing of experiences and 
desires. Analyzing an instance of actualized queer potentiality, in the resist-
ance to antiqueer politics in France, Perreau25 also defines a queer political 
community beyond negativity, as a critical return on an experienced event. 
He argues that a queer politics not only challenges the norms established by 
the majority, the idea that communities need fixed boundaries, but that it 
also claims one’s belonging to a political community, a return on a shared 
experience.
I join these queer insights in arguing that we need critical imagination and 
potentiality— a more adequate reformulation of the anticipatory- utopian 
moment— for feminism as much as for queer politics, and that indeed, these 
projects are in many ways one and the same. I have proposed in this book an 
antifoundationalist account of the “we” of feminism that is not only critical 
of identities, but also, I argue, full of potentiality. Indeed, I have defined fem-
inism as a political and moral project of caring for feminist subjects, under-
stood as subjects who give an account of themselves as feminists, but also as 
those subjects who are put in relation with feminism through their claims or 
the claims made about them. The potentiality of these relations is what brings 
them into the scope of feminism and into the web of political and moral re-
lations it creates. I contend that such an account of feminism can provide 
critical imagination, beyond the negativity of critique, because it centers on 
the ethical drive of feminism, on relationality and its inherent affectivity, 
dimensions that are crucial for utopianism.
One may then ask: if subjects who do not claim to be feminist but are put 
in relation with feminism are considered to be part of that political commu-
nity, is that community indeed defined by feminism as a set of shared values 
and a transformative commitment? What does this claim imply for the po-
litical boundaries of feminism? Indeed, a risk lies precisely at this juncture. 
The critical imagination I propose for the feminist project implies that we 
extend our care, our relations, to subjects who lay beyond what have been 
identified as feminism’s shared values and “good” subjects. To take again the 
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example given by Eirini Avramopoulou of a feminist coalition in Turkey, 
feminism meant here allying with religious Muslim women who do not de-
fine themselves as feminist, and “taking care” of each other.26 However, is this 
in any way new for feminism? Historically feminism has always enrolled in 
its project subjects who do not define themselves as feminists— “women”— 
and has claimed to speak for them and in their names. What is more, there 
is, in fact, no agreement on shared values among those who identify as 
feminists: gender equality, autonomy, and emancipation are values feminists 
are fighting for and fighting over at the same time.
However, the risks of the critical imagination that I propose are, I argue, 
morally and politically worthier of taking. Indeed, the risks that feminists 
take when they claim to represent “women” and women’s interests are often 
no risk at all: speaking for and in place of distant others who cannot speak 
for themselves because they are not listened to may just be an iteration of 
privilege. What is more, the deep essentialist narrative that these claims fuel 
enacts closures all too well known. In its place, the risk I propose is a risk in-
herent to any moral relation because, as Emilie Hache surmises, to treat the 
other well is never a given.27 It is a complex moral practice, especially, I would 
add, when we recognize that it is also a political act. Treating others equally is 
a deeply political action, as Jacques Rancière has carefully documented, but 
it is also the sign of a desire to treat them well, to be preoccupied by others 
and by my relation to them.28 Hence, we may take the risk that what we have 
come to know and experience as feminism may be transformed, becoming 
in part unrecognizable to us. However, doing so, we might in fact recognize 
new subjects as part of this project and recognize them as equals— a risk 
worth taking.
Emancipation without Agency
I conclude this book with a last venture into one of feminist theory’s pre-
ferred and perilous topics, that of agency. In opening this book, I underlined 
that sexularism debates captured feminists’ political imagination in great 
part because they centered on the nature of agency and autonomy: could 
pious Muslim women be redeemed as agentic subjects? How could agency 
be redefined to account for practices of compliance— with conservative 
gender norms and what were perceived as patriarchal injunctions— rather 
than resistance? The debate over agency and how best to conceptualize it 
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has provided us with some of the most insightful, innovative and complex 
reflections in contemporary feminist theory. This centrality to feminist 
thought is of course intimately linked with the centrality of emancipation in 
the feminist utopian project.29 I argue, maybe provocatively, that, for the sake 
of feminism’s emancipatory promise, we do not have to and should not settle 
the question of agency. My aim in this book has been to decenter our inquiry 
from the subjectivities and life forms of “distant” others— not- liberal- enough 
and pious subjects— and to turn away from questions asking whether these 
subjects can be recuperated for the feminist project, or whether the project’s 
limits have been exposed, making it irrelevant for postsecular times. I have 
argued that we should rather focus our attention on the political subjectivities 
of feminists and what we can learn about the feminist project as the project of 
creating political and moral relations. Now, last, I argue that this decentering 
also opens up new ways of thinking about the connection between agency 
and emancipation.
Many feminist theorists have argued that only by transforming our con-
ception of autonomy and freedom can we reconcile the feminist project 
with political subjectivities that fall outside the scope of liberalism.30 I have 
argued, on the contrary, that we need not enter the debate over the defini-
tion of what counts as autonomous behavior, freedom, or emancipation in 
order to decide how we should address questions such as those about forms 
of Islamic veiling. Indeed, I have argued that the feminist ethic of responsi-
bility that I propose can provide moral and political clues to help us more 
appropriately address the issues at stake for feminism in these debates be-
cause it can erode, or displace, the conflict over who embodies the “good” 
feminist subject, by shifting our moral inquiry away from the properties of 
“bad” or illiberal feminist subjects and toward the nature of our relationship 
with the “others” who are put in relation with us through feminist claims. 
Rather than asking, Can pious Muslim women— or any other type of eccen-
tric feminist subject— display autonomous behavior? Can they be recaptured 
as potential emancipated feminist subjects? I propose to ask, How should my 
relationship to these eccentric feminist subjects be defined? What is its na-
ture? Is it marked by power asymmetries? Do these asymmetries endow me 
with heightened moral responsibility to care for them as potential feminist 
subjects?
Now I return to the agency debate to also argue that, while the approach 
I propose sidesteps the question of agency, it does not leave us in a polit-
ical vacuum from which emancipation has disappeared. Rather, I  offer 
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that we can productively think of emancipation without agency. Both 
Saba Mahmood and Amy Allen have argued for the need to suspend nor-
mative (liberal) feminist assumptions in the face of the consequences 
that these assumptions can have, and have had, for the illiberal or not- 
so- liberal (female) subjects regulated by postcolonial, neoliberal, and 
secular discourses.31 Saba Mahmood’s critical appraisal of feminism’s nor-
mative liberal embrace of freedom leads her to ask the question of feminist 
responsibility— but not to provide us with a satisfying answer, other than 
sustaining the critique. She writes:  “Do my political visions ever run up 
against the responsibility that I incur for the destruction of life forms so that 
‘unenlightened women may be taught to live more freely?’ ”32 This critique 
is a challenge to the feminist project as a normative project of emancipation. 
It is also a challenge to the liberal understanding of autonomy, and an af-
firmation that there is a paradox of subjectivation, one in which I may desire 
to inhabit norms that oppress me or constrain me. As Alison Weir notes, 
this is only a paradox from the point of view of the liberal understanding 
of autonomy.33 From a more socially and historically astute and conceptu-
ally rich understanding of subject formation, such as the one developed by 
Foucault and which precisely inspires Mahmood’s reflections, it is no par-
adox at all but the very condition of subjectivation. However, a nonliberal 
understanding of autonomy, such as the conception offered by Mahmood of 
subjectivation as the practices of inhabiting social norms, does not provide 
a sound basis from which to think about the emancipatory potentiality of 
feminism. Indeed, Mahmood’s response to this critique and this challenge is 
placed on more personal terrain, that of the ethics of the anthropologist her-
self. As she attempts to give a more complex and comprehensive account of 
these forms of life, her proposal is to adhere to “a political imperative, born 
out of the realization that we can no longer presume that secular reason and 
morality exhaust the forms of valuable human flourishings.  .  .  . A partic-
ular openness to exploring nonliberal traditions is intrinsic to a politically 
responsible scholarly practice . . . and a willingness to reevaluate one’s own 
views in light of the Other’s.”34 Interestingly, I find here echoes between what 
Mahmood describes as the “politically responsible scholarly practice”35 and 
the feminist ethic of responsibility I have defined, in that both seek to create 
a space of possibility for the Other. However, Mahmood does not apply her 
insights to feminism as a political and moral practice, and her profound 
reflections on the nature and limits of liberal and critical accounts of agency 
seem to offer no potentiality for feminism as a critical and utopian project, 
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but rather to enjoin us to abandon not only feminism’s liberal premises but 
also its ambition to emancipate subjects.
Reflecting on Mahmood’s proposal, Amy Allen also endorses an approach 
that favors a continuing critical engagement with the identity categories that 
are mobilized by feminism, and a stance of humility toward the liberal norms 
that animate the feminist project. She remarks: “The endpoint of this line of 
questioning is the adoption of a stance of humility toward one’s own norma-
tive and political commitments, a stance that recognizes its own limits and 
contingencies and that is willing to have those commitments de- stabilized 
in the encounter with other forms of life.”36 She therefore proposes to break 
with the normative certainties inherent to most of modern critical theory 
about the importance of freedom, autonomy, and reflexive rationality, as well 
as with the idea of a specific place for the Western Enlightenment within mo-
dernity, an idea defended by some prominent critical theorists such as Jürgen 
Habermas. Allen provides a full and complex picture of the challenges that 
arise for feminist theory if it is to adopt a critical stance toward its norma-
tive ideals because it recognizes that they are also the product of relations of 
power, of a history not only of enlightenment but also of colonization and 
racism. Her answer to this challenge first suspends the relation of neces-
sity between feminism and any particular understanding of freedom as au-
tonomy,37 and, second, offers a negativistic conception of power, inspired by 
Foucault, that understands emancipation as “the transformation of a state of 
domination into a mobile, reversible field of power relations.”38 Indeed, this 
negativistic conception of emancipation does not need to imagine a “power- 
free utopia” and therefore is based on a more complex understanding of 
power and of how it shapes agency in ambivalent ways. This proposal, by 
loosening the normative requirements that define what is emancipation, 
should open up feminism to subjectivities that are not regulated by liberal 
norms. Hence, Allen resolves the conundrum of agency and emancipa-
tion by proposing a figure of emancipation— a more versatile field of power 
relations— that can accommodate “thin” conceptions of agentic behavior. 
For Allen, this conception preserves the possibility of both moments— 
critique and anticipatory- utopian— because the conception of emancipation 
is rooted in a more realistic understanding of power and therefore of agency.
While it is important to base our normative endeavors on more realistic 
representations of power and agency, Foucault’s negativistic conception may 
fall short of satisfying a political project such as feminism that has always de-
fined itself as transformative and collective. This negativistic conception gives 
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us more appropriate lenses to make sense of how power shapes agency, and 
of what may fall under a broader scope of emancipatory practices. It gives 
us a concept that is more adjusted to identify emancipatory possibilities in 
the complex interweaving of subjectivation and social forces. While I think 
we must retain such a negativistic conception of emancipation in a critical 
feminist approach, I argue that it must also be complemented, because this 
conception is too focused on the individual as the locus of agency or power 
(and as the subject of power) to make sense of the role of relations in emanci-
pation, and therefore it is too limited to capture emancipation as a collective 
project.
Among the reconceptualizations of autonomy outside of the premises of 
liberalism and individualism, relational accounts of autonomy have opened 
a theoretical space to think about autonomy as the product of social, emo-
tional, and moral relations, rather than an attribute of the sovereign indi-
vidual.39 Alison Weir has developed this insight in her reflection on the 
articulation between identities and freedom, arguing that if we take seriously 
the idea that we are socially constituted, we cannot provide a definite answer 
to the question of whether we act as autonomous individuals.40 However, this 
realization must not lead to feminist despair. Indeed, relationships provide 
us with a sense of identity, home, connections, freedom, and, importantly, 
possibilities for change. Some relations will foster my capacity for autonomy, 
and, reciprocally, freedom is also expressed in my ability to sustain the re-
lations I choose to forge, in my ability to choose whom and what I choose 
to love. Among those relationships are, following Weir, relationships of soli-
darity and identification that feminists may choose to develop. While Weir’s 
vision of solidarity and shared values among feminists is, I believe, too op-
timistic, she does provide an important insight when she underlines, using 
María Lugones’s idea of feminist coalitions as a form of “traveling” toward 
the Other,41 the transformative nature of solidarity relationships forged 
among feminists.
However, I have argued that such a transformation is not the product of 
a subjective imaginative capacity, that of “meeting” the “other” or putting 
myself in her shoes— even if halfway— as suggested, for example, by Iris 
Young. I also affirm that it cannot emerge from an “impulse” for solidarity 
between feminists, as suggested by Weir. Indeed, Weir suggests that iden-
tification with shared feminist values, and identification as/ with women 
and as/ with feminists, can provide a positive basis for feminist solidarity, 
forged in resistance and dissent. Contrastingly, I have documented in this 
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book that agreements and identifications with feminist values do not lead to 
solidarity— as debates on Islamic headscarves have largely demonstrated— 
and I  have also showed that identification with/ as women or feminists is 
the result of a complex process of political subjectivation, which more often 
than not encloses the feminist subject along racial and religious lines. Hence, 
Weir’s proposal of a transnational feminist subject bonded by solidarity and 
identification, although both processes are understood as reflective, ethical, 
and political processes, remains insufficient to bring about the transform-
ations of feminist solidarity she calls for.
The feminist ethic of responsibility I have proposed shares the premise 
that our freedom as political and ethical subjects is embedded in the 
relationships we may be able to forge and sustain, the collective feminist 
subject we may create. Moreover, I argue that this ethic can sustain a trans-
formative collective project because it requires a political recognition of 
power asymmetries between feminists, and because it involves ethical 
practices of care that erode boundaries between “good” and “bad” feminist 
subjects, thereby contributing to disestablishing social hierarchies such as 
whiteness— but also, importantly, hierarchies based on good and bad sexu-
alities or hierarchies based on ablebodiedness.42 Caring for those subjects 
deemed improper and bad is not only an ethical practice that opens spaces 
of possibilities for the other: it is also both a political promise of equality— 
treating the other equally is one of the ways in which I treat her well— and a 
transformative practice challenging the very social hierarchies that sustain 
forms of oppression. It is in this sense that a feminist ethic of responsibility 
constitutes a project of emancipation, an emancipation without the prereq-
uisite of agency.
***
A way to disrupt femonationalism, which is proliferating in Europe in partic-
ular, is to pay attention to those excluded subjects who are spoken for instead 
of spoken to, and to the boundaries of the moral world we create by making 
claims as feminists. National borders, citizenship regulations, religious and 
racial identities cannot serve as the limits of our communities. Nor can trans-
national feminist discourses that focus on distant others who are time and 
again spoken for. What is more, femonationalism, homonationalism, and 
other attempts to hollow out emancipatory projects to recuperate them 
in neoliberal agendas (think, for example, of business feminism) not only 
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pose a threat to these emancipatory projects, as the conflicts and divisions 
I  described clearly show, they pose more broadly threats to democracy, 
by emptying political projects that help us imagine the world we have in 
common of their very ethical drive. What femonationalism does to feminism 
is not only align it with xenophobic and racist political agendas, but also 
empty feminism of its potential to create a political community of equals, to 
engender moral relations.
By contrast, by concentrating our attention on the concrete consequences 
of our actions and discourses, instead of on the values we say we uphold, 
we may make space for others in our feminist discourses and communi-
ties. Holding to feminism as a treasure in peril to be lost triggers defensive 
reactions, an abstract adhesion to a set of ideas and an imagined community 
that in fact forecloses the feminist subject. Instead we must conceive femi-
nism, as Linda Zerilli proposed,43 as a world- building activity, a work that 
creates feminist relations. Acknowledging that I am in relation with other 
feminist subjects, and subjects who are spoken for by feminism, rather than 
believing that I represent them or their interests, implies scrutinizing the 
type of relations that connect us: What are the hierarchies that structure 
those relations? How can they be undone? This is not an abstract proposal 
or a naïve project of promoting moral feelings such as love and care among 
feminists. In fact, promoting love and care as grounds for political relations 
can be a radical and revolutionary project.44 It is a concrete project that 
we can apply in our contexts of work and mobilization. Who is concretely 
part of my project? What power does she have to voice her concern and 
be listened to? How are whiteness, racism, classism, ableism, and hetero-
normativity shaping the relations I create through feminism? What are the 
consequences of our actions on other subjects we enroll in our political pro-
ject of community? Can we make a promise to treat the other well, and make 
amends when we did not?
I am indebted to theories of care that have helped me articulate a uto-
pian vision of feminism rooted in the ethical drive of feminism. This drive is 
not limited to feminism, and the hierarchies that need to be disestablished, 
within feminism and beyond, are not limited to race and religion. Some of 
the insights we may gain from this investigation into feminist ethics and pol-
itics may be used to understand coalition politics that go beyond feminism. 
I do think that feminist theories and feminist ethics of care provide a spe-
cific normative vision of politics and democracy. This critical and normative 
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potentiality must be harnessed to oppose the recuperation of feminism by 
nationalist and xenophobic discourses, and, more broadly by neoliberal po-
litical agendas. Rethinking the articulation between moral relations and the 
political community that feminists create is, I hope to have shown, at the 
heart of this project of femoresistance.
Appendix on Methodology
The empirical fieldwork upon which this book is based comprises interviews with 
members (volunteers and officers) of fifty feminist organizations in France and Quebec.
These two cases were selected with an eye to comparing the dynamics of their femi-
nist movements and organizations, but also because they provided fertile grounds for 
this inquiry. Indeed, in both contexts heated debates about Islamic veiling occupied 
the public sphere; however, feminist organizations responded very differently, in each 
context and between each context, offering a wide variety of examples to draw from for 
my analysis. I also had a deep knowledge of both countries, having been educated in 
one and having begun my postgraduate academic career in the other. Through feminist 
activism and relations, I had easy points of entries for fieldwork and knew very well the 
debates raging in feminist circles in both contexts. Finally, Quebec offered a reversed 
mirror to European developments. While I could observe how French prohibitive pol-
icies against Islamic forms of veiling were spreading in several European countries, the 
dynamics of the policy and public debate in Quebec was very different, due to its po-
litical and legal system, and to the position occupied by major feminist organizations 
that I detail in  chapter 3. I found both cases worth researching in and of themselves, to 
highlight the dynamics between organizations, and worth comparing one to the other 
to underscore how dominant repertoires about race and religion profoundly shaped 
feminists’ perspectives on these issues.
To trace and analyze the various debates about the accommodation or prohibition of 
Muslim religious practices in France and Quebec, and the various feminist interventions 
and positions they gave rise to, I used parliamentary debates in both contexts, media cov-
erage, feminist petitions, interviews, and archives from feminist organizations over the 
period 2004– 2016. I also used public testimonies that narrate in affective and political 
language the issues at stake for racialized and/ or self- defined religious feminists as well as 
for white and/ or secular feminists.
In France, I analyzed the impact of veiling prohibition debates on feminist organ-
izations, with a particular focus on the 2004 ban on veiling in public schools and the 
2010 ban on full veiling in public spaces. I asked interviewees how they had positioned 
themselves and their organizations during these events and how they had navigated 
the moral terms of these issues, such as freedom, autonomy, and gender equality. In 
Quebec, I analyzed the impact of the ongoing debate on secularism, starting with the 
bill project on religious accommodation in public service (in fact targeting forms of 
veiling for public servants and clients), then reframed as the project of the charter for 
laïcité that captured the Quebecois political imagination beginning at the end of the 
2000s, and the well publicized 2007 Bouchard- Taylor Commission on reasonable ac-
commodation, until 2015.
252 Appendix on Methodology
Interviews in my sample were distributed in the following fashion:
France Quebec Total
Feminist organizations that represent racialized women 7 13 20
Feminist organizations that do not represent racialized 
women
12 18 30
Total 19 31 50
The status of the organizations varies across the sample. While I wanted to restrict the 
fieldwork to registered feminist NGOs, I decided to include more informal groups in 
order to ensure the representation of racialized feminist activism. Indeed, in particular in 
France, several groups of racialized feminists were not registered as NGOs; however, they 
did hold regular meetings, organize activities, and develop a public discourse of feminist 
advocacy and they had an updated website. I purposefully did not interview academics, 
public intellectuals, or femocrats. I also did not interview women identifying as feminist 
but working in other types of organizations such as unions and antiracist or ethnic- based 
organizations.
Some organizations did not use the word “feminist” in their name or in some public 
settings. For example, some racialized feminist organizations that cater to a specific com-
munity did not want to identify in all contexts as feminist, in order not to fuel negative 
reactions in their own community. However, respondents from these organizations iden-
tified as feminists among themselves: they see themselves as members in this political 
project of transformation, and seek to be recognized as such by other feminists.
I designed the sample of these activists and their organizations so as to address the topic 
at the heart of this book— that is, the conflicts over religious and racial identities within 
feminist movements. Hence, I chose to compare organizations and groups run by women 
from racialized minorities and directing their efforts toward specific groups of women de-
fined by their racialized, religious, or migrant identity, with “mainstream” organizations, 
run by white women, that do not claim a specific ethnic or religious identity but define 
their identity only around gender. Because issues of postcoloniality, race, and legal status 
are closely articulated with debates over veiling and the mobilization they reconfigure 
among racialized women, my fieldwork was not limited to Muslim women organizations 
but rather encompassed all feminist organizations that defined themselves thanks to a re-
ligious, racial, or national identity.
To select organizations, in Quebec I consulted listings of women’s organizations com-
piled by official agencies (such as the Quebec’s Conseil du Statut de la femme) and picked 
organizations representing a variety of racialized and self- identified ethnic backgrounds, 
with a balance between advocacy- type organizations and service providers in my sample, 
all located in Montreal. Marie Laperrière, then a master’s degree student, provided help 
with doing some of the interviews in Quebec. In France, no exhaustive listing exists, 
but I relied on prior knowledge of the landscape of the women’s movements, as well as 
snowballing technique, in order to identify service- oriented organizations that claim an 
ethnic/ immigrant identity. Given the existing networks among service provider organ-
izations and advocacy organizations (on issues such as violence against women, for ex-
ample), after the first round of interviews, I was able to identify almost all organizations 
that were relevant for this research and located in Paris, and I was able to interview the 
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majority of them. I do not provide a list of the organizations that were interviewed in 
order to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. Interviews lasted between 55 and 
115 minutes. I coded them on Atlas- ti software to ensure a systematic content analysis.
A lot has been written in anthropology, sociology, and gender studies on “encounters 
in the field,” positionality, standpoint, and subjectivity in qualitative research. However, 
more often than not this important question is reified to issues of privileged access to 
informants or personal narratives that revolve around the author’s subjectivity and the 
transformation she might have experienced through various encounters. In a more 
Bourdieusian vein, issues of positionality in research morph into finding ways to ob-
jectify one’s social position relatively to that of the informants and interviewees. While 
I find it important to reflect on positionality, on how one’s position grants access to some 
knowledge and may prevent one from accessing other information and knowledge, and 
while I also find it important to be able in one way or another to objectify one’s own posi-
tion, in order to be aware of what discourses one may be given access to and its inherent 
limits, I find these methodological reflections often reifying, acting as defensive strate-
gies transforming our research into a dead matter rather than a living one, a way of using 
methodology that Pascale Molinier has well described for researchers in biomedicine but 
that can apply, as she underlines, to all scholars.1 More rarely indeed do we truly reflect 
on the ethical and moral implications of qualitative methods. While there is a push in 
globalized academia to formalize ethical procedures and accreditations for research, this 
is obviously not the type of ethics I have in mind. Ethics certificates urge the scholar to 
formalize and limit the relation that will be created with interviewees by the research pro-
ject in order to minimize risk; they do not encourage us to think about what is unpredict-
able in the relation that we create in the field: the encounter, the moral texture that can 
condense during an interview, the feeling of responsibility that comes with interviewees’ 
sharing of knowledge with us.
As I mention in the first chapter of this book, my positionality as a white feminist ac-
ademic from the global North matters for how I accessed the field and the data I could 
collect. My feminist previous “credentials” and my knowledge of many organizations 
helped me to access fieldwork with white/ mainstream organizations in particular. My 
positionality was also marked by extraterritoriality: I did part of the fieldwork in Quebec 
while I was working there but I was not an active member of the Quebecois feminist 
movement. In France, while some rare interviewees knew me from previous encounters 
during my PhD years, they also knew I was now abroad and not an active member of the 
movement either. Hence, I believe that I was both distant and close— since I was clearly 
self- identifying as feminist. I had not written on the topic before and my own positions 
on Islamic veiling and its legal regulation was not predictable by the interviewee before 
the interview. Of course, as a white academic I certainly did not have access to a range of 
analyses and opinions, especially in interviews with racialized feminists. Sometimes they 
surfaced, late in the interview, when some form of trust may have consolidated as I shared 
concern about racism and marginalization in the movement with the interviewee. Then 
I felt something very similar to what Pascale Molinier describes in her fieldwork with 
caregivers in a retirement home:2 we agreed on the importance of racism within feminism 
(which is something different from its prevalence). And I could feel it and understand it 
more fully: not racism itself but its importance, something these interviewees experience 
all the time, but that I cannot understand without relating with my interviewees. I was 
not interested in evaluating the veracity of claims of instances of racism— my methodo-
logical and ethical compass was not pointing to the truthfulness or falseness of the data 
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collected— rather, in these moments, my compass was activated because they made me 
feel that my project was meaningful also for others.
Sometimes organizations had their own way of neutralizing the potential power rela-
tions at stake in the interview situation. In Montréal, a feminist organization for South 
Asian women had a policy for interviews, asking the interviewer to commit to sharing 
results and to financially contribute to the organization. I found this type of formalization 
of the process of sharing information and experience very useful in this specific context. 
The organization had a collective understanding of how power structures demands for 
information— pointing out that the same workers and volunteers were, again, asked to 
give some of their time to educate often privileged academics or students— and it had 
found a way to alleviate some of this imbalance.
The rest of the story is not entirely mine to tell. I can recount only my part in a set of 
relations that were established during fieldwork. These relations are not reducible to my 
positionality: my position moved and was in flux during interviews depending on what 
the interviewee shared with me. I was moved and displaced by interviews. Sometimes 
I disagreed with the feminists I interviewed, and I did mention my concerns at the end of 
the interview. This led to heated discussions that were often productive as moral and emo-
tional stakes surfaced just right then. Sometimes, and more often, I listened or encour-
aged my interlocutor by clearly stating that I agreed with her analyses. In these situations, 
trust was built, and more analyses were shared and discussed. Investigating such heated 
and politicized issues, I  never believed that an artificial neutrality on my part would 
allow me to collect better or more interesting data and insights. Certainly, a pretense of 
neutrality on my part would rather have denied any possibility of establishing a relation 
with interviewees, of sharing analyses and experiences as feminists. While I did not de-
clare my own inclinations and analyses at the beginning of the interviews, I did engage 
in discussions when the interviewee opened the door for it, which was in fact always the 
case. There is a fine line between intruding and caring for what is being said in interviews. 
Listening to the language that is being used by a person is an art, valued as such in psy-
chiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and in some feminist methodology,3 and it is cu-
rious and unfortunate that it is not always valued and taught— to the extent that it can be 
taught— in sociology. This book is concerned with delineating the moral boundaries and 
texture of feminist relations; it is therefore not surprising that I argue that these moral re-
lations were also an important dimension of the interviews. I cannot affirm that I listened 
well, I can only say that often I left interviews with a mixed feeling of joy and sadness: joy 
for what had been shared and the knowledge I had gained from the encounter, giving me 
the feeling that I could now understand better the world I shared with the interviewee, 
and sadness for the story of exclusion, of moral wrong that I had witnessed.
Of course, my perceptions of what happened during interviews, of the moral respon-
sibility that I may have felt and that may have been shared, is limited and subjective. I do 
not shy away from the nature of the material I collected, because it is this very nature, 
full of emotions, judgments, ambivalences, that is the flesh of this book. It is rather in the 
acknowledgment of the subjective nature of this material, and by making space for the 
various and contradicting viewpoints I encountered, that I hope to provide new know-
ledge and intelligibility to the question of feminists’ attachments to their political project 
and community. I did my best to make space for the viewpoints and experiences of the 
feminists I interviewed, and in particular for racialized feminists, by quoting at length 
their analyses and by putting their concerns at the heart of my inquiry and of my narrative. 
I believe that their language, the choice of their words, conveys the moral texture of the 
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relation that was established during interviews. Of course, inquiring about feminist rela-
tions, about how a political project of equality can exist and sustain itself with attention 
pointed to differential powers and hierarchies within this community, begs the difficult 
question of how to give voice to others while not speaking in their names.
Knowing the limits of my standpoint, and being a firm believer in standpoint episte-
mology that stresses that producing knowledge is a collective endeavor with a political 
purpose of disestablishing hierarchies and is also a moral quest, I can only encourage fur-
ther research that will multiply and share standpoints and analyses, so as to draw a fuller 
picture of our individual and collective attachment to feminism.
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feminist project in Lépinard, “Autonomy and the Crisis of the Feminist Subject.”
 29. See. for example. Narayan, “Essence of Culture”; Bracke, “Conjugating the Modern/ 
Religious”; Singh, “Religious Agency and the Limits of Intersectionality.”
 30. Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 5.
 31. Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 32.
 32. Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 34.
 33. Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 36. Sindre Bangstad provides a powerful critique of 
Mahmood’s simultaneous condemnation of liberal feminism and obliviousness re-
garding the religious political ideology of her ethnographic subjects; see Bangstad, 
“Saba Mahmood and Anthropological Feminism.”
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laïcité; Lépinard, “Writing the Law.”
 21. Asad, Formations of the Secular; Fernando, The Republic Unsettled; Stoler, “Colonial 
Aphasia.”
 22. Andreassen and Lettinga, “Veiled Debates.”
 23. For critical legal analyses of these regulations see McGoldrick, Human Rights 
and Religion; De Galembert, “La fabrique du droit”; Lépinard, “Writing the Law”; 
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“Intersectionality as a Tool for Social Movements.”
Notes 271
 34. Simon, “The Choice of Ignorance.”
 35. As a settler nation, Canada/ Quebec of course enforced colonial law on indigenous 
men and women; see Stark, “Criminal Empire.”
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 88. Ricci, “Un féminisme inclusif?”
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droits des femmes, and the Coordination féministe laïque exemplify this trend, 
as does the journal Pro- choix and its editors at the time, Fiammetta Venner and 
Caroline Fourest. Many members of the Collectif contre le viol also adopted a secu-
larist position. The Coordination féministe laïque was also very active, in France, in 
the movement against sharia arbitral courts in Ontario.
 111. Such as the NGO Femmes solidaires; see, for example, its press release of October 
12, 2003.
 112. It is important to note that when it was created, NPNS did not identify as a femi-
nist organization, and later on defined its feminism as opposed to the mainstream 
movement described as intellectualizing and removed from the reality of life in 
urban ghettos. See Garcia, “Des féminismes aux prises avec l’‘intersectionnalité.’ ” 
However, it was clearly identified as a feminist organization by the media, and fu-
eled this identification with its vocal participation in the March 8 demonstration.
 113. Including NGOs such as Mouvement des Maghrébins laïques de France and 
D’ailleurs ou d’ici mais ensemble.
 114. See her op- ed in Libération, Tamzali, “Féministes, je vous écris d’Alger,” reprinted in 
the Pro- choix issue of spring 2004. On Muslim women critiquin secular discourses in 
the Western public sphere as a new form of orientalism, see Mahmood, “Feminism, 
Democracy, and Empire.”
 115. Vigerie and Zelensky, “ ‘Laïcardes,’ puisque féministes.”
 116. Amara and Zappi, Ni putes ni soumises.
 117. Boumediene- Thiery et al., “Un voile sur la discrimination.” Here again, prominent 
feminist figures, including Françoise Gaspard and Christine Delphy, signed the op- 
ed. See also Tevanian, “Une loi antilaïque, antiféministe et antisociale,” 8.
 118. Balibar et al., “Oui au foulard à l’école laïque.”
 119. Boumediene- Thiery et al., “Un voile sur la discrimination.”
 120. In January 2004 the collective issued a press release, Collectif Une école pour 
tou- te- s, “Communiqué du collectif Une école pour tou- te- s.” http:// lmsi.net/ 
Communique- du- Collectif- Une- ecole.
 121. See Françoise Lorcerie’s analysis in Lorcerie, La politisation du voile. Among 
the signatories of a first petition against the law, one finds Muslim organiza-
tions such as the Collectif des Musulmans de France, Jeunes Musulmans de 
France, Conseil des imams de France, Etudiants musulmans de France, per-
sonalities and NGOs representing the “ghettos” and migrant integration issues 
such as Divercité (an NGO from Lyon led by Saïda Kada), Dounia Bouzar, MIB 
(Mouvement de l’immigration et des banlieues), human rights and antiracist 
NGOs such as the Human Rights League and the MRAP (Mouvement contre 
le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peoples), labor unions like SUD (Solidaires 
Unitaires Démocratiques), and political parties (the Greens and the Communist 
Revolutionary League).
 122. Tevanian, Le voile médiatique; Bouteldja, “De la cérémonie du dévoilement à Alger 
(1958) à Ni putes ni soumises.” See also the video documentary by Host, Un racisme 
à peine voilé.
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 123. I borrow the term from Stoler, “Colonial Aphasia.” The degree to which the prism 
of the colonial continuum is mobilized depends on the organization, as does the 
degree to which a “white feminism” is accused of complicity with neocolonial pol-
icies targeting young racialized men. See Garcia, “Des féminismes aux prises avec 
l’‘intersectionnalité.’ ”
 124. Houria Bouteldja also founded the Mouvement des indigènes de la République, later 
transformed into a Parti des indigènes de la République, and led the Indigenous 
Feminists, a collective that existed in the first years of the movement (2005– 2008) 
and issued a press release in January 2007. See Garcia, “Des féminismes aux prises 
avec l’‘intersectionnalité’ ”; Grewal, “ ‘Va t’faire intégrer.’ ”
 125. See, for example, Houria Bouteldja’s criticism of NPNS as promoting forms of co-
lonial politics in “De la cérémonie du dévoilement à Alger (1958) à Ni putes ni 
soumises.”
 126. Or alternatively by the World March of Women French section
 127. Koussens, “Sous l’affaire de la burqa”; Hennette- Vauchez, “Derrière la burqa.”
 128. Selby, “Un/ veiling Women’s Bodies”; Tissot, “Excluding Muslim Women”; Lépinard, 
“Writing the Law.”
 129. See Vauchez and Valentin, L’affaire Baby Loup ou la nouvelle laïcité.
 130. In 2009, NPNS president Sihem Habchi was interviewed by the Commission 
Gérin on the burqa with a performance that impressed the commission (see Tissot, 
“Excluding Muslim Women”), and in January 2010, NPNS demonstrated wearing 
burqas in front of the headquarters of the Socialist Party, denouncing its unwilling-
ness to legislate on the matter. See Equy, “Ni putes ni soumises manifeste en burqa 
devant le siège du PS.”
 131. See Selby, “Un/ veiling Women’s Bodies”; Beaman, “Overdressed and Underexposed 
or Underdressed and Overexposed?”
 132. See Trat, “Non à une loi contre le voile intégral.”
 133. “Pétition: Nous sommes toutes des femmes voilées.” The online petition was signed 
by 3,195 individuals.
 134. Les invités de Mediapart, “Lettre ouverte.” Veiled women also voiced their concerns 
after the minister in charge of women’s rights made derogatory comments about 
Islam and veiling in a media interview in April 2016. Les invités de Mediapart, 
“Pour en finir avec le contrôle politique du corps des femmes.” This statement 
constitutes one of the first public statements made by veiled women in their own 
names that invokes feminist values to criticize the femonationalist discourse of 
public authorities.
 135. Les invités de Mediapart, “Lettre ouverte.”
 136. Kassir and Reitz, “Protesting Headscarf Ban.”
 137. Feminist union activist Josette Trat responded to what she considered false and 
phantom accusations, in Trat, “Les féministes blanches et l’empire ou le récit d’un 
complot féministe fantasmé.” For a criticism of the underlying essentialism that 
characterizes the arguments set forth in the book, see Perreau, Queer Theory.
 138. Lépinard, “Doing Intersectionality.” Because the majority of French feminist or-
ganizations are run by white women, this means that a majority of white feminists 
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had trouble elaborating a critical discourse on the way secularism was being 
transformed in the name of women’s rights. However, as I document in  chapter 5, 
opinions among racialized feminists were not uniform, with some in favor of the 
bans and others strongly opposed.
 139. This social protest remains the longest (almost a month) and biggest (two mil-
lion participants are estimated to have attended the December 12 demonstration) 
workers’ strike in recent French history.
 140. Created in 1993, it broadly mobilized political parties and unions to lobby the gov-
ernment to create a new offense, délit d’entrave à l’avortement (crime of interference 
with abortion procedures)
 141. Each new president of the Republic can provide amnesty for certain types of 
offenses. In 1995, newly elected president Jacques Chirac proposed to amnesty per-
sons convicted of having interfered with abortion procedures.
 142. But, in contrast, less active in the debate over gender parity in politics that took 
place at the same time (1998– 2000)
 143. The CNDF deplores the lack of involvement of participants, and its difficulties in 
recruiting new members as a side effect of the ebb in protest and social movement 
politics that characterizes the current austerity period.
 144. In a similar way as radical feminists in the United States described by Roth, Separate 
Roads to Feminism. See Picq, Libération des femmes. In previous work on the French 
feminist movements I showed that inherited conceptions of gender oppression that 
left little place for intersectionality were tied to the structural place of the feminist 
movements of the second wave vis- à- vis the extreme Left and to the internal divi-
sion (between radicals and “class struggle” trends of the movement). See Lépinard, 
“The Contentious Subject of Feminism.”
 145. Lesselier, “Pour une histoire des mouvements de femmes de l’immigration en 
France.”
 146. Oral communication in Benani, “Faire et écrire l’histoire.”
 147. Collectif national pour les droits des femmes, En avant toutes!
 148. Collectif national pour les droits des femmes, De nouveaux défis pour le féminisme, 
forum du Collectif national pour les droits des femmes.
 149. To be noted, among these five pages dedicated to “Racism, xenophobia and discrimi-
nation against migrant women,” two are dedicated to Tunisian women discriminated 
against in Tunisia. As often in CNDF events, issues related to women in formerly 
colonized countries are bundled up with issues related to migrant/ racialized women 
in France and articulated with concerns about American imperialism, the global rise 
of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, the alliance of religions at the global level 
against women, the Algerian civil war, radical political Islam and terrorism, etc. This 
tendency is also visible in Trat, “Les féministes blanches et l’empire ou le récit d’un 
complot féministe fantasmé.” See  chapter 4 for details on how this international sol-
idarity invisibilizes racial discrimination in France. For similar reflections about the 
French feminist movement in the 1970s and 1980s, see Vergès, Le ventre des femmes.
 150. Collectif national pour les droits des femmes, De nouveaux défis pour le féminisme, 
forum du Collectif national pour les droits des femmes.
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 151. Paye, “Stop!”
 152. During the 2004 march itself tensions were palpable between the official organiza-
tions, which were in favor of the law banning religious symbols in public schools, 
and veiled women who came to march; see the narrative given by one participant 
in Java, “La marche de toutes les femmes ?” A year later, similar events of violence 
against veiled women participating in the World March of Women in Marseilles 
were related; see Collectif des féministes pour l’égalité, “Pour les droits des femmes, 
contre les exclusions, pour un monde plus solidaire.”
 153. Lettinga and Saharso, “The Political Debates on the Veil in France and the 
Netherlands”; Selby, “Hijab Debates in Europe.”
Chapter 4
 1. Butler, “Contingent Foundations,” 1995, 47.
 2. See also Kramer, Constitutive Exclusion.
 3. White ignorance has been conceptualized in different ways. Some authors insist on its 
epistemological dimension, as the systematic production of false perceptions and dis-
torted knowledge about racism that sustain the dominant group’s interests through 
cognitive dysfunctions. See Mills, The Racial Contract; Mills, “White Ignorance.” Other 
scholars insist on white ignorance as the product of a cultural work of self- representation 
by white people that systematically denies memories, histories, and realities linked to im-
perialism and domination of nonwhites. See Wekker, White Innocence, and Yancy, Look, 
a White!. My approach is situated in this second category of work, which investigates 
self- representation and the desire not to know that characterizes whiteness.
 4. Ahmed, “Phenomenology of Whiteness”; Lorde, Sister Outsider. In Sara Ahmed’s 
phenomenological account, whiteness is an ability to inhabit a world historically 
made white, an orientation toward this world that makes it reachable and livable as 
one’s own.
 5. Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters; Frankenberg, “Growing Up White”; 
McWhorter, “Where Do White People Come From?”
 6. Frye, The Politics of Reality.
 7. Frankenberg, “Growing Up White”; Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters, 
236. On the European context see Griffin and Braidotti, “Whiteness and European 
Situatedness.”
 8. Ahmed, “Declarations of Whiteness.”
 9. I am not therefore investigating the issue of white subjectivity and how it is shaped by 
power and domination, an issue that has preoccupied the field of critical whiteness 
studies. For a discussion of this issue, see McWhorter, “Where Do White People 
Come From?”; Cervulle, “La conscience dominante.”
 10. On the conflict over sexuality in the French second wave feminist movement see 
Eloit, “Lesbian Trouble.”
 11. Rowe, “Locating Feminism’s Subject”; Mane, “Transmuting Grammars of 
Whiteness.”
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 12. See Gloria Wekker’s powerful analysis of white innocence as a dominant cultural fea-
ture of white Dutch self- representation, in Wekker, White Innocence.
 13. In the next chapter, I explore the consequences of feminist whiteness for nonwhite 
feminists and how they respond to it and challenge it.
 14. For a similar approach see Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters; Mueller, 
“Producing Colorblindness.”
 15. Wekker, White Innocence, 16– 19.
 16. Farris, In the Name of Women’s Rights.
 17. See the various contributions to Sullivan and Tuana, Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance.
 18. I chose the concept of whiteness over other available terms used by other scholars 
of feminist movements, such as “minority”/ “majority” women (used in Predelli 
and Halsaa, Majority- Minority Relations in Contemporary Women’s Movements), 
“dominant” / “(multiply) marginalized” women, and “mainstream”/ “minority” 
feminists. Ethnic minority and ethnic majority organizations (or members) can 
be accurate descriptors of the various feminist organizations that take part in the 
feminist landscape of each country. However, in Quebec, for example, many or-
ganizations define themselves as multicultural and ethnically diverse. Sometimes 
they were founded by immigrant women and are now run by feminist officers 
from a diversity of ethnic backgrounds; sometimes they were founded by white 
Quebecois women and their staff remains mainly white. Hence the dichotomy 
minority/ majority does not cover the complexity of cases, in particular in 
Quebec. What is more, even as the term “majority” carries a political meaning, 
it does not convey the idea of a privileged position, ignored as such by the one 
that occupies it, as whiteness does. Marginalized/ dominant carries an interesting 
focus on the positions that organizations occupy within the feminist movement, 
but is not easily operationalized in the field and tends to reproduce the idea that 
Afro or Muslim feminism is marginal to feminism, therefore reinforcing the bi-
nary it is supposed to deconstruct. Finally, mainstream/ minority also does not 
apply well to the complex field of feminist organizations and tends to legitimize 
some organizations (and to overstate their status and influence) while delegitim-
izing others.
 19. In a previous piece using the same empirical data, I focused on organizations, rather 
than individuals, and categorized them into single- axis organizations (identifying as 
women’s rights organizations in a universal way and, implicitly, representing mostly 
women from the majority ethnic group) and dual- axis organizations (self- identifying 
as defending women from a specific ethnic or national group); Lépinard, “Doing 
Intersectionality.” However, this categorization could not capture how whiteness 
shapes feminist consciousness and activism.
 20. There was, for some organizations run by and for racialized women, and often for 
shelters, a gap between members’ self- identification as feminists and the organiza-
tions’ identification as a women’s organization for the wider public.
 21. See table of interviews in the appendix for more details on methodology and 
interviews sample.
Notes 281
 22. I retrace this shift in France from immigration to religion in Lépinard, “Migrating 
Concepts.”
 23. For example, in 2011 an event on feminism and Islamophobia led to the creation of 
a (short- lived) “front du 20 mars” in Paris, a network that gathered several organ-
izations. http:// frontdu20mars.github.io/ qui- sommes- nous/ (accessed August 
19, 2017).
 24. For example, while other scholars have noted the centrality of intersectionality and 
diversity for the younger generation of feminists in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, at the time of my fieldwork this was not the case in France— although 
this movement might have developed since then. Talk about intersectionality is, 
however, rarely met by practices to implement it. On the United States see Reger, 
Everywhere and Nowhere. On the United Kingdom see Evans, The Politics of Third 
Wave Feminisms; Evans, “Intersectionality as Feminist Praxis.” And on New Zealand 
see Schuster, “Intersectional Expectations.” To be noted, these studies review mostly 
white feminist activism in both contexts.
 25. Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters, chap. 6.
 26. Rowe, “Locating Feminism’s Subject”; Ortega, “Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant.”
 27. Reger, Everywhere and Nowhere; Mane, “Transmuting Grammars of Whiteness”; 
Evans, “Intersectionality as Feminist Praxis”; Schuster, “Intersectional Expectations.”
 28. Ahmed, “Declarations of Whiteness.”
 29. See  chapter  4 of this book and Bacchetta, “Décoloniser le féminisme”; Bacchetta, 
“Co- formations.”
 30. For an overview of debates on the diffusion of intersectionality through Europe and 
France in particular, see Fassa, Lépinard, and Roca i Escoda, L’intersectionnalité.
 31. I explored feminists’ relationships to the French republican ideology in the context 
of the campaign for political parity in Lépinard, L’égalité introuvable; Lépinard, “For 
Women Only?”
 32. A wide literature in history and sociology has explored the features of French univer-
salism, e.g., Perreau and Scott, Les défis de la République. On universalism and race in 
France, see Larcher, L’autre citoyen.
 33. Names of organizations have been anonymized.
 34. However, one should note that here again in the acknowledgment of the existence 
of immigrant and racialized women’s movements in the 1970s there is also a move 
toward race evasion. Indeed, French women from the overseas departments and ter-
ritories are never mentioned. While in the 1970s they were victims of massive illegal 
sterilization, a scandal widely mediatized then, this historical episode, a clear instance 
of French institutional racism and colonialism that reveals race as a French political 
reality (and not an American import or a side effect of immigration), is never men-
tioned or acknowledged by white French feminists. See Vergès, Le ventre des femmes; 
Paris, “Un féminisme anti- colonial.”
 35. Vergès, Le ventre des femmes; Guénif- Souilamas, La république mise à nu par son im-
migration; Saada, “The Empire of Law”; Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization.
 36. Bacchetta, “Décoloniser le féminisme.” Translation from cited works in French 
are mine.
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 37. Such a universalization of the white feminist subject has been documented in many 
other contexts, first and foremost by feminists of color; see, for example, Anzaldúa and 
Moraga, This Bridge Called My Back; Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex”; Hurtado, The Color of Privilege; Rowe, “Locating Feminism’s Subject.”
 38. Roth, Separate Roads to Feminism, 188.
 39. Lépinard, “The Contentious Subject of Feminism.”
 40. This organization was founded by the daughter of Maghrebi immigrants with the aim 
to create a popular movement whose mission is to represent the women “forgotten” 
by bourgeois feminism. It was rapidly promoted by the media as an organization rep-
resentative of racialized women living in deprived neighborhoods. However, and in-
terestingly, it reframed its identity as representing all women marginalized in society 
(including, for example, women living in rural areas with little access to public serv-
ices) and in 2015 elected a white woman as president. Its regional groups are also 
often headed by white women or men.
 41. On French color- blindness, see Sabbagh and Peer, “French Color Blindness in 
Perspective”; Simon, “The Choice of Ignorance.” On the historical formation of the 
French republican model of integration, see Favell, Philosophies of Integration. On the 
fear of disunity and the need for the invisibility of difference, see Lépinard, “Migrating 
Concepts”; Lépinard, “Writing the Law.”
 42. Analyzing the emergence of French antiracism in the 1930s with the birth of the first 
French organization devoted to antiracism and anti- Semitism, Emmanuel Debono 
shows that its universalist approach was adopted in order to downplay the actual 
focus of activists on the protection of Jews from violence and from anti- Semitic prop-
aganda; see Debono, Aux origines de l’antiracisme. The color- blind and universalist 
approach to racism continued after World War II, see Bleich, Race Politics in Britain 
and France. See also Larcher, “Troubles dans la ‘race.’ ”
 43. This structural conflict within French feminism, produced by the strength of French 
far- left organizations during the 1970s, fueled the “universalization” of gender op-
pression and is not unrelated to the tendency of many white feminists to embrace the 
claim for political parity and the universalist repertoire on gender in general. On the 
long- lasting impact of the second wave’s debates over the category “women” on the 
historical trajectory of French feminism, see Lépinard, “The Contentious Subject of 
Feminism.”
 44. Hoagland, “Denying Relationality,” 99.
 45. Ortega, “Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant.”
 46. Camille Masclet’s research on French feminist activists from the second- wave also 
suggests that they were deeply influenced in their political analysis of the Islamic 
veil debates in the 2000s by their relationship with Iranian and Algerian feminists 
in exile in France in the 1980s and 1990s; see Masclet, “Sociologie des féministes des 
années 1970.”
 47. Vergès, Le ventre des femmes.
 48. On this rhetorical device, see Michel, “Sheepology.”
 49. On the denial of relationality, see Hoagland, “Denying Relationality.”
 50. Whittier, Feminist Generations; Whittier, “Political Generations.”
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 51. Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness.” See also the long- standing discussions on the 
elimination of the word “race” from the French constitution: Balibar, “Le mot race 
n’est pas ‘de trop.’ ”
 52. On the structure of the Quebecois women’s movement and its approach to the 
inclusion of racialized and immigrant women, see Laperrière and Lépinard, 
“Intersectionality as a Tool for Social Movements.”
 53. Taylor, “Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?”; Banting and Soroka, “Minority 
Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada.”
 54. See Srivastava’s study on anglophone Canadian organizations’ antiracist programs; 
Srivastava, “Tears, Fears and Careers.”
 55. Hurtado, The Color of Privilege; Ortega, “Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant.”
 56. This discourse resisting intersectionality was expressed during the general assembly 
in 2015, but also on other occasions of feminist gatherings in Montreal (fieldwork 
notes, observation August 2015, Montreal). Geneviève Pagé rightly links these 
resistances to the attachment of older white feminists to the figure of the oppressed 
that was central to the Quebecois sovereignty project, a project that portrayed 
francophones as oppressed by anglophones and therefore as the oppressed “race”; see 
Pagé, “ ‘Est- ce qu’on peut être racisées nous aussi?’ ”
 57. Lamoureux, L’amère patrie; Pagé, “ ‘Est- ce qu’on peut être racisées nous aussi?’ ”
 58. See Laperrière and Lépinard, “Intersectionality as a Tool for Social Movements.”
 59. For example, more in line with other accounts of third- wave feminism, in 2015 the 
organization Feminist Dare adopted intersectionality as one of its core values and 
stressed the need to work with antiracist collectives. This rhetorical commitment 
was nevertheless not perceived as sufficient by one of its sister organizations based 
in a major French city, which broke with Feminist Dare at the same moment on the 
grounds that its position against the Muslim veil amounted to Islamophobia and 
racism.
 60. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 3.
 61. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 2.
 62. For a historical analysis of American and French feminism along these lines, see 
Riley, “Am I That Name?”; Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer.
 63. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 7.
 64. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 16.
 65. Especially in the chapter “Freedom” in Arendt, The Human Condition.
 66. This echoes Sarita Srivastava’s remarks on the articulation between whiteness and re-
spectability in feminist organizations; see Srivastava, “ ‘You’re Calling Me a Racist?’ ”
 67. See Laperrière and Lépinard, “Intersectionality as a Tool for Social Movements.”
 68. On how school shapes class expectations and relations in France, see Laacher, 
L’institution scolaire et ses miracles.
 69. A  prominent collective voice opposed to the FFQ’s accommodating position in 
sexularism debate is “Pour les droits des femmes du Québec,” http:// www.pdfquebec.
org/ , accessed November 13, 2017.
 70. These interviews are not representative of course of the variety of positions adopted 
by white French feminists (see for a counterexample the queer feminist approach 
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developed by the Front du 20 mars, http:// frontdu20mars.github.io/ , accessed 
January 5, 2018). The interviews I use in this section are, however, representative of 
how feminism is made white, which is why I focus here on their moral dispositions.
 71. Claudine is using the word “maternalist” here as the feminized version of paternalist.
 72. Nelly refers to the Party of the Indigenous of the Republic, a leftist organization that 
fights the persistence of colonial relations and racism in French society.
 73. In French, the neologism islamiste qualifies individuals who adhere to a political form 
of Islam linked to jihadism and terrorism. Here, Nelly’s confusion between islamiste 
and Islamic (islamique) reveals a confusion between Islam and jihadism.
 74. Anger and indignation are common feminist emotions that sustain feminist collec-
tive identity in the face of antifeminist sentiments. See Hercus, “Identity, Emotion, 
and Feminist Collective Action.” However, here these emotions are directed not 
at a broader public that is not welcoming to feminist ideas, but at nonwhite fellow 
feminists.
 75. Beltrán, The Trouble with Unity, 75.
 76. An attitude that is not limited to French white feminists. See Srivastava, “Tears, Fears 
and Careers.”
 77. Farris, In the Name of Women’s Rights; Bilge, “Mapping Quebecois Sexual 
Nationalism”; Hadj Abdou, “Gender Nationalism.”
 78. On the ways French institutions reconfigure Islam, see Fernando, The Republic 
Unsettled.
 79. Baines, “Must Feminists Support Entrenchment of Sex Equality?” Another way in 
which Quebecois white feminists identify with Quebecois nationalism has been to 
insist, for example, that exchanges within umbrella organizations and women’s rights 
forums and congresses occur only in French, while numerous racialized women’s or-
ganizations in the Montreal region work in English. This political demand has effec-
tively undermined the possibilities of including racialized women in the Quebecois 
women’s movement’s largest networks.
 80. An important exception to this statement was the governmental body for women’s 
rights, which on the contrary elaborated a discourse with heavy femonationalist 
overtones; Conseil du statut de la femme, Affirmer la laïcité.
 81. Ricci, “Un féminisme inclusif?”
 82. Vergès, Le ventre des femmes.
 83. See Lépinard, “The Contentious Subject of Feminism,” and Lépinard, L’égalité 
introuvable.
 84. Rochefort, Le pouvoir du genre.
 85. Della Sudda, “Par- delà le bien et le mal.”
 86. Between 1987 and 1995 many women’s rights organizations mobilized to pass a 
new law criminalizing the actions taken by far- right Catholic groups to prevent 
women from accessing medical facilities to have an abortion, and in 1988, a far- right 
Christian committed arson against a Parisian theater showing Martin Scorsese’s The 
Last Temptation of Christ.
 87. See Laborde, “On Republican Toleration”; Laborde, Critical Republicanism.
 88. This is what Laborde identifies as laïcité C in Laborde, “On Republican Toleration.”
Notes 285
 89. Selby, “French Secularism as a ‘Guarantor’ of Women’s Rights?”
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 49. Lépinard, “Doing Intersectionality.”
 50. Bacchetta, “Co- formations.”
 51. Allen, The Politics of Our Selves.
 52. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 17.
 53. See Paola Bacchetta’s analysis of the group in “Co- formations,” as well as Groupe du 6 
novembre, Warriors/ Guerrières.
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 5. Lépinard, “Autonomy and the Crisis of the Feminist Subject.”
 6. Rinaldo, “Pious and Critical”; Bracke, “Conjugating the Modern/ Religious”; Reilly, 
“Recasting Secular Thinking for Emancipatory Feminist Practice”; Brandt and 
Longman, “Working against Many Grains.”
 7. I borrow here Amy Allen’s distinction— which she borrows from Seyla Benhabib— 
between explanatory- diagnostic and anticipatory- utopian moments in political 
theorizing. See Allen, The Politics of Our Selves.
 8. Scott, The Politics of the Veil.
 9. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”; Crenshaw, “Postscript”; Townsend- Bell, 
“What Is Relevance?”; Emejulu and Bassel, “Whose Crisis Counts”; Bacchetta, 
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and the Crisis of the Feminist Subject.”
 31. Ratna Kapur provides a similar critique of the liberal assumptions of human rights 
discourse and its failure to account for subaltern subjectivities. She argues that this 
failure leads to the demise of that ideal; see Kapur, “In the Aftermath of Critique.”
 32. Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 197.
 33. Weir, Identities and Freedom.
 34. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent,” 225.
 35. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent,” 225.
 36. Allen, “Feminism, Modernity and Critical Theory,” 278.
 37. Allen, “Feminism, Modernity and Critical Theory,” 279.
 38. Allen, “Emancipation without Utopia,” 515.
 39. See in particular Nedelsky, Law’s Relations.
 40. Weir, Identities and Freedom.
 41. Lugones, “Playfulness.”
 42. Inckle, “Debilitating Times.”
294 Notes
 43. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom.
 44. Nash, “Practicing Love”; Molinier, Le care monde.
Appendix on Methodology
 1. Molinier, Le care monde, chap. 1.
 2. Molinier, Le care monde, chap. 2.
 3. Devault, “Talking and Listening.”
Bibliography
Abu- Lughod, Lila. “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological 
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others.” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 
(2002): 783– 90.
Agustín, Lise Rolandsen. Gender Equality, Intersectionality, and Diversity in Europe. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Ahmad, Dohra. “Not Yet beyond the Veil:  Muslim Women in American Popular 
Literature.” Social Text 27, no. 2 (99) (June 1, 2009): 105– 31.
Ahmed, Sara. Cultural Politics of Emotion. 2nd ed. Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University 
Press, 2014.
Ahmed, Sara. “Declarations of Whiteness:  The Non- performativity of Anti- racism.” 
Borderlands 3, 2004. http:// www.borderlands.net.au/ vol3no2_ 2004/ ahmed_ declar-
ations.htm.
Ahmed, Sara. “Feminist Killjoys.” In The Promise of Happiness, 50– 87. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010.
 Ahmed, Sara. Living a Feminist Life. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
Ahmed, Sara. “The Nonperformativity of Antiracism.” Meridians:  Feminism, Race, 
Transnationalism 7, no. 1 (2006): 104– 26.
Ahmed, Sara. “A Phenomenology of Whiteness.” Feminist Theory 8, no. 2 (2007): 149– 68.
Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
Ahmed, Sara. Willful Subjects. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014.
Ahmed, Sara, Jane Kilby, Celia Lury, Maureen Mcneil, and Beverley Skeggs. 
“Introduction:  Thinking through Feminism.” In Transformations:  Thinking through 
Feminism, 1– 24. London: Routledge, 2000.
Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Cultural Feminism vs. Poststructuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory.” Signs 13, no. 3 (1988): 405– 36.
Ali, Zahra. Féminismes islamiques. Paris: La Fabrique, 2012.
Allen, Amy. “Emancipation without Utopia: Subjection, Modernity, and the Normative 
Claims of Feminist Critical Theory.” Hypatia 30, no. 3 (2015): 513– 29.
Allen, Amy. “Feminism, Modernity and Critical Theory.” International Critical Thought 3, 
no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 268– 81.
Allen, Amy. The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary 
Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Amara, Fadela, and Sylvia Zappi. Ni putes ni soumises. Paris: La Découverte, 2003.
Amiraux, Valérie, and Jean- François Gaudreault- Desbiens. “Libertés fondamentales et 
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Barras, Amélie. “Travelogue of Secularism:  Longing to Find a Place to Call Home— 
1350506818755415.” European Journal of Women’s Studies, February 11, 2018, 1– 16.
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québécoises, ou du danger de la religion pour les femmes.” Recherches sociographiques 
57, nos. 2– 3 (2016): 475– 504.
Beckwith, Karen. “Women’s Movements at Century’s End: Excavation and Advances in 
Political Science.” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 371– 90.
Beltrán, Cristina. The Trouble with Unity:  Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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L’intersectionnalité: Enjeux théoriques et politiques, edited by Farinaz Fassa, Éléonore 
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Chetcuti- Osorovitz, Natacha. “Féminismes contemporains et controverse du pacte laïque 
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religieuses, appartenance citoyenne: Un équilibre en tension. Quebec: Presses Université 
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Evans, Elizabeth, and Éléonore Lépinard. Intersectionality in Feminist and Queer 
Movements: Confronting Privileges. Routledge, 2019.
Ewing, Katherine Pratt. Stolen Honor:  Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Fadil, Nadia. “Not- / Unveiling as an Ethical Practice.” Feminist Review 98, no.  1 
(2011): 83– 109.
Fanon, Frantz. Peau noire, masques blancs. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952.
Farris, Sara R. “Femonationalism and the ‘Regular’ Army of Labor Called Migrant 
Women.” History of the Present 2, no. 2 (2012): 184– 99.
Farris, Sara R. In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
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Laperrière, Marie, and Éléonore Lépinard. “Intersectionality as a Tool for Social 
Movements:  Strategies of Inclusion and Representation in the Québécois Women’s 
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“Le voile et ce qu’il dévoile.” Les mots sont importants. http:// lmsi.net/ - Le- voile- et- 
 ce- qu- il- devoile.
Walby, Sylvia. The Future of Feminism. Cambridge: Polity, 2011.
Walker, Margaret Urban. Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Wayland, Sarah V. “Religious Expression in Public Schools: Kirpans in Canada, Hijab in 
France.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 20, no. 3 (1997): 545– 61.
Whittier, Nancy. Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women’s Movement. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.
Whittier, Nancy. “Political Generations, Micro- cohorts, and the Transformation of Social 
Movements.” American Sociological Review 62, no. 5 (1997): 760– 78.
Weir, Alison. Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory Between Power and Connection. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Wekker, Gloria. White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016.
Weldon, S. Laurel. “Inclusion, Solidarity, and Social Movements: The Global Movement 
against Gender Violence.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (2006): 55– 74.
316 Bibliography
Yancy, George. Look, a White! Philosophical Essays on Whiteness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 2012.
Young, Iris Marion. “Asymmetrical Reciprocity:  On Moral Respect, Wonder, and 
Enlarged Thought.” Constellations 3, no. 3 (January 1, 1997): 340– 63.
Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Young, Iris Marion. “Responsibility and Global Justice:  A Social Connection Model.” 
Social Philosophy & Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 102– 30.
Yuval- Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation. London: Sage, 1997.
Yuval- Davis, Nira. “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics.” European Journal of Women’s 
Studies 13, no. 3 (2006): 193– 209.
Yuval- Davis, Nira. The Politics of Belonging:  Intersectional Contestations. 
New York: Sage, 2011.
Zajicek, Anna M. “Race Discourses and Antiracist Practices in a Local Women’s 
Movement.” Gender & Society 16, no. 2 (2002): 155– 74.
Zerilli, Linda M. G. Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005.
Index
For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52– 53) may, on 
occasion, appear on only one of those pages.
abortion rights, 77– 78
academia, 75– 76, 157– 58
Adorno, 178– 79, 208– 9
affective politics, 37– 38, 45, 226
affective turn, 43
Afro- feminism, 116, 157– 60, 169– 70
agency
debate over, 23– 24
ethical, 8– 9
feminist, 8, 9, 10– 11, 245– 48
of religious women, 7– 10, 52
and power, 8– 9, 248– 49
Ahmed, Naima Atef, 57
Ahmed, Sara, 26– 27, 236
feminist killjoy, 131– 32
feminist whiteness, 113
identity, 38– 39, 43
nonperformativity of antiracism, 69– 70
relationships, 35, 36– 37, 269n98
solidarity, 181
Algeria, 94– 96, 148, 151– 52
Allen, Amy, 153– 54, 184– 85, 243, 246– 48
Amara, Fadela, 72
ambivalence, 110, 111, 119
Améry, Jean, 132
anger
against colonialism, 148
and exclusion, 175– 76
white feminist, 114, 115, 117– 18, 
119, 126
anticipatory- utopian moment, 238– 39, 
242, 243
antiracism, 40– 41, 51, 61– 62
lack of institutionalization of, 78– 80, 81
nonperformativity of, 69– 70
anti- Semitism, 284n43
Arendt, Hannah
freedom, 29– 30, 106– 8
plurality, 30– 31
political community, 218
promises, 192, 198– 99
relations, 22– 23
resentment, 172– 73
theory of judgment, 185, 199– 200
Armstrong, Elizabeth, 266n48
Aune, Kristin, 44
autonomy, 7– 9, 246– 48, 249
Avramopoulou, Eirini, 223, 244– 45
axes of domination, 32, 36– 37
Baby- Loup, 74– 75, 271n20
Bacchetta, Paola, 91, 131, 153– 54, 171– 72, 
269– 70n105
Bangstad, Sindre, 261n33
bargaining, 7– 8
Bartky, Sandra, 195– 96
Bassel, Leah, 267n66
Beauvoir, Simone de, 154– 55
becoming feminist, 39– 40
See also feminist political subjectivation
Beltrán, Cristina, 118, 233– 34, 268n84
benevolent care, 108, 126, 140, 220
Benhabib, Djemila, 126– 27
Benhabib, Seyla, 195
Black feminism, 33, 45, 133– 34, 226
Black Women’s Coordination, 137
bodily autonomy, 75
Boggio Éwanjé- Épée, Félix, 75– 76
Bouchard, Gérard, 56– 57
Bouchard- Taylor Commission, 56– 57, 
59, 60– 61
Bourdieu, Pierre, 255
Bouteldja, Houria, 73– 74
Braidotti, Rosi, 7
Bread and Roses March, 65– 66
Brown, Wendy, 131– 32
318 Index
Brudholm, Thomas, 132
burqa, 279n130
burkini, 5– 6, 70, 75
Butler, Judith, 14
agency, 8– 9
critique, 241– 42
ethical turn, 30, 208– 9, 261– 62n40, 
262n47– 48
exclusion, 181
morality, 178– 79
subject question, 27, 28, 42, 83, 153– 54
Canada, 54– 55
Canadian Charter of Rights, 55, 60
Canadian Supreme Court, 57– 58
care, 15– 16
deserving of, 36– 37
for distant others, 45, 156, 220– 21
feminist, 146– 47, 222– 27
for other feminists, 161, 216– 20, 221, 
250, 251
theories of, 22– 23
women as object of, 107– 8
See also benevolent care, ethics of care
Casgrain, Thérèse, 65
categorization, 18
Catholic Church, 52, 60, 76– 77, 
120, 121– 22
Cavell, Stanley, 158, 179, 210
Charest, Jean, 56– 57
Charte de la laïcité, 58, 126– 27
Charte des valeurs, 58, 160, 176– 77, 
229, 274n61
Chirac, Jacques, 71
Cho, Sumi, 270n5
choice, 108– 9, 125, 126, 139, 144– 45, 
146– 47, 153
Christian extremism, 122
Christian religious symbols, 58
Circulaire Chatel, 74– 75
class, 90, 93, 97, 149, 163
Coalition for Abortion and Contraception 
Rights (CADAC), 77– 78
coalitions
desire for, 194, 196– 97
emotional dimension, 190
and identity, 185– 87
moral bonds of, 185, 191– 93
politics of, 63– 64
possibility for, 33– 34
and power asymmetry, 187– 88, 189– 91
as a promise, 193– 94
among racialized women’s 
organizations, 191– 92
Cole, Elizabeth, 275n78
Collectif feministe pour l’égalité (CFPE), 
73– 74, 75– 76
Collectif national pour les droits 
des femmes (CNDF), 71– 73, 
77– 81, 275n77
colonial aphasia, 73– 74, 75– 76, 94
colonialism
erasure of, 73– 74, 137
in feminism, 73– 74, 121– 22
politicization of, 142– 43, 173– 74
and race, 91, 94– 95, 170
and secularism, 51
settler, 53, 67– 68, 136– 37
coloniality of power, 150– 51
color- blindness, 53, 88, 93, 97
Commission Debré, 71
Commission Gérin, 279n130
communicative ethics, 203– 6, 231
Communist Party, 72, 126
Conradi, Alexa, 65– 66
Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF), 59, 
60– 61, 73– 74
Cornell, Drucilla, 28, 179– 80
Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 32, 144, 270n5
critical theory, 16– 17
culture, 99– 100, 137– 41
See also difference: cultural, Western 
culture
Das, Veena, 210– 11, 219– 20
David, Françoise, 65– 66
Davis, Kathy, 28– 29
Dean, Jonathan, 44
Debono, Emmanuel, 284n43
Debout!, 290n70
de Lauretis, Teresa, 14, 16, 28, 43, 44– 45, 
217– 18, 241– 42
Deleuze, Gilles, 22, 130– 31, 178– 80
Delphy, Christine, 73– 74
Derrida, Jacques, 28
Deveaux, Monique, 7– 8
difference
in coalitions, 185– 86, 195
cultural, 99– 100, 101, 109, 138– 42
Index 319
as divisive, 61– 62
between feminists, 26
in feminist theory, 9– 10, 20, 26– 29, 239
hierarchy of, 47
in judgments, 34– 35
and plurality, 199– 200
politics of emotion, 41
religious, 35– 36, 110
universal, 121– 22
distance, 90, 91– 92, 93, 112, 113, 221, 255
diversity, 88, 92, 99
divorce, 109, 138– 39
Doerr, Nicole, 294n109
Dot- Pouillard, Nicolas, 277n101
double oppression, 33, 49
El- Tayeb, Fatima, 50
emancipation
and agency, 246– 48
collective, 34
of feminist subjects, 10– 11, 14
and gender equality, 236– 37
as political project, 17– 18, 40
and public schools, 73
questioning of, 152– 53
and religion, 52, 123
Western conception of, 75
emotions
and care, 221, 226
and identification with others, 195
as moral demands, 171– 72
political, 22, 39
and subjectivation, 39– 41, 43, 45
of whiteness, 85– 86
enlarged mentality, 195, 198– 202, 
211– 12, 219
enlarged sympathy, 194– 98
enlarged thought, 203– 7, 230– 31
equality, 30, 250
See also gender equality
ethic of care, 15– 16, 30, 210, 212
See also benevolent care, care
ethical disposition. See moral disposition
ethical violence, 155– 56, 158– 59, 175– 76, 
178– 79, 208– 9
ethics, 8– 9, 14– 17, 255
Europe, 47, 49– 50, 51– 52, 81
exclusion
from deliberation, 204– 5
from feminist subject, 117– 18, 175– 76, 
181– 82, 209– 10, 239– 40
from public school, 96– 97
through secularism, 126
social, 90
by white feminists, 196– 97
experience, 37– 39, 41
false consciousness, 115– 16
Farris, Sara, 4, 25, 260n17
Fassin, Didier, 16– 17, 39– 40, 42– 43
fear, 119
Fédération des femmes du Québec 
(FFQ), 97– 98
Comité des femmes des communautés 
culturelles, 68– 69
historical legacy, 64– 70
inclusion of racialized women, 105– 6, 
188, 219
intersectionality, 61– 62, 101, 174– 75
racialized feminists’ demands, 165– 66
racism, 60– 61, 62
and regulation of Islamic veiling, 59, 
176– 77, 223– 24
and religious arbitration, 56
female genital mutilation, 117– 18
feminism
as an activity, 182– 83
foundationalist, 222
Islamic, 125, 131, 160, 170, 190– 91
located in the past, 118
as a moral project, 13– 16, 183
multiculturalist, 7– 8
as a political project, 13– 17, 22– 23, 
85– 86, 106– 8, 114
postcolonial, 7– 8, 28– 29, 36, 49, 115– 16, 
221, 260n13, 263– 64n10
and racism, 6– 7
secularist, 72
as a set of dispositions, 26– 27
as a social project, 85– 86, 106– 8, 
114, 119
See also Afro- feminism, Black 
feminism, feminist political 
community, feminist subject, 
feminist theory, liberal feminism, 
second- wave feminism, third- wave 
feminism
feminist activists, 5, 11, 18
320 Index
feminist collective subject, 27, 34, 42, 
107– 8, 115
and difference, 199– 200
enrollment in, 112
exclusion from, 117– 18, 175– 76
and representation, 216
Feminist Dare, 89– 90, 122, 285n63
feminist ethic of responsibility, 16, 22– 23, 
212– 20, 233
and compassion, 218
and exclusion, 185
and others, 246– 48
and political community, 14– 15, 
220, 222– 27
and pragmatism, 227– 35
in relationships, 246, 250
feminist imagination, 4, 9, 244– 45
feminist intervention, 108– 9, 111, 112, 
119, 139
feminist movements, 18, 52– 53
See also second- wave feminism, third- 
wave feminism
feminist political community, 244– 45
boundaries of, 15– 16, 30– 31
care for, 216– 20
creation of, 26, 45, 182– 83, 184
and emotions, 39– 40
exclusion from, 205
and feminist ethics, 199– 200
inclusion in, 201– 2, 222– 23, 251
and representation, 215– 16
feminist political subjectivation, 26, 
41– 46, 238– 39
and coalitions, 190
and exclusion, 196– 97
through feminist intervention, 112, 113
identity building, 186– 87, 233
and political community, 216
of racialized feminists, 154– 60, 161
through resistance to power, 171– 72
as shaped by emotions, 39
feminist praxis, 11– 12, 21– 22, 35, 164– 65
feminist relationships, 22– 23, 45, 84
abandonment, 223– 25
equal, 29 , – 114, 119
ethical, 15– 16, 42– 43
in fieldwork, 256
free, 106– 7, 199
and identity, 37– 38
moral, 183– 84, 191– 93
and moral dispositions, 127– 28
and power asymmetries, 34, 102, 203
and responsibility, 213– 15, 246
transformative, 249
feminist subject
boundaries of, 15– 16, 44, 83, 115– 16, 
119, 127– 28, 152, 171, 183, 184
construction of, 181– 82
emancipated, 5– 7, 10– 11, 95, 237– 38
“good” or “bad”, 18, 35– 37, 40– 41, 
48– 49, 113– 14, 120, 152– 53, 
196– 97, 209– 10
as lost, 118
moral dimension, 14, 30, 36– 37
nonwhite women as, 106, 112, 
113– 14, 190– 91
passive, 110, 111
in question, 13– 14, 16, 27, 28– 29
recognition as, 217– 18
as white, 92, 93, 97
See also feminist collective subject
feminist theory, 44– 45, 237– 38
difference in, 9– 10, 20
ethics in, 12
intersectionality in, 49
postcolonial, 28– 29, 260n13
poststructuralist, 28
subject question in, 28, 198– 99
feminist values, 42– 43, 153, 163– 66, 
228– 30, 236, 244– 45, 249– 50
feminist whiteness, 21– 22, 83
boundaries of, 104, 182
challenges to, 121– 22, 153– 54, 
162– 67, 178
denial of relationality, 207– 10
and education, 103– 4
as feminist subject, 111
moral dispositions, 106, 119
and nationalism, 86– 87, 120, 126– 27
and privilege, 169
production of, 38– 39, 84– 85, 93, 106
repertoires of, 96– 97, 98, 105– 6
and secularism, 124
as universal, 164– 65
femonationalism, 4
challenges to, 69– 70, 250– 51
Index 321
in feminist organizations, 47– 48, 77
and feminist whiteness, 21, 86, 
126– 27, 240
rise of, 25, 70– 71, 237
and secularism, 51– 52, 120
femoresistance, 251– 52
fetishization, of nonwhite bodies, 169– 70
Finestone, Sheila, 67
Foucault, Michel, 8– 9, 42, 154, 248– 49
France, 5– 6, 268n81
assimilation, 149
color- blind approach, 53
femonationalism, 47– 48
fieldwork in, 87, 253, 254
headscarf debates, 70– 71, 76– 77
history of race, 91
intersectionality, study of, 270– 71n8
religion, 51– 52
See also republican universalism
Frankenberg, Ruth, 83– 84, 88– 89, 
97, 106
freedom, 7, 8, 29– 30, 106– 7, 199, 246– 48
Freud, Sigmund, 28
Friedman, Marylin, 7– 8
Front de Libération des Femmes 
(FLF), 66– 67
Gay, Amandine, 159– 60, 288n21
gender equality
and cultural difference, 49– 50, 109
and national identity, 51– 52, 56– 57
as primary value, 9– 10, 11, 
121– 22, 140– 41
as secular, 4, 47– 48, 57
as specific to Western culture, 4, 11– 12
gender parity, 121– 22
generational gap, 97, 104, 116– 18, 155– 56
Giraud, Isabelle, 275n78
Girls on the Rise, 92, 123
Grosz, Elizabeth, 23– 24
Groult, Benoîte, 154– 55
Groupe du 6 novembre, 157
Guénif- Souilamas, Nacira, 51
Habchi, Sihem, 126, 279n130
Habermas, Jürgen, 248
Hache, Emilie, 228– 30, 245
Hancock, Ange- Marie, 267n66, 270n5
headscarf debates, 6– 7, 20– 21, 34, 38– 39, 
49– 50, 51– 52, 70– 72
hierarchy of struggle, 144, 156
hijab, 55, 74– 75, 145– 46, 176– 77
Hill, Anita, 206
Hoagland, Sarah Lucia, 208
Hollande, François, 74– 75
homonationalism, 4, 17– 18
hooks, bell, 131– 32
hospitality, 35
Houda- Pepin, Fatima, 56, 126– 27
identity, 22– 23
construction of, 37– 39, 
186– 87, 197– 98
depoliticization of, 201
and exclusion, 222
as multiple, 195– 96
identity/ freedom paradox, 7
identity politics, 29, 32– 35, 36– 37, 61– 62
ignorance
and anger, 117– 18
epistemology of, 83– 84, 86, 169, 
208, 225
and ethical violence, 178– 79
as privilege, 95, 237
and universalism, 91– 92
whiteness as, 21– 22, 83– 85, 120, 
124, 240
in women’s organizations, 80, 81
immigrant integration, 49– 50, 53, 60, 93, 
98, 99– 100
inclusion, 49
in coalitions, 187, 188
desire for, 88, 152
and difference, 195– 96, 204, 205– 6
as feminist priority, 102, 
231– 32, 240– 41
and intersectionality, 98– 99
and religion, 51– 52
in women’s organizations, 67, 68, 156, 
165– 66, 174, 233
indignation, 114, 115
indigenous women, 67– 68, 73– 74, 
115– 16, 134
ties with migrant women’s 
organizations, 136– 37, 143, 191– 92
integration. See immigrant integration
322 Index
interculturalism, 54– 55, 60, 98– 101, 
105– 6, 134– 35
International Women’s Day, 73– 74, 81, 
114– 15, 162, 165– 66, 188, 191
intersectionality, 20– 21, 26, 28– 29, 
31– 37, 61– 62
adoption by women’s organizations, 
63– 64, 69– 70, 101– 4, 174, 240– 41
diffusion in France, 157
foundations of, 27– 28, 133– 34
and emotions, 37– 38, 39
and politics, 32, 36– 37, 137– 38
and representation, 153– 54, 163
`resistance to, 97, 103– 4, 174– 75
structural, 32, 49– 50
as tool for inclusion, 98
as tool for self- criticism, 101, 103– 4
intersectional identities, 137– 38
Iran, 94– 95
Islam, 3– 4, 48– 49, 50
and national identity, 120
and race, 51– 52, 86– 87, 89
and racialized feminists, 137– 38
See also Muslim men, Muslim women
Islamic veiling
as a choice, 125, 126, 144– 45
criticism of, by racialized women, 
147– 48, 149– 50
and feminism, 36– 37
and feminists, 80– 81
meanings of, 71– 72, 73– 74, 112– 13
regulation of, 4, 5– 6, 51– 52, 54– 55, 57– 58, 
74– 75, 89, 146– 50
and republican values, 72
in women’s organizations, 36, 109– 10, 
112, 227– 28
See also burqa, burkini, headscarf 
debates, hijab, niqab
Islamophobia
and bans on veiling, 5– 6, 52– 53, 73– 74
racialization of, 89
and secularism, 73– 74, 123– 24
and women’s organizations, 62, 80, 150
Jews, 67, 96, 273n46, 275n67
Kandel, Liliane, 72
Kapur, Ratna, 295n31
Kateb, George, 195– 96
Laborde, Cécile, 123, 260n20
laïcité, 61– 62, 97, 121– 23
See also Charte de la laïcité
language, 158– 59, 168, 171– 72, 176, 179, 
210, 256– 57
Latour, Bruno, 231– 32
Laugier, Sandra, 158, 179, 210, 211– 12
leftists, 66– 67, 73, 78, 93– 94
radical, 91– 92, 97– 98, 115– 16, 158
lesbians, 143, 156, 157– 58, 159, 162
Les Mots Sont Importants, 260– 61n21, 
277n101
Les Yvettes, 174
Levinas, Emmanuel, 261– 62n40, 262n48
LGBT movement, 156– 57, 162, 
223, 266n48
liberal feminism, 6– 10, 11– 12
liberalism, 6– 8, 40– 41, 246– 48
Liberal Party, 57– 58, 59, 65
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, 
78, 154– 55
Lloyd, Moya, 261– 62n40
Lorde, Audre, 131– 32, 270– 71n8
love, 172– 73, 226, 251
L’R des femmes, 163– 64
Lugones, María, 195– 96, 249
Lyshaug, Brenda, 194– 99
Magliani- Belkacem, Stella, 75– 76
Mahmood, Saba, 8– 10, 246– 48,   
294n109
March 8 for all, 114– 15, 116
See also International Women’s Day
Martin, Biddy, 37– 38
Marxism, 154– 55, 158
Masclet, Camille, 272n27
McCall, Leslie, 270n5
melancholy, 114, 115, 118
Michel, Noémi, 175– 76
micro- cohort, 151– 52, 154– 55, 
157– 58, 160
migrant women, 35– 36, 78– 80, 100– 1, 
102, 134
See also racialized women
migrant women’s organizations, 67– 69, 
78– 79, 136– 37
minority cultures 3– 4
minority position, 22, 130– 31, 
171– 72, 177– 80
Index 323
minority women, 268n77, 282n18
modernity, 236– 37, 248
Mohanty, Chandra, 37– 38, 269n96
Molinier, Pascale, 209– 10, 255, 263n65
Montesquieu, 268n81
Moraga, Cherríe, 39
moral bonds, 184– 85
moral demands, 172
moral dispositions, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21– 22
boundaries of, 201– 2
and care, 220– 21
and coalitions, 190, 195– 96
and emotions, 39– 41, 45
and feminists, 42– 43, 106
of Muslim women, 111
and power, 43– 44
of racialized feminists, 130
of whiteness, 85– 86, 119
See also ambivalence, anger, 
benevolent care, fear, indignation, 
love, melancholy, resentment, 
self- righteousness
morality, 15, 36– 37, 210– 13, 216– 17
moral judgment, 114– 15, 116
moral position, 18– 19
moral pragmatism, 152– 53
moral values, 228– 30
mosque movement, the, 8– 9
Mouvement des libération des femmes 
(MLF), 154– 55, 290n70
multiculturalism, 28– 29
Canadian, 53, 54– 55, 60, 134– 35
in Quebec, 97– 99, 105– 6, 282n18
in women’s organizations, 136– 37, 
140, 145
See also interculturalism
Muñoz, José Esteban, 43, 243– 44
Muslim men, 51
Muslim women
agency of, 111
care for, 227– 28
experiences of, 230
and feminist responsibility, 224– 25
as feminist subject, 125, 150
invisibilization of, 90, 91
as subject of public debates, 49– 50
as victims, 126– 27, 170, 197
in women’s organizations, 
103– 4, 147– 48
Narayan, Uma, 7– 8
Nash, Jennifer, 45, 226, 267n66
Nasreen, Taslima, 72
National Front, 74– 75
national identity
debates about, 57
feminism in, 21
feminist whiteness as, 86, 120
as secular, 48– 49, 51– 52, 58, 123– 24
nationalism
challenges to, 30, 167– 69
and instrumentalization of gender 
equality, 4
instrumental use of, 76– 77
resistance to, 17– 18
and women’s rights, 120
See also femonationalism, 
homonationalism, Quebec: 
nationalism
Ni putes ni soumises (NPNS), 72, 
73– 75, 126
niqab, 61– 62, 74– 75, 145– 46, 223– 24
nonwhite women. See racialized women
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 78
Okin, Susan Moller, 28– 29, 259n3
Ontario, 55– 56
Ortega, Mariana, 95
other, the, 15– 16, 22– 23, 28– 29
care for, 220– 21, 224
moral relation to, 96– 97, 210– 11
in the political community, 222– 23
and white feminists, 45
Pagé, Geneviève, 285n60
Paris, Myriam, 283n35
Pelchat, Christiane, 59
Perreau, Bruno, 202, 243– 44, 290n83, 
293– 94n99
plurality, 30– 31, 199– 200, 205
political community, 3– 4, 14– 15, 26, 29– 30, 
58, 243– 44
See also feminist political community
political context, 15, 42
political passions, 39– 40, 131– 32
political subjectivation, 16– 17, 18– 19, 20, 
21, 40, 43
See also feminist political subjectivation
political subjectivity, 7, 42– 43
324 Index
politics of location, 37– 38
populism, right- wing, 53, 81
positionality, 18– 19, 255
postcolonialism
in feminist movements, 36, 49, 70– 71, 
73– 74, 115– 16, 137– 38
in feminist theory, 4, 6– 8, 28– 29, 221
guilt, 73
and race, 169, 170
racialized discursive injuries, 175– 76
representation of the other, 221
and resentment, 173
See also colonialism, feminism: 
postcolonial
postcolonial melancholia, 85
postsecularism, 7, 35– 36
power, 8– 9, 10– 11, 16– 17, 18
erasure of, 100
in feminist practices, 35
hierarchies of, 42– 43
and identity politics, 32– 34
and moral dispositions, 40– 41, 43– 44
structural relations of, 49– 50
in women’s organizations, 113
power asymmetries, 25– 26, 32, 34, 102, 
203– 4, 205– 6
in coalitions, 63– 64, 189– 91
in political community, 201
reflection on, 221
and responsibility, 206, 212– 15, 225
pragmatism, 226
privilege, 83– 85, 86, 94, 112, 214
projects, the, 90, 92, 135– 36
Proletarian Left, 94
promises, 13– 14, 176– 77, 216– 18
Puar, Jasbir, 4
Quebec, 76– 77
feminist coalition, 47– 48, 63– 64
fieldwork in, 87, 253, 254, 256
francophone identity, 67, 167– 69, 
285n60, 286n84
immigrant integration, 53, 60
nationalism, 54– 55, 60, 65, 67– 68, 97– 98, 
136– 37, 167– 68, 169
regulation of Islamic veiling, 55, 56– 58
religion, 52
secularism, 121
women’s movements, 59
Quebecois Party, 57– 58, 60– 61
queer theory, 243– 44, 264n14, 264n20
Quiet Revolution, the, 60, 65, 290n65
race
depoliticization of, 97, 98, 127– 28, 140
and feminists, 85, 103– 4
and immigration, 86– 87, 117– 18
and others, 83– 84
outside the national borders, 
94– 95, 96– 97
politicization of, 64– 65, 69– 70, 94, 
105– 6, 142– 44, 152
and religion, 126– 27, 144– 45
race cognizance, 88– 89, 93, 98, 105– 6
racialization
of religious identity, 49– 50, 51– 52, 58
politics of, 36– 37
process of, 36, 48– 49
racialized feminists, 22, 142, 
150– 51, 157– 58
criticism of mainstream women’s 
organizations, 129– 30, 
138– 40, 240– 41
emotions, 39, 171– 72
and Islamic veiling, 144– 45, 
147– 48, 149– 50
political subjectivation, 152, 154– 60
social movements, 133– 34
relation with white feminists, 130– 31, 
160, 172, 189– 90
visibility, 160, 161– 62
See also self- organizing
racialized women, 49– 50
exclusion of, 79
as feminist subjects, 108, 115, 
117– 18, 119
and integration, 98
as object of feminist care, 106, 108, 119
and secularism, 126
self- organizing, 47– 48, 63– 64, 92, 97– 98, 
100– 1, 104– 5
social distance, 90, 91– 92, 93, 113
terminology, 105– 6, 143
in mainstream women’s organizations, 
100– 1, 102– 3, 113– 14
See also indigenous women, 
migrant women, Muslim women, 
self- organizing
Index 325
racialized women’s organizations, 63, 
81, 254
See also migrant women’s 
organizations
racism
evasion of, 116
in the feminist movement, 39, 62, 255
in headscarf debates, 73
institutional, 90– 91
and Islam, 52– 53
in Quebec, 61
virtuous, 51
See also antiracism
Rancière, Jacques, 245
Reader, Soran, 216– 17, 293n85
Reagon, Bernice Johnson, 186
reasonable accommodation, 55, 58, 145
Reger, Jo, 18
relationality, 192– 93, 210– 12, 233
affective dimension, 244
denial of, 213– 15, 240
and moral values, 228– 30
relationships, 35, 36– 37, 39– 40
See also feminist relationships
religion
and agency, 8– 9, 52
discrimination, 55
as inherently oppressive to women, 92, 
96– 97, 122– 23, 125, 126, 151– 52
and race, 50, 52– 53, 144– 45
religious accommodation, 49– 50, 
56– 57, 60, 62
See also reasonable accommodation
religious arbitration, 55– 56
religious discrimination, 71
representation, 215– 16
representation, descriptive, 68– 70, 188
republicanism, 72, 73, 260n20
republican universalism, 93, 97, 121– 22, 
135– 36, 150– 51
resentment, 131– 32, 172– 74, 176, 
179– 80, 240– 41
responsibility, 12, 14– 15, 212– 16, 
224– 25, 226– 27
See also feminist ethic of responsibility
Ricci, Amanda, 67
Riley, Denise, 181
Roth, Benita, 33, 66– 67, 91– 92, 133– 34
Rowe, Aimee Carrillo, 268n68
Sadou, Zazi, 72
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 71, 74– 75
Scott, Joan, 38– 39, 47– 48
second- wave feminism, 66– 67, 117– 18
autonomist trend, 72
class- struggle trend, 72, 75, 77– 78, 
93– 94, 114– 15
and race, 93– 94
and secularism, 122
US, 39, 88, 130– 31, 270– 71n8
See also Black feminism
secularism, 51
as ally of women’s rights, 47– 48, 59, 
72, 150
and feminist whiteness, 120– 28
instrumental use of, 76– 77
and national identity, 48– 49, 51– 53, 58
and Quebec, 60
and republicanism, 72, 123
self- organizing
to challenge feminist whiteness, 165– 66
and coalitions, 187
and cultural difference, 139– 40
history of, 133– 37, 159– 60
to self- represent, 160
on shared experience, 140– 41
self- representation, 160– 62
self- righteousness, 116, 119
sexual freedom, 51
sexularism debates, 47– 48, 53– 54, 57, 59, 
76– 77, 121– 22, 124, 237– 38
Sikhs, 273n46, 275n67
Simonin, Anne, 268n82
Sisters Unite, 94– 95
Smith, Barbara Ellen, 267– 68n67, 294n100
social location, 86, 151– 52, 155– 56
social movements, 40, 133
solidarity, 11, 37– 38, 156, 181, 249– 50
South- Asian Women’s Center of Montreal 
(SAWC), 59, 61– 62
Springer, Kimberly, 133– 34, 144
Stasi, Bernard, 71
Stewart, Maria, 27– 28
Stoler, Ann Laura, 266n52, 279n123
subject, 13– 14, 43
See also feminist subject
subjectivation, 8– 9, 14– 15, 39– 40, 42
See also feminist political subjectivation, 
political subjectivation
326 Index
subjectivity, 32, 199– 200, 219
See also political subjectivity
Tamzali, Wassyla, 72
Taylor, Charles, 56– 57
third- wave feminism, 88
Third World women, 28– 29
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 268n81
Trat, Josette, 279n137, 280n149
triple jeopardy, 33, 49
Tronto, Joan, 15– 16, 19, 42– 43, 210– 11, 
212– 15, 218– 19, 223– 24
Truth, Sojourner, 27– 28
Tunisia, 280n149
umbrella organizations, 47– 48, 62, 71, 72
Une école pour tou- te- s, contre les lois 
d’exclusion, 73– 74
universalism, 33
French, 89– 93
of gender oppression, 104– 5, 140– 41, 
197– 98, 208– 9
and secularism, 76– 77, 123
as strategic, 91– 92
as violence, 178– 79
of whiteness, 84, 164– 65
See also republican universalism
values, 22– 23, 30– 31, 56– 57, 
121– 22, 123– 24
See also feminist values
veiled women. See Muslim women
veiling. See Islamic veiling
Vergès, Françoise, 96– 97, 122, 137, 150– 
51, 266n52, 280n149, 283n35
Vigerie, Anne, 72
violence against women, 140– 41
violence, ethical. See ethical violence
voice, 158, 161, 179, 199, 200– 1, 
210, 211– 12
vulnerability, 242– 43
We Care about One Another, 223
Weir, Allison, 7, 246– 48, 249– 50
Wekker, Gloria, 106
Weldon, Laurel, 187, 275n78
Western culture, 3– 4, 51, 53
Western gaze, 28– 29
white feminists
and care, 95
and international solidarity, 89, 94– 95
as knowledgeable, 99– 100, 117– 18, 125
moral identity, 15, 40– 41, 110
and nationalism, 67
and others, 45, 84, 85
political subjectivation of, 
84– 85, 115– 16
and power, 173, 175– 76
race cognizance, 88– 89, 98
resistance to antiracism, 61– 62
and universalism, 66– 67, 89, 91– 92
as victims, 168– 69, 276n87
whiteness, 21, 83– 84, 86– 87
and autonomy, 261n38
desire for diversity, 88, 92
and emotions, 106
and ignorance, 83– 85, 208
as invisible, 83– 84
as universal, 33
See also feminist whiteness
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 28, 210, 211– 12
Women Mediators, 141
women of color, 143
See also migrant women, Muslim 
women, racialized women
Women’s Health, 108– 9
women’s movements, 32, 33– 34, 
130, 133– 34
See also second- wave feminism, third- 
wave feminism
women’s organizations
advocacy- oriented, 142, 166
funding of, 134– 36, 142, 190
and immigrant integration, 101
inclusion of men, 163– 64
Muslim, 55– 56
power relations, 63– 64
representing racialized women, 36
service- oriented, 97– 98, 99– 100, 
108– 9, 138– 40
See also migrant women’s organizations, 
racialized women’s organizations
women’s rights, 57
See also gender equality
Women’s Rights Collective, 90– 91, 93– 94
women’s rights organizations
Index 327
inclusion of racialized women, 99
language in, 167– 68
and nationalism, 4
and national values, 56– 57, 121– 22
and sexularism debates, 47– 48
world- building, 29– 30, 106– 7, 
198– 99, 251
World March of Women, 61– 62, 65– 66, 
68– 69, 166, 275n78, 281n152
Young, Iris, 16– 17, 203– 7, 212– 14, 230– 31, 
249– 50, 293– 94n99
Yuval- Davis, Nira, 261n38
Zélensky, Anne, 72
Zerilli, Linda
on difference, 30– 31
enlarged mentality, 198– 202, 203
feminism as a political project, 
106– 8, 182– 83
feminist subject, 27
freedom, 34– 35, 241– 42
judgment, 230– 31
political community, 29– 30, 206, 
211– 12, 218
promises, 192
resentment, 172– 73

